With analysis from Pulse of Africa (POA) By Mahder Nesibu Sept. 15, 2026 The Red Sea, a narrow waterway connecting the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, has in recent years come under heavy insecurity. The prevalence of armed groups around the waterway, compounded by threats such as piracy, has undermined its reliability, despite it handling around 13 percent of global shipping. This threat has now come under the spotlight. When war broke out between Iran on one side and Israel and the United States on the other, a similar waterway, the Persian Gulf, and the chokepoint connecting it to the Indian Ocean, came to be weaponised, with Tehran effectively choking a passage that handles 25 percent of the world's oil and gas output. The same weaponisation became visible at Bab-el-Mandeb, the chokepoint of the Red Sea, when Yemen's Houthis, who control the country's north bordering the chokepoint, declared a blockade against Israel in March 2025, partly motivated by their alignment with Iran. The rebels have since extended that blockade to Saudi Arabia, with whom they have been at war for over a decade, a conflict paused by a truce in 2022. Just last week, A blitzkrieg offensive by Houthi forces over the past week has shattered the regional status quo, placing the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait firmly under their control. Sweeping down Yemen’s western coast with relentless momentum, the forces have completely overrun Saudi-backed government positions, meeting virtually zero resistance along the way. Saudi is said to have launched counter offensives with sorties targeting Houthis’ positions. The situation remains fluid. Saudi ships, like Israeli ones, have become targets for the Houthis, compounding the insecurity the waterway has been witnessing. On top of that, piracy, primarily emanating from the Somali coast, continues to pose a threat. Although thought to have decreased in frequency, piracy on Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea appears to be resurging. The New York Times reported in late August that the pattern points to a possible resurgence, with 2026 alone seeing 17 piracy-related incidents documented. Although Israeli and Saudi shipping, alongside international cargo, are coming under direct attack, the effects of this insecurity are more structural. According to Reuters, shipping across the Red Sea has declined by as much as 60 percent since 2023, when the Houthi weaponisation of the chokepoint began, and has not effectively recovered since. These figures translate into greater costs for shipping and slower traffic, as ships are diverted through the Cape of Good Hope route along southern Africa, adding extra days at sea and additional fuel costs. For countries served through the Red Sea itself, this has meant greater volatility in their trade. Beyond the added costs of moving ships through the sea, it means living with the risk of disruption, particularly for essentials such as oil and gas. This has been the case for countries in the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, whose supply lines have been subject to disruption. Moves to secure the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb have largely been futile, falling short of a comprehensive and cohesive plan to meet the challenge, as geopolitical competition within the Middle East and the Horn of Africa has undermined such efforts. One country that has been making efforts to secure the Red Sea is Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa state, the largest in the region by both population and economy, has been trying to establish a security presence on the waterway to help address the prevailing insecurity. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti, the country on the African side of Bab-el-Mandeb, for more than 85 percent of its maritime affairs, and its imposed landlocked status has limited its ability to contribute to addressing a security dilemma that carries consequences for its own economy and stability, as well as those of its neighbours. This, alongside historical realities and demographic concerns, has formed the foundation of the country's case for a return to the Red Sea. Access to the sea has been treated as a primary issue of national interest by the majority Ethiopians for long —an issue that received greater prominence particularly since 2018, when the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power. Alongside launching a diplomatic push, Ethiopia also revived its navy that same year, effectively declaring its strong interest in reestablishing a security presence on the Red Sea. The Ethiopian Navy was a major actor in Red Sea affairs for decades. Established in 1955, it is older than most naval security institutions in the region, including Saudi Arabia's, which was launched in 1960. It had been a pillar of Red Sea security for decades and was only disbanded in 1996, following Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia in 1991. Now revived, it offers to contribute to maritime security and help address the growing dilemma facing the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Speaking at the 4th Annual Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Dialogue this April, Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian Navy Kindu Gezu stated that Ethiopia's bid was also "for the common benefit of the region", adding that "inclusivity strengthens legitimacy and fosters shared interests in security and connectivity". For the region, and for those affected by insecurity in the Red Sea, it is worth considering what an increased Ethiopian role could contribute. For Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and also to superpowers with footholds on the region, the case for backing Ethiopia's return to the sea is a reasonable one on maritime security grounds. Writing for the Middle Eastern outlet MEMRI, Morocco expert Anna Mahjar-Barducci made the case for Ethiopia's access to the sea on similar security grounds, arguing that the United States, a global power that considers Red Sea security a strategic priority, should back Ethiopia, as the country could play a critical role in securing the waterway. The Middle East and the Horn of Africa face the same strategic considerations. Strategic competition aside, states in the region now have to treat maritime security as a matter of permanent concern. Ultimately, the solution rests on inclusive mechanisms that pool together available resources, including those Ethiopia can offer. Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea could strengthen regional security.

Abay/Nile Waters at the Intersection of Ethiopia- Egypt Relations   Sept. 15, 2026 (ENA) By Ambassador Teshome Toga Chanaka (PHD) Background The Nile is one of the world’s great transboundary river systems, shared by eleven riparian countries. Egypt and Sudan are the principal downstream states with virtually no contribution to the flow of the Nile. The Nile’s waters originate in the upstream countries, Ethiopia being the source of the Blue Nile. The Blue Nile, originating in the Ethiopian highlands, contributes 86% share of the Nile’s annual flow. For centuries, the utilization of Nile waters has been a source of tension between upstream and downstream countries. Historical circumstances, colonial legacies and competing interpretations of rights over the river have contributed to a pattern of mistrust that has often prevented the emergence of a genuinely cooperative basin-wide framework. Egypt, in particular, has developed and maintained an entrenched position concerning the allocation and utilization of the Nile waters. Its continued emphasis on what it describes as “historical rights” and on agreements concluded during periods when most upstream countries were not parties to the negotiations has made it difficult to establish a framework based on contemporary principles of international water law, particularly equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation to cooperate. The 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan is a particularly important example. The agreement allocated the entire estimated Nile flow between the two downstream countries without the participation of the other riparian states, including Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile. It is difficult to envisage how such an arrangement could provide a sustainable basis for managing a shared trans boundary resource in the twenty-first century. The fundamental issue, therefore, is not whether Egypt has legitimate interests in the Nile. It unquestionably does. The question is whether those interests can legitimately be pursued at the expense of the equally legitimate interests of the other riparian states. Why Egypt Needs a New Nile Strategy for the 21st Century? Egypt’s heavy dependence on the Nile is a reality that Ethiopia fully understands. But dependence does not confer a monopoly over a shared international watercourse. The challenge is to reconcile Egypt’s legitimate water-security concerns with the development aspirations and rights of the upstream countries. The twenty-first century has transformed the political, economic and technological circumstances of the Nile Basin. Population growth, climate change, food insecurity, energy demands, economic development and changing patterns of regional cooperation have fundamentally altered the context in which Nile waters must be managed. It is therefore neither realistic nor sustainable to approach the Nile exclusively through the prism of historical allocations. The river must increasingly be viewed as a shared resource whose sustainable management requires cooperation, dialogue, scientific evidence and equitable utilization. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) represents perhaps the clearest manifestation of this changing reality. The GERD has demonstrated Ethiopia’s growing capacity to mobilize domestic resources and undertake major infrastructure projects in pursuit of its national development objectives. Whatever one’s position on the dam, it has fundamentally changed the political and strategic context of the Nile question.   Consequently, statements that Ethiopia should not be permitted to construct another dam on the Blue Nile cannot provide a serious basis for future policy. Ethiopia’s development needs cannot be indefinitely subordinated to another country’s perception of its own water security. Nor is it realistic to assume that Ethiopia’s development projects on the Nile can be prevented indefinitely through efforts to restrict international financing. The experience of the GERD demonstrated Ethiopia’s ability to mobilize domestic resources when external financing was unavailable. This is an important lesson for all concerned: the future of the Nile cannot be determined through vetoes, pressure or attempts to prevent development. It must be shaped through cooperation. The same applies to the broader political relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt. Attempts to address differences over the Nile through political pressure, geopolitical rivalry or support for destabilizing forces cannot provide a sustainable solution. Such approaches risk deepening mistrust and making an eventual settlement more difficult. Military confrontation is equally untenable. No military strategy can produce sustainable water security. The Nile will continue to flow across borders long after political crises have passed. The only durable answer is therefore a political and diplomatic framework that recognizes the legitimate interests of all riparian countries. Other major transboundary river systems demonstrate that shared rivers need not inevitably become sources of military confrontation. China, for example, shares numerous transboundary rivers with neighboring countries and has developed a variety of mechanisms for managing shared water interests. The experiences of other river basins demonstrate that differences can be managed through dialogue, cooperation and negotiated arrangements. The Comprehensive Framework Agreement and the Changing Regional Context The effort by the Nile Basin riparian states to establish a basin-wide legal framework has been underway for many years. The negotiation of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) was intended to provide a more inclusive and equitable basis for cooperation among the Nile Basin countries. The CFA’s evolution reflects an important reality: upstream countries increasingly expect their interests and development needs to be recognized within the governance of the Nile Basin. The issue is therefore larger than the GERD or the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia. It concerns the fundamental question of how an international river basin should be governed in an era of population growth, climate change, energy transition and rapid economic transformation.   A sustainable Nile framework cannot be built around arrangements negotiated without the participation of all concerned states. Nor can the interests of downstream countries simply be ignored. The answer lies in developing an inclusive framework that accommodates the legitimate concerns of downstream states while recognizing the development rights of upstream countries. Ethiopia’s Cooperative Approach Should Not Be Mistaken for Weakness Since the political transition of 1991, Ethiopia has repeatedly expressed its preference for dialogue and cooperation in addressing the Nile question. The 1993 memorandum of understanding reached during the visit of Ethiopia’s Transitional Government leadership to Cairo and the subsequent 2015 Declaration of Principles on the GERD involving Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan were important demonstrations of Ethiopia’s willingness to engage diplomatically and seek mutually beneficial solutions. The Declaration of Principles was particularly significant because it established a set of principles intended to guide the three countries in addressing issues related to the GERD, including cooperation, equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These initiatives demonstrate that Ethiopia does not seek confrontation with Egypt. Indeed, Ethiopia has repeatedly made clear that it has no intention in harming the Egyptian people. This was amply stated by PM Abiy Ahmed during his offical visit to Cairo. Ethiopians and Egyptians share deep historical, cultural and human bonds. If the two countries estblish cooperation and working together, the benefits will transcend the borders of the two countries. The outcome will have broader regional impact. The Nile should be a bridge connecting the peoples of the two countries rather than a permanent source of antagonism between them. But cooperation is necessarily reciprocal. Ethiopia’s willingness to negotiate should not be interpreted as an acceptance of arrangements that deny its legitimate development interests. Nor should restraint be mistaken for weakness. Ethiopia has legitimate interests in using its natural resources to reduce poverty, expand access to electricity, develop agriculture and transform its economy. At the same time, Ethiopia has an interest in ensuring that its utilization of the Nile is undertaken responsibly and without significant harm to downstream populations. This is precisely why a cooperative framework is possible. The Way Forward: From Confrontation to Cooperation The Nile question has reached a point where old assumptions need to be reconsidered. Egypt’s water-security concerns are legitimate. Ethiopia’s development aspirations are equally legitimate. Sudan also has legitimate interests that must be taken into account. The challenge is to create a framework in which these interests are not viewed as mutually exclusive. The choice before Egypt and Ethiopia should therefore not be framed as a choice between Egyptian water security and Ethiopian development. The real choice is between competition and cooperation; confrontation and dialogue; unilateralism and shared governance. There is considerable room for cooperation. The two countries could strengthen scientific and technical cooperation on hydrology, climate change, drought and flood management, sedimentation, agricultural productivity, electricity trade and water-use efficiency. Ethiopia’s potential for hydropower development and Egypt’s expertise in water management could, for example, become complementary rather than competing assets. A broader economic relationship could also transform the politics of the Nile. Energy trade, investment, infrastructure connectivity, agriculture and regional economic integration could create incentives for both countries to regard the river as an opportunity for mutual benefit rather than a zero-sum contest. The way forward is therefore not through threats, pressure or attempts to prevent Ethiopia from developing its water resources. Nor is it through unilateral actions that disregard the legitimate concerns of downstream countries. The answer is a return to the negotiating table with a different mindset. Egypt needs to recognize that the Nile Basin of the twenty-first century is fundamentally different from the Nile Basin of the nineteenth or twentieth century. Ethiopia, for its part, should continue to demonstrate that its development of the Nile can coexist with the legitimate water-security interests of downstream countries. The central principle should be simple: no country should seek to monopolize a shared river, and no country should be denied its legitimate right to development. The Nile can become either a permanent fault line between Egypt and Ethiopia or an unprecedented opportunity for cooperation between two ancient civilizations. The choice is ultimately political.   What is required now is not another round of confrontation, but a new political understanding—one founded on sovereign equality, equitable and reasonable utilization, mutual respect, scientific cooperation and shared prosperity. The Nile does not belong to one country. It is a shared resource, and its future must be built on shared responsibility. …………………… * The author is former Ethiopian Ambassador to Egypt. The views only represent that of the author alone. Ambassador Teshome Toga Chanaka is a senior Ethiopian politician and veteran diplomat. He served as Speaker of the House of Peoples' Representatives, Minister of Youth, Sports, and Culture, and Commissioner of the National Rehabilitation Commission. In his diplomatic career, he served as Ambassador to the European Union, China, Kenya, and Ghana.

By Staff Writer Sept. 14, 2026 (ENA) The week of September 6 to 12, 2026, was marked by continuing conflicts, rising energy risks, diplomatic realignments and mounting climate and humanitarian pressures. The Middle East remained the most immediate source of concern for global security and energy markets, as tensions around strategic waterways threatened to disrupt oil supplies and international trade. The war in Ukraine also continued despite renewed diplomatic contacts, while the BRICS summit in New Delhi highlighted the growing influence of the Global South and provided a platform for a cautious rapprochement between India and China. Climate and health concerns added to the pressure. The World Meteorological Organization reported that August 2026 was the hottest August on record and warned that a strong El Niño could intensify extreme weather into 2027. Humanitarian crises remained acute in Gaza and Sudan, while a new Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo raised concerns about regional disease transmission. At the same time, artificial intelligence continued to move beyond the technology sector and into discussions about national security, economic development, military applications and global governance. Taken together, the week's developments underscored how closely security, energy, trade, climate, technology and humanitarian affairs have become intertwined. Peace and Security Middle East: The strategic waterways become a growing security risk as the Middle East remained the world's most immediate security and energy risk during the week, with the conflict involving Iran, the United States and regional actors continuing to threaten strategic transport routes. In Yemen, Iran aligned Houthi forces advanced toward the Bab el Mandeb Strait and reached Perim Island, a strategically important position at the entrance to the Red Sea. Any prolonged disruption of the waterway could compound the impact of restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz, another critical route for global energy shipments. Reuters reported that a closure of Bab el Mandeb could affect up to 7 percent of global oil supplies and about 12 percent of global trade. Saudi Arabia has sought greater US assistance against the Houthis, while Washington has so far favored intelligence and other forms of support rather than direct military involvement. The risks increased after Saudi Arabia temporarily shut its East West oil pipeline following a drone attack believed to have originated from Iraq. The pipeline can carry between 4 million and 5 million barrels of oil a day and provides an alternative route for Saudi exports when the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted. The simultaneous vulnerability of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and alternative oil infrastructure has intensified fears of a wider energy and shipping shock. Prolonged disruption could raise oil and transport costs, increase inflationary pressure and weigh on global economic growth. Gaza: Gaza remained caught between diplomatic efforts and continuing violence. Despite the ceasefire framework established in 2025, the humanitarian situation remained severe, with damaged infrastructure, restricted humanitarian access and deteriorating water systems leaving civilians increasingly vulnerable to hunger and disease. UN agencies continued to warn that food insecurity remained widespread. Damage to water and health infrastructure has also increased the risk of communicable diseases. The crisis illustrates the close relationship between Gaza's humanitarian emergency and the unresolved political and security questions surrounding the territory. Without sustained security arrangements, reconstruction and reliable humanitarian access, the humanitarian situation is likely to remain fragile. Ukraine: The Russia Ukraine war remained active despite renewed diplomatic efforts. US envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff travelled to Kyiv following discussions in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The meetings sought to revive negotiations and explore prospects for further diplomacy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the discussions as substantive. Diplomatic activity, however, did not translate into an immediate reduction in hostilities. Russian missile and drone attacks continued to strike Ukrainian cities, while Ukraine maintained attacks against targets inside Russia. The principal obstacles remain unresolved, including territorial control, security guarantees for Ukraine and the future structure of European security. The continuing gap between diplomatic contacts and developments on the battlefield demonstrates the difficulty of converting negotiations into a durable settlement. Europe: European governments are increasingly focused on hybrid threats linked to the Ukraine war, including drones, cyberattacks and possible sabotage of critical infrastructure. Germany is preparing stronger measures following a drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport that German authorities attributed to Russian actors. The episode has reinforced wider European concerns about the vulnerability of airports, energy facilities, telecommunications networks and other critical infrastructure. The shift reflects a broader understanding of modern conflict, in which pressure can be exerted through cyber operations, disruption of infrastructure and covert activities without crossing the threshold of conventional warfare. Economy, Trade and Energy Oil: Energy Markets Face Multiple Supply Risks Energy markets were among the week's most closely watched economic developments, with oil prices moving above $100 a barrel amid concerns over disruptions to supplies and shipping. The simultaneous risks surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and Saudi Arabia's alternative oil infrastructure have raised fears of a broader supply shock. A prolonged disruption could increase transportation and production costs worldwide and complicate central banks' efforts to contain inflation. The episode also demonstrates the strategic importance of alternative energy routes. Infrastructure designed to bypass vulnerable maritime chokepoints can become critical during periods of geopolitical tension, but its effectiveness depends on its own security and operational continuity. Global Growth Remains Fragile The global economy continues to face a difficult combination of geopolitical uncertainty, elevated public debt, trade disputes and changing monetary conditions. The World Bank projects global economic growth of about 2.5 percent in 2026. While growth remains positive, the outlook is constrained by persistent geopolitical tensions and uncertainty over trade and monetary policy. The United States is also facing significant fiscal pressure. Its federal budget deficit reached about $1.97 trillion on a fiscal year to date basis, exceeding the deficit recorded during the whole of fiscal year 2025. Because the United States remains central to global financial markets, developments in its fiscal and monetary policies influence borrowing costs, exchange rates and capital flows far beyond its borders. Trade: Geopolitics Reshapes Global Supply Chains Trade is increasingly being shaped by strategic considerations rather than market forces alone. Governments and companies are restructuring supply chains to improve resilience, protect strategic industries and secure access to critical minerals. Trade tensions between the United States and Canada continued during the week, while businesses increasingly explored alternative suppliers and production locations. This restructuring could create opportunities for resource rich developing countries, particularly in Africa. Rising demand for lithium, cobalt, copper, graphite and rare earth elements could support domestic processing and industrialization if African countries succeed in moving beyond the export of unprocessed commodities. The opportunity, however, depends on investment in infrastructure, energy, skills, technology and effective industrial policies. Diplomacy and Global Governance BRICS Strengthens Its Global South Platform The 2026 BRICS summit in New Delhi emerged as one of the week's most important diplomatic events, reinforcing the group's growing role in debates over global security, trade and international governance. Leaders expressed concern over conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine and criticised unilateral sanctions imposed outside the UN Security Council framework. They also called for greater protection of civilian infrastructure and nuclear facilities during armed conflicts. Chinese President Xi Jinping urged BRICS to play a greater role in efforts to promote peace in the Middle East. With its expanded membership, BRICS represents a substantial share of the world's population and economic output. Its growing influence reflects a broader effort by emerging powers to gain greater weight in institutions and decisions traditionally dominated by Western powers. The summit nevertheless exposed the limits of the grouping. BRICS members have different political systems, economic interests and strategic priorities. Its expansion therefore strengthens its geopolitical weight while also making consensus more difficult. India and China Pursue a Cautious Rapprochement Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit, signalling an effort to stabilise relations after years of tension. Xi's visit was his first to India in seven years. The two leaders discussed border stability, trade, investment and regional connectivity. Bilateral trade reached a record $155.6 billion in 2025, although India's trade deficit with China remains substantial. The meeting does not eliminate the countries' strategic rivalry, particularly over their disputed 3,800 kilometer border. However, improved relations could create space for greater trade and regional economic cooperation. Their rapprochement is also significant beyond bilateral relations. Better India China ties could influence the wider balance within BRICS and shape cooperation among major powers of the Global South. Africa Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis Deepens Sudan continues to face one of the world's largest humanitarian and security emergencies. The UN Security Council extended the arms embargo covering Darfur for another month while discussions continued over a US proposal for a nationwide embargo. Washington argues that broader restrictions could increase pressure on Sudan's warring parties to enter negotiations, while Russia has opposed expanding the measure. The conflict has displaced approximately 13 million people and contributed to famine conditions in parts of the country. Humanitarian agencies are also struggling with severe funding shortages, leaving millions without adequate food, healthcare and other essential assistance. Sudan's crisis increasingly demonstrates how prolonged conflict can overwhelm humanitarian systems. Displacement, hunger, disease and the destruction of infrastructure are reinforcing one another, making a political settlement increasingly urgent. Ebola: Regional Health Concerns Rise The Democratic Republic of Congo is confronting another serious Ebola outbreak, prompting increased surveillance and preparedness measures in neighboring countries. The World Health Organization has warned that insecurity, displacement and cross border population movement could complicate containment efforts. Countries including Kenya have strengthened preparedness at major border points, highlighting the importance of coordinated regional disease surveillance. The outbreak reinforces the growing connection between public health, population mobility and regional security. Rapid detection, cross border information sharing and adequate health infrastructure remain essential to preventing localised outbreaks from becoming wider emergencies. Climate and Environment Record Heat Raises Concern Over Extreme Weather The World Meteorological Organization reported that August 2026 was the hottest August on record and warned that a strong El Niño could intensify extreme weather into 2027. The combination of rising global temperatures and El Niño increases the risk of heatwaves, droughts, floods and agricultural disruption. Extreme heat is also affecting labour productivity, infrastructure and electricity demand. Climate change is therefore no longer solely an environmental issue. Its effects are increasingly visible in food security, public health, economic productivity, migration and national security. Wildfires Add to Public Health Risks Rising temperatures and increasingly frequent wildfires are also undermining air quality in some regions. Wildfire smoke contains fine particulate matter that can travel long distances, increasing respiratory and cardiovascular risks far from the original fire zones. The trend demonstrates how climate change can amplify several environmental and public health challenges simultaneously. Heat can increase wildfire risk, while smoke can worsen health conditions and place additional pressure on already stretched healthcare systems. Technology and Artificial Intelligence AI Safety Debate Intensifies Artificial intelligence remained a major global technology issue, with growing attention to the security implications of increasingly capable systems. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei called for greater caution in the development of advanced AI models, arguing that safety evaluations need to keep pace with technological progress. He highlighted concerns about AI's potential use in weapons development, surveillance, cyber operations and fraud. The debate is therefore moving beyond productivity and innovation toward questions of accountability, autonomous systems, national security and technological control. The central policy challenge is becoming increasingly clear: governments and technology companies must determine how to capture the economic benefits of increasingly capable AI while limiting its potential to amplify existing security threats. AI Offers Development Opportunities At the same time, the World Bank has highlighted AI's potential to accelerate productivity in developing economies if countries invest in digital infrastructure, skills and effective institutions. For Africa, AI could contribute to education, healthcare, agriculture, public administration and industrial development. Yet the continent also faces the risk of becoming overly dependent on technologies and platforms developed elsewhere. Building local digital capacity, improving connectivity and developing technical skills will therefore be essential if African countries are to become users, developers and owners of AI technologies rather than simply consumers. AI Supports Lunar Exploration AI is also expanding the boundaries of scientific exploration. NASA and IBM launched an open source AI model designed to analyse lunar data and identify geological features, including ice deposits, craters and volcanic formations. The technology could support future lunar missions by helping scientists identify resources and potential landing sites. The development illustrates how AI is increasingly being applied not only to commercial and security challenges but also to scientific research and space exploration. Latin America Brazil Election Becomes Increasingly Competitive Brazil's presidential election is becoming increasingly competitive. A September poll showed President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and right-wing challenger Flavio Bolsonaro tied at 41 percent in a potential runoff. The election will carry significance beyond Brazil because of the country's economic weight, agricultural importance and role in BRICS and global climate diplomacy. The outcome could influence Brazil's domestic economic policies as well as its position on environmental protection, regional integration and relations with major global powers. Colombia Enters a New Political Phase Colombia has also entered a new political phase following the election of right wing President Abelardo De La Espriella. Former President Juan Manuel Santos has urged the new government to fully implement the FARC peace agreement, arguing that it remains important to addressing rural poverty, drug trafficking and violence. The transition comes as Colombia continues to balance security concerns with the long term challenge of consolidating peace and expanding economic opportunities in areas historically affected by conflict. The Week in Perspective The week's developments reveal several broader trends shaping the international system. Geopolitics is increasingly affecting the global economy. Conflicts are no longer confined to battlefields. They are directly influencing oil prices, shipping routes, inflation, production costs and global supply chains. The international system is becoming more multipolar. The BRICS summit, the India China rapprochement and renewed diplomatic contacts involving Washington, Moscow and Beijing point to a more complex distribution of global power. Yet greater multipolarity does not necessarily mean greater cooperation, as major powers continue to compete over security, trade, technology and strategic influence. Climate and security are increasingly interconnected. Extreme heat, wildfires, floods and other climate related disasters are affecting food production, infrastructure, migration and public health. Climate pressures can also intensify existing economic and political vulnerabilities. Humanitarian needs are outpacing international financing. Protracted conflicts are generating displacement, hunger and disease at a time when humanitarian agencies face serious funding constraints. Sudan and Gaza remain among the clearest examples of this widening gap. AI is becoming a strategic issue. Governments and technology companies are increasingly concerned not only with the economic benefits of artificial intelligence but also with its military, cyber, surveillance and governance implications. At the same time, developing countries are seeking ways to use AI to accelerate economic and social development. Conclusion The week of September 6 to 12 demonstrated that the major challenges facing the international community cannot be considered in isolation. A conflict in the Middle East can affect oil prices and shipping costs thousands of kilometres away. A disruption in global trade can alter industrial strategies in Africa. Climate extremes can worsen food insecurity and displacement, while new technologies can simultaneously create opportunities for development and new forms of security risk. The emerging global order is therefore defined not only by competition among major powers but also by the growing interdependence of security, energy, trade, climate, technology and humanitarian affairs. The central challenge for governments is to manage these interconnected risks while maintaining channels for cooperation. The week's developments showed that geopolitical trust remains weak, but the need for international cooperation has rarely been greater.

By Staff Writer Sept. 13, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia entered the 2019 Ethiopian calendar year with an unusually broad national agenda—intensified diplomacy, investment promotion, economic transformation, digital innovation, reconciliation and a renewed focus on strategic maritime interests. From September 6 to 12, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s participation in the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi dominated Ethiopia’s international agenda. His engagements with leaders of major emerging economies highlighted Addis Ababa’s determination to turn diplomacy into opportunities for investment, technology, trade and development cooperation. At home, the government entered the new year emphasizing economic transformation, logistics development, digitalization, climate resilience and reconciliation. The release of more than 600 federal prisoners added a strong political and reconciliation dimension to the New Year, while renewed discussion over Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable Red Sea access placed the country’s economic and security interests at the centre of a wider regional debate. Taken together, the week’s developments point to an emerging national strategy: strengthen domestic productive capacity, widen international partnerships, attract capital and technology, deepen regional influence and pursue strategic interests while maintaining a commitment to cooperation and peaceful engagement. A New Year of Renewal and Reflection   Ethiopia celebrated Enkutatash 2019 on September 11, following the five-day Pagume period that bridges the old and new years. The occasion carried both cultural and political significance. Government leaders used the New Year to emphasize peace, national unity, development and continued reform. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and First Lady Zinash Tayachew shared a New Year meal with members of the local community, underscoring the traditional values of solidarity and togetherness. Enkutatash is among Ethiopia’s most distinctive cultural celebrations. Observed on Meskerem 1, it marks the beginning of a new year in the Ethiopian calendar and coincides with the transition from the rainy season to clearer skies, green landscapes and the appearance of the yellow Adey Abeba flowers. But Enkutatash represents more than the turning of a calendar page. It is a season of renewal, hope, reconciliation and togetherness. Families gather, children visit relatives and friends, traditional foods are prepared and people exchange wishes for peace, health and prosperity. Young girls traditionally perform Hoya Hoye, moving from house to house and receiving gifts in return. Across Ethiopia’s diverse communities, the New Year is celebrated through different traditions, music, dance, clothing and cuisine, while retaining a shared spirit of renewal. Churches and religious communities also hold special services, prayers and celebrations. In Addis Ababa and other cities, the celebration is increasingly accompanied by public cultural programmes, concerts, exhibitions and community events. Diplomatic representatives, including Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia Avraham Neguise and Cameroon’s Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue Monono, also extended New Year greetings to Ethiopians. For many Ethiopians, Enkutatash is therefore both celebration and reflection—a moment to leave behind the difficulties of the previous year, strengthen relationships and enter the new one with renewed determination. BRICS Puts Ethiopia’s Global South Strategy in Focus   The most prominent diplomatic development of the week was Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s participation in the 18th BRICS Leaders’ Summit in New Delhi. For Ethiopia, the summit was more than a high-level diplomatic gathering. It offered a platform to deepen engagement with major emerging economies while advancing Addis Ababa’s broader effort to strengthen Africa’s role within an evolving global order. Prime Minister Abiy called for stronger BRICS cooperation with Africa, particularly in minerals, renewable energy and industrial development. He stressed the importance of enabling African countries to move beyond exporting raw materials and capture greater value from their resources. Artificial intelligence also featured prominently in Ethiopia’s message. PM Abiy urged BRICS countries to ensure that AI becomes a tool for Africa’s development rather than another source of technological inequality. Debt sustainability and climate finance were also highlighted, linking the priorities of emerging economies with the development challenges confronting Africa. Ethiopia further proposed a BRICS coordination track toward COP32, which Addis Ababa is scheduled to host in 2027. The proposal reflects Ethiopia’s effort to connect economic diplomacy, climate action and the development priorities of the Global South. The strategic significance for Ethiopia is considerable. BRICS engagement can potentially expand access to markets, investment, technology and alternative sources of development finance while strengthening relations with some of the world’s fastest-growing economies. In this sense, Ethiopia’s BRICS diplomacy is increasingly economic as well as political. Bilateral Diplomacy Moves Toward Trade, Technology and Investment The New Delhi summit also created space for a series of bilateral engagements. Prime Minister Abiy’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin focused on strengthening the Ethiopia-Russia strategic partnership across areas including defence and security, trade, investment, education, technology, culture, climate and development.   His talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi explored opportunities to further strengthen Ethiopia-India relations, particularly in investment, defence and emerging sectors. With Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, discussions focused on investment, tourism, renewable energy and industrial development. Abiy also held discussions with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on Red Sea security and regional stability, while meeting Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Vietnamese Prime Minister Lê Minh Hưng. The breadth of these engagements illustrates a broader shift in Ethiopia’s foreign economic policy: diplomatic relationships are increasingly being viewed as platforms for investment, trade, technology transfer, industrial cooperation and development partnerships. Investment Diplomacy Takes Centre Stage Investment promotion remained another defining feature of the week. President Taye Atske Selassie led a high-level Ethiopian delegation to Dubai for the 15th Annual Investment Meeting, presenting Ethiopia’s investment opportunities and highlighting ongoing economic reforms. Clean energy and other strategic sectors were presented as areas of substantial potential for foreign investment. The engagement formed part of the government’s effort to increase private-sector participation in Ethiopia’s economic transformation. Ethiopia is also seeking stronger economic ties with Gulf countries. President Taye called for increased Qatari investment, reflecting Addis Ababa’s wider effort to attract capital into infrastructure, energy, manufacturing and other productive sectors. The message is increasingly clear: Ethiopia wants foreign investment not simply as a source of capital, but as a vehicle for expanding production, creating jobs, transferring technology and integrating the country more deeply into regional and global markets. Mojo Logistics Hub Strengthens the Trade Infrastructure   The inauguration of the expanded Mojo logistics centre marked another significant development in Ethiopia’s economic transformation. Located about 70 kilometres southeast of Addis Ababa, the facility covers approximately 60 hectares and is designed to increase freight-handling capacity, improve cargo movement and strengthen regional connectivity. Prime Minister Abiy described the project as an important step toward regional economic integration and the practical implementation of Ethiopia’s ambitions under the African Continental Free Trade Area. The significance of logistics extends beyond a single facility. For a landlocked economy heavily dependent on international trade, efficient logistics can reduce transportation costs, improve export competitiveness and connect Ethiopian producers more effectively with regional and international markets. It also complements Ethiopia’s broader maritime strategy: access to ports is only as useful as the inland systems that can move goods efficiently between production centres and maritime corridors. Growth Continues, but Transformation Must Reach Households Ethiopia entered 2019 with economic transformation remaining at the centre of the government’s agenda. Macroeconomic reform, private-sector development, manufacturing, agricultural commercialization, export growth and infrastructure expansion remain key priorities. The World Bank reported 9.2 percent economic growth for Ethiopia in fiscal year 2024/25, placing the country among Africa’s faster-growing economies. Yet strong headline growth does not automatically translate into broad-based prosperity. Low per-capita income, limited employment opportunities and pressure on household purchasing power remain significant challenges. The central question for the new year, therefore, is not simply whether Ethiopia can sustain growth, but whether growth can generate productive employment, strengthen household incomes and improve living standards. Reconciliation at the Start of a New Year Peace and reconciliation also featured prominently as Ethiopia entered 2019. More than 600 federal prisoners, including prominent figures, were released around the New Year. The move was presented as part of broader efforts to promote reconciliation and create conditions for political dialogue. Prime Minister Abiy urged those released to use the opportunity to begin the New Year in a spirit of peace and contribute to the outcomes of the national consultation process. The releases gave the New Year a powerful reconciliation message. At the same time, Ethiopia’s continuing security challenges demonstrate that reconciliation is not a single event but a longer national process. Turning political openings into sustainable peace remains one of the country’s most important—and difficult—tasks. From Paper to Digital Digital transformation is becoming increasingly central to Ethiopia’s development ambitions. In a message marking Pagume 5, described as “The Day of the Future,” Prime Minister Abiy said Ethiopia was moving “from paper to digital, from passive consumption to active innovation.” The ambition goes beyond expanding internet access. Ethiopia is seeking to develop domestic technological capacity, modernize public services and build an economy capable of producing technology and innovation. Artificial intelligence is emerging as an important part of that strategy. Officials from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development visited the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute as part of regional consultations on an IGAD AI framework and strategy. At the BRICS summit, Abiy linked AI directly to Africa’s development, arguing that technological advancement should contribute to economic transformation and digital sovereignty. For Ethiopia, AI has potential applications across agriculture, healthcare, education, finance, manufacturing and public administration. The challenge now is implementation: building the infrastructure, skills, institutions and locally relevant solutions required to translate ambitious digital policies into measurable economic and social gains. Green Growth and Climate Resilience   Climate resilience was another important theme of the week. An assessment by AlphaGeo ranked Addis Ababa second globally and first in Africa among major cities for climate resilience, using geospatial artificial intelligence to assess climate exposure and adaptation capacity. The assessment comes as Ethiopia continues to position renewable energy, environmental restoration, green infrastructure and climate adaptation as integral components of its development strategy. A Green Growth Investment Forum held during the week called for stronger private-sector participation in green investment, reflecting an effort to connect environmental priorities with economic opportunity. Ethiopia’s preparations to host COP32 in 2027 provide an additional international platform. Addis Ababa is seeking to use the conference to amplify Africa’s voice on climate finance while promoting renewable energy, green investment and climate-resilient development. The broader challenge will be to ensure that climate action supports economic transformation rather than competing with it. Red Sea Access: A Strategic Question Ethiopia Cannot Ignore Perhaps no issue carries a greater strategic regional dimension than Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable and sovereign access to the Red Sea. For Ethiopia, the issue is increasingly connected to economic development, national security, trade and the country’s demographic trajectory. Education Minister and economist Professor Berhanu Nega argued that Ethiopia’s growing population and economic requirements make the question of sea access increasingly difficult to postpone. “You cannot have 130 million people sitting here without access to the sea at a time when sea access is very important for security as well as trade,” Berhanu said. At the same time, he stressed that Ethiopia should pursue its objective peacefully and in a way that benefits neighbouring countries. “It is better if we do this peacefully, and not only peacefully but for mutual benefit, so that all of us can benefit from this,” he said. Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia Avraham Neguise also expressed support for Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access, describing it as a matter with wider implications for Red Sea stability. “Empowering and strengthening Ethiopia and creating stability in the Red Sea is the interest of all, not only for Ethiopia,” he said, adding that Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea would be positive.   He further warned that instability along the maritime corridor could have consequences far beyond the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, affecting international trade and the global economy. Other analysts have placed greater emphasis on negotiation and regional arrangements. Former US Ambassador to Ethiopia and George Washington University adjunct professor David Shinn has suggested that Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations could potentially form part of a broader diplomatic understanding involving Ethiopia, Egypt and Eritrea. These perspectives point to the central challenge facing Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. For Addis Ababa, dependable sea access is increasingly viewed as an economic and strategic necessity. For its neighbours, however, any new maritime arrangement must be carefully managed to avoid aggravating existing regional rivalries. The issue will therefore require diplomacy as much as strategy. Red Sea Insecurity Raises the Stakes The security situation around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb adds another layer of urgency. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and serves as a critical maritime gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal route. Continued insecurity can disrupt shipping, increase transportation and insurance costs and place additional pressure on already vulnerable global supply chains. For Ethiopia, which depends heavily on maritime trade, prolonged disruption can directly affect the cost and reliability of imports and exports. This makes the maritime question part of a much larger economic equation. Efficient inland logistics, diversified trade corridors and stable regional maritime arrangements are all essential to protecting Ethiopia’s economic interests. The Bigger Picture The first major week of Ethiopia’s 2019 Ethiopian calendar year brought together issues that may initially appear separate but are increasingly interconnected. BRICS diplomacy is about more than foreign policy—it is also about markets, investment, technology and development finance. Investment diplomacy is about more than attracting capital—it is about expanding productive capacity, creating jobs and strengthening Ethiopia’s position in global value chains. The Mojo logistics centre is about more than cargo—it is part of the infrastructure required to make Ethiopia more competitive in regional and international trade. Digital transformation and artificial intelligence are about more than technology—they are increasingly tied to productivity, public services, innovation and economic sovereignty. Green development is about more than environmental protection—it is becoming an important source of investment, energy security and international influence. And the Red Sea question is about more than geography—it sits at the intersection of trade, security, demography, regional diplomacy and Ethiopia’s long-term economic ambitions. The release of more than 600 prisoners, meanwhile, gave the beginning of the new year a powerful message of reconciliation, even as continuing security challenges underline the difficult road ahead. A New Year, A Larger Strategic Test As Ethiopia begins 2019, the country faces the challenge of connecting these different priorities into one coherent national strategy. Economic growth must translate into jobs and better living standards. Investment must strengthen productive sectors rather than simply increase capital inflows. Digitalization must deliver practical gains. Climate action must support development. Reconciliation must contribute to lasting peace. And diplomacy must protect Ethiopia’s economic and strategic interests while avoiding unnecessary regional confrontation. The coming year will therefore be measured not only by the scale of Ethiopia’s ambitions, but by its ability to convert those ambitions into results. Ethiopia is seeking a larger role in the global economy, deeper partnerships with emerging powers, greater technological capacity, stronger regional connectivity and a more secure place within the maritime geography of the Horn of Africa. The strategic test will be to pursue these objectives while balancing national interests with regional cooperation and stability. That balance may ultimately define Ethiopia’s journey through 2019—and shape how the country positions itself in an increasingly competitive and interconnected world.

Addis Ababa, September 11, 2026 (ENA) —In a major media milestone for the continent, the prominent international publication TIME Africa has published a comprehensive cover story hailing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as a profound monument to continental unity, economic independence, and shared prosperity. The extensive report, titled "The Power to Unite Africa," underscores that the mega-dam is far more than a conventional engineering venture. Instead, it stands as a testament to what African ambition, homegrown capital, and regional synergy can accomplish when charting a self-determined path toward industrialization. A core focal point of the TIME Africa analysis is the uniquely autonomous financial trajectory of the project. At a time when cross-border African infrastructure is heavily dependent on foreign governments, development banks, and international lenders, Ethiopia successfully pioneered a paradigm shift. The publication commends the mobilization of domestic capital, noting that ordinary Ethiopian citizens and the global diaspora entirely financed the multi-billion-dollar project through government resources, domestic borrowing, and structured Renaissance Dam Bonds. TIME Africa positions this as a masterclass for a continent burdened by massive infrastructure funding gaps, proving that African savings, pension funds, and diaspora wealth can effectively substitute for restrictive international project finance. With an installed generating capacity exceeding 5,000 megawatts, the dam is described as a catalyst to completely transform Ethiopia’s domestic energy architecture, eliminate power shortages, and stimulate manufacturing. Crucially, the report argues that the dam's true genius lies in its outward-facing regional capacity. By channeling surplus electricity across borders via expanding transmission grids into neighboring countries like Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, and wider members of the Eastern African Power Pool, the GERD serves as the vital physical anchor needed to realize the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Addressing the long-standing geopolitical friction surrounding the Nile, TIME Africa critiques outside actors and international commentaries that have historically reduced the technically complex river management into a zero-sum security conflict. The publication highlights that when infrastructure is viewed through a lens of military threats, the backward and illogical vocabulary of conflict replaces diplomatic and engineering solutions. Citing groundbreaking scientific research published in Nature Water, the report presents empirical evidence showing that deep economic interdependence actually protects downstream water security. Because hydroelectric production requires water to continuously flow to generate power, Ethiopia holds an inherent commercial incentive to keep the Nile moving through the dam's turbines. Enhanced power trade scenarios demonstrate that Sudan can resolve electricity shortages, while Egypt can significantly lower its maximum annual irrigation deficit. The report insists that permanent technical data sharing and direct institutional communication will easily resolve prolonged drought management without the need for geopolitical gridlock. "The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will likely be viewed as one of the great African stories of our time." The report highlights the significance of homegrown funding for major infrastructure, demonstrating that projects costing billions can be built with minimal reliance on international finance. It advocates for shifting from zero-sum water disputes to cooperative benefit-sharing and regional market integration. ⬇️ Read the full piece below. THE POWER TO UNITE AFRICA The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is more than a hydroelectric project. It is a demonstration of what African ambition, African capital and regional cooperation can achieve – and an opportunity to turn a potentially contested resource into a source of shared prosperity. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will likely be viewed as one of the great African stories of our time. Built across the Blue Nile, it is the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa and one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects the continent has undertaken. It has the capacity to transform Ethiopia’s energy landscape, support industrialisation and feed electricity into an increasingly interconnected regional market. But its importance goes beyond the power it can generate. GERD offers something larger: an opportunity to rethink how African countries build together, finance their own development and manage resources that do not stop at national borders. There is another reason the project matters. Ethiopian citizens and diaspora helped pay for it. At a time when the discussion around African infrastructure often begins with the question of which foreign government, development bank or international investor will finance it, GERD followed a significantly different path. The project was overwhelmingly financed domestically, including through government resources, domestic borrowing and bonds purchased by Ethiopians at home and abroad. The Renaissance Dam Bond was deliberately structured to allow relatively small investments, giving ordinary Ethiopians and members of the diaspora a means to participate in financing a project that was presented as part of the country’s national development. That story deserves far more attention than it receives. Africa faces an enormous infrastructure financing gap, while African savings, pension capital, diaspora wealth and domestic financial markets remain underused as sources of development capital. GERD is not a financing model that can simply be copied from one country to another, but the principle behind it is powerful. A population was asked to participate directly in building national infrastructure, and a project costing billions of dollars was brought into existence with extraordinarily limited dependence on conventional international project finance. For a continent searching for ways to finance its own transformation, that experience is key. On top of that, there is the electricity. The dam’s installed generating capacity is more than 5,000 megawatts. For Ethiopia, where access to reliable electricity remains a major developmental challenge, that power can support homes, businesses, manufacturing and a more industrial economy. Beyond Ethiopia, it can be traded. Transmission lines do not need to end at national borders. Ethiopia already trades electricity with neighbouring countries, and a deeper regional power market could allow energy generated on the Blue Nile to support economies far beyond the dam itself. This is where GERD becomes much more interesting as an African project rather than simply an Ethiopian one. For years, however, the dam has been discussed internationally through a very different lens. Rather than beginning with what this infrastructure could make possible – greater electricity generation, regional power trade, industrialisation, lower-carbon growth and a more interconnected East Africa – international involvement and commentary around GERD have repeatedly amplified the dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt. A technically complex disagreement over the management of a shared river has too often been pulled into the language of geopolitical confrontation. The Nile has, in effect, become internationalised as a source of friction when it could be treated as an extraordinary platform for African cooperation. Framing, as always, is important. Africa cannot allow – or afford – for outside influence to spur division again. Language creates political possibilities, but it can also close them. Once infrastructure is discussed principally as a threat, security begins to displace economics, diplomacy and engineering. Questions about electricity markets, transmission infrastructure, reservoir management and regional development become questions about winners and losers. Eventually, the backwards and illogical vocabulary of military action begins to enter a conversation that should fundamentally be about how neighbouring African countries share the benefits of a river upon which they all depend. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has described the Nile as an existential issue for Egypt and stated that his country retains the right to defend itself under international law should harm occur that interrupts its water supply. Egypt’s concerns cannot just be dismissed. The Nile is fundamental to Egyptian life, agriculture and economic security, and no serious vision of African cooperation should require one African country to disregard the legitimate interests of another. But accepting the legitimacy of Egyptian water security concerns is very different from accepting the inevitability of confrontation. There is another way to look at the problem, and the research points towards it. From Water Sharing to Benefit Sharing Research published in Nature Water offers one of the most compelling arguments for changing the terms of the debate. Rather than modelling GERD purely as a question of how much water one country retains or another receives, researchers examined the relationship between water management and electricity trade across the region. Their conclusion deserves considerably more attention in African policymaking. Greater electricity trade between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt is evidenced to create benefits for all three. The researchers found that increased power trade could reduce irrigation water deficits in Egypt and Sudan, increase hydropower generation in Ethiopia, increase generation from existing hydropower facilities downstream, reduce Sudanese electricity shortages, lower regional carbon emissions and increase Ethiopia’s financial returns from electricity exports. Under the highest power-trade scenario examined, the model reduced Egypt’s maximum annual irrigation deficit by as much as four billion cubic metres compared with the baseline proposal used by the researchers. The reason is remarkably straightforward. Hydroelectricity requires water to move. If Ethiopia has long-term agreements to sell electricity downstream, it has an economic incentive to release water through GERD’s turbines to generate that electricity. The commercial relationship itself can therefore reinforce the movement of water downstream. This changes the nature of the conversation. Instead of negotiating only over water allocations, the countries can negotiate over benefits. Egypt and Sudan gain access to competitively priced renewable electricity and potentially more predictable river management. Ethiopia earns export revenues and creates demand for the enormous generating capacity it has built. Regional grids become more interconnected. Economic interdependence grows. The river ceases to be something that must simply be divided and becomes something from which value can be created together. That does not eliminate every difficulty. The operation of GERD during prolonged drought remains an important and legitimate issue, and different operating policies can produce different outcomes downstream. This is precisely why Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan need permanent technical cooperation: shared hydrological data, transparent reservoir information, agreed drought-management mechanisms and direct communication between the institutions responsible for water and electricity. But those are engineering and diplomatic problems capable of engineering and diplomatic solutions. They are not arguments for conflict. A Monument to African Ambition GERD represents something Africa desperately needs more of: infrastructure at scale. Across the continent, unreliable and insufficient electricity continues to constrain economic growth. Businesses rely on generators, factories struggle with inconsistent grids, and communities remain disconnected from the power systems that modern economies take for granted. Africa cannot industrialise without electricity. It cannot process more of its own minerals, build globally competitive manufacturing industries, expand its digital economy or provide modern infrastructure for a rapidly growing population without vastly more generation and transmission capacity. GERD should therefore not be understood solely as an Ethiopian asset. Its greatest potential may ultimately lie in the network around it. Sudan can benefit. Kenya can benefit. Djibouti can benefit. Egypt can benefit. Other members of the Eastern African Power Pool can benefit as regional transmission infrastructure develops. The objective should not be for every African country to become an energy island, attempting to produce every megawatt it consumes within its own borders. Europe does not function that way. Neither should Africa. A genuinely interconnected African electricity market would allow countries with abundant hydroelectric, solar, wind, gas or geothermal resources to sell power across borders, improving resilience and allowing capital to flow towards the places where energy can be produced most efficiently. GERD could become one of the anchors of such a system in Eastern Africa. Africa Cannot Bomb Its Way to Development There is something deeply troubling about the ease with which military language enters discussions about African infrastructure. The continent already faces a sizable infrastructure deficit. We need power stations and transmission lines, railways and ports, roads and fibre networks, water infrastructure, industrial corridors and logistics systems. Many of the projects capable of transforming African economies will inevitably cross borders or affect neighbouring countries. If every major cross-border project becomes a geopolitical zero-sum contest, Africa’s development will remain hostage to its artificially created borders rather than accelerated by them. The answer cannot be destroying infrastructure. It must be building more of it – and connecting it. This matters even more as Africa attempts to create the world’s largest integrated trading area through the African Continental Free Trade Area. Trade integration without infrastructure integration is an illusion. Goods cannot move freely without transport corridors. Digital services cannot scale without fibre and data infrastructure. Industry cannot grow without reliable energy. A common African market ultimately requires physical systems that make national borders less economically consequential. GERD offers an opportunity to think in exactly those terms. An African Solution There is also a question of agency. The future of the Nile should ultimately be determined by Africans. International partners can provide expertise and finance. Scientists from around the world can contribute research. Multilateral institutions can facilitate negotiations. All of that has value. But Africa should be wary when disagreements between African states become theatres for wider geopolitical competition or when outside involvement hardens positions rather than helping neighbouring countries find common ground. The continent knows that history too well. The Nile Basin should instead become a demonstration of African diplomatic maturity: Ethiopia’s development aspirations recognised, Egypt’s water security protected, Sudan’s interests respected and a regional economic framework built around the things these countries can achieve together. The African Union exists precisely because sovereignty and continental solidarity do not have to be opposing ideas. GERD presents an opportunity to prove that principle in practice. The Renaissance Can Be Bigger Than Ethiopia The name itself deserves consideration: the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Its renaissance need not belong only to Ethiopia. Imagine a future in which GERD powers Ethiopian industry while exporting electricity throughout the region; where Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia coordinate water and energy management rather than levying threats; where interconnected grids allow renewable electricity to move to wherever it is needed; and where the Nile supports African manufacturing, data centres, mineral processing, transport systems and rapidly growing cities. There is a lesson in how it was built, too. Ethiopians did not wait for the rest of the world to decide that their infrastructure was worth financing. Citizens bought bonds. The diaspora contributed. Domestic institutions provided capital. Whatever the full scope of that model was, the underlying idea is worth carrying across the continent: Africans themselves can have a direct financial stake in the infrastructure that will determine Africa’s future. That could mean infrastructure bonds. Diaspora instruments. Pension capital. Sovereign investment. Regional development finance. It could mean new vehicles that allow African citizens to invest directly in commercially viable energy, transport and digital projects. GERD should provoke a much broader discussion not only about what Africa needs to build, but about who should own and finance what it builds. The dam is already there. The question facing Africa now is what the continent chooses to make of it. A dam can become a wall, or it can become a bridge. At a moment when Africa needs energy, infrastructure, industrialisation and greater continental integration, we should always choose the bridge. The waters of the Nile have connected African civilisation for thousands of years. Now they can help power its future.  

By Yordanos D. Sept. 11, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia is welcoming the 2019 New Year with renewed confidence, a stronger sense of national purpose and an increasingly ambitious development agenda, as the country seeks to transform the gains of recent years into lasting economic prosperity and improved livelihoods. Enkutatash, celebrated on Meskerem 1, falls on September 11 in the Gregorian calendar and marks the beginning of a new year in Ethiopia's distinctive calendar. The Ethiopian calendar consists of twelve months of 30 days each, followed by the five day or six day intercalary month of Pagume. Beyond its uniqueness as a system of timekeeping, the calendar remains an important expression of Ethiopia's historical identity and cultural continuity. The New Year also arrives as the rainy season gives way to the bright season traditionally associated with renewal. Green landscapes, blooming Adey Abeba flowers, family gatherings and traditional songs give the holiday a distinctive atmosphere. For Ethiopians, therefore, the New Year represents more than the turning of a calendar page. It is a moment for reflection on what has been achieved, recognition of the challenges that remain and renewed commitment to what lies ahead. For Ethiopia, the arrival of 2019 carries an additional significance. It comes at a time when the government is seeking to move the country's development trajectory from reform and construction toward greater productivity, economic self reliance and broad based prosperity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly framed the current period as a transition from announcing ambitions to delivering tangible results. In a series of messages issued during the final days of 2018, he described Ethiopia's resurgence as increasingly visible in major national projects, economic reforms and initiatives intended to improve everyday life. "Yesterday we declared our rise; today, we live it," the Prime Minister said in his September 7 message. He pointed to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, corridor development, the Bishoftu International Airport mega project and macroeconomic reforms as manifestations of the country's development momentum. He said the transformation was already bringing "seamless urban mobility, vast employment opportunities" and a stronger outlook for future generations. The country had built an unshakable foundation for multinational unity through its indigenous values and the philosophy of Medemer, or synergy. The Prime Minister cited the National Dialogue, human centered corridor development, volunteer programs and the Green Legacy Initiative (GLI) as examples of efforts intended to translate collective national aspirations into practical results, stressing Ethiopia's objective is not merely physical construction but the creation of an inclusive and economically self-reliant country in which citizens can participate in and benefit from national development. That message provides an important framework for 2019. The new Ethiopian year is expected to be more about consolidating reforms, completing major projects, expanding production and ensuring that economic growth produces wider opportunities. From Reform to Productive Growth The economic agenda for 2019 is anchored in the country's Ten-Year Development Plan and the second phase of the Homegrown Economic Reform Program. The government has increasingly emphasized macroeconomic stability, structural transformation, private sector participation, domestic resource mobilization and export competitiveness. The federal budget approved for the 2019 Ethiopian fiscal year amounts to about 2.339 trillion Birr, making it the largest federal budget in the country's history. The allocation framework gives significant attention to education, roads, health, agriculture, energy expansion and urban development, while also providing budgetary support to regional states. The budget is designed to consolidate the gains of economic reform while addressing the pressure on household purchasing power and supporting low-income communities. Finance Minister Ahmed Shide has said the spending plan gives particular attention to vulnerable households while maintaining the reform agenda and pursuing inclusive growth. The scale of the budget reflects the breadth of the government's ambitions for the new year. But the central test will be implementation: whether investment can translate into greater production, more employment, stronger exports and improved public services. Agriculture and Food Sovereignty Agriculture remains at the heart of Ethiopia's transformation because of its role in food security, employment, industrial inputs and export earnings. The country has increasingly moved beyond a narrow food security approach toward the broader objective of food sovereignty. Wheat production, irrigation development, mechanization, agricultural clusters, improved seeds and livestock development have become important elements of this strategy. The Yelemat Trufat initiative is also intended to strengthen livestock productivity and improve household nutrition while creating opportunities for farmers and pastoralists. The broader objective is to make agriculture more productive, commercially oriented and capable of supplying both domestic industries and export markets. In 2019, greater attention is expected to be placed on irrigation and dry season production, mechanization, value addition and market linkages. Such measures are critical if agricultural growth is to translate into lower food imports, stronger rural incomes and a reliable supply of raw materials for manufacturing. The government's wider development plan identifies agriculture as one of the sectors capable of driving structural transformation alongside manufacturing, mining, tourism and technology. Ethiopia reiterated this approach at an African Union technical meeting in July, highlighting agriculture, manufacturing, mining, tourism and technology as key sectors under the Ten-Year Development Plan. Manufacturing and "Made in Ethiopia" Industrialization will be another major priority in 2019. The Made in Ethiopia initiative has been designed to increase domestic production, strengthen industrial capacity, substitute imports and improve export performance. The Ministry of Industry reported that policy measures under the initiative, together with improved access to finance, have contributed to increased manufacturing production, exports and import substitution. The next challenge is to turn these gains into a sustained industrial transformation. Ethiopia needs industries capable of producing more inputs locally, creating decent employment for a growing young population and connecting agriculture with manufacturing through stronger value chains. Greater productivity, improved quality, reliable energy supplies, logistics, access to finance and export market development will therefore remain central to the industrial agenda. The emphasis on domestic production also forms part of a broader national objective of reducing dependency and increasing economic self reliance. Mining Mining is emerging as another important pillar of the transformation agenda. The government is seeking to expand responsible mining investment, improve the formalization of the sector and increase the contribution of minerals to export earnings and foreign exchange generation. Gold has become particularly important, while broader mineral exploration is expected to support industrial development and diversification. The sector, however, will need to balance investment and production with environmental protection, community benefits and responsible resource management. If managed effectively, mining can provide foreign exchange while supplying raw materials for domestic industries and creating new investment opportunities. Tourism and Aviation Tourism is another area where Ethiopia's natural, historical and cultural assets offer significant economic potential. Initiatives such as Dine for Ethiopia and broader destination development efforts have sought to turn Ethiopia's historical sites, landscapes, cuisine and cultural heritage into stronger sources of employment and foreign exchange. Aviation is an important part of this strategy. The planned Bishoftu International Airport represents one of the country's most ambitious infrastructure projects and is intended to strengthen Ethiopia's position as a major aviation and logistics hub. Prime Minister Abiy has identified the airport among the projects symbolizing the country's current development momentum. The airport, together with Ethiopian Airlines' expanding network, improved road connectivity and tourism infrastructure, could strengthen Ethiopia's position as a gateway connecting Africa with the Middle East, Asia and other global markets. Technological Transformation The digital economy is becoming increasingly central to the country's development strategy. Under Digital Ethiopia 2030, Ethiopia is seeking to expand digital public services, digital identification, mobile financial services, telecommunications, artificial intelligence and technology based entrepreneurship. The objective extends beyond providing internet access. Digital transformation is expected to reduce transaction costs, improve government services, expand financial inclusion, create new businesses and connect Ethiopian enterprises to regional and global markets. Prime Minister Abiy has also increasingly linked Ethiopia's development ambitions with technological sovereignty. In his message marking African Union Day, he called on African countries and young people to take greater ownership of the continent's digital future. For Ethiopia, this means that 2019 could become an important year for turning digital infrastructure into productive economic capacity. Infrastructure That Connects the Economy Infrastructure development remains one of the most visible components of Ethiopia's transformation. Corridor development projects in Addis Ababa and other cities are changing urban mobility and public spaces while creating new commercial and social infrastructure. The approach is increasingly focused on integrating roads, pedestrian facilities, public spaces, greenery and urban services rather than treating road construction as an isolated activity. Prime Minister Abiy has specifically cited human centered corridor development as one of the practical initiatives demonstrating how collective national action can generate tangible results. Beyond cities, roads, energy infrastructure, logistics corridors and aviation projects are intended to reduce the cost of moving people and goods and connect producers to markets. The challenge in 2019 will therefore be to ensure that infrastructure does not remain an end in itself but becomes a platform for production, investment and employment. Energy Independence Energy remains fundamental to Ethiopia's industrial and economic ambitions. The completion and inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has become one of the country's most important milestones in its effort to expand electricity generation and strengthen energy security. The dam is also increasingly presented by the government as a symbol of national capacity, collective financing and self reliance. Prime Minister Abiy has included the GERD among the major projects that demonstrate Ethiopia's shift from aspiration toward concrete development. The priority for the new year is therefore not only generating electricity but ensuring that expanded power supply translates into industrial production, agricultural processing, digital services, exports and improved living standards. Green Development Economic transformation is also being pursued alongside environmental restoration. The Green Legacy Initiative has become one of Ethiopia's most prominent national environmental programs, combining tree planting with watershed restoration, climate resilience and broader public mobilization. The initiative has evolved from a tree planting campaign into a wider development approach linking environmental protection with agriculture, water management, urban greenery and climate resilience. Prime Minister Abiy again cited the Green Legacy Initiative in his latest New Year message as one of the practical programs through which collective national values have been converted into tangible action. The coming year will therefore require Ethiopia to pursue economic growth while protecting its natural resources and strengthening resilience against climate related shocks. Human Capital No development strategy can succeed without investment in people. Education, health, employment and skills development remain essential to Ethiopia's long term transformation, particularly given the country's large and youthful population. The 2019 federal budget places education and health among the major priority areas, while the government's economic strategy continues to emphasize employment creation and private sector development. The challenge is to ensure that young Ethiopians are not simply beneficiaries of economic growth but active participants in it. This requires stronger technical and vocational education, digital skills, entrepreneurship opportunities, access to finance and a business environment capable of absorbing millions of young people entering the labor market. Unity as a Development Imperative Economic transformation cannot be separated from peace and national cohesion. In his latest New Year message, Abiy placed unity at the center of the country's development trajectory, arguing that shared values and Medemer provide the foundation for collective progress. His message comes after a year in which the National Dialogue process, development initiatives, volunteer programs and large scale infrastructure projects have all been presented as mechanisms for strengthening national cohesion. The idea is straightforward: development requires stability, stability requires cooperation and cooperation becomes stronger when citizens share a sense of national purpose. As Ethiopia enters 2019, this connection between peace, unity and development is likely to remain one of the central themes of the government's agenda. From Construction to Results The defining question of 2019 will ultimately be whether Ethiopia can move successfully from building foundations to generating results from those foundations. The country has invested heavily in roads, energy, urban infrastructure, agriculture, digital systems, environmental restoration and major national projects. Economic reforms have also begun to change the policy environment. The next stage requires productivity. Factories must produce more competitively. Farmers must earn more from higher productivity. Infrastructure must reduce transport costs. Digital systems must make services faster and more accessible. Energy expansion must support industrialization. Tourism must create jobs and foreign exchange. Mining must generate greater economic value while protecting communities and the environment. This is consistent with the broader philosophy expressed by Prime Minister Abiy at the Ethiopia Delivers National Summit earlier this year, where he described nation building as a continuous collective responsibility and emphasized that reforms should become foundations for lasting change. A New Year of Execution Ethiopia therefore enters 2019 at a significant point in its development journey. The country is not beginning from zero. It enters the new year with major projects completed, others under construction, an extensive economic reform program, a new fiscal framework and a development strategy that places agriculture, manufacturing, mining, tourism and technology at the center of structural transformation. The approved 2.339 trillion birr federal budget provides the financial framework for implementing the priorities of the new fiscal year, while the Ten Year Development Plan provides the longer term direction. But ambition alone will not determine the success of the new Ethiopian year. Implementation, productivity, accountability and the ability to translate national investments into improvements in household incomes and public services will be decisive. That is why the message of the New Year is increasingly one of execution. Ethiopia's 2019 begins with the country seeking to transform the foundations laid during the previous years into a more productive, resilient and self reliant economy. The challenge is substantial, but so is the opportunity. As the Adey Abeba blooms across the Ethiopian landscape and families gather to celebrate Enkutatash, the New Year offers a natural moment to look forward. It is a moment to preserve what has been achieved, correct what has not worked, accelerate what is delivering results and ensure that the country's major development ambitions are translated into tangible benefits for its people. In the words of Prime Minister Abiy's latest New Year message, Ethiopia's aspiration is to build an inclusive, economically self-reliant nation while unlocking the collective potential of its people. For 2019, that aspiration now faces its most important test which is turning momentum into lasting prosperity.

By Yordanos D. Sept. 7, 2026 (ENA) In the week ranging from August 28 to September 5, 2026, the world experienced overlapping security, economic, environmental, and humanitarian challenges, with developments across Africa, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas demonstrating the increasingly interconnected nature of global affairs. Conflicts continued to affect energy markets and diplomatic relations, while economic pressures, climate risks, humanitarian emergencies, and technological competition crossed regional boundaries. At the same time, countries in the Pacific and other vulnerable regions continued to call for stronger international cooperation as global challenges increasingly transcend national borders. Peace and Security The world witnessed a complex array of overlapping security challenges across multiple continents, illustrating how local instability rapidly reverberates through global trade, energy supply chains, and international relations. Major power rivalries, ongoing armed conflicts, and non-traditional threats continued to destabilize key strategic regions, highlighting the delicate balance between diplomatic efforts and escalating volatility on the ground. One among these is the Russia Ukraine conflict which remained one of the central security concerns in Europe during the week, as diplomatic contacts involving the United States and Russia raised cautious hopes for renewed negotiations. However, disagreements over territory, security guarantees and Ukraine's future continued to complicate efforts to achieve a durable settlement, while continued military attacks underscored the gap between diplomatic engagement and an effective ceasefire. The conflict also continued to have implications beyond Europe, particularly through its effects on energy supplies, food markets and international security calculations. Meanwhile, tensions involving the United States and Iran remained a major threat to stability in the Middle East, with developments surrounding the Strait of Hormuz drawing particular international attention because of the waterway's importance to global energy transportation. Any prolonged confrontation in the region could therefore have consequences far beyond the Middle East, particularly for energy dependent economies in Asia and Europe. In Africa, Sudan remained one of the continent's most serious security and humanitarian emergencies, while instability in parts of the Sahel continued to challenge governments and regional organizations. In the Horn of Africa, security concerns, political stability and access to strategic maritime routes likewise remained closely interconnected. Elsewhere, Asia continued to face security pressures linked to territorial disputes, military competition and strategic rivalry among major powers. The region's position along some of the world's most important trade and maritime routes means that instability in the Middle East can quickly influence Asian security and economic calculations. In the Americas, Haiti's prolonged security crisis remained a major concern, with gang violence, weak state institutions and humanitarian pressures creating a complex emergency that requires both security measures and political solutions. At the same time, Pacific island countries increasingly view climate change itself as a security challenge, as rising sea levels, extreme weather, food insecurity and potential displacement threaten the long-term stability of vulnerable communities. Global Economy, Trade and Energy Economic developments during the week continued to demonstrate how closely national economies are linked to geopolitical events. Europe remained under pressure from the economic consequences of the Russia Ukraine war and elevated energy costs, prompting governments to strengthen energy security, diversify supplies and expand renewable energy. These efforts have also gained strategic importance as European countries seek to reduce vulnerabilities created by dependence on external energy sources. The situation in the Middle East remained particularly important for Asia, where many economies depend heavily on imported energy. Any prolonged disruption around the Strait of Hormuz could raise transportation and production costs and contribute to broader inflationary pressures. At the same time, Asian economies continued to occupy a central position in global manufacturing and the production of electric vehicles, batteries and renewable energy technologies. Across Africa, governments continued to confront the difficult task of financing infrastructure, energy and industrial development while managing debt pressures, food insecurity and climate related economic losses. Consequently, many African countries are seeking investment partnerships that can promote manufacturing, value addition and renewable energy rather than relying primarily on exports of raw materials. In North America, policies adopted by the United States on tariffs, technology, energy and strategic supply chains continued to influence global trade patterns and relations with major economic powers. In Latin America, meanwhile, governments continued to balance economic growth with the need to expand clean energy investment and reduce excessive dependence on commodity exports. The region's reserves of lithium, copper and other strategic minerals, together with its agricultural production, have increased its importance to the global energy transition. Climate Change and the Environment Climate change continued to emerge as both an environmental and development challenge across continents. In Africa, changing weather patterns are affecting agriculture, water availability, food security and livelihoods, encouraging governments to link climate adaptation with agricultural modernization, renewable energy and environmental restoration. Similar pressures are being felt across Asia, where extreme heat, flooding, storms and other climate hazards are placing growing demands on infrastructure, agriculture and public services. The region's rapid economic growth makes it both highly exposed to environmental risks and central to global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Europe continued to advance policies aimed at reducing emissions and expanding renewable energy, while increasingly linking climate policy with energy independence, industrial competitiveness and national security. In North America, the United States and Canada continued to confront wildfires, extreme weather and other climate related risks while debating the pace of the transition from fossil fuels to cleaner energy sources. In Latin America, the Amazon remained at the center of international environmental discussions, with deforestation, biodiversity protection, agricultural expansion and the rights of indigenous communities continuing to influence policy debates. For Pacific Island states, however, climate change represents a particularly immediate threat. Rising sea levels, coastal erosion, extreme weather and changing patterns of food and water availability are placing pressure on communities whose economies and territorial security are closely tied to the ocean. Consequently, Pacific leaders continue to call on major emitters to strengthen climate action and uphold efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Global Health and Humanitarian Affairs Health and humanitarian challenges continued to intersect with conflict, displacement, climate change and economic insecurity. Across Africa, health systems in several countries remained under pressure from armed conflict, population displacement and disease outbreaks. The Democratic Republic of the Congo's experience with Ebola has underscored the continuing importance of rapid disease surveillance, vaccination and international cooperation, while access to affordable treatment for conditions such as sickle cell disease remains an important public health priority. In conflict affected areas, the destruction of health infrastructure and displacement of communities further complicate efforts to provide basic medical services. In Asia, governments continued to strengthen disease surveillance and preparedness based on lessons from previous global outbreaks. Dense populations, rapid urbanization and extensive international travel make regional cooperation especially important in limiting the spread of infectious diseases. Europe, for its part, continued to strengthen public health preparedness while confronting the combined pressures of aging populations, migration and growing demands on health systems. Across the Americas, unequal access to healthcare, infectious diseases, chronic illnesses and humanitarian emergencies remained important concerns, with Haiti providing a particularly clear example of how insecurity can severely disrupt healthcare delivery. The humanitarian consequences of conflict remained especially severe in the Middle East, where displacement and damage to health services continued to place civilian populations at risk. Humanitarian organizations have therefore continued to call for civilian protection and expanded access to medical assistance. Meanwhile, Pacific countries face distinctive health risks associated with climate change, including heat stress, food insecurity, water shortages and the spread of climate sensitive diseases, demonstrating how environmental pressures can increasingly become public health emergencies. Diplomacy and International Relations Diplomatic activity during the week reflected the growing need for countries to address security, economic and environmental challenges collectively. In Africa, governments continued to strengthen partnerships focused on trade, investment, peace and development, while regional organizations faced continued pressure to improve mechanisms for resolving conflicts and responding to unconstitutional changes of government. In Europe, the Ukraine conflict remained a dominant issue in diplomatic discussions as governments sought to maintain support for Ukraine while preserving transatlantic cooperation and addressing the continent's energy and security concerns. Across Asia, strategic competition involving China, the United States, India, Japan and other major powers continued to shape diplomatic relations. Economic partnerships, maritime security, technology and supply chains have increasingly become integral components of foreign policy, illustrating how diplomacy is no longer confined to traditional political and security matters. In the Middle East, diplomatic efforts remained focused on containing regional conflicts and preventing further escalation, particularly as tensions involving Iran and the United States demonstrated how instability in the region can affect international security and the global economy. At the same time, Pacific island states continued to use international diplomacy to elevate climate change, ocean governance and sustainable development as central foreign policy and security priorities. Their efforts reflect a broader shift in international diplomacy toward recognizing environmental and developmental challenges as matters of global security. Technology, Innovation and Strategic Competition Technology remained another major arena of international competition, with the United States continuing to occupy a central position in global efforts involving artificial intelligence, semiconductors, advanced computing and other strategic technologies. Asian economies, particularly China, Japan, South Korea and India, continued to expand investment in artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, electric vehicles and renewable technologies. As a result, technological competition is becoming increasingly intertwined with national security, economic independence and control over strategic supply chains. Europe likewise continued efforts to strengthen technological sovereignty and reduce dependence on external suppliers for critical technologies, energy systems and digital infrastructure. In Africa, governments are increasingly turning to digital transformation, artificial intelligence, fintech and digital public infrastructure to expand economic opportunities and improve public services. Latin American countries are similarly seeking to develop digital economies and technology-based industries while attracting investment in critical minerals and clean energy technologies. For Pacific Island countries, the technological challenge is somewhat different but equally important. Reliable digital connectivity remains essential for improving access to education, healthcare, disaster response and international markets. Thus, while major powers compete over advanced technologies, smaller and developing economies continue to focus on ensuring that digital transformation contributes to inclusion, resilience and sustainable development. Food, Water and Human Security Food and water security remained closely linked to conflict, climate change and economic conditions. In Africa, food insecurity continued to be driven by conflict, drought, displacement and economic pressures, making investment in irrigation, agricultural productivity and climate resilient farming increasingly important for long term stability. In Asia, water shortages, food prices and agricultural resilience remained significant concerns, particularly as climate change places additional pressure on freshwater resources and food production. The Middle East continued to face particularly acute water security challenges, where limited freshwater resources, population growth, climate change and political tensions are increasing competition over water. In Europe, the continuing consequences of the Ukraine war remained relevant to agricultural markets, grain supplies and fertilizer prices, with effects extending well beyond the continent. The Americas continued to serve as major suppliers of agricultural commodities to global markets, meaning that droughts, floods and other climate shocks in North and South America can influence food prices and supply chains worldwide. Pacific island states, meanwhile, remain especially vulnerable to food and water insecurity because of limited arable land, dependence on imported food and the growing effects of rising sea levels and extreme weather. These pressures illustrate how food, water and environmental security are increasingly inseparable and why solutions require cooperation across regions rather than isolated national responses. Global Outlook The week's developments demonstrate that peace, economic security, climate change, health, food security, technology and diplomacy can no longer be treated as separate global issues. A conflict in one region can disrupt energy supplies and food markets thousands of kilometers away. Climate shocks can increase food insecurity, displacement and migration, while health emergencies can quickly become economic and humanitarian crises. Similarly, diplomatic tensions can influence trade, investment, technology and access to strategic resources. Looking ahead, global developments are likely to be shaped not only by individual conflicts or national policies but also by the ability of countries to cooperate across regions. The challenge for the international community is increasingly interconnected: maintaining peace while building resilient economies, responding to climate change, protecting public health, securing food and water supplies, and ensuring that technological and economic transformation creates opportunities across all continents. Sources: The roundup draws on reporting and analysis from major international and regional media and institutional sources including Reuters, AP, BBC, Al Jazeera, The Guardian, CNN, France 24, DW, Africanews, Euronews, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Bloomberg and Financial Times.

By Staff Writer Sept. 4, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia closed the 2018 Ethiopian calendar year with a week marked by accelerating economic transformation, expanding digital ambitions and a more assertive focus on strategic national interests. From agriculture and exports to digitalization, housing finance, water resources and maritime access, developments during the final days of the year pointed to an emerging national agenda centered on productive capacity, economic resilience, strategic autonomy and deeper integration into regional and global markets. The five-day Pagume programme provided a platform for the government to take stock of progress in economic reform, agriculture, infrastructure, renewable energy, technology and national resilience while outlining priorities for the year ahead. The figures presented during the week offered concrete indicators of the scale of this transformation. More than 33.5 million hectares were cultivated during the 2025/26 fiscal year, producing more than 1.85 billion quintals of agricultural output, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. Livestock exports generated 128.3 million USD, up from about $95 million previously, an increase of more than 35 percent. Ethiopia also earned more than 11.2 billion USD in export revenues during the 2018 Ethiopian fiscal year and has set a target of 13.4 billion USD for 2026/27, reflecting an intensified drive to expand exports, generate foreign exchange and move toward higher-value production. Taken together, these developments signal an economy seeking not only faster growth but also a stronger productive base capable of reducing import dependence, easing foreign-exchange pressures and strengthening resilience to external shocks. Economic Transformation: From Reform to Productive Capacity Economic transformation emerged as the defining theme of the week. As Ethiopia prepared to enter a new calendar year, the Government Communication Service used Pagume to highlight what it described as progress in macroeconomic stability, revenue mobilization, exports, agricultural and industrial production, renewable energy and major infrastructure development. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed placed these achievements within a broader national sovereignty and self-reliance agenda, pointing to rising wheat production, expanding domestic manufacturing and initiatives such as Yelemat Trufat (Bounty of the Basket) and Made in Ethiopia. The direction reflects Ethiopia’s ongoing Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda, which seeks to address macroeconomic imbalances, strengthen the foreign-exchange market, improve debt sustainability and create greater space for private-sector investment. The emerging model is therefore about more than growth. It is increasingly about producing more, processing more, exporting more and competing more effectively in global markets. Agriculture: A Pillar of Economic Sovereignty Agriculture remains central to Ethiopia’s transformation because it links food security, employment, rural incomes, exports and industrial development. The reported cultivation of more than 33.5 million hectares and agricultural output exceeding 1.85 billion quintals underscore the scale of the sector. The government is seeking to raise productivity through irrigation, mechanization, improved seeds, fertilizer production, livestock development and agro-processing, with the longer-term goal of moving from predominantly subsistence-oriented agriculture toward a more productive and commercially integrated sector. Wheat production has acquired particular strategic importance. Expanding domestic wheat output can reduce import requirements while conserving scarce foreign exchange, making agricultural productivity increasingly relevant to the country’s broader economic sovereignty agenda. Livestock exports offer another avenue for value creation. Ethiopia’s 128.3 million USD in livestock export earnings during the 2018 Ethiopian fiscal year highlights the potential to expand foreign-exchange earnings through greater processing capacity and higher-value meat and livestock products. However, sustaining these gains will require continued investment in irrigation, rural infrastructure, market access, productivity, food-system resilience and household purchasing power. Digital Transformation Opens a New Economic Frontier Digitalization is rapidly becoming another pillar of Ethiopia’s economic transformation. Ethio Telecom’s 2026/27 business plan targets 295 billion birr in revenue, a 36.7 percent increase from the previous year. It also aims to expand its customer base to 96.2 million and mobile data and internet users to more than 60 million. The ambition goes beyond telecommunications. Under its three-year “Next Horizon: Digital & Beyond” strategy, Ethio Telecom is seeking to expand into digital financial services, cloud computing, enterprise solutions, digital platforms and artificial intelligence. The shift reflects a broader national effort to use digital infrastructure to expand financial inclusion, support entrepreneurship, modernize public services and connect a growing population to the digital economy. Housing Finance Signals Deeper Financial-Sector Reform Another significant development was the agreement between the National Bank of Ethiopia and the International Finance Corporation to establish a dedicated Mortgage Refinance Company. The institution will have 100 billion Birr in capital, with the IFC committing at least 200 million USD. The initiative is intended to ease liquidity constraints in the banking system and expand mortgage financing. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who witnessed the signing of the Framework for Cooperation, said the partnership would support the government’s ambition to provide 1.5 million affordable and dignified homes while increasing private-sector participation. Beyond housing, expanded mortgage finance could stimulate construction, employment, financial intermediation and household asset formation, while contributing to the development of Ethiopia’s financial sector. Strategic Water Resources and Abay/Nile Perhaps the week’s most consequential strategic debate centered on Ethiopia’s water resources and the equitable utilization of the Abay/Nile. Fekahmed Negash, Chairperson of the Advisory Team on Transboundary Water and GERD at the Ministry of Water and Energy, highlighted the substantial evaporation losses experienced by downstream reservoirs. In an interview with ENA, Fekahmed said downstream reservoirs could lose up to 20 billion cubic meters of water annually through evaporation, with the Aswan High Dam alone accounting for an estimated 15–16 billion cubic meters in annual losses. He argued that Ethiopia’s highland geography provides favorable conditions for water storage, particularly in deep and relatively cool gorges where evaporation can be minimized. According to Fekahmed, highland storage can also provide wider benefits, including sediment retention, longer downstream dam lifespans, flood regulation and opportunities for cascade hydropower generation. He called for a unified basin-wide framework through which Nile countries could maximize the river’s shared benefits. The discussion comes as Ethiopia continues to emphasize the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of transboundary water resources, while presenting water development as essential to agriculture, energy generation and economic growth. Historical Equity Enters Abay Debate The strategic water debate also took on a historical and economic dimension. Former State Minister for Irrigation Development Birhanu Lenjiso argued that Ethiopia has legitimate grounds to seek redress for historical economic losses, foregone development opportunities and longstanding inequities in Abay/Nile utilization. His argument adds a development perspective to Ethiopia’s longstanding position that the Nile should be utilized equitably and in a manner that supports the development aspirations of all basin countries. The debate increasingly extends beyond water itself to questions of energy security, food production, economic development and regional cooperation. Red Sea Access: Economic Imperative Meets Strategic Interest Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable access to the Red Sea also remained prominent during the week. Education Minister Professor Berhanu Nega described access to the sea as a logical, historical and economic imperative, linking the issue to Ethiopia’s demographic realities, economic interests and national security. For a large landlocked economy, maritime connectivity has direct implications for the cost and competitiveness of imports and exports, foreign-exchange flows, supply-chain resilience and access to international markets. Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions are therefore increasingly intertwined with its broader economic strategy. Water resources, energy, trade corridors and maritime connectivity are emerging as interconnected components of the country’s long-term economic and strategic outlook. Regional Connectivity and Digital Logistics Advance The same emphasis on economic integration was evident in Ethiopia’s engagement with the Horn of Africa Initiative Trade Ministers Meeting, which highlighted the importance of trade corridors, connectivity and trade-facilitating infrastructure. Meanwhile, Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics launched a digital customer self-service platform aimed at modernizing port and cargo operations. The platform provides services including cargo tracking, booking, demurrage management, digital payments and complaints handling, helping reduce reliance on paper-based procedures and streamline import-export operations. The move illustrates how Ethiopia’s economic transformation is increasingly extending beyond production to the digital modernization of trade and logistics. Pagume and the Narrative of National Revival The government’s decision to organize Pagume under the theme “Ethiopia’s Revival” was significant both economically and politically. Rather than treating the final five days of the Ethiopian calendar simply as a period of celebration, the programme served as a national stocktaking exercise and a platform for presenting a forward-looking development narrative. The five days focused respectively on breakthrough, revival, resilience, diversity, and the future and digital transformation. The framework sought to connect individual achievements and projects to a broader national story centered on renewal, resilience and economic self-reliance. Looking Ahead: From Growth to Strategic Autonomy The final week of the 2018 Ethiopian calendar year offered a snapshot of a country seeking to redefine the foundations of its economic future. Agricultural expansion is being linked to food security and industrialization. Domestic manufacturing is being promoted to reduce import dependence. Digitalization is opening new economic frontiers. Housing finance is being connected to financial-sector development. Export expansion is becoming increasingly important for foreign-exchange generation. And water resources and maritime connectivity are being framed as strategic pillars of long-term economic security. The challenge now is implementation. Production gains and ambitious targets will have their greatest impact if they translate into higher household incomes, more jobs, stronger private investment, improved food security and greater international competitiveness. Ethiopia’s economic transformation is consequently becoming broader than a conventional growth agenda. It is increasingly a project to build the productive capacity, infrastructure, technology, financial systems and regional connectivity needed to sustain growth and strengthen strategic autonomy. As Ethiopia enters a new year, the emerging direction is clear: produce more, add more value, export more, digitize faster and deepen regional economic integration. If sustained and effectively implemented, this trajectory could reshape not only Ethiopia’s domestic economy but also its strategic position in the Horn of Africa and its role in the wider African and global economy.

Inside Cairo Necolonial Political Establishment and Its Longstanding Strategy to Contain Ethiopia By Yordanos D. Sept. 4, 2026 (ENA) Egypt’s relationship with Ethiopia has evolved beyond a dispute over Abay (Nile) waters into a broader strategic rivalry involving political influence, regional security, maritime access and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Over decades, the two countries’ competing interests have intersected with developments in Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea, while Ethiopia’s efforts to expand its economic capacity, develop its water resources and regain diversified access to the sea have added new dimensions to the relationship. The pattern of competition can be examined through the historical role of Nile politics, regional alliances, security cooperation and the wider struggle for strategic influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The Roots of the Confrontation The roots of the rivalry lie partly in geography, as the largest share of the Abay’s water originates in the Ethiopian highlands. Egypt, as a downstream country, has historically depended heavily on Ethiopia’s Blue Nile for its population and development. Although the river is a shared resource that can support the development of all the countries through which it flows, Egyptian officials have consistently opposed upstream countries’ efforts to use their water resources for development. Egypt has sought to invoke the 1929 Anglo Egyptian Nile Agreement and the 1959 Egyptian Sudanese Nile Agreement in Nile water politics. However, neither agreement included Ethiopia or other upstream countries as parties. Despite Egypt’s repeated efforts to use these agreements as a basis for its position on Nile waters, agreements concluded without the participation of upstream countries, including Ethiopia, cannot permanently prevent those countries from developing their own water resources. That was one of the reasons Ethiopia constructed the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which has transformed the longstanding dispute over the Nile into a new chapter. In fact, Egypt’s actions concerning Ethiopia have deep historical roots. Historical studies have linked Egyptian involvement to the Somali Ethiopian conflict. Egypt has also sought to widen its presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean by cultivating relationships with countries competing with Ethiopia and applying different forms of pressure on Ethiopia. Egypt has also been working consistently with countries around Ethiopia, including Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea aiming to put its pressure in Ethiopia. Egypt and Somalia signed a defense agreement in August 2024, expanding military and security cooperation. While both governments described the relationship as supporting Somali sovereignty and counterterrorism, the agreement attracted attention in Addis Ababa because of its timing and its connection to wider Horn of Africa rivalries. Egypt also has longstanding military ties with the Sudanese Armed Forces and has publicly supported Sudan’s military leadership since the outbreak of war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in April 2023. Egypt provides direct military support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Nevertheless, Cairo’s close relationship with Sudan’s military establishment has strategic implications for Ethiopia, particularly given the two countries’ shared border, the Al Fashaga dispute, trade routes and the wider Abay Basin security environment. Eritrea represents a particularly important dimension of Ethiopia’s maritime vulnerability. Its Red Sea coastline and ports at Massawa and Assab historically provided Ethiopia with direct access to the sea. Eritrea’s independence in 1993 transformed Ethiopia into a landlocked country dependent on neighboring states for maritime trade. Many political analysts also believe that Egypt contributed to this situation, as Egypt maintained relations with Eritrean actors during the Ethio Eritrean conflict. As part of what has been described as a longstanding strategy, Boutros Boutros Ghali has also been mentioned as one of the figures associated with developments surrounding Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia. Boutros Ghali and Nile Politics Many political analysts argue that Boutros Boutros Ghali occupies an important place in the history of relations between Ethiopia and Egypt. As Egypt’s foreign minister before becoming UN Secretary General, he was closely involved in Egyptian foreign policy during a period of major political transformation in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Some analysts have attributed a significant role to Boutros Ghali in Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia. Eritrea’s independence, however, resulted from decades of armed struggle the subsequent referendum. From Cairo to the halls of the United Nations, Egyptian politicians pushed to hasten Eritrea’s separation, striking at the heart of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. Boutros Ghali was also one of the most prominent Egyptian figures associated with the securitization of Nile politics. His warning that future conflicts could be fought over water became emblematic of Egypt’s perception of the Nile as a national security issue. Under President Abdel Fattah el Sisi, Egypt’s policy toward Ethiopia has continued with a stronger military and geopolitical dimension. Cairo has strengthened relations with Somalia, maintained close ties with Sudan’s military establishment and preserved strategic relations with Eritrea, while continuing its opposition to Ethiopia’s position on the Nile and its pursuit of diversified maritime access. Egypt’s October 2024 political declaration with Somalia was issued in Asmara in the presence of Eritrean regime’s leader and called for expanded cooperation and stronger Somali security capabilities. The development was viewed in Ethiopia as contributing to an emerging regional alignment with implications for Ethiopia’s stability and development. Interference in Internal Affairs It is also alleged that Egypt has interfered in Ethiopia’s internal affairs by supporting or maintaining contacts with opposition and armed groups. Egypt was accused of interference during periods of unrest in the past, including allegations of armed groups. Such external support for armed or political actors, where established, can intensify existing divisions and prolong insecurity. Egypt has been accused of exploiting domestic disagreements whenever they serve Cairo’s broader regional interests. Support, financing, training, diplomatic backing or logistical assistance to armed groups, if established, could increase their ability to sustain conflict and place additional pressure on the Ethiopian state. Pressure on Stability and Development Egypt has persistently pursued measures that could retard Ethiopia’s development and increase strategic pressure on the country. Ethiopia’s economic transformation depends on energy, infrastructure, industrialization, agricultural modernization, trade and reliable access to international markets. Egypt’s strategy can therefore be viewed not as a single openly declared campaign, but as a pattern of strategic pressure operating across several fronts: water diplomacy, regional alliances, military cooperation, maritime influence and engagement with internal opposition forces. However, Ethiopia has managed to withstand these pressures while confronting the challenges associated with Egypt and its regional partners. The country has continued to address the Nile dispute, navigate regional alliances and maritime competition, respond to internal security challenges and construct the GERD. It has also planned the construction of additional dams as part of its broader effort to develop its water resources. Besides, Ethiopia is strongly working to regain its position in the Red Sea, which is central not only to Ethiopia’s maritime access but also to the balance of peace and security in the region. Ethiopia’s pursuit of peaceful and diversified maritime access is part of its broader economic and national security strategy rather than simply a territorial ambition. At the same time, continued regional militarization risks turning the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea into a theater of prolonged geopolitical competition. Ethiopia’s presence in the Red Sea will therefore remain an important element of the region’s future strategic balance, despite the opposition, allegations and competing narratives surrounding its return to the Red Sea. In a nutshell, the relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt reflects a longstanding competition in which water resources, regional alliances, security interests and maritime access have remained closely interconnected. From Nile politics and the historical involvement of regional actors to contemporary security and diplomatic alignments, the rivalry has extended beyond the river itself and become part of the broader geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Ethiopia has continued to pursue its development objectives, including the utilization of its water resources, the construction of the GERD and efforts to secure peaceful and diversified maritime access. The developments demonstrate that Ethiopia’s economic transformation and maritime aspirations are increasingly connected to the wider strategic balance of the region. As competition continues, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea will remain important arenas in which political influence, economic interests, security considerations and maritime access intersect.

    With analysis from Pulse of Africa (POA) Sept. 2, 2026 (ENA) By Mahder Nesibu In a session with senior government leaders in 2023, Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, stated that his country's fortunes are intimately tied to the Nile and the Red Sea, and that these two bodies of water are fundamental factors to the country's growth or its decline. In that session, the Prime Minister set out the geographical, historical, ethnic and economic foundations of what he termed Ethiopia's legitimate need for access to the sea. The Ethiopian state has echoed that framing consistently in the years since, and securing maritime access now stands as a defined objective within Ethiopia's national interest thinking. The geographical argument begins with scale. Ethiopia sits in close proximity to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and stands as the largest country by area in a Horn of Africa region whose other states it dwarfs in size. Addis Ababa regards its landlocked status, which it has taken to describing as a geographical prison, as an unnatural condition rather than a settled fact of geography. That framing carries into a set of ethnic considerations centred on the Afar communities along the Red Sea coast, whose cultural and political centre lies within Ethiopia's own Afar region but who have been structurally separated, on both sides of the border, from the freedom to interact as one community. The separation, among many other negative consequences, severely restricted access to the Red Sea coast, and by extension to lucrative trade and resources, of significant number of Afaris who consider the sea a home. An economic imperative runs alongside these arguments. The Ethiopian economy has sustained growth of roughly ten percent a year for close to three decades, expanding its demand for engagement with the Red Sea correspondingly. Neighboring Djibouti services approximately 95% to 97% of Ethiopia's international trade, and that degree of dependence on a single conduit makes diversification a pressing concern as the economy continues to expand and requires more reliable and resilient supply chains. Demography reinforces the same case. The Horn of Africa's total population, spanning Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti, is estimated at around 170 million people, of whom Ethiopia accounts for roughly 80 percent, a population exceeding 130 million and still expanding. For Addis Ababa, this represents a structural dilemma, in that a population of this scale remains poorly connected to global maritime trade and exchange, and the toll of that disconnection grows heavier as the country's economic and demographic weight increases. The historical dimension of the argument is, in some respects, the most telling, and it is the one the Prime Minister invoked directly in referring to the Red Sea's influence over Ethiopia's periods of strength and weakness. The pattern he described holds up under scrutiny: Ethiopia's most active and prosperous historical periods have consistently coincided with its presence on the Red Sea, while its darkest moments of decline and dormancy have tended to follow its retreat from the coast, whether through internal weakness or foreign intervention. The recent past illustrates this most clearly. In his work “አሰብ የማን ናት” (“To Whom Does Assab Belong”), the Ethiopian intellectual Dr Yaqob Haile-Mariam —prominent lawyer, legal scholar and politician — revisited the question of Assab in 2011, arguing that the port had long served as a natural outlet for Ethiopia and that the Ethiopian government of the period had erred in allowing Eritrean secession to proceed without first securing an outlet to the Red Sea, an outlet he regarded as fundamental to Ethiopian statehood. He criticised Addis Ababa's lack of initiative in pursuing the matter seriously through negotiation and advocacy on international platforms. For Dr Yaqob, Assab embodies a longer sequence of historical episodes that pushed Ethiopia away from the Red Sea, even as it remained, in recent history, Ethiopia's most actively used port. Ethiopia was rendered landlocked when Eritrea seceded in May, 1993. Tracing a lineage back through the historical ports of Adulis and Zeila, Assab connected Ethiopia to the Red Sea until Eritrean secession, and continued to do so in more unconventional arrangements afterward. Dr Yaqob argued that Ethiopia's landlocked status constitutes a structural national problem, and that Assab remains the clearest historical case through which that problem should be understood and addressed. He was particularly critical of how Assab came to be left within Eritrean territory during the secession process, and of the broader terms under which Eritrea separated from Ethiopia. This fits into a considerably longer pattern. The Red Sea has functioned as a critical corridor for global commerce and connectivity since antiquity, and it was through this waterway that Axum, one of the earliest manifestations of Ethiopian civilisation, achieved its prosperity. Axum traded through its port of Adulis on the Red Sea as far as the Roman Empire and India, with that trade forming the principal pillar of a prosperity that made Axum one of the major powers of Late Antiquity. The Red Sea, as a source of state power, was equally an arena of competition. Axum's decline at the turn of the first millennium CE is generally attributed to its loss of standing as a trading power, following the emergence of the Umayyad Caliphate, which challenged Axumite control of the maritime route and forced a retreat into Ethiopia's interior. That pattern recurred through much of the second millennium, as Ethiopia repeatedly re-establish its presence on the coast and repeatedly encountered geopolitical resistance, including from the Ottoman Empire in the medieval period, which understood the strategic value of the Red Sea as clearly as Ethiopia did. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries followed a similar trajectory, though the arrival of colonialism, and later the geopolitics of two world wars and the Cold War, made the competition sharper and the Red Sea theatre considerably more complex. Italian colonialism, beginning in the late nineteenth century, marked the start of Ethiopia's modern retreat from the sea. Ethiopia's Bahr Negash resisted colonial incursions along the coast, but resistance proved insufficient to prevent Italy from annexing Ethiopia's coastal territories, a colonial advance ultimately halted at Adwa in 1896 before it could extend across the whole country. Italian colonial strategy was shaped in part by the significance of the Red Sea, beginning with the occupation of Assab and extending later into the economically rich Ethiopian interior. (The 1869 purchase of Assab was a direct private transaction between an Italian agent and local Afar leaders without the formal consent or prior knowledge of the central Ethiopian imperial government.) Although the colonial project ended in 1952, when Ethiopia regained sovereignty over what is now Eritrea, that arrangement did not endure. A secessionist movement took root in the territory and eventually reshaped the regional order entirely. The place of Eritrea within Ethiopia, referred to by Ethiopian intellectuals as the “Eritrean Affair”, is a complex question that extends well beyond the matter of maritime access, but the direction the affair ultimately took, culminating in Eritrean secession, has been shaped substantially by the question of access to the sea and by what Ethiopian analysts describe as a conspiracy to deprive Ethiopia of it. The role of External actors was crucial to that trajectory. The Eritrean secessionist movements, from the Muslim League during the federation period to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and later the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), received support from states such as Egypt, which regarded Ethiopia as a historical rival. Ethiopia's leadership has long been aware of this dynamic. In 1928, Emperor Haile Selassie, addressing the Eritrean question, spoke of his country's hope in reclaiming the territories and seaports that had been taken by its enemies. External support for Eritrean secessionism following Eritrea's unification with Ethiopia reflected a strategy pursued consistently by regional and other powers, chief among them Egypt, which shared the Red Sea with Ethiopia and viewed it as a competing power over that waterway, and which regarded Ethiopia, over the Nile even more than the Red Sea, as its principal rival. Ottoman and Egyptian incursions into the Red Sea coast during the 16th and 19th centuries systematically chipped away at the Ethiopian Empire's direct access to maritime trade ports, laying the groundwork for its modern landlocked status. Emperor Yohannes IV successfully defeated major military incursions by Khedivial Egypt—then an autonomous vassal state of the Ottoman Empire—during the Egyptian–Ethiopian War in the mid-1870s. The current Ethiopian administration has internalised this history directly. Beyond describing the Nile and the Red Sea as the twin determinants of Ethiopia's prosperity, Prime Minister Abiy's government has developed what it calls the vision of the two waters, a framework built around the geopolitical interconnection between these two bodies of water rather than treating either in isolation. The historical foundation for this argument is substantial. It runs from Ethiopia's ancient rulers, who regarded the Red Sea as a natural frontier of their state and ruled accordingly, to the country's contemporary leadership, which now treats Red Sea security as a fundamental national security interest and the possession of a reliable maritime outlet as central to that interest. Whether that outlet is eventually secured through Assab or through other arrangements, Ethiopia's pursuit of renewed access to the sea aims to reverse a historical pattern in which loss of the coast has repeatedly coincided with periods of national decline, and access to it with periods of national strength. Combined with the mounting demographic and economic imperatives now shaping Ethiopia's position, that argument rests on considerable historical and material weight. The question carries consequences that extend beyond Ethiopia itself, reaching the wider region and the international community. An Ethiopia genuinely integrated into the global maritime system would loosen a structural constraint that has long limited its growth, and given Ethiopia's scale as one of Africa's largest and most closely watched economies, that growth would carry transformative implications for the Horn of Africa and the continent more broadly. On the geopolitical side, the Red Sea has become, in recent decades, a site of considerable instability for international trade and shipping, a dilemma that concerns the international community and Ethiopia in equal measure. Dependent on the Red Sea for its commerce yet excluded from direct access to it, Ethiopia's landlocked status prevents it from playing a substantive role in addressing the security challenges that affect both itself and the wider region. Ethiopians tend to read their own history on the Red Sea as one of prosperous trade and stability, and a reliable outlet today, in their reading of that history, would allow the country to play a meaningful part in securing it once again.

By Staff Writer August 30, 2026 Ethiopia’s week unfolded at the intersection of continental diplomacy, health cooperation and the country’s broader development ambitions, with Addis Ababa once again serving as a major platform for regional and international engagement. From hosting the 76th Session of the WHO Regional Committee for Africa (RC76) to renewed national discussions on development along the Abay River and Ethiopia’s pursuit of sovereign sea access, the week highlighted a central theme: Ethiopia’s determination to advance development while deepening regional cooperation and economic integration. The developments also underscored the growing importance of the Abay River and the Red Sea in Ethiopia’s long-term economic strategy—one focused on energy security, connectivity, trade and regional prosperity. Ethiopia Hosts Africa’s Leading Health Forum Addis Ababa took center stage in Africa’s health diplomacy as Ethiopia hosted the 76th Session of the WHO Regional Committee for Africa. Co-organized by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Africa, the three-day meeting brought together President Taye Atske Selassie, African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Health Minister Dr. Mekdes Daba, and delegates from 47 WHO African Region member states, alongside ministers, global health leaders, development partners, donors and WHO representatives.   The gathering reviewed progress on regional health priorities and considered new strategies, resolutions and collective actions aimed at strengthening health systems, advancing universal health coverage, improving health security and enhancing emergency preparedness. It also provided an opportunity to showcase Ethiopia’s progress in expanding essential health services and strengthening its capacity to respond to public health emergencies. The WHO Regional Committee for Africa, the governing body of WHO’s African regional office, meets annually to shape regional health policy, review the organization’s work and establish priorities for improving health outcomes across the continent. Africa’s Health Future Must Be African-Led A strong message emerging from the gathering was the need for greater African ownership of the continent’s health agenda. President Taye Atske Selassie called for a new approach centered on African priorities, stronger integration and measurable action, arguing that the continent’s next chapter in health should be driven increasingly by domestic capacity rather than fragmented responses and prolonged dependence. External assistance, he noted, can complement national health objectives, but development support should respond to Africa’s priorities rather than being shaped primarily by reform agendas designed elsewhere. “We must not sit here and adapt to reforms designed elsewhere,” President Taye said, urging African countries instead to “shape the reform agendas” according to their own priorities and vision. AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf similarly stressed that health sovereignty is becoming an essential component of Africa’s development agenda.   He pointed to persistent and emerging challenges, including Ebola, cholera, Mpox, HIV and tuberculosis, as well as the growing burden of non-communicable diseases. At the same time, he highlighted structural constraints facing African health systems, including limited infrastructure, inadequate financing and shortages of trained health professionals. WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom noted that Africa has continued to make progress toward important health targets despite facing some of the deepest reductions in international health financing in a generation. The discussions therefore went beyond public health emergencies, touching on a broader question of how Africa can build resilient, self-reliant and sustainable development systems. Abay River: Development, Energy and Regional Cooperation Alongside health diplomacy, the Abay River remained central to Ethiopia’s national development discourse. Ethiopia views the Abay—one of the major contributors to the Nile, as a critical resource for expanding electricity generation, supporting industrialization and strengthening economic transformation. The inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) marked a major milestone in that development trajectory. The project, Africa’s largest hydropower facility, has been presented by Ethiopia as a cornerstone of its ambition to expand electricity access, accelerate industrial development and strengthen its position as a regional energy hub.   The GERD has also intensified the broader regional debate over the equitable and reasonable utilization of shared Nile waters. Ethiopia maintains that the development of its water resources should be pursued in accordance with principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, while recognizing the interests and concerns of other Nile Basin countries. Against this backdrop, former Water Minister Shiferaw Jarso told ENA that Ethiopia should remain firm in pursuing its development interests on the Abay River. He also called for Egypt to compensate Ethiopia for the use of its water resources, citing Ethiopia’s contribution of about 86 percent of the Nile’s flow through the Abay system. Shiferaw argued that continued Egyptian opposition would not prevent Ethiopia from developing additional water infrastructure and reiterated Ethiopia’s longstanding position on the equitable utilization of Nile waters. Similarly, Water Resources researcher Professor Yacob Arsano noted that Egypt’s accusations against Ethiopia over the Abay (Nile) River, despite Egypt contributing no water to the river’s flow, are baseless and completely unacceptable. He stressed that Ethiopia has no allocated share of the Nile waters under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, to which Ethiopia was not a party. “Ethiopia has a legitimate right to utilize its water resources for development while ensuring equitable and reasonable use of the Nile waters,” Professor Yacob underscored. He said Egypt has historically sought to hinder Ethiopia’s development and progress, including by supporting internal groups, to prevent the country from utilizing its abundant natural resources. Red Sea Access: From Strategic Necessity to Regional Opportunity Ethiopia’s pursuit of sovereign sea access also remained an important part of the country’s development discourse. For Africa’s second-most populous country, which is landlocked, access to maritime trade routes carries significant economic implications for logistics, trade competitiveness, industrialization and regional connectivity.   Fethi Mahdi, Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Relations and Peace Affairs Standing Committee of the House of Peoples’ Representatives, told ENA that Ethiopia’s demand for sea access extends beyond cargo handling and transshipment. He emphasized that the issue has a broader economic foundation, citing United Nations studies indicating that landlocked countries can face significant economic disadvantages compared with countries that have direct access to the sea. Ethiopia has repeatedly framed its quest for sea access around sovereign access, mutual benefit, peaceful dialogue and partnership with neighboring countries. The emphasis is increasingly shifting from the question of access alone to the larger economic possibilities that maritime connectivity could unlock for the Horn of Africa: expanded trade, integrated infrastructure, investment, industrial corridors and stronger regional markets. In this sense, Ethiopia’s maritime ambition can potentially become not only a national economic project but also an opportunity for regional economic integration and shared prosperity. Thailand-Ethiopia Ties Gain Strategic Momentum Ethiopia’s diplomatic engagement also gained momentum during the week with the official visit of Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sihasak Phuangketkeow. The visit reflected Thailand’s interest in deepening its bilateral relationship with Ethiopia while expanding its engagement with Africa through the African Union, headquartered in Addis Ababa. Phuangketkeow said his visit had two strategic objectives: strengthening Thailand’s partnership with Ethiopia and broadening Thailand’s engagement with Africa through the AU.   The development points to Addis Ababa’s continuing importance as a diplomatic bridge between Africa and the wider world. Beyond traditional political relations, Ethiopia and Thailand have opportunities to expand cooperation in trade, investment, technology, tourism, agriculture, manufacturing and connectivity, potentially linking Southeast Asian expertise and markets with Africa’s growing economic opportunities. The relationship therefore carries significance beyond bilateral diplomacy, particularly as both sides seek new partnerships in an increasingly interconnected global economy. Ethiopia Pushes Youth-Centered Growth Through BRICS Ethiopia also used the BRICS platform to advance its economic and development priorities, calling for stronger investment in Africa’s young population. At the BRICS Youth Ministers’ Meeting in Visakhapatnam, India, the Ethiopian delegation called for dedicated financing mechanisms for youth-led enterprises and greater investment in digital and green technologies. With more than 70 percent of Ethiopia’s population under the age of 30, the delegation emphasized that young people should be viewed not simply as beneficiaries of development but as drivers of innovation, entrepreneurship, productivity and economic transformation.   The call for dedicated financing and joint investment reflects Ethiopia’s broader push to connect its youthful population with emerging opportunities in technology, green development and entrepreneurship. A Week Defined by Development and Diplomacy Taken together, the week offered a snapshot of Ethiopia’s increasingly interconnected development agenda. Hosting Africa’s leading health forum reinforced Addis Ababa’s role as a center of continental diplomacy. Discussions over the Abay River highlighted Ethiopia’s determination to expand energy and water-resource development. The pursuit of sea access underscored the economic importance of maritime connectivity, while engagement with Thailand and BRICS demonstrated Ethiopia’s effort to diversify partnerships and mobilize new opportunities for investment, technology and trade. These developments point toward a broader strategic vision in which development, diplomacy and economic integration increasingly reinforce one another. For Ethiopia, the challenge ahead is not simply to pursue national development objectives, but to translate them into platforms for cooperation that can generate benefits beyond its borders. The Abay River can become a foundation for energy and economic transformation; improved maritime connectivity can strengthen regional trade; health cooperation can build continental resilience; and youth investment can drive the next generation of African growth. Ultimately, Ethiopia’s evolving development narrative is increasingly about turning strategic geography and natural resources into engines of economic opportunity—while building partnerships capable of converting regional challenges into shared solutions.

By Staff Writer August 30, 2026 The final week of August was marked by intensifying geopolitical competition, continuing wars, humanitarian emergencies, economic uncertainty and devastating natural disasters. From the Middle East and Europe to Africa, Asia and Latin America, governments confronted a series of crises that demonstrated the increasingly interconnected nature of global security, economics, public health and climate change. The Middle East remained at the center of international attention as the United States intensified economic pressure on Iran while diplomatic efforts continued to ease tensions surrounding the strategically important Strait of Hormuz. In Europe, Russia's-Ukraine war remained intense despite renewed diplomatic contacts involving Washington and Moscow. Africa faced several overlapping challenges, including a worsening Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, continuing conflict and infrastructure destruction in Sudan, and the deepening security and humanitarian crisis in Haiti. In Asia, China and India sought to maintain stability along their disputed border, while China continued to confront economic difficulties and growing international trade pressure. The global economy remained vulnerable to geopolitical developments. Oil markets responded to changing expectations over the situation around Hormuz, while concerns about inflation, debt, trade tensions and monetary policy continued to weigh on governments and investors. At the same time, severe natural disasters highlighted the growing vulnerability of communities to climate related risks. Catastrophic flooding in the Himalayan region caused extensive loss of life and destruction, while rescue teams struggled to reach affected communities. Middle East: Iran Crisis and the Struggle Over Hormuz The Middle East once again dominated the international agenda as the confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran continued to reshape regional security and global energy markets. Washington intensified its economic campaign against Tehran during the week, targeting entities and networks linked to Iran's economy and seeking to discourage other countries from maintaining significant commercial relations with the country. The United States also warned foreign governments and companies that continued economic engagement with Iran could expose them to secondary sanctions. The approach demonstrated Washington's attempt to combine economic pressure with diplomatic and strategic measures. However, Iran rejected the American pressure, describing the sanctions as hostile and insisting that such measures would not force Tehran to abandon its strategic interests. The most immediate international concern remained the Strait of Hormuz, a vital energy and shipping corridor. The confrontation has disrupted normal commercial activity in the area and increased the risks and costs associated with transporting energy. Diplomatic efforts continued during the week to reduce tensions and create conditions for shipping to gradually return to normal. Qatar, Pakistan and Oman remained involved in efforts to maintain communication between the parties. The possibility of progress in diplomacy also influenced international energy markets, with oil prices easing as concerns about a prolonged disruption appeared to moderate. However, uncertainty remained because shipping activity through the waterway had not fully returned to normal. The significance of the crisis extends beyond oil. Disruption around Hormuz can increase shipping costs, insurance premiums, fertilizer prices and food costs, potentially adding to inflationary pressure in economies far from the Middle East. The conflict has also affected the strategic calculations of Gulf countries. Months of confrontation have raised questions about existing regional security arrangements and the ability of governments to protect critical infrastructure and international shipping routes. Gaza and the West Bank The humanitarian and security situation in the Palestinian territories remained deeply concerning. Despite efforts to maintain a ceasefire arrangement, violence continued in Gaza and the West Bank. Israeli military operations and clashes demonstrated the fragility of the ceasefire and the difficulty of achieving a lasting reduction in violence. The continuing insecurity has complicated international efforts to stabilize Gaza and establish a longer-term political framework. Disagreements over security, governance, disarmament and the future administration of Gaza continue to obstruct progress toward a durable settlement. In the West Bank, tensions involving Israeli settlers and Palestinian communities added another layer of instability. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned settler violence, while Washington also expressed strong criticism of attacks against Palestinians. The Gaza crisis continues to affect international diplomacy far beyond the Palestinian territories. It remains an important factor in Israel's relations with European governments, Arab states and the wider Muslim world, while also being closely connected to the broader confrontation involving Iran and other regional actors. Europe: Ukraine War and Renewed Diplomatic Contacts Russia's war against Ukraine continued to cause extensive destruction, with Russian missile and drone attacks targeting Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. One of the week's most serious incidents involved a powerful explosion near Kyiv after a Russian strike on an ammunition storage facility. The incident caused significant casualties and damage to nearby structures and prompted Ukrainian authorities to review ammunition storage procedures. The incident came amid continued Russian attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, industrial facilities, ports and logistics centers as Ukraine prepares for another difficult winter. Ukraine also continued attacks against Russian energy and industrial infrastructure. The increasingly reciprocal targeting of economic and logistical facilities demonstrates that both sides are seeking to weaken the other's ability to sustain the war. Yet alongside the fighting, diplomatic activity showed signs of renewed movement. Ukrainian officials indicated that technical discussions could resume, although they cautioned against expecting an immediate breakthrough. Territorial control remains one of the most difficult issues separating Moscow and Kyiv, with Russia continuing to demand territorial concessions that Ukraine rejects. There were also reports of renewed contacts between Washington and Moscow concerning the possibility of high-level negotiations involving the leaders of the United States, Russia and Ukraine. The diplomatic developments have created an unusual contrast. On the battlefield, the conflict remains intense. At the diplomatic level, Washington is exploring possible channels for negotiations. Whether the two tracks can eventually converge remains uncertain. Russia continues to seek territorial concessions and security guarantees, while Ukraine insists on protecting its territorial integrity and obtaining stronger international security assurances. Africa One of Africa's most serious public health emergencies continued to unfold in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where an Ebola outbreak has expanded across several areas. The outbreak is particularly difficult to contain because it is occurring in communities affected by insecurity, displacement and limited health infrastructure. virus involved is the Bundibugyo species of Ebola, which presents particular challenges for health authorities because the medical tools available for some other Ebola strains are not directly applicable in the same way. The World Health Organization and African health institutions have intensified surveillance, contact tracing, treatment and community engagement efforts. Health authorities have emphasized that public cooperation is essential to controlling the outbreak. Mistrust, misinformation and insecurity can make it difficult for medical teams to identify cases, trace contacts and provide treatment. The spread of the outbreak also creates concerns for neighboring countries because population movements across borders can facilitate transmission. Uganda has made progress in controlling Ebola transmission, but its proximity to eastern Congo continues to present a risk. Other neighboring countries also face challenges because of population displacement and limited health infrastructure. The Congo outbreak is therefore not simply a national public health emergency. It represents a broader regional health security challenge requiring cooperation among Central and East African countries. Asia China and India took steps to reduce tensions along their disputed Himalayan border. Following high level discussions, the two governments reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace and stability along the frontier. They also agreed to strengthen communication and continue efforts toward resolving their differences through dialogue. The development is significant because relations between the two Asian powers have been affected by years of border tensions. For Beijing and New Delhi, maintaining stability is increasingly important as both countries seek to concentrate on economic development while expanding their influence in international affairs. China remains one of India's most important economic partners, while India is seeking to strengthen its position in global manufacturing, technology and diplomacy. Improved communication could reduce the possibility of military incidents even though the underlying territorial disagreements remain unresolved. The Global Economy: Energy, Debt and Interest Rates The global economy demonstrated considerable resilience but remained vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. International economic institutions continued to warn that disruptions in energy markets could revive inflationary pressures. A sustained increase in energy prices would make it more difficult for central banks to reduce interest rates and could raise borrowing costs for governments, businesses and households. High public debt, trade tensions and geopolitical uncertainty remain significant risks to the global economic outlook. Central banks therefore face a difficult balancing act. They must contain inflation without weakening economic activity at a time when governments are already carrying heavy debt burdens. Financial markets are closely watching developments in energy markets, interest rates, currencies and international trade. The Iran crisis has demonstrated once again how quickly a regional conflict can become a global economic issue. Japan and the Yen Currency markets also remained under pressure. The Japanese yen continued to trade weakly against the U.S. dollar, raising concerns about the wider effects of currency instability. Japanese authorities have previously taken measures to prevent disorderly movements in the currency, while U.S. officials have warned that sharp fluctuations could create instability in global financial markets. The yen's importance extends beyond Japan because the country is deeply integrated into international financial markets. Major currency movements can affect investment flows, government bond markets and international borrowing conditions. The situation also reflects broader uncertainty over monetary policy in the United States, Japan and Europe. Natural Disasters One of the week's most devastating natural disasters occurred in the Himalayan region along the Nepal China border. A major glacier related flood triggered destructive flows of water, mud and debris, causing widespread damage and loss of life. Communities were cut off as landslides destroyed roads and damaged infrastructure. Rescue operations were complicated by unstable terrain, continuing rainfall and difficult mountain conditions. Hydropower infrastructure was also affected, while some people were believed to have become trapped in tunnels connected to development projects. China and Nepal mobilized rescue teams and requested additional technical assistance as authorities attempted to reach isolated communities and identify missing people. The disaster has renewed concerns about the vulnerability of Himalayan communities to glacier instability and climate change. Mountain regions are particularly exposed to sudden flooding, landslides and other hazards associated with changing temperatures and unstable glacial systems. The tragedy also demonstrates how climate related disasters are increasingly connected to infrastructure, food security, energy supply and regional development. Climate and Environmental Pressure The week also highlighted the broader climate pressures facing different parts of the world. Wildfires, heatwaves, floods and extreme weather events continue to place pressure on governments and emergency services across Europe, North America, Africa and Asia. Developing countries face particular difficulties because their emergency response systems often have fewer resources and their populations may have less capacity to recover from disasters. Climate change is also placing growing pressure on agriculture, water resources and public health. For Africa, the combination of conflict, food insecurity and climate shocks presents especially serious risks. Drought, flooding and extreme heat can quickly transform local economic difficulties into humanitarian emergencies. The challenge for governments is therefore not simply responding to individual disasters but strengthening resilience before disasters occur. International Trade and the G20 Global economic diplomacy is receiving greater attention as governments prepare for discussions under the G20 framework. Issues including global growth, trade imbalances, sovereign debt, supply chains and access to critical resources are expected to remain central to international economic discussions. The meetings come at a time when economic relations are increasingly influenced by geopolitical competition. The United States is pushing for what it describes as fair competition and more balanced trade relations. China faces criticism over its export driven economic model, while Europe is concerned about competitiveness, energy security and its economic relationship with Washington. Developing countries are seeking greater access to markets, investment, technology and affordable financing. The central question is whether the G20 can continue to provide a platform for cooperation at a time when major powers are increasingly pursuing competing economic and strategic interests. Technology and Artificial Intelligence Artificial intelligence remained an important driver of the global economy. Investment in AI infrastructure, advanced computing and robotics continued to expand even as some traditional manufacturing sectors faced difficulties. The United States remains a major center of AI investment, while China is rapidly expanding its capabilities in artificial intelligence, robotics and advanced manufacturing. China's robotics industry received particular attention during the week as Beijing hosted a major international robotics event showcasing advances in automation and industrial technology. The competition over AI is increasingly connected to semiconductor production, electricity generation, data centers and national security. Governments increasingly view advanced computing as a strategic asset rather than simply a commercial technology. This is creating a new form of international competition in which economic policy, industrial policy, technological development and national security are becoming increasingly interconnected. Latin America: Venezuela Latin America witnessed significant political and economic developments during the week, with an emerging energy relationship between Venezuela and the United States standing out as one of the most consequential. Washington’s reported agreement to give American companies a major role in developing Venezuela’s oil resources could mark a significant shift in relations between the two countries and open a new phase of economic engagement. The development comes as Venezuela seeks to revive its oil industry after years of underinvestment, economic difficulties, international sanctions, political instability and deteriorating infrastructure. Despite possessing some of the world’s largest proven oil reserves, Venezuela has struggled to maintain production capacity and fully capitalize on its petroleum resources. If implemented successfully, greater involvement by U.S. companies could bring much needed investment, technology and technical expertise to Venezuela’s energy sector. A recovery in Venezuelan oil production could also increase supplies to international markets and contribute to greater flexibility in global energy trade. For Washington, the arrangement carries both economic and strategic significance. Additional Venezuelan oil supplies could provide an alternative source of crude at a time when global energy markets remain vulnerable to disruptions linked to conflicts and instability in the Middle East. Closer energy ties with Caracas could also give the United States greater influence over Venezuela’s economic trajectory and its engagement with the wider Western Hemisphere. For Venezuela, renewed access to Western investment and technology could accelerate the rehabilitation of its petroleum infrastructure, increase export earnings and provide additional government revenue. However, the prospects for a sustained recovery will depend on political stability, the legal and regulatory framework governing foreign investment, sanctions policy and the ability of companies to rebuild production infrastructure that has deteriorated over many years. The development also has wider geopolitical implications. Venezuela has maintained close economic and political relationships with countries such as China and Russia. A stronger economic relationship with the United States could therefore alter Venezuela’s external partnerships and influence the broader balance of power in the Western Hemisphere. The emerging U.S. Venezuela energy relationship nevertheless faces considerable uncertainties. Questions remain over the implementation of the agreement, the scale and speed of potential investment, the future of sanctions and Venezuela’s domestic political environment. Restoring the country’s oil industry to substantially higher production levels will also require significant capital, infrastructure rehabilitation and sustained technical investment. Beyond Venezuela, Latin American governments continued to confront a range of longstanding challenges, including migration, organized crime, economic inequality, weak institutions and political polarization. Haiti’s worsening security situation remained a major regional concern, while governments across the continent continued to balance domestic economic pressures with demands for greater social stability and public security. The developments underscore the increasingly interconnected nature of Latin America’s political, economic and energy affairs. Venezuela’s oil recovery, in particular, could have consequences extending beyond its borders, affecting regional diplomacy, U.S. energy policy and global oil markets. Conclusion The final week of August offered little evidence that the world's major crises are nearing resolution. Instead, it revealed a global system under simultaneous pressure from war, economic rivalry, humanitarian emergencies, public health threats and climate related disasters. Yet there were also signs of diplomacy and cooperation. China and India renewed efforts to stabilize their border relationship. International mediators continued working to reduce tensions around Hormuz. Washington explored renewed diplomatic contacts over Ukraine. International health organizations intensified efforts to contain Ebola in Congo. Rescue teams in the Himalayan region continued working to reach communities affected by catastrophic flooding. The central challenge for the international community is therefore not simply to manage individual crises but to prevent them from reinforcing one another. Energy insecurity can deepen inflation. Inflation can increase social pressure. War can disrupt food and energy supplies. Climate disasters can intensify displacement. Displacement can place additional pressure on fragile states. Weak institutions can make countries more vulnerable to armed groups, disease and economic shocks. The events of this week demonstrate that the global order is entering a period in which security, economics, health, climate and technology are increasingly inseparable. As September begins, the direction of major conflicts and diplomatic initiatives will determine whether the international community moves toward greater stability or faces another period of escalation. Sources: The roundup draws on reporting and background information from Reuters, AP, BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, France 24, DW, The Guardian, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Financial Times, Bloomberg, CNBC, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal.

By Tewodros Habenom August 29, 2026 For more than a decade, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has stood at the center of one of Africa’s most consequential geopolitical and hydropower shifts. Yet reducing Egypt’s unfounded propaganda against Ethiopia over water risks missing a larger and increasingly important story. Egypt’s opposition to Ethiopia’s development of the Abay (Nile) River did not begin with the GERD, and Cairo’s latest escalation about Ethiopia’s plans to develop additional water infrastructure cannot be understood in isolation. They form part of a broader strategic contest involving water security, regional influence, the Red Sea, Ethiopia’s internal politics and the shifting balance of power in the Horn of Africa. The central question, therefore, is no longer simply how the two countries should manage the Nile. It is whether a dispute over a river is gradually becoming a wider struggle over Ethiopia’s strategic choices and regional position. A dispute that escaped the negotiating table The most revealing evidence that the dispute has long extended beyond technical questions of water came into public view in 2013. During a meeting chaired by then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi to discuss the GERD crisis, several Egyptian political figures were inadvertently heard discussing possible ways of pressuring Ethiopia. The meeting was being broadcast live, apparently without all participants realizing that their comments were on air. The statements were extraordinary. Younis Makhyoun, then head of Egypt’s Al-Nour Party, suggested supporting Ethiopian opposition movements as a means of putting pressure on Addis Ababa. He specifically referred to the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front. He also discussed strengthening Egypt’s relations with Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti and viewing those relationships as potential pressure points against Ethiopia. Ayman Nour, then head of the Ghad al-Thawra Party, went even further. He advocated a political and intelligence presence capable of engaging with Ethiopia’s internal affairs and argued that relations with Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti could constitute an important card for pressuring the giant East African nation. Contemporary reporting recorded his call for political, intelligence and military teams to operate in Ethiopia. These were not diplomatic communiqués. Nor should statements by individual politicians automatically be treated as proof of a formal, enduring Egyptian state policy. But their significance cannot simply be dismissed. They exposed, in unusually direct fashion, the thinking circulating within an influential segment of Egypt’s political establishment at one of the most sensitive moments in the GERD dispute. The world did not learn about these ideas through leaked intelligence documents or diplomatic speculation. It heard them on live television. From water politics to pressure politics What makes the 2013 episode particularly important today is the logic behind the proposals. The discussion was not limited to negotiating the operation of a dam. It included internal Ethiopian political dynamics, neighboring states, intelligence capabilities and even the possibility of military pressure. Makhyoun referred to Ethiopian opposition groups as potential “pressure cards,” while contemporary accounts reported discussion of using intelligence capabilities against the dam if other options failed. Nour, meanwhile, proposed creating the perception that Egypt was preparing for military action as a means of intensifying pressure on Ethiopia. Yet Egypt has never tested Ethiopia through direct military confrontation. The military option remains a dead end for Cairo, constrained by Ethiopia’s geography, strategic depth and military capabilities. Taken together, the remarks revealed a broader conception of the dispute: pressure could potentially be applied not only through diplomacy, but also through Ethiopia’s internal political vulnerabilities and its regional environment. That distinction matters. A disagreement between two sovereign states over the management of a transboundary river belongs at the negotiating table. Efforts to manipulate a country’s internal political divisions or transform neighboring states into instruments of strategic pressure belong to a fundamentally different category. This is precisely why the 2013 episode remains relevant. The Horn of Africa has changed—and so has the battlefield More than a decade later, the geopolitical landscape surrounding Ethiopia has become considerably more complicated. The Nile dispute now intersects with Red Sea security, Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access, the conflict in Sudan, Somalia’s security concerns and competition for influence across the Horn of Africa. Egypt’s relations with countries surrounding Ethiopia have also become more strategically significant. In June 2026, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi received Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo, with the two sides discussing bilateral cooperation, Sudan and coordination on Red Sea security. Egypt and Eritrea have subsequently continued consultations on their strategic partnership and regional security. When today’s regional alignments are viewed alongside the strategic thinking publicly articulated during the 2013 GERD crisis, a legitimate question emerges: Is Cairo’s strategy fundamentally about water interests—or is it increasingly about managing Ethiopia’s growing regional influence? That question has become more relevant as competition over the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa intensifies. Recent regional analysis has noted that Egypt’s concerns now extend beyond the Nile to Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, regional partnerships and expanding geopolitical role. In July 2026, consultations involving Egypt, Somalia, Eritrea and the United States also highlighted the increasingly interconnected nature of Red Sea security, Ethiopia’s regional ambitions and broader Horn of Africa competition. Ethiopia’s rise changes the calculation There is another reality that Cairo must confront. Ethiopia today is not the Ethiopia of previous decades. The GERD itself has become a symbol of this transformation. For Ethiopia, the project is not simply an electricity-generating facility. It represents a national effort to mobilize domestic resources, expand energy production and demonstrate that a major African development project can be financed and built through national determination. That transformation has altered the political psychology surrounding the Nile. Ethiopia is increasingly asserting that development, sovereignty and regional economic integration cannot be subordinated indefinitely to downstream preferences. This does not mean Ethiopia has no responsibility toward downstream countries. It does. As an upstream country, Ethiopia has demonstrated its commitment to the sustainable and equitable use of shared water resources, maintained communication with downstream states, and acted with due regard for the interests of downstream countries. But responsibility does not mean surrendering sovereign rights. Ethiopia does not need Cairo’s permission to develop projects on Ethiopian soil, just as Egypt does not require Addis Ababa’s permission to develop its own territory. Ethiopia’s responsibility is cooperation. Not submission. The line is crossed when Egypt’s water concerns are transformed into an entitlement to dictate what Ethiopia can build, where it can build it, or how it can use its own natural resources. Abay (Nile) is a shared resource. But Ethiopia’s territory, sovereignty and right to development are not Egyptian possessions. Cooperation requires mutual respect; it cannot mean Ethiopia develops only when Cairo approves. The question Cairo must answer If Cairo’s case is truly about water, why does it increasingly look like a struggle for political leverage over Ethiopia? And if Cairo’s objective is stability in the Horn of Africa, how can the region achieve lasting peace if neighboring states increasingly view one another through the lens of containment and strategic rivalry? These are not questions directed against the Egyptian people. Ethiopians and Egyptians have centuries of historical, cultural and human connections. The two societies have far more reasons to cooperate than to become permanent adversaries. The real issue is not the GERD alone. But it is a decades-old strategic logic of confrontation against Ethiopia embedded in Egyptian political thinking—a pattern that has repeatedly treated pressure, regional alliances and political leverage as instruments for containing Ethiopia’s rise. A dangerous cycle for the Horn The greatest danger is that Abay (Nile) dispute becomes a gateway into a much wider regional confrontation. The Horn of Africa is already one of the world’s most strategically sensitive regions. It sits alongside the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, through which critical global trade routes pass. It is also affected by conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, unresolved regional rivalries and growing competition over ports, maritime access and security partnerships. Adding Egypt’s reckless proxy strategy to an already fragile regional environment carries risks far beyond the borders of the two countries. A strategy of containment could produce the opposite of its intended outcome. Instead of forcing Ethiopia to abandon its development ambitions, it could encourage Addis Ababa to deepen strategic partnerships elsewhere, accelerate efforts to diversify its regional relationships and adopt an even more security-oriented approach to its foreign policy. That would make compromise harder—not easier. Ethiopia cannot be treated as a pressure card The central lesson of the 2013 episode is therefore not simply that Egyptian politicians once discussed aggressive measures against Ethiopia. It is that the idea of influencing Ethiopia through its internal vulnerabilities and regional surroundings was publicly articulated at a critical moment in the Nile dispute. That history deserves to be remembered—not to perpetuate hostility, but to prevent the repetition of a dangerous logic. Ethiopia’s internal political affairs belong to Ethiopians. Its development choices belong to its sovereign institutions and people. And its relationships with neighboring countries cannot legitimately be transformed into a permanent geopolitical battlefield. The answer to pressure should not be escalation. It should be strategic confidence, diplomacy and regional engagement. Beyond the GERD: Abandon the Politics of Fear and Pressure Egypt has no reason to fear Ethiopia’s development. Thus, Egypt should stop treating Ethiopia’s development as one. Ethiopia has repeatedly demonstrated maximum generosity and a willingness to negotiate under the African Union-led framework, grounded in a simple principle: "African solutions to African problems" What is needed is not pressure, proxy competition, or regional maneuvering, but dialogue, transparency, mutual respect and genuine African-led solutions. Egypt must abandon the outdated assumption that political pressure can dictate Ethiopia’s strategic choices or produce a sustainable outcome. Rather than turning the Horn of Africa into a geopolitical chessboard, Egypt should choose cooperation over confrontation and dialogue over destabilizing regional competition. The consequences of continued brinkmanship will ultimately be borne by the people of the region. GERD was built as a development project. But politically, it has become something far greater: a symbol of Ethiopia’s determination to control its own development, pursue its national interests and shape its own future. That reality cannot be negotiated away through pressure, threats or alliances forged beyond Ethiopia’s borders. Nor can Ethiopia’s future be written in Cairo or in any other capital, without Ethiopia at the table. The era when Ethiopia’s strategic choices could be dictated from outside its borders is over. Egypt’s choice is now clear: negotiate with Ethiopia as an equal partner—or remain trapped in a politics of fear that cannot stop Ethiopia’s rise. Egypt’s choice is now clear: negotiate with Ethiopia as an equal partner—or remain trapped in a politics of fear that cannot stop Ethiopia’s rise.

By Staff Writer August 23, 2026 Global affairs this week were dominated by the continuing US-Iran conflict, growing uncertainty over the Strait of Hormuz, the unresolved Gaza war, renewed fighting in Ukraine and worsening humanitarian pressures across Africa. At the same time, heightened risks around the world's major maritime chokepoints continued to raise concerns over oil supplies, shipping costs, inflation and the resilience of global trade. The crises are increasingly interconnected. Developments in the Middle East are affecting energy markets and maritime transport, while the wars in Ukraine and Gaza continue to reshape military alliances and diplomatic relations. In Africa, conflict, food insecurity and climate pressures are compounding one another, creating new challenges for governments and humanitarian organizations. Middle East The confrontation between the United States and Iran remained one of the most consequential developments of the week, with diplomacy struggling to keep pace with escalating economic and military pressure. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian defended a memorandum of understanding with Washington as a possible route out of the stalled conflict. He said an agreement could provide a basis for resolving the confrontation and easing the economic pressure that has intensified under US sanctions and restrictions on Iranian trade. At the same time, Iranian officials have continued to reject what they describe as attempts to force Tehran into submission. Iran's new security chief, Mohsen Rezaei, adopted a more confrontational position, warning Gulf countries against assisting US economic measures against Iran. His remarks have heightened concern that the conflict could expand beyond direct US Iranian confrontation and draw additional regional states into the crisis. The economic consequences inside Iran are also becoming increasingly visible. The Iranian rial has fallen sharply, with reports this week putting the open market exchange rate at around two million rials to the US dollar. The currency collapse reflects the severe pressure created by the war, sanctions and disruption to Iran's external economic relations. Strait of Hormuz Becomes A Major Global Economic Concern The Strait of Hormuz remained at the center of international concern because of its importance to global energy supplies. Any prolonged interruption of shipping through the narrow waterway could affect oil exports from the Gulf and increase costs for countries dependent on imported energy. Oil prices rose for a second consecutive week as the conflict continued to threaten supplies and US President Donald Trump warned of sanctions against countries trading with Iran. The implications extend well beyond the Middle East. Higher oil prices can increase transportation and production costs, raise consumer prices and complicate efforts by central banks to control inflation. A prolonged disruption could therefore turn a regional security crisis into a wider global economic shock. Diplomatic efforts have continued alongside attempts by governments and companies to find alternative routes and reduce exposure to the chokepoint. But the strategic importance of Hormuz means that there is no easy substitute for the volume of energy and maritime trade normally passing through the waterway. Gaza Crisis Continues The Gaza conflict remained unresolved despite continued diplomatic efforts. Israel has rejected the US backed 15-point proposal intended to establish a pathway toward ending the war, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu maintaining that Israel will not accept arrangements that leave Hamas armed or require an Israeli withdrawal under terms his government considers unacceptable. The disagreement has exposed a significant gap between Washington's diplomatic initiative and the Israeli government's position. While the US plan has sought to establish a framework for ending the conflict, Israel has continued to emphasize the dismantling of Hamas's military capabilities and its own security requirements. The continuing dispute has also complicated wider regional diplomacy. Egypt has remained involved in efforts to advance negotiations, while US envoys have continued consultations with regional governments. Meanwhile, the humanitarian consequences of the war remain severe. Continued military operations, displacement and restrictions on essential supplies have kept Gaza's humanitarian situation at the center of international concern. The failure to secure a durable ceasefire means that the conflict continues to pose risks not only to Palestinians and Israelis but also to wider regional stability. Red Sea Security Remains Fragile Security in the Red Sea and around Yemen deteriorated further this week as Houthi forces increased their military activity against Saudi and maritime targets. The Houthis have claimed dozens of operations against Saudi targets over the past month, while reports indicate that attacks have also affected commercial shipping. Four sailors were killed in a recent Houthi missile attack on a commercial vessel, highlighting the continuing danger faced by international crews operating in the region. The escalation comes as fighting between the Houthis and Yemen's internationally recognized government has also intensified. The situation is particularly significant for global trade because the Red Sea connects the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. Continued insecurity around the Bab el Mandeb Strait can force ships to take longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing fuel consumption, insurance costs and delivery times. The simultaneous instability around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea creates an especially serious strategic problem. Hormuz is central to global energy shipments, while Bab el Mandeb is a major gateway for trade between Asia and Europe. Disruption at both points could place substantial pressure on international supply chains. Russia-Ukraine War The Russia Ukraine war remained intense, with heavy attacks continuing while diplomatic prospects remained uncertain. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Sunday that he sees a potentially important diplomatic window stretching from the US G20 summit later this year into the summer of 2027. His remarks indicate that Kyiv continues to view negotiations as possible but not necessarily imminent. At the same time, the military situation remains highly volatile. Zelenskyy said Russia is preparing to expand its military manpower and could draft an additional 300,000 troops after parliamentary elections scheduled for September. He also warned that Moscow could pursue a broader mobilization in the following year. Russia has continued missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian targets, while Ukraine has expanded its own drone strikes against Russian infrastructure and economic facilities. The growing use of long-range drones and missiles is increasingly pushing the conflict beyond traditional front lines. Western military support remains another major issue. Ukraine faces shortages of air defense systems, particularly Patriot interceptors, as Russian missile attacks increase. France and Germany have been working to strengthen Ukraine's air defense capabilities ahead of the winter period. The conflict therefore remains both a battlefield confrontation and a broader contest involving European security, defense spending, energy supplies and relations between Russia and Western countries. Global Economy and Energy Energy security remained one of the most important economic issues of the week. Oil prices increased as the US Iran conflict threatened supplies and uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz continued. Brent and US crude futures recorded weekly gains as markets assessed the possibility of prolonged disruption. The economic effects could extend well beyond the energy sector. Higher crude prices increase the cost of transportation, electricity generation and industrial production. They can also raise the cost of food because agriculture, processing and distribution all depend heavily on energy. For central banks, the situation presents a difficult policy dilemma. A geopolitical energy shock can push inflation higher at a time when policymakers may already be seeking to reduce interest rates. If the shock persists, governments could face renewed pressure to subsidize fuel, support vulnerable households or intervene in strategic supply chains. Global shipping is also under pressure. If vessels continue avoiding major conflict zones, longer routes will increase fuel consumption, insurance premiums and delivery times. These costs ultimately affect manufacturers, retailers and consumers. Technology and Artificial Intelligence Artificial intelligence remained a major area of economic and strategic competition. The global AI race is increasingly extending beyond the development of individual applications toward control of computing infrastructure, advanced semiconductors, data centers and large-scale AI models. Nvidia is preparing to report its latest earnings on August 26, an event that financial markets are closely watching because of the company's central role in supplying advanced chips for AI systems. The company's strategic ambitions are also expanding. Nvidia announced a $6 billion investment deal involving AI startup Poolside, aimed at developing advanced open weight AI models and strengthening US competitiveness against rapidly developing Chinese AI systems. The competition is therefore increasingly linked to national security. The United States and China are competing not only over AI software but also over semiconductor manufacturing, computing capacity and access to advanced technologies. For developing countries, the expanding AI economy presents both opportunities and risks. Access to affordable computing and digital infrastructure could accelerate development, while unequal access to advanced technology could widen the digital divide. Climate and Food Security Climate risks remained closely connected to food security, water availability and humanitarian conditions. The World Meteorological Organization said this month that a strong El Niño is developing and is expected to intensify during August to October. The phenomenon is likely to influence global rainfall and temperature patterns, with above normal temperatures expected across much of the world. For the Greater Horn of Africa, the picture is more complicated. WMO reported this week that El Niño is expected to contribute to warmer and wetter than normal conditions during the final quarter of 2026. ICPAC, IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre, forecasts a 90 percent likelihood of enhanced rainfall over southern Ethiopia, central and southern Somalia and northeastern Kenya. However, the regional outlook is not uniform. ICPAC forecasts wetter than normal conditions in parts of the eastern Horn while expecting drier than normal conditions across parts of South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, western Kenya, northern Tanzania and Rwanda during August to October. Most of the region is also expected to experience above normal temperatures. These contrasting conditions increase the need for early warning and preparedness. Heavy rainfall can increase the risk of flooding and displacement, while dry conditions in other areas can threaten agriculture, livestock and water supplies. The broader food security picture remains particularly worrying in conflict affected parts of Africa, where climate shocks are occurring alongside displacement, damaged agricultural systems and reduced humanitarian funding. Global Outlook The week's developments demonstrate how closely connected today's global crises have become. The US Iran conflict is no longer only a Middle Eastern security issue. Its effects are being transmitted through oil markets, maritime transport, financial markets and global supply chains. At the same time, the Red Sea remains vulnerable to attacks that could disrupt one of the world's most important commercial corridors. The Russia Ukraine war continues to reshape European security and military policy, while the Gaza conflict remains a major source of regional instability. In Africa, Sudan's war, Sahel insecurity and food crises are interacting with climate pressures to create a complex humanitarian emergency. The coming weeks will therefore be closely watched on several fronts. The immediate priority will be whether diplomatic efforts can prevent further escalation between Washington and Tehran and restore stability around the Strait of Hormuz. Developments in Gaza and the Red Sea will also determine whether pressure on regional trade routes intensifies. Beyond the immediate conflicts, markets will be watching oil prices, inflation and global shipping costs. Technology markets will focus on Nvidia's earnings and the continuing US China AI competition, while governments in climate vulnerable regions will prepare for the effects of a strengthening El Niño. Taken together, these developments point to a global environment in which security, trade, energy, technology, climate and humanitarian issues are increasingly interconnected. A crisis in one strategic region can rapidly produce economic and political consequences far beyond its original borders. Note: This analysis was compiled from reports and updates published during the week by Reuters, The Associated Press (AP), Agence France-Presse (AFP), BBC, Al Jazeera, CNN, the Financial Times, The Economist, Africanews and other leading international media outlets.

Staff Writer August 23, 2026 National Dialogue reaches a historic milestone as Ethiopia reasserts its sovereign right to develop the Abay, while diplomacy, security and strategic partnerships reinforce the country’s growing regional profile. The past week marked a defining chapter for Ethiopia, one shaped by historic political dialogue at home and an increasingly assertive posture on the regional and international stage. After 40 days of intensive deliberations involving nearly 4,000 Ethiopians from diverse backgrounds, the National Dialogue Conference concluded in Addis Ababa with approximately 400 recommendations addressing some of the country’s most pressing political, social and institutional challenges. At the same time, Ethiopia strongly reaffirmed its sovereign right to utilize its water resources, pushing back against criticism over plans to develop additional dams on the Abay (Nile) River. The message from Addis Ababa was unequivocal: Ethiopia will develop its resources to meet its national needs while pursuing cooperation with fellow Nile Basin countries.   Beyond these two defining developments, Ethiopia remained in the international spotlight through high-level engagement on security, diplomacy, regional affairs and strategic partnerships. National Dialogue: From Differences to a Search for Common Ground The conclusion of Ethiopia’s National Dialogue represented a significant milestone in the country’s attempt to address longstanding challenges through a nationally driven process. For 40 days, participants from different regions, political, social and professional backgrounds listened to competing perspectives, debated difficult questions and sought common ground. The process culminated in nearly 400 recommendations intended to contribute to a more peaceful, inclusive and stable Ethiopia.   The closing ceremony brought together senior government officials, former presidents, religious leaders, national figures and international guests, underlining the wider significance attached to the process. Former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta described the dialogue as an important opportunity for Ethiopians to turn the country’s diversity into a source of strength and make inclusive dialogue a foundation for lasting peace and prosperity. He praised the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission for bringing thousands of voices together, calling the initiative an “act of patriotism of the highest order.” Kenyatta also placed Ethiopia’s experience within a broader African context, recalling the country’s historic role in the continent’s political consciousness—from the victory at Adwa to Emperor Haile Selassie’s international leadership and Addis Ababa’s role in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity.   But he also stressed that lasting peace requires reaching those who remain outside the process. “Your peace is not a favor. Your peace is the condition of your own rest, and our peace is a condition for all of us in our region,” he said, linking Ethiopia’s stability directly to peace and security across the Horn of Africa. Former Nigerian President and African Union High Representative Olusegun Obasanjo likewise described Ethiopia’s National Dialogue as historic and potentially exemplary for the rest of Africa. Congratulating Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the National Dialogue Commission, Obasanjo said the ultimate objective of the process should be lasting peace, security and stability—conditions he described as essential for development and national growth.   “Peace is so important and it is worth giving everything,” he stressed, noting that preparations for the dialogue had taken four years. With its 40-day deliberations and thousands of participants, the process, he said, was “a serious and great undertaking” and “an example for the rest of us in Africa.” Abay: Ethiopia Draws a Clear Line on Sovereign Resource Development While the National Dialogue focused on finding common ground within Ethiopia, the country delivered an equally firm message abroad over the utilization of its water resources. Ethiopia has reaffirmed plans to develop additional dams on the Abay River, triggering strong reactions from Egypt and once again placing the Nile at the center of regional attention. Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa made Ethiopia’s position clear: the country does not require permission from another state to develop its own water resources. “Ethiopia is a sovereign country,” the Minister said, pointing to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as an example of the country’s determination to pursue its development priorities.   In an exclusive interview with Pulse of Africa, Habtamu said the GERD was built primarily for electricity generation and is already contributing hydropower to Ethiopia while creating opportunities for regional energy cooperation. He categorically rejected proposals for joint management of the dam, arguing that Ethiopia would not accept arrangements that could give another country control over infrastructure built and financed by Ethiopians. “How come any entity asks to jointly manage the dam built by Ethiopians. This is impossible and unacceptable,” he underscored. Ethiopia’s broader position is that Nile Basin countries should pursue negotiation, cooperation and equitable development rather than arrangements that restrict Ethiopia’s ability to utilize its water resources. For Addis Ababa, the issue is ultimately tied to development: expanding electricity access for its population, generating economic opportunities and exporting power to neighboring countries. The Abay, therefore, is not simply a waterway in Ethiopia’s development discourse. It has become a central symbol of the country’s pursuit of energy security, economic transformation and sovereign decision-making. A Stronger Security Partnership with the United States   Ethiopia’s strategic engagement also expanded on the security front. A high-level Ethiopian delegation led by Major General Teshome Gemechu, Director General of Foreign Relations and Military Cooperation at the Ministry of Defense, visited the United States from August 19–20. During consultations at the Pentagon, Ethiopian officials met with senior U.S. defense and diplomatic officials to discuss bilateral security and defense cooperation. The talks, co-led with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for African Affairs Brian J. Ellis, resulted in an agreement to elevate military and diplomatic cooperation between the two countries to a new level. The development signals Ethiopia’s interest in strengthening strategic partnerships at a time when security dynamics across the Horn of Africa and the wider Red Sea region are rapidly evolving. Ethiopia–China Ties: From Partnership to Strategic Alignment China also remained central to Ethiopia’s international engagement. Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia Chen Hai described the two countries’ all-weather strategic partnership as a cornerstone of efforts to build a community with a shared future between China and Africa. In an exclusive interview with ENA, Ambassador Chen said the relationship had moved beyond traditional diplomacy, evolving into a broad partnership based on political trust, economic cooperation and mutual support.   “China and Ethiopia support each other politically and economically,” he said, emphasizing closer coordination to deliver benefits to both peoples. The partnership also carries significance beyond bilateral relations. Ethiopia’s role as a major African diplomatic center and China’s expanding engagement across the continent give the relationship wider implications for Africa-China cooperation. A Week That Signals a More Assertive Ethiopia Taken together, the week’s developments point to an Ethiopia seeking to balance national reconciliation at home with greater strategic confidence abroad. The conclusion of the National Dialogue offered a platform for Ethiopians to confront difficult questions through dialogue and compromise. The firm position on the Abay demonstrated Addis Ababa’s determination to defend its development interests and sovereign rights. Meanwhile, renewed engagement with the United States and China showed Ethiopia’s continuing effort to diversify and deepen strategic partnerships. The common thread is clear: Ethiopia is seeking greater national consensus, greater control over its development choices and a stronger voice in shaping the political and strategic future of the Horn of Africa. The coming months will reveal Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive approach to its resources, security and diplomacy can help reshape its role in the region. For a country at the crossroads of the Nile Basin, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, last week was more than a sequence of major events. It was a week that underscored Ethiopia’s determination to define its future on its own terms while remaining a consequential actor in Africa and beyond.

It Is Time to Stop Pretending Ethiopia Has No Stake in the Red Sea By Yordanos D. August 22, 2026 The strategic importance of Ethiopia’s maritime question has become increasingly difficult to separate from the wider security crisis unfolding across the Middle East, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Recent disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated how quickly instability at a single maritime chokepoint can affect energy prices, shipping networks, insurance markets, supply chains and consumers thousands of kilometres away. These developments offer a wider lesson: maritime chokepoints are not simply geographical passages. They are arteries of the global economy. When their security deteriorates, the consequences can spread rapidly across continents. This raises a critical question for the Horn of Africa: what would happen if prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz were accompanied by a major disruption at Bab el Mandeb? The consequences could be severe. Hormuz is vital to the movement of energy from the Persian Gulf, while Bab el Mandeb connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, forming a crucial trade route between Asia and Europe. A simultaneous disruption at both chokepoints could force ships to choose between navigating dangerous waters and taking substantially longer routes around Africa. The resulting increase in fuel consumption, insurance costs, freight rates and transit times could create another major shock to global trade.   It is against this backdrop that Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable access to the Red Sea assumes significance far beyond its own commercial interests. For a country of more than 130 million people, secure maritime access is an economic necessity. But Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea could also have broader implications for regional connectivity, maritime security, investment and the resilience of international trade. Let us break down the calculus. The central question, therefore, is not simply whether Ethiopia should regain access to the sea. It is whether a stable and legally negotiated Ethiopian maritime presence could become part of a broader regional system capable of protecting one of the world’s most important trade corridors. Let us break down the strategic calculus. Hormuz and Rising Cost of Global Maritime The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz is enormous. In the first half of 2025, about 20.9 million barrels of oil and petroleum liquids per day passed through the strait, equivalent to roughly one fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption and about one quarter of global maritime oil trade. The strait also carries substantial volumes of liquefied natural gas, making it one of the world’s most important energy corridors. The disruption of these flows illustrates the vulnerability created by such dependence. By the second quarter of 2026, data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration showed that oil flows through Hormuz had fallen sharply compared with 2025 levels, reflecting the impact of regional conflict and maritime restrictions. Oil prices have responded to the uncertainty. Brent crude reached about $91.62 per barrel on August 19, 2026, and remained above $93 per barrel on August 21 amid continuing concerns over supply disruptions. The lesson is clear: instability at a strategically located maritime chokepoint can increase the cost of energy, transportation and insurance almost immediately. The significance of Hormuz, however, cannot be understood only through oil prices. The strait is embedded in a wider commercial system that connects energy producers in the Gulf with consumers across Asia, Europe and other regions. Any prolonged disruption can therefore generate secondary effects across manufacturing, transportation, electricity generation and food production.   Bab el Mandeb: The Other Critical Gateway Bab el Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Together with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, it forms part of one of the world’s most important maritime corridors linking Asia and Europe. When vessels cannot safely navigate the Red Sea, many are forced to travel around the Cape of Good Hope. The longer route requires more fuel, crew time and vessel capacity and significantly increases voyage times. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, disruptions around Bab el Mandeb or the Suez Canal can force ships onto the longer southern African route, increasing freight rates and shipping costs. Container ships carrying manufactured goods, bulk carriers transporting commodities, tankers carrying petroleum products and vessels carrying agricultural inputs can all be affected. A ship that spends several additional weeks at sea is also unavailable for another shipment during that period. Consequently, effective global shipping capacity can decline even when factories, warehouses and ports remain operational. The world has already experienced this problem following attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, which prompted major shipping companies to divert vessels around Africa. The resulting increase in voyage distances and transit times demonstrated how quickly maritime insecurity can spread through freight markets, supply chains and consumer prices. For Africa, the implications are particularly serious. Many countries depend on imported fuel, fertilizers, machinery, food and manufactured products. Higher shipping costs can therefore translate into higher domestic prices and increased pressure on foreign exchange reserves. The Dual Chokepoint Crisis A simultaneous or successive disruption of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb would transform two regional security problems into a potentially much larger global maritime crisis. Hormuz is principally critical for Gulf energy exports, while Bab el Mandeb is a key gateway for commercial vessels moving between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. If both were seriously disrupted, shipping companies could face a difficult choice between navigating insecure waters and taking dramatically longer alternative routes. Freight rates and insurance premiums could rise sharply. European manufacturers could experience delays in receiving Asian components and finished products, while Asian exporters could face higher costs in reaching European and North African markets. African economies would also be exposed because many depend heavily on imported fuel, fertilizers, machinery, food and manufactured goods. Governments could require more foreign currency to purchase the same volume of imports, while businesses could pass higher transportation, insurance and energy costs on to consumers. Recent shipping data further illustrates the sensitivity of the two corridors to regional insecurity. Reuters reported that only nine commodity vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz on both August 18 and 19, 2026, while traffic through Bab el Mandeb fell from 32 to 27 vessels over the same period. By August 21, Reuters reported that Hormuz traffic had fallen further to seven commodity vessels, while Bab el Mandeb recorded 23 vessels. These figures do not establish that either waterway has been permanently closed. They do, however, demonstrate how quickly geopolitical uncertainty can change commercial shipping behaviour. Even without a formal blockade, heightened security risks can discourage operators, increase insurance costs and force vessels onto longer routes. A prolonged disruption at both chokepoints would therefore be more than a regional maritime crisis. It could become a major shock to global energy markets, international trade and supply chains.   Egypt’s Spoiler Role in Both Horn Africa and Red Sea Region Evidently, Egypt’s destabilizing activities in the Horn of Africa can be examined historically through its security and political engagement with countries surrounding Ethiopia. Its growing military cooperation with Somalia has particular strategic significance because Somalia lies close to the Bab el Mandeb, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. The deployment or potential deployment of Egyptian military forces in Somalia could intensify strategic rivalry with Ethiopia and contribute to the militarization of an already fragile security environment. Egypt’s close political and security alignment with Sudan’s military establishment is another source of regional concern. The continuing war in Sudan has weakened state institutions, expanded armed networks and generated displacement and instability across the region. External military and political involvement risks prolonging the conflict and creating additional security pressures along Ethiopia’s western frontier and the Red Sea. A prolonged crisis in Sudan, where Egypt is behind this ongoing catastrophic civil war, could also create wider instability across the Horn, disrupting trade routes and increasing the movement of armed groups and illicit networks. Egypt has also supported Eritrea’s regime, whose strategic position on the Red Sea gives a leverage its proxy ambition. Closer Egyptian engagement with Eritrea, combined with its military cooperation with Somalia and its relationship with Sudan, could contribute to competing security alignments around Ethiopia and increase tensions across the Horn. The most serious concern is the strategic importance of the Bab el Mandeb. Egypt has a vital interest in the waterway because it provides access to the Suez Canal and is central to Egypt’s maritime trade. Egypt has an operational plan to physically close the Bab el Mandeb, the expansion of Egyptian military and political influence around the Horn raises concerns that the waterway could become an instrument of strategic pressure. Any attempt by Egypt or forces aligned with its interests to obstruct navigation through the Bab el Mandeb would have consequences far beyond the Horn of Africa. Such a disruption could create chaos in world trade. The Bab el Mandeb is a critical link between the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean trade system. Its disruption could force ships to take longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope, sharply increasing transportation costs, insurance premiums, delivery times and fuel consumption. It could also disrupt energy supplies and the movement of food, manufactured goods and essential commodities between Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Coming on top of instability around other major maritime chokepoints, a serious disruption at Bab el Mandeb could place additional pressure on already vulnerable global supply chains. Taken together, Egypt’s expanding military partnerships, political alliances and strategic positioning in Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea risk intensifying polarization in the Horn of Africa. If these relationships are used as instruments of confrontation with Ethiopia, they could contribute to greater militarization around the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb. The consequence would not be limited to Ethiopia or the Horn. A crisis affecting Bab el Mandeb could escalate into a wider maritime emergency, threatening regional stability and creating severe disruption to international commerce and global trade. Why Ethiopia’s Maritime Return Matters? This is where Ethiopia’s maritime question takes on significance beyond national economic interests. Ethiopia’s dependence on external maritime gateways leaves its international trade vulnerable to disruption along regional transport corridors. More than 90 percent of Ethiopia’s import and export trade has historically moved through the Addis Djibouti corridor. Heavy dependence on a single principal gateway creates economic exposure when congestion, conflict, political disputes or maritime insecurity affect that route. A reliable and legally negotiated Ethiopian maritime presence could provide an additional option. It could diversify transport corridors, reduce dependence on a single gateway and strengthen Ethiopia’s ability to withstand regional disruptions. The objective should not be Ethiopian control of the Red Sea. Rather, it should be predictable and mutually agreed access established through arrangements that respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of coastal states. Such an arrangement could provide benefits extending well beyond Ethiopia’s immediate maritime interests. It could strengthen the resilience of global trade by creating additional options for the movement of goods and reducing the risks associated with excessive dependence on a limited number of vulnerable maritime corridors. It could also contribute to stronger maritime security by encouraging greater cooperation among Red Sea and Horn of Africa countries in protecting shipping routes and responding to emerging security threats. At the same time, improved access to the Red Sea could reduce pressure on existing trade corridors, particularly those facing congestion, insecurity or rising transportation costs, while providing Ethiopia and neighbouring countries with more efficient routes to international markets.   Ethiopia’s maritime engagement could also deepen regional economic integration by linking its large domestic market with the economies and ports of the Horn of Africa and the wider Red Sea region. Greater connectivity could support cross border trade, logistics, manufacturing and infrastructure development, creating opportunities for countries to benefit from Ethiopia’s expanding economy while strengthening regional supply chains. Improved access to maritime trade would further enhance food and energy security by giving Ethiopia more reliable and diversified channels for importing essential commodities, fuel and industrial inputs. Such connectivity could also make the region more attractive to investors by improving access to markets, lowering logistics costs and encouraging investment in ports, transport networks, industrial parks and related infrastructure. Ethiopia’s maritime agenda should therefore be approached as part of a wider regional economic and security framework rather than as a contest for control over strategic territory. A negotiated arrangement could bring together Ethiopia’s need for reliable maritime access with the legitimate interests of coastal states. Ethiopia could secure predictable commercial access, while coastal states could benefit from transit revenues, infrastructure investment, employment, expanded markets and stronger economic links with one of Africa’s largest domestic markets. Such a framework could also help separate economic connectivity from military confrontation. Commercial maritime access does not necessarily require territorial control. A carefully negotiated arrangement can provide access while preserving the sovereignty of the coastal state and supporting the security interests of neighbouring countries. This distinction is critical. Ethiopia’s maritime return will be sustainable only if it is based on mutual interest, international law, transparency and respect for sovereignty. The wider strategic objective should be a Red Sea in which economic interdependence becomes a source of stability rather than a trigger for confrontation. Greater trade, infrastructure connectivity and shared maritime security could create incentives for countries to protect the same commercial system from which they benefit. In this sense, Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea could become part of a broader effort to build a more resilient regional economy. The country’s large population, expanding domestic market and growing industrial and agricultural potential could generate substantial demand for maritime services, while improved access could help connect neighbouring economies to Ethiopian markets.   In a nutshell, the significance of Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea extends far beyond the question of ports, trade routes or national economic interests. In an era when disruptions at Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb can reverberate through energy markets and global supply chains, the Horn of Africa needs a more resilient and balanced maritime system. Reliable Ethiopian access to the Red Sea, achieved through a peaceful, legally negotiated and mutually beneficial arrangement, could provide such an opportunity. It could diversify regional trade routes, reduce dependence on a single corridor, strengthen maritime security, attract investment, improve access to essential commodities and deepen economic integration across the Horn of Africa. For Ethiopia, maritime access would reduce a fundamental vulnerability associated with being landlocked. For coastal states, it could generate investment, transit revenues and expanded markets. For international shipping, it could contribute to a stronger regional security environment. For global markets, it could add another layer of resilience at a time when maritime chokepoints are increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical disruption. The strategic objective, therefore, should not be domination of the Red Sea by any single state. It should be the creation of a stable maritime order in which Ethiopia has legitimate and predictable access, coastal states retain their sovereignty, and international shipping enjoys greater security. In this sense, Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea should be understood not merely as a national aspiration but as a potential contribution to regional stability and global trade resilience. A peaceful maritime settlement could turn Ethiopia from a vulnerable landlocked economy into a more active economic and security stakeholder in one of the world’s most consequential maritime regions.

Aug 17, 2026 By Girma Mirgisa What comes to your mind when you think about Russia? For many first-time visitors, Russia may seem distant and mysterious. It’s a vast nation known through powerful images of history, politics, literature, architecture, and global events. Before my trip, I primarily knew Russia through books, news, from people and other platforms. I had heard of Moscow, Red Square, and the country’s rich history, but understanding a place through media is quite different from experiencing it personally. From July 19 to 26, 2026, I had the opportunity to travel to Moscow as one of 31 journalists from 22 African countries for an intensive journalism and cultural programme organized by RT Academy under Rossotrudnichestvo’s “New Generation” initiative. I arrived in Moscow expecting a week focused mainly on professional training. But the experience turned out to be much bigger than I expected. I returned home with new experiences, meaningful friendships, different perspectives, and a deeper understanding of Russia beyond what I had seen or heard in the media. The journey turned into much more than a journalism program. It became an opportunity to experience Russia through its culture, history, technology, people, and everyday life. One thing became clear to me: you cannot truly discover Russia in just one day, but you can certainly be impressed by it from the moment you arrive. Starting With Journalism The journey began with the profession that brought all 31 of us together: journalism. It was our shared passion and profession that created the opportunity to meet, learn from one another, and explore new ideas together. Throughout the program, we took part in masterclasses, practical exercises, newsroom discussions, and exchanges with RT correspondents and media professionals. We explored various aspects of international journalism and learned how RT International and RT en français organize their news operations and correspondent networks. The practical focus of the program was especially beneficial. We didn’t just listen to lectures; we had direct chances to practice, ask questions, share experiences, and create media content. We explored mobile journalism, advanced filming techniques, and new ways to produce digital content. One topic that particularly intrigued me was artificial intelligence. AI is quickly changing journalism. It assists with research, transcription, translation, editing, data processing, and multi-platform media production, allowing journalists to work more efficiently. However, the technology also raises important questions. How do we maintain strict factual accuracy? How do we verify information in an automated world? How do we protect editorial independence? And how do we ensure technology supports journalism instead of undermining a journalist’s responsibilities? In my view, AI should be treated strictly as a tool, not a replacement for professional judgment. A machine can process information quickly, but journalism still requires human curiosity, ethics, context, and an unwavering commitment to truth. For African journalists, understanding emerging technologies is becoming increasingly essential as the continent's media landscape evolves. The training in Moscow provided not only technical knowledge, but also a space to critically reflect on where our profession is heading. For me, practical learning is the cornerstone of journalism. A journalist may understand the theory of reporting, but real skill develops through observation, practice, questioning, and lived experience. The Moscow programme was a powerful reminder that journalism is a profession that requires continuous learning. Learning From 31 African Journalists Perhaps one of the most valuable parts of the programme was not inside the classroom at all—it was the people. Thirty-one journalists from 22 African countries came together, each bringing different professional backgrounds, languages, cultures, and experiences. Some were reporters, while others were presenters, editors, and foreign correspondents. Yet, despite coming from different corners of the continent, we quickly discovered that many of the challenges facing African journalists are remarkably similar. We discussed changing audience habits, digital platforms, newsroom pressures, artificial intelligence, mobile journalism, and the shared challenge of telling African stories to both continental and global audiences. Our conversations often continued long after the formal sessions had ended. Over meals, during site visits, and while traveling across the city, we shared stories about our countries, our work, and our lives. That camaraderie made the programme feel less like a formal training course and more like a dynamic summit of African journalists learning from one another. For me, these human connections were among the greatest achievements of the journey. From the Training Room to the Streets of Moscow As the week progressed, the programme moved beyond the newsroom. This was when I began to discover Moscow as a visitor. My first impression was the sheer scale of the city. Moscow is massive, yet it retains a distinct identity. Everywhere I looked, modern urban life existed alongside reminders of centuries of history. Sleek skyscrapers, advanced transportation systems, and modern technology stood side by side with historic monuments, ancient churches, grand public squares, and classical architecture. The city seemed to tell two stories at the same time: one about its deep past, and another about its future. Moscow appeared uniquely determined to preserve both. Walking through Moscow gave me a deep appreciation for urban design. The city masterfully combines historic architecture with sprawling, green public spaces. Parks and tree-lined avenues offer a sense of openness within a massive metropolis. Moscow has not chosen between preserving its heritage and modernizing—it is actively mastering both. Our tour guide added an invaluable layer to this experience. With deep historical knowledge and an evident connection to the city, the guide brought Moscow’s transformation to life. The storytelling went far beyond a dry list of dates and figures; it was filled with personal understanding, emotion, and genuine pride. Listening to the guide while navigating the city helped me see Moscow not just as a collection of structures, but as a living landscape shaped by generations of people. It was a clear reminder that to truly understand a country, you must listen to how its people remember their past. Red Square: Seeing History With My Own Eyes One of the places I had most wanted to see was Red Square. I had seen it countless times in photographs and news broadcasts, but standing there in person was completely different. The static images suddenly came to life. The historic buildings surrounding the square, the majestic architecture, and the movement of people created an atmosphere that no television screen can capture. For me, Red Square represented more than a famous landmark; it was a vivid reminder that history isn't just something we read about in books—sometimes, we can stand in the very places where it unfolded. Another memorable experience was our visit to the National Centre Russia. The centre offered an extraordinary experience: a journey across one of the world's largest countries without leaving the capital. Through interactive exhibitions and modern technology, we were introduced to Russia's diverse regions, geography, history, traditions, and cultural identities. What impressed me most was how technology was used to bring history to life, proving that preserving heritage doesn't mean keeping it locked away in dusty archives. Technology can make history accessible, interactive, and engaging for younger generations. Russia's vast geography and cultural diversity became much easier to grasp, reinforcing my core impression of the city: Russia is deeply rooted in its past, but actively leveraging technology to tell its story to future generations. Later, we travelled to Sparrow Hills, where we enjoyed a panoramic view of the city from the viewing point. From high above Moscow, the scale of the city became even more striking. The view brought together the city’s buildings, roads, green spaces, and landmarks, offering a different perspective from what we had seen while walking through its streets. Remembering the Great Patriotic War Another deeply moving experience was our visit to the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Moscow. The visit gave me an opportunity to learn more about the Soviet Union's experience during the Second World War and to witness how the Russian people remember one of the most difficult and defining periods in their modern history. Walking through the museum, I encountered historical stories, photographs, military objects , and memorial spaces that presented the scale of the suffering, sacrifice, and courage associated with the war. For me, this was more than simply visiting a museum. It was a journey through memory. The guide helped me understand how deeply the Great Patriotic War remains connected to Russian historical consciousness and national identity. The atmosphere was solemn and reflective. It was a place where history felt close. What I found particularly meaningful was the sense of remembrance and patriotism expressed throughout the museum. The stories of soldiers, families, and civilians brought a human dimension to an enormous historical event. An Evening at the Theatre: Experiencing Russian Ballet The cultural experience took another memorable turn when we attended a ballet performance at the theatre. We watched “Bakhchisarai Fountain.” For me, it was a completely different way of experiencing Russian culture. After spending the day learning about the country’s history and visiting its landmarks, sitting in the theatre and watching the dancers tell a story through movement, music, and expression offered another window into Russia’s artistic heritage. The performance showed me that culture does not always need words to communicate. It was one of those moments when I simply sat back and enjoyed the experience, allowing the performance to speak for itself. The cultural experience extended far beyond famous buildings and historical sites. It was alive in everyday interactions—in public parks, street conversations, theatres, and around the dinner table. Culture is not only preserved in museums; it is also tasted and shared. During the programme, sharing meals and experiences with fellow African journalists became an important part of our cultural exchange. Russian cuisine reflects the country’s climate and history, featuring hearty soups, fresh bread, potatoes, meats, and traditional dishes that were entirely new to me. Trying unfamiliar foods was a pleasant reminder of what travel is all about: stepping outside your comfort zone. You do not simply observe a country; you taste it, listen to it, walk through it, and absorb it. Sometimes, a simple meal shared with new friends becomes the memory that lingers longest. Beyond the landmarks, the people were the true highlight of the experience. Travel challenges assumptions. Before visiting a place, we construct mental images based on news reports, films, and social media. Meeting people directly can challenge those preconceived notions. Conversations with Russian media professionals and the organizers behind our programme revealed another side of the country. Their hospitality and enthusiasm made the experience deeply personal. The visit reaffirmed that international understanding is not forged solely through official diplomacy—it also happens when people meet, talk, share experiences, and learn from one another. Ethiopia and Russia: Beyond Headlines As an Ethiopian journalist, my visit also prompted me to reflect on the relationship between Ethiopia and Russia. The two nations share long-standing political, educational, cultural, and people-to-people ties. Being in Moscow allowed me to view this relationship through a direct lens rather than through official statements or secondhand reports. This is exactly where responsible journalism plays a vital role. Journalists are uniquely positioned to help audiences see foreign societies beyond basic stereotypes, bringing to light stories of human connection, culture, and innovation. The deeper our mutual understanding, the stronger our connections become. During the city tour, an unforgettable moment occurred when the guide paused and asked the group if anyone knew about Alexander Pushkin and his connection to Africa. For an Ethiopian journalist, this question hit home immediately. Widely celebrated as the founder of modern Russian literature, Pushkin holds a central place in the nation’s cultural heart. Yet, Pushkin is more than just Russia’s national poet—he represents a tangible historical bridge between Russia and Ethiopia. Pushkin proudly traced his ancestry back to his maternal great-grandfather, Abram Petrovich Gannibal, an African nobleman brought to the court of Peter the Great, whom historical tradition and research strongly tie to Ethiopian origin. Responding to the guide's question was a moment of pride to explain how Pushkin's legacy is celebrated back home. In Addis Ababa, his memory is honored with a dedicated square and a bronze monument—a symbol of the long-standing cultural link between Ethiopia and Russia. Standing in Moscow and encountering Pushkin’s presence across monuments, squares, and literary institutions created a profound feeling of shared history. It was a clear reminder to everyone in the group that the bonds connecting Ethiopia and Russia were woven centuries ago through literature, royalty, and shared heritage. A Meeting Point for Africa and Russia The programme served as a vital platform for Global South media cooperation. African journalists were able to engage meaningfully with Russian counterparts while fostering stronger intra-African networks. This kind of exchange is increasingly critical. Africa is producing rich stories, building powerful media platforms, and asserting its own perspectives on global affairs. African journalists need opportunities to engage with international colleagues not merely as passive observers but as equal professionals who bring vital expertise and distinct viewpoints to the table. The Moscow program demonstrated how professional exchanges can build enduring networks that far outlast the event itself. Looking Back on the Journey When I first boarded my flight to Moscow, I thought I was traveling primarily for media training. I returned home with far more. I gained valuable technical knowledge on emerging media tools, exchanged insights with brilliant journalists from across Africa, and experienced Russian culture, cuisine, and warmth firsthand. I walked through iconic historical sites, stood in awe within the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War, and listened to local stories that breathed life into the streets. On my final day, I looked at Moscow through a new lens. The streets that once felt unfamiliar had become recognizable. The buildings were no longer just architecture, the museums were no longer just tourist stops, and the stories I heard throughout the week had woven themselves into a clear picture. You cannot discover Russia in a day, or even in a week. But one week is more than enough to ignite a lifelong desire to explore more. Sometimes, the best way to truly understand a place is simply to go there. I left Russia with rich memories—and with the feeling that I had only opened the first page of a much larger story.

With analysis from Pulse of Africa (POA)   Aug 20, 2026 By Mathias Bule Ethiopia sits at a crossroads of history, geography, and geopolitics, serving as a vital link between Africa, the Arab world, and the Red Sea corridor. Its strategic location near the Middle East and its role as the gateway to sub-Saharan Africa make it a critical player in regional stability, economic development, and cultural exchange. Recognizing Ethiopia’s historical roots, geopolitical significance, and current strategic needs offers an opportunity for Africa and the Arab world to forge a more integrated, mutually beneficial partnership—one rooted in respect, cooperation, and shared interests. Ethiopia’s enduring relationship with the Arab world stretches back over 3,000 years. Long before modern borders and nation-states, ancient trade networks crisscrossed the Red Sea, connecting the Ethiopian highlands and the Arabian Peninsula. The Kingdom of Da’mat, which emerged around the 10th century BCE, reflects a blend of African and South Arabian influences. Its stone architecture and writing scripts point to a shared cultural heritage that predates colonial borders. The Axumite Empire, one of Africa’s greatest ancient civilizations, dominated trade routes linking Africa, India, and the Roman Empire. Its merchants traded gold, ivory, and spices, establishing Ethiopia as a vital node in ancient global commerce. The military campaigns of Axumite rulers into southern Arabia in the 6th century CE, notably Emperor Kaleb’s intervention in Yemen, exemplify Ethiopia’s historical influence and strategic engagement with the Arab world. These interactions laid the groundwork for a relationship that would endure through centuries, rooted in trade, diplomacy, and cultural exchange. There is also linguistic evidence that points to the deep human contact that has existed for millennia. Religious ties have also played a pivotal role. When followers of Prophet Muhammad faced persecution in Mecca, some found refuge in Ethiopia’s Christian kingdom—an act of compassion that earned Ethiopia a revered place in Islamic history. The story of the First Hijra in 615 CE, when the Prophet’s followers sought sanctuary in the Horn of Africa, symbolizes Ethiopia’s long-standing tradition of hospitality and justice. Ethiopia’s Current Geopolitical Role: A Pillar of Regional Stability Today, Ethiopia’s significance extends beyond its rich history. With over 135 million people, Ethiopia is Africa’s second-most populous country and a key anchor in the Horn of Africa. Its leadership role is exemplified by hosting the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, positioning Ethiopia as a political and diplomatic hub for the continent. Ethiopia’s diverse religious landscape, with large Christian and Muslim populations, embodies a cultural blend that resonates across both African and Middle Eastern societies. Its economic ties are equally vital: millions of Ethiopian workers travel to Gulf countries for employment, supporting family income through remittances. Gulf nations have invested heavily in Ethiopian agriculture, infrastructure, and energy projects, recognizing Ethiopia’s potential as a growth market and strategic partner. However, Ethiopia’s strategic importance is not solely rooted in history or demographics. Its economic development, particularly through projects like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), underscores its ambition to harness regional water and energy resources. The GERD, in particular, symbolizes Ethiopia’s pursuit of sovereignty over its Abay waters, while opening up a whole new opportunity for cooperation between and among riparian countries. The Strategic Imperative for Regional Cooperation Ethiopia’s geopolitical importance is intertwined with its need for sea access and regional integration. As a nation rendered landlocked in 1993 through shady deals, Ethiopia sees 95% of its trade passing through Djibouti—a single port that, while vital, presents logistical and strategic vulnerabilities. The heavy reliance on Djibouti imposes multi-billion-dollar costs on Ethiopian trade, constrains growth, and highlights the urgent need for Ethiopia to reclaim its right for access to the sea. For the Arab world and Africa, Ethiopia’s stability and economic growth are essential. A fractured, isolated Ethiopia could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa, fueling insurgencies, refugee flows, and cross-border conflicts. Conversely, a stable, economically integrated Ethiopia acts as a bulwark against extremism and regional insecurity. It also offers opportunities for joint economic development, infrastructure projects, and resource sharing. One of the most pressing issues is Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access. Whether through port leases, joint port ownership, or regional corridors, Ethiopia’s efforts aim to secure its trade routes and reduce dependency on Djibouti. These initiatives require a cooperative framework involving neighboring countries, Gulf states, and African regional bodies like the African Union. Such collaboration can transform potential geopolitical flashpoints—such as water disputes or port access—into opportunities for shared prosperity and regional stability. Such a large nation cannot be held a geographical prisoner, while sitting at a stone-throwing distance from the Red Sea coast – whose shores were once patrolled by Ethiopia’s naval fleets as sovereign territory. Why the Arab World and Africa Must Collaborate with Ethiopia The case for an integrated approach to Ethiopia’s strategic needs is compelling. First, Ethiopia’s economic potential can serve as a catalyst for regional development. Its large agricultural sector, burgeoning manufacturing industry, and energy projects like the GERD can supply food, energy, and industrial goods not only to its own population but also to neighboring countries and Gulf markets. Second, regional security depends on stability in Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa faces threats from insurgent groups, border conflicts, and transnational crime. Ethiopia’s stability is directly linked to the security of the Arab world’s southern gateway—especially the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden—through which a significant portion of global trade passes. Ensuring Ethiopia’s sovereignty and economic resilience will, in turn, bolster maritime security and counter-terrorism efforts. Finally, geopolitics in the Red Sea corridor must recognize Ethiopia’s legitimate maritime and economic interests. Its pursuit of port access and regional corridors is not a threat but a necessity for its development. Treating Ethiopia as a partner rather than an adversary will prevent conflicts, promote economic integration, and ensure long-term regional stability. Ethiopia’s strategic, historical, and cultural significance makes it a central pillar for regional stability and prosperity in Africa and the Arab world. Embracing Ethiopia’s needs for sea access, respecting its sovereignty, and fostering inclusive cooperation can convert potential geopolitical flashpoints into opportunities for shared growth. For Africa and the Middle East, the path forward lies in partnership, recognizing Ethiopia as a vital bridge—an ancient civilization with a future rooted in regional integration, economic development, and mutual respect. Only through such collective effort can we secure a stable, prosperous future for all peoples of the Red Sea corridor and beyond.

Why Ethiopia Belongs in the Arab League? By Jibril Lamo August 19, 2026 The trajectory of global diplomacy is shifting toward historic truth and economic pragmatism, exposing the futility of outdated geopolitical vetoes. For decades, Egypt has extensively leveraged the Arab League to serve its own narrow interests and geopolitical agenda. Yet, this transactional dynamic begs a fundamental question: what has the Arab world received from Egypt in return? Let us confront the uncomfortable truth. The answer is virtually nothing. Rather than consistently advancing collective strength, Cairo’s policies and decades of authoritarian rule have, critics argue, contributed to instability across the region—weakening Sudan’s sovereignty while pursuing policies that have fueled tensions in East Africa and the Red Sea. These regions are not peripheral to Arab interests; they are strategically indispensable to the Arab world’s security, maritime trade, energy supplies and food security. One of the most consequential examples of Egypt’s divisive regional approach is its historical involvement in the Eritrean question and the broader struggle over Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. Cairo was overtly supporting separatist forces and political projects intended to weaken Ethiopia and constrain its regional influence. The eventual separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia remains a defining episode in the Horn of Africa’s turbulent history and a powerful reminder of how external geopolitical calculations can reshape the destiny of nations. Historical diplomacy reveals that Egyptian politician Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who served as acting Foreign Minister before becoming UN Secretary-General, played a pivotal role in advancing the Eritrean secession project to permanently weaken Ethiopia. Furthermore, Cairo’s active destabilization of the southern Red Sea basin presents a direct threat to global maritime trade and regional security. By stoking tensions around the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and proxying armed factions, Cairo has transformed vital maritime passages into arenas of geopolitical confrontation, jeopardizing the broader security architecture essential for the energy and food logistics of the entire Arab world. While Egypt’s self-serving maneuvers generate regional friction, Ethiopia’s accession to the Arab League presents a transformative opportunity from which the Arab world stands to gain immensely. Under the visionary framework of the Medemer philosophy, Ethiopia possesses the diplomatic posture and inclusive vision needed to unite and integrate the Arab world far more effectively than Cairo ever could. As the undisputed diplomatic capital of Africa and the permanent headquarters of the African Union, Ethiopia brings unparalleled experience in multilateral consensus-building. Far from being a geopolitical gamble, Ethiopia’s aspiration to join the Arab League is a natural homecoming. As a Red Sea nation with a population exceeding 135 million, a booming economy, and deep civilizational ties, Ethiopia’s membership would establish an indispensable bridge between Africa and the Middle East. Ethiopia’s connection to the Middle East is built upon millennia of shared heritage, culture, and bloodlines. In academic institutions such as Harvard University, Ethiopian studies have historically resided within Oriental and Near Eastern departments, reflecting the deep historic entanglement between Habesha civilization and the Near East. The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait was never a barrier; it served as a vibrant corridor connecting commerce, culture, and communities across the Red Sea. From the reign of King Abraha to modern genetic studies confirming shared ancestry between Ethiopian and Middle Eastern populations, these foundational bonds remain undeniable. Linguistically and culturally, the structural bedrock of the Ethiopian state is Semitic. Ge'ez, the sacred classical language of Ethiopia, alongside its modern descendants Amharic and Tigrinya, belongs directly to the South Semitic branch of the Afroasiatic language family. This linguistic heritage inextricably links Habesha syntax, vocabulary, and literary traditions to classical Arabic, Aramaic, and Hebrew. The shared linguistic infrastructure between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula offers continuous, tangible proof of a bi-directional civilizational flow. Beyond linguistics, Ethiopia holds a sacred and irreplaceable standing in the foundational history of Islam. When the companions of the Prophet Muhammad faced severe persecution in Mecca, it was to the Aksumite Kingdom that they fled for survival. The First Hijrah to Habesha, where the righteous Emperor Najashi extended royal dignity and sanctuary to the early Muslim community, saved the Islamic faith at its inception. This deep spiritual intertwining makes Ethiopia’s cultural identity inseparable from the broader Near East. Despite these undeniable facts, Cairo has systematically weaponized the Arab League as an instrument of institutional containment against Addis Ababa. For generations, Egyptian foreign policy has operated on an obsolete zero-sum doctrine that views any Ethiopian sovereign progress—whether the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam or the reclamation of direct maritime access—as a threat. By projecting its own hydropolitics onto the entire Arab bloc, Egypt has forced the League into a posture of artificial hostility toward its most powerful neighbor. In contrast to Cairo's policy of exclusion, contemporary realities demand total integration. Under the guiding principle of Medemer, Ethiopia offers the Arab world structural advantages that far surpass outdated rivalries. With an expanding industrial base and immense green energy capacity, Ethiopia serves as the primary stability anchor for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin. While much of the Middle East faces severe water scarcity, desertification, and vulnerable food supply chains, Ethiopia’s highland ecology and abundant freshwater resources position it to become a vital agro-industrial partner for the entire Arabian Peninsula. Integrating Ethiopia into the Arab League transforms the Red Sea into a prosperous economic zone driven by Arab capital paired with Ethiopian land, energy, and labor scale. The League of Arab States must transcend twentieth-century nationalisms and embrace the civilizational reality of the Red Sea basin. Existing member states like Djibouti, Somalia, the Comoros, and Mauritania demonstrate the bloc's capacity to accommodate diverse regional realities. Full membership for Ethiopia does not diminish its proud African identity; rather, it elevates Ethiopia to its rightful role as the primary bridge connecting the African continent to the Middle East. It is time for the Arab League to move past Egyptian gatekeeping, leverage Ethiopia’s unifying synergy, and grant Addis Ababa its full and rightful seat.

By Staff Writer August 17, 2026 (ENA) The Horn of Africa is entering another consequential phase in its long-running struggle over security, sovereignty, economic development and access to strategic waterways. At the center of these tensions is Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive pursuit of national development, regional integration and reliable sovereign access to the sea. Unfortunately, there have been mounting efforts by neighboring actors to contain, undermine and ultimately frustrate that trajectory. Predominantly, Egyptian officials have been at the forefront of reinforcing a destabilizing regional agenda driven by their ambition to prevent Ethiopia, a giant African nation, from rising and asserting its rightful place in the region. Recent provocations against Ethiopia, involving forces aligned with the banned TPLF and Eritrean-backed elements, have added a dangerous new dimension to an already volatile regional environment. Emerging reports indicate that the now-defunct TPLF opened a new military front in northwestern Ethiopia, only to face a decisive setback. The episode has exposed the fragility of what has been portrayed as the so-called “Tsemdo” alliance, an alignment spearheaded by the Eritrean regime alongside local anti-peace forces, including TPLF elements. Its setback represents more than a battlefield reversal. It strikes at a broader strategy aimed at exploiting Ethiopia’s internal divisions, exporting conflict across its borders and obstructing the country’s development and regional ambitions. For the regime in Asmara, the setback is particularly consequential. Eritrea has repeatedly positioned itself at the center of political and security calculations directed against Ethiopia. The latest developments therefore raise a fundamental question: Is the Horn of Africa witnessing yet another attempt to use proxy forces and cross-border alliances to keep Ethiopia politically divided, economically constrained and strategically isolated? If so, the implications extend far beyond a single battlefield. They touch the very foundations of sovereignty, regional stability, economic integration and Ethiopia’s legitimate pursuit of sovereign access to the sea. To understand why Shabia, Eritrean regime, consistently positions itself at the forefront of internal subversion against Ethiopia, one must examine its historical underpinnings. From its inception, the modern Eritrean architecture was fostered by Cairo not as an isolated geopolitical entity, but as a strategic proxy designed to exert leverage against Ethiopia, the source of Abay (Nile). For millennia, the adage that "Egypt is the gift of the Nile" has shaped Cairo's strategic doctrine. However, this narrow conception of exclusive entitlement, which entirely disregards upper riparian nations, most notably Ethiopia, which contributes 86 percent of the river’s total flow has generated persistent friction across the basin. Rather than embracing equitable utilization and collaborative resource management, successive Egyptian administrations have sought to undermine the rights of upper riparian states and maintain regional hegemony. The political, geostrategic, and geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa has taken on critical dimensions that bear directly on regional security and equilibrium. Cairo’s current posture, which acts as a catalyst for containment and strategic destabilization against Ethiopia, carries far-reaching consequences. Much of this dynamic stem from the institutional legacies of the colonial era. British administrative structures in Sudan and Egypt prioritized the development of powerful military and security apparatuses at the expense of resilient civilian political institutions. Following independence, both nations inherited centralized state frameworks lacking deep-rooted democratic traditions. In Sudan, civilian administrations faced political fragmentation and economic instability, leading to eight military coups since 1956. In Egypt, the 1952 Free Officers Revolution established the armed forces as the dominant political authority and the self-proclaimed custodian of national continuity. This institutional dominance expanded over time into the economic realm. In Egypt, the military apparatus maintains substantial holdings across critical sectors, including manufacturing, infrastructure, construction, and agriculture. Similarly, in Sudan, military and security networks historically exercised control over key commercial domains, such as gold mining and agricultural trade. These commercial interests have solidified institutional autonomy, making transitions to civilian oversight exceedingly complex. These domestic military structures have significantly influenced regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa through several interconnected mechanisms. First, protracted internal conflicts in Sudan have precipitated massive population displacements, driving millions of refugees into neighboring states, including Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, and Egypt. These flows place acute strains on host communities, public infrastructure, and border security management. Second, Egyptian military-led administrations have consistently framed Nile water allocation strictly through a national security lens, particularly regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This rigid approach has frequently complicated diplomatic negotiations over shared water resources and impeded efforts toward equitable basin-wide governance. Third, regional political volatility discourages direct foreign investment, disrupts critical trade corridors, and delays cross-border infrastructure initiatives intended to link the Red Sea trade routes to the broader African hinterland. At present, Egyptian strategic maneuvers involve coordinating diplomatic and logistical alignments with the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Eritrean administration, and local insurgent factions active in the Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray regions—collectively referred to as Tsimdo. This coordinated effort aims to constrain Ethiopia's economic trajectory, impede its national development programs, and restrict its legitimate access to Red Sea maritime commerce. The primary objective of this coalition is to export armed conflict into Ethiopian territory and regionalize domestic friction. By providing logistical and operational backing to groups acting in opposition to the constitutional order, these external actors directly challenge established international norms regarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite repeated strain placed upon the Pretoria Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, the Ethiopian Government has exercised notable restraint. Rather than resorting to force, federal authorities allocated over 30 billion Birr toward rapid socio-economic rehabilitation, infrastructure reconstruction, and public service restoration in affected areas. Nevertheless, sub-regional actors and hostile elements have sought to exploit this measured approach, misrepresenting developments on the ground to the international community. Furthermore, recent maritime initiatives—such as the Red Sea council framework involving Egypt, Eritrea, and Sudan, appear deliberately structured to bypass Ethiopia, seeking to reinforce its landlocked status and impede its integration into regional maritime trade. Unless these coercive postures are set aside in favor of genuine regional cooperation, the Horn of Africa risks being drawn into broader geopolitical instability.