Addis Ababa, October 23, 2026 (ENA) — Egypt and Türkiye have renewed their dispute over maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean following a decision by Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives to endorse a 2019 maritime agreement between Ankara and the authorities in Tripoli. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry declared the move “null and void,” arguing that the ratification infringes on Egypt’s sovereign rights and has no legal effect. Türkiye, meanwhile, maintains that the arrangement is consistent with its interpretation of international maritime law. The dispute centers on a memorandum signed in November 2019 by Türkiye and Libya’s then internationally recognized Government of National Accord to define maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean. Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus opposed the agreement, arguing that it conflicts with their maritime claims. The latest diplomatic clash reflects broader geopolitical rivalries involving Egypt and other regional actors over maritime jurisdiction, natural resources, security, and political influence. Egypt has faced criticism over its regional policies, with analysts questioning whether its pursuit of strategic interests could contribute to instability and intensify competition over regional resources. For instance, reports recently showed that Egyptian strikes massacred at least 200 Sudanese miners and wounded many others at mining sites in Sudan’s North Al-Wadi area. The reported attacks have raised concerns over civilian safety and Egypt’s involvement in Sudan’s ongoing conflict. Some observers view the reported attacks as part of Egypt’s broader involvement in Sudan, where competing domestic and external interests have complicated efforts to end the war. In a recent interview with ENA, Abdulshakur Abdulsamad, Senior Researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies and Regional Integration Initiative, argued that Egypt seeks to prolong the war in Sudan to continue benefiting from the country’s water resources. The ongoing conflict could allow Egypt to benefit from larger-than-usual quantities of water that Sudan has been unable to utilize, the senior researcher noted. Egypt’s relations with Ethiopia have also been strained by disagreements over Nile water utilization. Cairo has opposed aspects of Ethiopia’s development plans, particularly the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), while Ethiopia maintains its right to use its natural resources for development, including electricity generation. The dispute highlights longstanding differences between upstream and downstream countries over equitable water utilization and regional cooperation. Egypt’s role in Sudan’s ongoing conflict has also drawn scrutiny from political analysts, who question whether Cairo’s support for the Sudanese Armed Forces could affect prospects for peace and strengthen its influence over Sudan’s political future. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which began on April 15, 2023, has devastated Sudan’s economy and infrastructure, displaced millions of people, and disrupted regional trade. Food and Agriculture Organization estimates indicate that Sudan’s grain production in 2025 declined by 22 percent compared with the previous year. Some analysts argue that Egypt is pursuing strategic interests in Sudan in ways that could prolong the conflict. Israel, meanwhile, criticized the maritime deal, accusing its regional rival Türkiye of destabilizing the Eastern Mediterranean. The dispute has renewed attention to the region’s overlapping maritime claims and potential energy resources. Cairo is particularly concerned that the agreement could affect hydrocarbon exploration rights and undermine its regional partnerships. Türkiye insists that the pact remains valid, setting the stage for a sharper diplomatic confrontation over maritime boundaries. According to reports, Egypt supports Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in eastern Libya primarily to secure its approximately 1,100-kilometer desert border, combat Islamist militant groups, and counter the influence of regional rivals such as Türkiye. The eastern Libyan parliament’s decision to ratify the agreement previously signed between Türkiye and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord signals a potential shift that directly challenges Cairo’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean. The parliament, aligned with eastern Libya and based in Tobruk, reversed years of opposition to the Türkiye-Libya maritime deal following the election of a new speaker, Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi. By aligning eastern authorities with an agreement originally signed by western Libya’s Tripoli-based authorities, the decision could indicate a shift toward a more unified Libyan position on the pact. The European Union opposed the ratification, backing Greece’s position and maintaining that the agreement infringes on the maritime rights of an EU member state.

By Tison Tesfay   October 22, 2026 (ENA) Not every war that devastates a country necessarily runs counter to the interests of its neighbors. For some regional powers, prolonged instability presents an ideal opportunity to expand influence, reshape political calculations, and postpone the reckoning with a neighbor that should be regarded as an equal. In the case of relations between Egypt and Sudan, the question is no longer whether Egypt is involved in the Sudanese war, but rather the extent of its involvement and the deeper strategic objectives Cairo seeks to achieve by fueling the conflict through support for a particular military faction. In this context, political analyst Mohamed Al-Arrousi argues that Egypt’s continued intervention in Sudan threatens the country’s sovereignty and endangers stability throughout the Horn of Africa. A careful reading of developments on the ground and in the political arena confirms that Egypt’s approach in Sudan is aimed less at ending the war than at ensuring its continuation and securing a compliant, pro-Egyptian regime, even if this comes at the cost of prolonging the suffering of the Sudanese people and exhausting the country’s national capabilities. Water Strategy, Resource Plunder, and Fears over the GERD The figures reveal the scale of the systematic destruction inflicted on Sudan’s economic infrastructure since the conflict erupted on April 15, 2023. Estimates by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) indicate that grain production in 2025 declined by 22 percent compared with the previous year and stood approximately 19 percent below the average of the preceding five years. The World Bank also reported that Sudan’s gross domestic product contracted by 29.4 percent in 2023, followed by a further contraction of 14 percent in 2024. This economic and political paralysis serves vital and direct Egyptian strategic interests. If Sudan achieves stability and recovers, it will be able to make independent decisions regarding the management of Nile projects, foremost among them the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is essential for Sudan in mitigating devastating floods and benefiting from the vital electricity supplies it receives from the dam to develop eastern Sudan. Moreover, a stable Sudan in control of its own affairs would work to regulate its water allocations. This means that the huge volumes of water that have been wasted as they flow from Sudan into Egypt would cease, a prospect that Egyptian strategic calculations fear and regard as a threat to the country’s customary water security. That is precisely why Egyptian politicians work day and night to keep Sudan mired in instability, while seeking to preserve a regional order in which Sudan remains dependent and unable to fully control its own resources. Egypt’s gains from Sudan’s weakening extend far beyond the Nile water issue. Sudan’s instability also raises concerns over the illicit extraction and smuggling of its wealth, with reports of cross-border trafficking involving natural resources, livestock, and raw materials threatening Sudan’s economic sovereignty. Cario’s politicians exploit the state of chaos and the absence of border controls to support its economy and meet its needs at the expense of the resources of the exhausted Sudanese people. As senior researcher Abdushakur Abdelsamad emphasizes, Egypt’s approach views the exhaustion of Sudan as a guarantee that it will be unable to demand its fair share of water or exploit its vast lands and resources. This ensures the uninterrupted flow of water and wealth northward while keeping Sudan shackled by dependency and subordination. The Border Dispute and the Imposition of a De Facto Reality in Halaib Egypt’s exploitation of Sudan’s weakness is most clearly demonstrated in the issue of the occupied Halaib, Shalateen, and Abu Ramad area. While Sudan has historically insisted on its sovereignty over this strategically important coastal region, Egypt has exploited successive political and military crises in Khartoum to consolidate its military and administrative control and impose a fait accompli. The continuation of the war and the fragmentation of Sudanese institutions provide Egypt with an ideal cover to close this issue politically and diplomatically. Sudan’s leadership has become completely incapable of raising the issue of sovereignty over Halaib or even making a verbal claim to it. This reflects a clear equation of political subordination: tacit acceptance of territorial control in exchange for weapons and diplomatic support. Military Support and Direct Bias Toward One Faction Despite Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s official statements about “protecting Sudanese state institutions”—most recently during his meeting with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan on October 4, 2026—the actual conduct of the Egyptian military goes beyond supporting the concept of the “state” and extends to direct involvement in backing one military party at the expense of the Sudanese people. Egyptian intervention is no longer confined to diplomatic support. A documented Reuters report dated February 2, 2026, revealed satellite imagery and intelligence assessments confirming the deployment of combat drones at Egyptian bases near the Sudanese border for use in supporting Sudanese army operations. This direct technological and military intervention transforms Egypt from a party supposedly sponsoring peace into a direct partner in managing battles on the ground, adding fuel to the fire and prolonging the confrontations. Violation of Sudanese Sovereignty Egyptian military involvement has reached unprecedented levels through an explicit violation of Sudanese sovereignty. Egypt has reportedly massacred at least 200 Sudanese miners and wounded many others in targeting mining sites in Sudan’s North Al-Wadi area. Many observers say the recent civilian attacks are part of Egypt’s direct and indirect involvement in Sudan’s ongoing conflict, aimed at maximizing its own interests. In a recent interview with Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), Abdulshakur Abdulsamad, Senior Researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies and Regional Integration Initiative, underscored that Egypt seeks to prolong the war in Sudan to continue benefiting from the country’s water resources. In that regard, these airstrikes were not merely a violation of international borders and international law, which prohibits the use of force against the territory of other states; they also resulted in civilian casualties among Sudanese miners and other civilians. The widespread protests the bombing sparked in Sudanese cities reflect public anger and condemnation of the suspicious silence of Sudanese authorities, which have been accused of complicity and of abandoning their duty to protect citizens in exchange for Egyptian military assistance. The conduct of military operations inside Sudanese territory confirms that Cairo has come to treat Sudanese airspace and geography as an open security hinterland for its operations, with no regard for the principles of sovereignty or international law. The Regional Hegemonic Agenda and Sudan’s Future Egypt understands that an independent Sudan governed democratically and supported by strong civilian institutions would make decisions based exclusively on Sudanese national interests. These interests could necessarily conflict with Egyptian calculations on water, borders, and regional alliances. According to political commentators, Egypt’s current strategy is aimed at shaping a Sudan that remains weak, fragmented, and dependent on Cairo, unable to fully assert control over its resources or pursue an independent regional agenda. Egypt’s insistence on imposing military solutions and supporting one military faction obstructs any path toward a comprehensive political settlement that includes civilian forces and ensures the restoration of constitutional governance. The objective is not to build peace, but to tighten control over political and military decision-making in Khartoum, allowing Egypt thereafter to exert pressure on the region and obstruct regional development projects that do not serve its immediate interests. Sovereignty Is Not Granted; It Is Reclaimed Sudan’s future and the protection of its sovereignty cannot be secured through dependence on foreign powers that build their interests at the expense of the Sudanese people’s suffering. The true test of the credibility of Egypt’s slogan of “respecting Sudan’s sovereignty” requires an immediate halt to direct military interventions, respect for Sudanese territory and airspace, and an end to arming one particular faction at the expense of a comprehensive political solution. Ultimately, the Sudanese people and their national institutions face an unmistakable reality. A strong and independent Sudan cannot be built as long as its resources and destiny are entrusted to the wishes of regional allies who regard Sudan’s weakness as a source of stability for themselves, and the destruction of its foundations and plunder of its wealth as guarantees of their own influence.