Staff Writer October 1, 2026 (ENA) From the ballot box to a new government, Ethiopia enters a defining chapter of its democratic journey Ethiopia is moving into a decisive new chapter of its political journey, with the country’s federal government set to be formed following the conclusion of the 7th General Election and the establishment of newly elected regional and city councils. The transition marks a critical moment for Africa’s second-most populous nation, not simply because a new administration is taking shape, but because the country is seeking to translate an enormous electoral exercise into functioning institutions, political representation and a renewed national mandate. On October 5, 2026, Ethiopia is scheduled to inaugurate the newly elected House of People’s Representatives and formally establish the new federal government, completing the constitutional process that followed the June 1 general election. The date represents more than the opening of a new parliamentary term. It is the point at which the ballot box gives way to governance, as elected representatives assume responsibility for translating electoral mandates into policies, laws and public institutions. The 7th General Election was conducted on a scale rarely seen in Ethiopia’s history. More than 54 million citizens registered to vote, while 51.7 million cast ballots, according to the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). Forty-two political parties fielded 10,438 candidates, alongside 80 independent candidates, in an electoral process that extended across the country. For Ethiopia, the significance of the moment lies not only in the numbers. It lies in what comes next. From Ballots to Institutions The election has now moved beyond campaigning and voting. Its results are being translated into institutional authority. The Prosperity Party secured 438 of the 501 House of Peoples’ Representatives seats for which results were announced, giving it the parliamentary majority required under Ethiopia’s constitutional system to form the federal executive. The result gives the incoming government a clear parliamentary mandate. But the next chapter will ultimately be measured not by the size of the electoral victory, but by how that mandate is converted into effective governance. That responsibility comes at a consequential time. Ethiopia is simultaneously navigating economic reform, national dialogue, peacebuilding, institutional reform, regional diplomacy and an ambitious development agenda. The new administration will therefore inherit not merely the authority to govern, but a broad set of expectations from citizens, businesses, political actors and international partners. The transition from electioneering to governing will be the real test of the country's institutions. Regional Governments Already Taking Shape The federal transition is being preceded by developments at the regional and city levels.Regional councils have begun constituting their governments and electing their chief administrators, providing the institutional foundation for the next phase of governance. In Addis Ababa, the city council unanimously reappointed Adanech Abiebie as mayor on September 30, giving her another term to lead the capital’s administration. The council cited infrastructure development, administrative reforms and citizen-focused services among the areas of her previous tenure. The developments across the regions and the capital demonstrate that Ethiopia's post-election transition is unfolding through multiple layers of its federal structure rather than through a single event in Addis Ababa. This gradual process—from regional councils to the federal parliament—also underscores the constitutional architecture through which political authority is organized in the country. A Constitutional Transfer of Political Authority Ethiopia's Constitution places the House of People’s Representatives at the center of federal legislative authority and provides the constitutional basis for forming the executive following parliamentary elections. Article 56 provides that the political party or coalition holding a majority in the House forms and leads the federal executive. The election result has therefore established the parliamentary basis for the formation of the next government. The significance of October 5 consequently extends beyond ceremony. It represents the institutional point at which the outcome of the June election becomes a new governing arrangement. For a country with Ethiopia's political complexity, maintaining constitutional continuity during this transition carries particular importance. The election attracted significant continental attention, with the African Union deploying an election observation mission led by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. The AU subsequently commended the June 1 election, describing it as an important step in Ethiopia’s democratic evolution and recognizing the role of the National Election Board in administering the process. But the AU’s engagement went beyond election monitoring. As the host of the African Union headquarters and a country with a central diplomatic role on the continent, Ethiopia’s political developments carry significance well beyond its borders. As former President Kenyatta noted ahead of the vote, Ethiopia’s election held importance for the wider African continent. That continental attention now turns to what comes next: the peaceful translation of an electoral mandate into constitutional government. With the new House of Peoples’ Representatives set to open and the federal government to be formed on October 5, Ethiopia is approaching a defining moment. One is that will demonstrate whether electoral competition can be followed by orderly constitutional governance, institutional continuity and a peaceful political transition. Representation Beyond the Winning Party The parliamentary majority gives the Prosperity Party the constitutional basis to form the federal government. At the same time, the presence of opposition representatives in federal and regional legislatures means that Ethiopia's political institutions will continue to contain competing political voices. That matters because democracy does not end when the ballots are counted. The post-election parliament becomes the arena in which competing priorities, interests and political perspectives are translated into legislative debate, scrutiny and public policy. For opposition parties, elected representatives and independent voices, the new parliamentary term provides an institutional platform through which they can represent their constituencies and engage in the country's political process. For the governing party, the parliamentary majority brings the corresponding responsibility of translating its mandate into effective administration and public accountability. The Bigger Test: Turning Political Transition into Peace Perhaps the most important question for Ethiopia now is the new political cycle can help deepen peace and institutional stability. Ethiopia's political history has repeatedly demonstrated the cost of unresolved political disputes. The country's current national dialogue and reconciliation efforts are therefore taking place alongside the formation of the new government. The government has repeatedly presented dialogue, reconciliation and constitutional institutions as important instruments for addressing national challenges. The National Dialogue process has also sought to gather views on longstanding political and social issues across the country. The new government will therefore enter office with expectations extending well beyond economic management. Citizens will look to institutions to deliver security, justice, economic opportunity, public services and accountable governance. Political parties will be expected to compete through institutions rather than confrontation. And the international community will watch how Ethiopia's democratic institutions evolve during the new five-year political cycle. A New Chapter, Not an Ending The formation of a new government is often treated as the conclusion of an election. For Ethiopia, it is better understood as the beginning of the more demanding phase.The ballot has expressed a political choice. The councils are being organized. The federal parliament is preparing to open. The constitutional machinery is moving toward the installation of a new executive. Now comes governance. The coming political term will test whether electoral participation can be converted into stronger institutions; whether political competition can coexist with national dialogue; whether constitutional mechanisms can provide space for disagreement without returning the country to confrontation; and whether the enormous expectations generated by Ethiopia's development ambitions can be matched by institutional capacity. Ethiopia is entering this new chapter with the political authority produced by its seventh general election and with institutions that must now carry that mandate into everyday governance. The country’s democratic journey, therefore, does not end with the announcement of results or the swearing-in of a new government. It moves from the ballot box to the institution, from political competition to public responsibility, and from electoral mandate to the harder work of building peace, prosperity and accountable governance. That is the next chapter Ethiopia is preparing to write.

By Staff writer What the 2nd Ethiopian Finance Forum 2026 Signals for Ethiopia’s Reform Path Ethiopia is advancing its economic transformation through broad structural reforms aimed at strengthening financial stability, expanding investment, boosting domestic production, and building stronger institutions. These reforms are designed to create a more resilient and self-reliant economy capable of generating employment, attracting investment, and supporting sustainable development. The opening of the Second Ethiopian Finance Forum 2026 on Tuesday at the Adwa Victory Memorial Museum highlighted this strategic direction, bringing together key priorities in economic reform, financial sector development, and private sector participation. The forum also focused on ways to transform the country’s human, natural, and institutional resources into powerful drivers of growth and prosperity. Running through October 1, the forum provides a platform to highlight progress in macroeconomic management, expand financing for private enterprises, strengthen agricultural production, and modernize financial services. The key contributors to this progress include ongoing economic reforms, an expanded role for the private sector, enhanced agricultural financing, a declining inflation rate and digitalizing finance. National Economic Reform Ethiopia’s macroeconomic reform program represents a major step toward building an economy aligned with national development priorities while strengthening the state’s capacity to mobilize resources, expand employment and improve citizens’ living standards. Deputy Prime Minister Temesgen Tiruneh said Ethiopia is implementing economic and financial reforms aimed at moving the country from stabilization toward economic transformation. The measures include reforms to the foreign exchange market, monetary policy and financial sector regulation, as well as opening sectors to greater competition and investment. As part of efforts to strengthen national institutions, Ethiopia established Ethiopian Investment Holdings to improve the performance of strategic national assets and institutions, including Ethiopian Airlines, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and Ethio Telecom. These institutions have a significant role in expanding services, supporting economic growth and strengthening Ethiopia’s participation in regional and international markets. Ethiopia has also strengthened cooperation with development partners while implementing an economic reform program designed around its national priorities. The program has enabled the country to secure support from the International Monetary Fund to address balance of payments pressures, ease economic imbalances and sustain the reform process. Expanding Private Sector Expanding the role of the private sector has emerged as a major component of Ethiopia’s financial sector reforms, particularly through changes in lending policies that have enabled more resources to reach productive enterprises. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia increased its annual lending to the private sector from about 30 billion Birr to nearly 300 billion Birr. The number of small and medium sized enterprises benefiting from financing also increased from around 5,000 to 35,000, strengthening their capacity to expand operations, invest and create employment. The bank has also provided financing for home and vehicle purchases by reducing the required down payment to 10 percent and allowing repayment periods of up to 20 years at an interest rate of 14 percent. To support innovation and entrepreneurship, the bank allocated five billion Birr for loans of up to 10 million Birr to emerging entrepreneurs without requiring collateral or an initial contribution. The initiative is intended to create additional opportunities for new businesses and emerging enterprises. These measures reflect efforts to create a financial system that responds more effectively to the needs of the productive economy and enables individuals and institutions to turn ideas into viable economic activities. Agricultural Financing Expanding agricultural financing is another important element of Ethiopia’s economic transformation, given the sector’s contribution to food security, employment, production and trade. The volume of loans extended to agriculture and related sectors increased from 28 billion birr last year to 189 billion Birr. The government is also investing in irrigation development, agricultural mechanization, improved land use and productivity enhancement. Minister of Planning and Development Fitsum Assefa said reform measures have contributed to easing inflationary pressures. She noted that average annual inflation declined from more than 26 percent before the reforms to slightly above 16 percent one year after their implementation, attributing the improvement to coordinated monetary and fiscal measures. Wheat production has emerged as one example of the transformation Ethiopia is seeking to consolidate. According to data presented at the forum, increased domestic wheat production has enabled the country to reduce its dependence on imports and move toward self-sufficiency. The Green Legacy initiative has also contributed to efforts to strengthen agricultural resources and food production while linking environmental protection with long term economic development. Declining of Inflation The decline in average annual headline inflation from about 26 percent in 2024 to nearly 16 percent during the 12 months following the reform reflects progress in efforts to address economic pressures and create a more stable environment for businesses and investors. The reforms included gradual adjustments to the ceiling on bank credit growth, which rose from 14 percent to 18 percent and then 24 percent before the ceiling was abolished. The government also shifted toward instruments such as securities sales to finance budget deficits rather than relying on direct borrowing from the National Bank of Ethiopia. Tax policy reforms have further strengthened the government’s capacity to mobilize and manage domestic revenue, supporting public expenditure and improving coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. Minister of Finance Ahmed Shide said the comprehensive macroeconomic reform has produced tangible results in easing the national debt burden and reducing inflation. He added that completing debt restructuring agreements would help ease pressure on public finances and reduce foreign exchange constraints. At the same time, direct and indirect fuel subsidies have exceeded 600 billion Birr over the past eight years. The government allocated 130 billion Birr for petroleum products during the current fiscal year, in addition to 100 billion birr to support fertilizer supplies, with the stated objective of protecting consumers and maintaining the productive capacity of farmers and businesses. Digitalizing Finance The digital transformation of banking services is another important component of Ethiopia’s financial sector modernization, expanding access to financial services, facilitating transactions and creating new financing opportunities. Services such as CBE Birr and CBE Fast Loan have expanded digital financial services to millions of customers, contributing to financial inclusion and facilitating access to banking services, particularly for small and medium sized enterprises. The forum also witnessed the official launch of the Ethiopian Finance Academy, formerly known as the Ethiopian Financial Studies Institute, following the expansion of its capabilities and the adoption of a new organizational structure. The academy is expected to prepare professionals capable of responding to developments in banking, capital markets and digital finance through training programs, professional certifications and specialized research on financial policy. It will also provide capacity building programs for leaders of financial institutions. The launch was attended by National Bank of Ethiopia Governor Eyob Tekalign, senior bank officials, heads of banking and insurance institutions and other invited guests. Governor Eyob said Ethiopia is working to build a strong and dynamic financial sector capable of supporting the country’s development ambitions and sustainable economic growth. He said strengthening the banking sector includes increasing capital, encouraging mergers and acquisitions, expanding financing and facilitating the participation of foreign banks. Conclusion The discussions at the Second Ethiopian Finance Forum demonstrate an integrated approach to economic transformation that combines macroeconomic stability, institutional development, private investment, increased production and financial modernization. The expansion of private sector lending, the growing number of small and medium sized enterprises accessing finance, increased agricultural financing and the expansion of digital financial services are contributing to a broader economic base and greater participation in national development. The decline in inflation, the development of alternative instruments for budget financing, improved domestic revenue mobilization and progress in debt restructuring are also important components of efforts to create a more stable economic environment. As Ethiopia continues implementing its reform program, greater integration of finance, production, technology and human capital development will be important to ensure that macroeconomic improvements translate into increased employment, higher productivity and improved living standards. The Second Ethiopian Finance Forum therefore provides a platform for assessing the progress of the country’s economic reforms while highlighting the financial sector’s role in mobilizing resources, supporting productive investment and strengthening the foundations for long term economic development.

From Pulse of Africa, ENA’s Partner Media Sept. 30, 2026 (ENA) Throughout history, several Egyptian leaders relied on military invasions, proxy wars, and covert diplomacy to secure hegemony over the Nile Basin and destabilize Ethiopia. The story was never only about water. It was about power. It was about fear. And it was about who gets to decide the future of a river that feeds millions. For more than a century, Egypt and Ethiopia have been locked in a rivalry shaped by one unchangeable geographical fact.Egypt is downstream. Ethiopia is upstream. The Blue Nile, which is known in Ethiopia as the Abay, orgonites in the Ethiopian highlands. From that single reality grows the deeper question is Who controls development when the source of life sits upstream, but the security sits downstream? The rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia has never followed one steady path. It evolved again and again. First, it leaned on conquest. Then it shifted to diplomacy and regional pressure. Later it turned into financial leverage. And in the twenty-first century, it became an intense contest over one project,the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). To understand the present, you have to trace the past through changing strategies and changing fears. Each era added a new layer. The Era of Imperial Ambition In the nineteenth century, when expansion tried to solve everything (1863–1879), Egypt under Khedive Ismail Pasha tried to reshape the map. Egypt’s forces pushed south and east, seeking influence over territories tied to the Red Sea and the upper Nile basin. Control was imagined as something that could be seized by marching. In 1875 and 1876, Egyptian armies advanced into Ethiopian territory.But the campaigns failed badly. At Gundet in 1875 and Gura in 1876, then in what is now Eritrea, Emperor Yohannes IV’s forces inflicted major defeats. These defeats ended Egypt’s attempt to conquer Ethiopia by force.And the lesson stuck. Military expansion could not easily determine who held the Ethiopian highlands. And it could not settle who controlled the sources of the Nile. Proxy Warfare and Soft Power This was an era where Nile diplomacy meets the politics of the Horn (1956–1970). Under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the conflict moved away from battlefield logic.It became a political system. Now the Nile contest was pursued through diplomacy, regional competition, proxy warfare, and pressure. Nasser reportedly used support for rival forces and insurgencies to isolate Ethiopia. He backed Somali irredentism in the Ogaden conflict. He also funded insurgencies in Eritrea. And Egyptian policy included blocking international loans for Ethiopian water infrastructure. A key symbol of this era was the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan. It allocated Nile water use without Ethiopia and the upstream riparian states at the table.Ethiopia rejected the agreement, and upstream countries were excluded from decision-making. At the same time, Nile politics became inseparable from regional politics. The dispute no longer lived only on riverbanks. It reached across the Red Sea, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, and became entangled with broader balance-of-power calculations in the Horn of Africa. This is where the rivalry deepened: water security became a regional strategy. The Security Imperative This was a period when the Nile becomes a national-security line (1970–1981). Under Anwar Sadat, the tone changed again. The Nile stopped being treated mainly as economics. It became a security question. Sadat reportedly threatened open military action against Ethiopian proposals for Nile dams. During the 1977 Ogaden War, Egypt armed Somali forces. Strategic alliances were formed to encircle and weaken Ethiopia. The regional conflict and the Nile dispute became sharper together. Historical research documents Egyptian military assistance to Somalia during the war and reflects concerns that instability in Ethiopia could destabilize Sudan and that would harm Egypt’s strategic position. The rhetoric also became more direct. Sadat warned that if Ethiopia interfered with Egypt’s Nile water access, Egypt might respond with force. One scholarly account records the idea that there would be “no alternative” to force if Egypt’s Nile interests were threatened. This was a shift in mindset. From development disagreement to military readiness. From bargaining to red-line thinking. Financial Siege and Containment During the Hosni Mubarak period (1981–2011), direct confrontation mattered less. Pressure became quieter, more complex, and more bureaucratic. Egypt leaned into diplomacy and international influence. The approach was described as covert regional containment, supporting armed insurgencies inside Ethiopia, blocking financing, and reportedly establishing intelligence presence in neighboring states. The most visible conflict in this era often centered on financing for Ethiopian water infrastructure. Sources describe Egyptian opposition to international funding for projects that Cairo believed could affect Nile flows. But it is important to avoid oversimplification. The repeated claim that Mubarak simply vetoed every Ethiopian dam loan is too broad. Still, the broader pattern remained clear. Egypt tried to preserve its established position in Nile diplomacy. Ethiopia pressed harder for freedom to develop. So, the struggle continued, but with new tools: loans, institutions, technical approvals, and diplomatic timing. A Televised Shock The Mohamed Morsi era brought a dramatic public moment. In 2013, political discussion about the GERD appeared in an unusual form. During a live televised meeting, Egyptian political figures discussed covert and extreme options to pressure Ethiopia. Ideas included sabotage, arming Ethiopian rebel factions, and launching air strikes. The broadcast caused widespread embarrassment and international concern. But it also revealed something critical that the dam had become embedded deeply in Egyptian security thinking. Not only as a technical dispute. But as a threat to national stability, shaping what some leaders were willing to discuss openly. This episode did not prove a personal order for violence. Yet it showed the range of pressure strategies some political figures believed might be justified. Modern Encirclement and Red Lines Under Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Egypt’s posture became a mix of formal diplomacy, military deterrence, and regional containment. On one side, Egypt strengthened military and defense alliances with neighboring states. Reported strategies include intelligence sharing and efforts to encircle Ethiopia geopolitically, through partnerships with countries in the region. On another side, Egypt expanded security focus in and around the Red Sea and near critical maritime chokepoints like the Bab-el-Mandeb. Strengthening security ties with Eritrea and projecting naval presence close to the Horn became part of this approach. Proxy and strategic leverage also appeared in the narrative. Ethiopian has accused Egypt of capitalizing on domestic instability, such as conflict in Tigray, to pressure Addis Ababa and delay GERD operations. Egypt has repeatedly framed downstream water disruption as an existential matter. Officials described downstream water security as a “red line,” with warnings of major consequences if Egypt’s access to Nile water is threatened. Finally, diplomatic and financial isolation remained part of the toolbox. Egypt leveraged international organizations, including the United Nations Security Council and the Arab League, to lobby against Ethiopia’s dam-filling plans and to restrict international funding. From Battlefield to Boardroom Across these eras, the methods changed, but the fundamental strategy remained the same: to keep Ethiopia contained. Under Ismail Pasha, Egypt attempted direct military expansion. Under Nasser, the battlefield shifted to regional proxy competition and diplomatic isolation. Sadat reframed the river into an explicit security issue, while Mubarak relied on quiet financial blockades and covert pressure. Morsi’s administration publicly entertained extreme containment options, and El-Sisi has combined military deterrence, encirclement alliances, and financial lobbying. Yet, despite centuries of coordinated pressure and proxy conflicts, this strategy has ultimately failed. Ethiopia’s persistent endurance has defied every attempt to restrict its growth, culminating in the construction and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam—proof that no strategy of containment could permanently alter the sovereign destiny of the Ethiopian highlands. It is undeniable that the river is vital to Egypt. So is Ethiopia’s right to develop the resources of the Abay. And the enduring disagreement shows a major limitation that agreements negotiated without all basin countries at the table cannot fully resolve what upstream and downstream must share. The Nile’s Real Lesson This long history offers a clear warning. Stability does not emerge from domination. It does not come from isolation. It does not come from proxy competition. And it does not come from threats that lock neighbors into permanent insecurity. The Abay has flowed northward for centuries. The challenge now is to ensure the river becomes a foundation for cooperation, not a permanent trigger for confrontation. Water can be a weapon in the wrong framework. But it can also be a shared lifeline in the right one. The future of the Nile Basin will not be settled by force alone. It will be settled by a framework that addresses water security and development rights together, while bringing legitimate interests across the basin into the same room. And the question remains urgent, not historical that will the Nile become a contract between neighbors or another battlefield disguised as diplomacy? In today’s interconnected world, the lesson of this long rivalry is clear: zero-sum hydro-politics belongs to a bygone era. Realities on the ground—demographic growth, climate change, and pressing economic demands—make it impossible for any single nation to monopolize or dictate the destiny of the Nile. Downstream security cannot be bought through the containment or destabilization of upstream neighbors. True, lasting stability can only emerge when all basin states move past colonial-era claims and embrace the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization. Through genuine dialogue, shared institutions like the Nile River Basin Commission, and cooperative development, the Abay can finally transition from a regional battleground into a shared lifeline for millions.

Sept. 30, 2026 (ENA) The successful completion and inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has demonstrated that Ethiopia possesses the engineering, institutional and financial capacity to undertake projects of historic scale. The achievement has also opened a broader question: What comes next for Ethiopia’s development of the Abay (Blue Nile) Basin? GERD is more than a single hydropower project. With an installed capacity of 5,150 MW and a reservoir capacity of about 74 billion cubic metres, it represents one of Ethiopia’s largest infrastructure undertakings and a major expansion of the country’s capacity to develop its water and energy resources. The experience accumulated through GERD—from engineering and project management to financing, institutional coordination and human-resource development, provides Ethiopia with a substantial knowledge base for considering additional water-resource projects. The Abay Basin Has More Potential GERD is not the only hydropower opportunity identified in the Ethiopian Blue Nile system. An International Water Management Institute (IWMI) assessment found that more than 120 potential hydropower sites had been identified along the Ethiopian Blue Nile, while 26 were investigated in greater detail under the Abay River Basin Master Plan. The assessment also identified substantial potential for additional hydropower development, alongside irrigation schemes. More recent research further points to the possibility of integrating hydropower generation with irrigation development. Research available through Addis Ababa University indicates that a four-project cascade that could generate up to about 38 TWh of annual electricity under a hydropower-focused scenario, while integrated irrigation development would require balancing electricity generation against water-use needs. These findings do not mean that every identified project should automatically be constructed. Rather, they demonstrate that the Abay Basin contains a significant portfolio of technically identified opportunities that can be evaluated according to economic feasibility, environmental sustainability, downstream effects and Ethiopia’s long-term development priorities. From One Mega Project to a Broader Development Strategy For Ethiopia, the strategic significance of GERD therefore extends beyond electricity generation. Additional carefully planned hydropower and irrigation infrastructure could contribute to electricity supply, agricultural productivity, food security, industrialization and regional power connectivity. Hydropower could also strengthen Ethiopia’s renewable-energy base and create additional opportunities for electricity exports. The key lesson from GERD is that large national infrastructure projects require more than physical construction. They require long-term planning, institutional capacity, financing mechanisms, technical expertise, public participation and sustained national commitment. Solomon Zena, Executive Director of the Policy Innovation Research Center (PIRC), told ENA recently that Ethiopia should build on the experience gained through GERD. “The nation needs to move ahead and build more dams,” Solomon said, stressing that the successful completion of GERD demonstrated what Ethiopians could accomplish through unity and determination. His argument reflects a broader development proposition: GERD should not necessarily be viewed as the conclusion of Ethiopia’s major water-infrastructure ambitions, but as a foundation from which future projects can be evaluated. Development Rights and Shared Waters The debate over additional dams, however, cannot be separated from the broader Nile Basin dispute. Egypt has repeatedly opposed reports of additional Ethiopian dams. In August 2026, Egyptian Irrigation Minister Hani Sewilam said Egypt would not allow Ethiopia to build new dams on the Nile. Egyptian officials have also called for legally binding arrangements concerning the operation of GERD and Nile-water flows. Ethiopia, for its part, maintains its right to develop its water resources for economic and social development while arguing that its projects can be pursued without causing significant harm to downstream countries. This disagreement, particularly as tensions escalate over Egypt’s opposition to Ethiopia’s development projects, highlights a fundamental challenge in the Nile Basin: how the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization can be advanced in a way that respects the development rights of all riparian states. The issue should therefore be addressed through evidence, technical assessment and genuine cooperation—not through efforts to freeze development, particularly in the upstream countries of the basin. Beyond GERD The completion of GERD has changed the scale of what Ethiopia can realistically contemplate in terms of national infrastructure. The country now possesses experience from one of Africa’s largest hydropower projects, while the Abay Basin contains a much wider portfolio of historically identified hydropower and irrigation opportunities. The next phase should consequently focus on careful, technically sound and economically viable development and dam infrastructures. Additional dams should be considered project by project, based on hydrological data, economic returns, environmental and social impacts, irrigation requirements, climate resilience and Ethiopia’s aspiration for future development. GERD has demonstrated Ethiopia’s capacity to build at an unprecedented scale. The larger question now is how that capacity can be translated into a long-term, integrated Abay Basin development strategy that expands clean energy, supports agriculture and industry, strengthens regional electricity integration and advances Ethiopia’s development objectives while engaging constructively with downstream countries. The lesson of GERD is therefore not simply that Ethiopia can build a mega-dam. It is that Ethiopia has acquired the experience and institutional confidence to think beyond a single project and consider the next generation of transformative infrastructure.

By Gizachew Meku Sept. 29, 2026 (ENA) The Horn of Africa is approaching the final months of 2026 with an increasingly important climate signal that is a strengthening El Niño that could bring substantially wetter conditions to parts of the region while increasing the risks of flooding, landslides, crop damage, disease outbreaks and infrastructure disruption. El Niño is a recurring climate phenomenon in which unusually warm sea-surface temperatures in the central and eastern tropical Pacific alter atmospheric circulation, affecting rainfall and temperatures far beyond the Pacific. Its impacts vary by region and season, making it an important factor in seasonal forecasting and preparedness. For the Horn, the latest forecasts show that the region faces neither a uniformly wet nor uniformly hazardous season. Rather, the impacts are likely to vary significantly by location, timing and intensity of rainfall. This makes the ability to translate forecasts into timely, localized decisions more important than simply predicting whether the coming season will be wet or dry. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) reported in September that El Niño is firmly established and expected to strengthen to a very strong event toward the end of 2026. WMO forecasts indicate an exceptionally high likelihood, nearly 100 percent, that the phenomenon will persist through February 2027. The organization has also warned that the combination of El Niño and other oceanic conditions could produce significant changes in rainfall and temperature patterns, increasing the risk of extreme weather in different parts of the world. For the Greater Horn of Africa, the latest regional outlook provides a more specific picture. The IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) forecasts a 90 percent likelihood of enhanced October to December rainfall over southern Ethiopia, central and southern Somalia and northeastern Kenya. It also identifies a high likelihood of seasonal rainfall exceeding 400 millimeters in parts of central and southern Somalia, central Kenya, the Lake Victoria Basin, Burundi, western Rwanda and western Tanzania. The October to December season is particularly important for several countries in the region. ICPAC notes that it can account for up to 70 percent of annual rainfall in parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia and up to 40 percent in parts of Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda. Consequently, the quality and distribution of these rains can have major implications for agriculture, livestock, water availability and food security. The Dual Nature of the Forecast The forecast presents both opportunities and risks. For communities affected by water shortages and poor pasture conditions, increased rainfall could replenish rivers, reservoirs and groundwater, regenerate grazing areas and improve crop and livestock production. In agricultural areas, timely and well distributed rainfall could support planting and crop development while improving household and market food supplies. However, rainfall that arrives too intensely or over a short period can produce the opposite result. Heavy downpours can overwhelm drainage systems, cause flash floods and landslides, erode farmland, damage crops and disrupt roads, bridges, schools, health facilities and markets. Flooding can also contaminate water sources and increase the risk of waterborne diseases. ICPAC's latest outlook therefore emphasizes that seasonal forecasts must not be interpreted as a guarantee of rainfall at a particular location or on a particular day. The centre recommends using the seasonal outlook together with weekly and monthly forecasts, climate monitoring information and forecasts issued by national meteorological and hydrological services. Temperature presents another dimension of the risk. ICPAC expects warmer than average conditions across much of the Greater Horn, while WMO's global outlook also points to widespread above normal temperatures during the September to November period. The combination of heat and heavy rainfall can create complex pressures. High temperatures can increase water demand and stress livestock, while intense rainfall can produce flooding and disease risks. In other words, a wetter season does not automatically eliminate the effects of drought or climate vulnerability. Ethiopia illustrates this complexity. Southern parts of the country are among the areas where enhanced October to December rainfall is anticipated. Such rains could support agricultural and livestock activities, particularly where communities have experienced water and pasture pressures. At the same time, intense rainfall could produce localized flooding, waterlogging, soil erosion and damage to roads and other infrastructure. The same combination of opportunity and risk extends across Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. The precise consequences will depend on where rainfall occurs, when it arrives and how rapidly it accumulates. The central question, therefore, is not simply what El Niño will bring. It is whether governments, humanitarian agencies, farmers, pastoralists and communities can act on the available information before forecast risks become humanitarian and economic emergencies. From Forecasts to Decisions The existence of a forecast creates a valuable window for early action. Agricultural authorities can use climate information to adjust planting recommendations, promote appropriate crop varieties and provide farmers with advice on soil and water management. Where flooding is expected, authorities can strengthen drainage systems and identify areas where planting decisions need to account for excessive moisture. Livestock authorities can support pastoralists with information on pasture and water availability, strengthen animal health surveillance, prepare vaccination campaigns and facilitate access to fodder where necessary. Water authorities can monitor reservoirs, rivers and flood prone areas while preparing water management measures in advance. Urban administrations can inspect drainage systems, clear blocked waterways and identify communities and infrastructure exposed to flooding. Infrastructure authorities can assess vulnerable roads, bridges, culverts and water facilities before heavy rains arrive. Where possible, preventive maintenance can be undertaken before access becomes difficult. Health authorities also have an important role. Flooding and standing water can increase the risk of diseases such as cholera and malaria in vulnerable areas. Strengthening surveillance, preparing health facilities and prepositioning medicines and other supplies can allow health systems to respond more rapidly when cases begin to rise. Social protection systems can similarly prepare mechanisms for supporting households whose livelihoods may be affected. Early assistance can help vulnerable families avoid selling livestock, tools, seed stocks or other productive assets to meet immediate food and household needs. These measures are at the heart of anticipatory action: identifying a foreseeable hazard, establishing agreed thresholds and taking predefined measures before the impact becomes severe. Regional Preparedness Is Underway The need to move from forecasting to implementation has already been recognized at regional level. The IGAD High Level Forum on El Niño Preparedness, held in Addis Ababa from September 15 to 17, focused on preparedness, anticipatory action and resilience. The resulting IGAD High Level Call to Action calls for national and local contingency plans to be updated and activated, with clear arrangements for evacuation and humanitarian access. The regional call also emphasizes the prepositioning of food, health, water, sanitation and hygiene supplies, protection of critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges and health facilities, and strengthened surveillance of flood related diseases including cholera and malaria. It further calls for timely agricultural advisories, livestock vaccination and measures to protect pastoral livelihoods. The significance of these measures lies in timing. Food assistance that arrives after roads have been cut off by floods is less effective than supplies positioned before access is disrupted. Veterinary support delivered after livestock disease has spread is more difficult than preventive vaccination and surveillance. Emergency shelter provided after communities have been displaced is more costly and logistically difficult than preparing evacuation sites and access routes beforehand. This is why the next stage of regional preparedness should focus on implementation at community level. Forecast information needs to reach farmers, pastoralists, local administrators, health workers and communities in forms they can understand and use. A seasonal probability expressed in technical language has limited value unless it is translated into practical advice such as when to plant, where to move livestock, which areas to avoid and when to prepare for possible evacuation. Financing Early Action Financing remains one of the most important conditions for successful anticipatory action. In June 2026, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) launched a joint El Niño anticipatory action appeal seeking USD 202 million to protect 8.8 million people across 22 high risk countries. The proposed measures include cash assistance, climate resilient seeds, livestock protection, water harvesting and storage, flood protection, agricultural advisories and early warning information. The appeal reflects a broader shift in humanitarian policy from responding after disasters occur to acting before predictable shocks cause major losses. The economic argument for this approach is also significant. WFP reports that experience from previous El Niño events indicates that every dollar invested in anticipatory action can save between USD 3 and USD 7 in avoided losses and response costs. FAO has similarly reported that anticipatory action can generate up to USD 7 in benefits and avoided agricultural losses for every dollar invested. These figures do not mean that every intervention will produce the same financial return. Outcomes depend on the hazard, location, intervention, timing and population affected. They nevertheless demonstrate why investing before a predictable climate shock can be economically more efficient than relying exclusively on emergency response after losses have occurred.For the Horn of Africa, financing mechanisms need to be sufficiently flexible to release resources when agreed forecast thresholds are reached. Waiting for visible disaster impacts before mobilizing funds can undermine the very purpose of anticipatory action. The Importance of Local Forecasts One of the most important lessons from the current outlook is that a regional forecast cannot substitute for local information. ICPAC's seasonal forecast provides a broad picture of expected climate conditions across the Greater Horn. National meteorological and hydrological services provide increasingly detailed information that can guide decisions at national and local levels. Weekly and monthly updates can then help authorities determine whether anticipated conditions are materializing and whether planned interventions should be activated or adjusted. This layered approach is particularly important because rainfall can vary substantially over relatively short distances. Two communities in the same district may experience different rainfall amounts and different levels of flood exposure. For that reason, preparedness plans should include clearly defined trigger points. These could relate to rainfall totals, river levels, soil moisture, reservoir conditions, flood forecasts, disease indicators or other locally relevant thresholds. Once a threshold is reached, the corresponding action should already be agreed. This could mean releasing cash assistance, moving livestock, distributing seeds, reinforcing flood protection, opening temporary shelters or deploying health teams. Such systems reduce the gap between receiving information and making decisions. Agriculture and Livelihoods at the Center Agriculture and livestock deserve particular attention because climate shocks can produce consequences that extend well beyond a single season. A flood can destroy standing crops, wash away topsoil, damage irrigation systems and interrupt access to markets. For pastoralists, excessive rainfall can improve pasture in some areas while simultaneously increasing animal disease risks or making movement difficult. The impact on households can therefore depend not only on the amount of rainfall but also on their ability to absorb and recover from shocks. Early action can help protect this productive capacity. Climate informed planting advice, flood tolerant or short cycle seeds, livestock vaccination, fodder support and water management can reduce losses while helping households maintain their livelihoods. This is particularly important in areas where communities have already experienced repeated drought, conflict, displacement or economic pressures. A new climate shock can compound existing vulnerabilities, making early intervention more valuable. Health Risks Require Early Attention Flood preparedness should also be treated as a public health priority. Flooding can contaminate drinking water and sanitation systems, increase exposure to waterborne diseases and create breeding conditions for disease vectors. At the same time, disruption of roads and health facilities can make it more difficult for communities to obtain treatment. The IGAD High Level Call to Action specifically highlights strengthened health surveillance for flood related diseases such as cholera and malaria. Early warning systems can therefore serve more than disaster management agencies. Information about expected rainfall and flooding can allow health authorities to increase surveillance, prepare medical supplies, strengthen community awareness and coordinate with water and sanitation agencies before outbreaks escalate. The Cost of Waiting The consequences of delayed action can extend for years. Flood damaged roads and bridges require expensive reconstruction. Crop losses can reduce household income and food availability. Livestock losses can remove a major source of wealth and livelihood for pastoral families. Damage to water systems can create prolonged public health problems, while repeated shocks can push vulnerable households deeper into poverty. The experience of previous El Niño events demonstrates the scale of these risks. WFP has noted that the 2015 to 2016 El Niño affected the food security of an estimated 60 million to 100 million people globally. For the 2026 to 2027 event, WFP has warned that climate impacts could add substantially to existing food insecurity in countries already facing conflict, displacement and economic pressures. The figures underline an important point: climate forecasting is not an end in itself. Its value is measured by whether information changes decisions early enough to reduce harm. A Narrow Window for Action The Horn of Africa enters the October to December season with an unusual combination of information and uncertainty. The regional climate signal is sufficiently strong to justify preparedness. At the same time, forecasts cannot determine every local outcome months in advance. The timing and intensity of rainfall can change, and conditions can differ considerably between neighboring areas. That uncertainty should encourage flexibility rather than delay. Governments and partners can establish contingency plans based on several possible scenarios, prepare resources in advance and update decisions as new forecasts become available. Communities can be given clear information about what actions to take under different rainfall and flood scenarios. The objective should not be to predict every event perfectly. It should be to reduce the consequences of foreseeable risks. Conclusion The Horn of Africa has three important assets as it approaches the final months of 2026: increasingly clear regional climate information, established early warning systems and growing experience with anticipatory action. The latest ICPAC outlook points to a high likelihood of enhanced rainfall across parts of the southern and equatorial Greater Horn, while WMO expects El Niño to strengthen and persist into early 2027. At the same time, the regional outlook warns of warmer than average temperatures and the possibility of flooding and other climate related hazards. The challenge now is to close the gap between forecast and action. Farmers need timely and usable information. Pastoralists need livestock and water preparedness. Health authorities need surveillance and supplies. Infrastructure agencies need to protect vulnerable assets. Humanitarian organizations need resources before emergencies peak. Most importantly, communities need to be placed at the center of preparedness decisions. El Niño carries uncertainty, but uncertainty does not mean that nothing can be done. Forecasts can identify elevated risks, early warning systems can establish triggers, financing can support timely interventions and local institutions can translate regional information into practical action. For the Horn of Africa, the measure of preparedness will ultimately be whether the region uses the warning it has today to reduce the losses it might otherwise face tomorrow.

Addis Ababa, September 29, 2026 (ENA) —The northern Ethiopia conflict has been a complex issue that has plagued the country for years. At the heart of this conflict is the belligerent TPLF, which has consistently shown a disregard for human life and a desire to destabilize the region. Despite the Ethiopian government’s efforts to promote peace and stability, the defunct TPLF, through a prescription of destructive alliance, has continued to pursue a path of violence. The TPLF's History of Aggression The banned TPLF has a long history of aggression and violence. From its early days as a rebel group to its current status as a rogue organization, the illegal TPLF has consistently shown a disregard for human life and a desire to destabilize the region. The alliance's attack on the Northern Command in November 2020 was a blatant act of aggression that sparked the conflict in Tigray region. Since then, the defunct TPLF has continued to launch attacks on civilians, including women and children, and has been responsible for the destruction of property and infrastructure. The Humanitarian Crisis The TPLF's actions have resulted in a devastating humanitarian crisis in Tigray. Thousands of people have been displaced, and many more have been killed or injured. The group's blockade of humanitarian aid has exacerbated the crisis, leaving many people without access to food, water, or medical care. The Ethiopian government has worked tirelessly to address the humanitarian crisis, but the defunct TPLF continued aggression has made it difficult to provide aid to those in need. The Ethiopian Government's Efforts to Promote Peace Despite the defunct TPLF, the Ethiopian government has continued to work towards promoting peace and stability in the region. The government has launched several initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue and reconciliation, including the establishment of a negotiation team and the offer of amnesty to TPLF leaders. The government has also taken steps to address the humanitarian crisis, including the provision of food, shelter, and medical aid to those affected by the conflict. The International Community's Role The international community has a critical role to play in promoting peace and stability in Ethiopia. The community must condemn the anti-peace TPLF and its supporters, particularly the regime in Eritrea. And the global community should support the Ethiopian government's efforts to promote peace and stability. The global community must also provide humanitarian aid to those affected by the conflict and work towards finding a lasting solution to the crisis. In conclusion, the TPLF is a belligerent organization that has consistently shown a disregard for human life and a desire to destabilize the region. The alliance's actions have resulted in a devastating humanitarian crisis, and its continued aggression has made it difficult to provide aid to those in need. The Ethiopian government has worked tirelessly to promote peace and stability, and the international community must support these efforts. The illegal TPLF must be held accountable for its actions, and the international community must work towards finding a lasting solution to the crisis. A Threat to Regional Stability TPLF’s belligerence is not only a threat to peace and stability in Ethiopia but also a threat to regional stability. Its actions togther with other anti-peace forces have the potential to destabilize the entire region, and its aggression has already had a significant impact on neighboring countries. The international community must take action to prevent the TPLF and unholy marriages of the destructive forces from spreading and to promote peace and stability in the region. A Call to Action The international community should continue to condemn the TPLF’s aggression and support the Ethiopian government’s efforts to promote peace and stability. Most importantly, the international community should support the federal government’s efforts to bring the TPLF’s terror to an end.

By Staff Writer   Sept. 27, 2026 (ENA) The week of September 20 to 26, 2026, was marked by intense diplomatic activity as governments confronted a widening range of challenges affecting international peace, security and development. The 81st United Nations General Assembly brought world leaders together in New York at a time of continuing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, persistent humanitarian crises, growing geopolitical competition and uncertainty over the future of the global economic order. Middle East Crisis The continuing crisis in the Middle East remained one of the most difficult issues confronting diplomats in New York. The situation in Gaza highlighted the gap between the existence of a ceasefire and the restoration of normal civilian life. According to a September UN report, the ceasefire that began on October 10, 2025 ended large scale hostilities but did not end violence. Israeli airstrikes, shelling, drone attacks and ground operations have continued, while Hamas and other armed groups have not disarmed. The report said around two thirds of Gaza remained inaccessible or subject to severe access restrictions, leaving civilians concentrated in overcrowded and insecure areas. Humanitarian conditions remained a major concern. The UN report said the 2026 humanitarian appeal was only 40 percent funded and warned that preparations for winter were being hampered by depleted stocks of shelter and nonfood items, restrictions on humanitarian supplies and inadequate funding. It also called for the restoration of essential services, including sewage, waste management, health facilities and electricity. Consequently, the Palestinian question continued to occupy an important place in international diplomacy, with governments discussing humanitarian access, civilian protection, reconstruction and the need for a broader political process. Ukraine War The war in Ukraine remained another central issue during the General Assembly week. UN political affairs officials warned that the conflict was entering a dangerous phase as attacks continued to cause civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. The UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs confirmed that Rosemary DiCarlo participated in the Security Council's high-level meeting on Ukraine during the week. Diplomatic engagement continued alongside the fighting. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy used his presence in New York for discussions with US President Donald Trump and other leaders as Kyiv continued to seek international support and stronger protection for critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul in New York on September 26. Reuters reported that it was their first meeting since Russia-Ukraine war erupted in February 2022, with the talks covering bilateral relations and the situation surrounding Ukraine. The meeting did not resolve the fundamental disagreements between Moscow and European governments. Nevertheless, the resumption of direct contact at ministerial level illustrated the continued role of diplomacy even when relations remain deeply strained. US China Engagement US China relations also attracted considerable attention during the week as President Donald Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in Washington. Trade and artificial intelligence were among the central issues discussed by the two leaders. Reuters reported that Washington and Beijing agreed to extend their existing trade truce for two months, while AI emerged as another important area of discussion. The talks came against a backdrop of continuing strategic competition between the world's two largest economies over trade, advanced technology, artificial intelligence and security. At the same time, both sides have an interest in maintaining channels of communication to manage disagreements and prevent competition from developing into wider confrontation. Artificial intelligence has consequently become an increasingly important part of international diplomacy. Discussions between Washington and Beijing reflect a wider effort to establish mechanisms for addressing the risks associated with increasingly powerful technologies while maintaining technological development and economic competition. Global Trade The future of the multilateral trading system was another important issue during the week. The WTO's World Trade Report 2026 warned of substantial economic costs if the multilateral trading system becomes increasingly fragmented. According to WTO simulations, a geopolitically fragmented trading system could reduce global GDP by 5.1 percent and global exports by 18.6 percent. In contrast, an enhanced cooperation scenario could increase global GDP by 2.9 percent and global exports by 17.9 percent. The findings come as governments increasingly use tariffs, industrial policies and other measures to protect domestic industries and strengthen economic security. While such policies can serve national economic objectives, greater fragmentation can also make international trade less predictable and increase costs across supply chains. For developing economies, the issue is particularly significant. Predictable access to international markets remains important for export expansion, industrial development, investment and employment. The debate therefore extends beyond major economic powers to countries seeking greater integration into global value chains. Global Health Health cooperation was another major component of the General Assembly week. On September 25, governments held the second UN General Assembly High Level Meeting on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response. The meeting sought renewed political commitment to strengthening global preparedness through multilateral cooperation, equity and solidarity. The World Health Organization said leaders emphasized the need for sustained investment in health systems and stronger international cooperation. Although progress has been made since the COVID 19 pandemic, significant gaps remain in financing, surveillance, health infrastructure and equitable access to medical products. The discussions also took place against the backdrop of continuing outbreaks and other public health emergencies. WHO highlighted the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a reminder that infectious diseases can rapidly cross borders and require coordinated international responses. At the same time, WHO announced updated recommendations concerning influenza vaccine composition for the 2027 southern hemisphere season, underscoring the continuing importance of global disease surveillance and coordinated vaccine development. Climate Action Climate change also featured prominently in the General Assembly programme. A high-level meeting on climate action and the just transition was held on September 23, bringing together governments and other stakeholders to discuss accelerating the energy transition, strengthening energy security and addressing climate justice. The following day, the Assembly convened a high-level plenary meeting on the threats posed by rising sea levels. The discussions focused particularly on vulnerable coastal areas and small island developing states, highlighting the need for international cooperation and long-term adaptation measures. These discussions demonstrated that climate diplomacy is increasingly connected with questions of energy security, development, finance and international equity rather than being treated solely as an environmental issue. Artificial Intelligence Artificial intelligence continued its transition from a primarily technological subject into a major question of international governance. The debate now encompasses safety, economic transformation, national security, employment, misinformation, military applications and accountability. The US China discussions during the week added a bilateral dimension to this broader international debate, particularly as Washington and Beijing explore ways to manage AI related risks while competing over technological leadership. The issue also featured within the wider UN agenda, reflecting growing recognition that the development of advanced technologies requires international dialogue. As AI systems become more influential across economies and public institutions, governments face the challenge of developing rules and cooperation mechanisms without unnecessarily restricting innovation. Conclusion The week of September 20 to 26 demonstrated both the importance and the limitations of contemporary diplomacy. The 81st UN General Assembly brought governments together at a moment when conflicts, economic tensions, climate pressures, health risks and technological change are increasingly interconnected. In Gaza and Ukraine, diplomatic efforts continued alongside unresolved conflicts. In Washington, the US and China maintained direct engagement despite strategic competition. At the WTO, the economic consequences of fragmentation remained a central concern, while at the UN and WHO, governments sought stronger cooperation on climate action and pandemic preparedness. The significance of the week therefore lay not only in individual meetings or statements, but also in the continued effort to keep diplomatic channels open. The General Assembly provided a common forum where governments could articulate differences while exploring areas of possible cooperation. As high-level week continues beyond September 26, the central question is whether the commitments and diplomatic contacts generated in New York can move from declarations to practical measures. The coming weeks will provide a clearer indication of whether negotiations on conflicts, trade, health, climate and emerging technologies can produce tangible progress in an increasingly divided international system.

By Staff Writer Sept. 27, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia’s diplomatic outreach, regional connectivity and economic transformation took centre stage during the week of September 20–26, as the country pursued an increasingly interconnected agenda spanning maritime access, global trade, energy, digital finance and regional integration. At the centre of the week was Ethiopia’s engagement at the 81st United Nations General Assembly, where President Taye Atske Selassie placed reliable sea access, stronger African representation in global institutions, multilateral reform, regional peace and sustainable development high on the international agenda. Back home and across the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia also advanced major economic and infrastructure initiatives. A new petroleum-products pipeline linking Ethiopia and Djibouti was announced, the country’s long-running bid to join the World Trade Organization moved into its final phase, and tourism posted more than 1.6 million international arrivals and over 5 billion USD in revenue during the 2018 Ethiopian Fiscal Year. This strategic infrastructure project aimed at further strengthening economic ties and cooperation between the two east African nations, was officially announced in the presence of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Ismail Omar Guelleh. Particularly, the project connecting Damerjog in Djibouti to Dewele in Ethiopia through a new refined petroleum products pipeline is supported by storage terminals at both ends. Together, the developments pointed to a broader national strategy: strengthening Ethiopia’s position in global institutions while building the infrastructure, trade links, energy systems and digital platforms needed to support long-term economic transformation. Sea Access Moves to the Global Diplomatic Agenda Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable maritime access emerged as one of the most prominent themes of its participation in the UN General Assembly. Addressing the General Debate in New York, President Taye said Ethiopia was pursuing all possible diplomatic avenues to secure access to and from the sea, linking the issue directly to the country’s economic transformation and integration into global trade. He also stressed that the question could be addressed in a manner that serves the common interests and development of countries in the region.   The President’s UN address placed the maritime issue within a wider diplomatic framework that included African representation in global decision-making, multilateral reform, regional peace, climate action, renewable energy and technological transformation. He also presented the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as a Pan-African clean-energy project capable of contributing to regional prosperity, while reaffirming Ethiopia’s commitment to regional integration and peaceful cooperation. Ethiopia-Djibouti Pipeline Deepens Regional Connectivity A major infrastructure announcement during the week added a powerful economic dimension to Ethiopia’s regional integration agenda. Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Dangote Group announced plans for a 120-kilometre refined petroleum-products pipeline connecting Damerjog in Djibouti with Dewele in Ethiopia, supported by storage facilities at both ends with combined capacity exceeding one million cubic metres. The project is being developed through a partnership between Ethiopian Investment Holdings and the Dangote Group. The planned infrastructure is designed to reduce Ethiopia’s reliance on tanker-truck transportation, cut logistics costs, ease congestion along the corridor and improve the efficiency and reliability of fuel distribution. Beyond fuel logistics, the project carries wider regional significance. It adds another layer to the economic relationship between Ethiopia and Djibouti and illustrates how infrastructure can turn regional integration from a diplomatic objective into practical economic connectivity. WTO Accession Enters Final Stretch Ethiopia’s long-running effort to join the World Trade Organization also moved closer to completion. The Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration said the accession process has reached the final stage of drafting the Working Party Report. Ethiopia is simultaneously pursuing bilateral market-access negotiations, with agreements concluded with 11 of 17 negotiating partners while discussions continue with the remaining six.   For Ethiopia, WTO membership is closely linked to its broader economic reform programme. The government expects accession to provide a more predictable framework for international trade, expand market opportunities, strengthen institutional capacity and support greater integration into global value chains. The process therefore represents more than a diplomatic milestone; it is part of Ethiopia’s effort to reposition its economy within the global trading system. Tourism Emerges as a Strong Foreign-Exchange Earner Tourism delivered another notable economic signal during the week. Ethiopia welcomed more than 1.6 million international tourists during the 2018 Ethiopian Fiscal Year, generating over 5 billion USD in revenue, according to the Ministry of Tourism. International arrivals increased by more than 300,000 from the previous fiscal year, while foreign-exchange earnings rose by more than 21 percent.   The figures came ahead of World Tourism Day on September 27, whose 2026 theme focuses on digital technology and artificial intelligence and their potential to reshape tourism. Ethiopia is also seeking to improve the visitor experience through digital tools. A new Tourist Information Center near Bole International Airport has been inaugurated with digital maps and multimedia displays designed to promote the country’s cultural, historical and natural attractions. Digital Finance Becomes Part of Economic Infrastructure Ethiopia also used the UN General Assembly week to showcase its progress in digital financial inclusion. At a high-level side event jointly organized by Ethiopia’s Permanent Mission to the UN and the United Nations Capital Development Fund, officials and development partners examined the expansion of digital payments, national digital identity and digital public infrastructure.   The discussions reflected an important shift in Ethiopia’s digital-development narrative: digital finance is increasingly being treated not merely as a financial service but as part of the country’s wider economic infrastructure. Digital identity, interoperable payments and digitally enabled public services are being linked to entrepreneurship, productivity, financial inclusion and the Sustainable Development Goals. The government highlighted initiatives including Digital Ethiopia 2030, Fayda, interoperable payment systems and BRIDGE 2030 as components of this emerging digital ecosystem. The next challenge, officials and development partners noted, is to move beyond access and ensure that digital systems translate into productive economic opportunities for households and businesses. Energy Exports Strengthen Regional Economic Links Renewable energy remained another important pillar of Ethiopia’s regional economic strategy. According to Ethiopian Electric Power CEO Ashebir Balcha, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam accounts for 52 percent of Ethiopia’s electricity export revenue, while total electricity-export earnings have surpassed 500 million USD. Ethiopia currently exports electricity to Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and Tanzania. The figures underline the growing role of electricity trade in Ethiopia’s economic and regional integration agenda. The GERD is increasingly positioned not only as a national power-generation project but also as part of a broader regional energy network—linking renewable-energy production with exports, foreign-exchange generation and cross-border economic cooperation. Peace and Regional Integration Remain Central Alongside economic diplomacy, Ethiopia continued to emphasize regional peace and cooperation. At the UN, President Taye reiterated Ethiopia’s support for a Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned process to achieve lasting peace in Sudan, while also highlighting regional integration through infrastructure, trade and people-to-people relations. This approach reflects the increasingly close connection Ethiopia draws between peace, connectivity and economic development across the Horn of Africa. Infrastructure corridors, energy trade, maritime connectivity and regional institutions are increasingly being viewed as parts of the same broader equation: creating an environment in which economic integration can reinforce regional stability.   A Week That Connected Diplomacy with Development The developments of September 20–26 presented a picture of Ethiopia pursuing several strategic priorities simultaneously. At the global level, the UN General Assembly provided a platform to advance Ethiopia’s positions on maritime access, African representation, multilateral reform, climate action and regional peace. At the regional level, the Ethiopia-Djibouti petroleum pipeline added fresh momentum to infrastructure-led integration, while expanding electricity exports continued to strengthen cross-border economic links. At the economic level, WTO accession moved into its final stretch, tourism generated more than $5 billion in revenue, and digital finance gained greater prominence as an element of economic infrastructure. Consequently, the week’s developments highlighted an increasingly interconnected Ethiopian agenda—from diplomacy to trade, from sea access to infrastructure, from renewable energy to digital finance, and from regional connectivity to global economic integration. The common thread is clear: Ethiopia is seeking to translate diplomatic engagement and infrastructure investment into broader economic connectivity, while positioning regional cooperation as an important component of its long-term development trajectory.

Addis Ababa, September 27, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopia’s Meskel-Demera, the discovery of the ‘True Cross’, celebration has captivated international visitors with its striking blend of faith, culture, history and community. The celebration gives visitors from around the world a rare firsthand glimpse into one of Ethiopia’s most distinctive and enduring religious traditions. For them who gathered in Addis Ababa to witness the festival, Meskel was more than a colorful public celebration. It was an opportunity to experience a centuries-old Christian tradition that remains deeply embedded in Ethiopian society.   Approached by ENA, visitors from Jordan, Jamaica, Norway, Germany and Croatia described Meskel as a unique and memorable experience, highlighting the vibrant ceremonies, spiritual atmosphere, warm hospitality and the remarkable participation of people from across society. Michelle Akasheu, a visitor from Jordan, said he was immediately impressed by the warmth of the Ethiopian people and the spiritual atmosphere surrounding the celebration. “I’m Christian, so I’m Catholic. A friend asked me to join him today to see this beautiful festival, which I really love,” Akasheu said.   He said attending Meskel gave him a rare opportunity to witness Ethiopia’s longstanding Christian tradition in a deeply communal setting. “Christianity is very, very old in this country, and it is embedded in the spirit of the people here,” he said. The participation of priests and the wider community, he added, made the celebration particularly distinctive. Having previously visited the Vatican and attended other religious events, Akasheu said Meskel offered an experience closely connected to Ethiopia’s unique Christian heritage. He also expressed interest in exploring the country beyond Addis Ababa, particularly its rock-hewn churches, monasteries and other historic sites. “There is a lot to be seen here,” he said, encouraging greater international promotion of Ethiopia’s cultural and religious heritage. For Jamaican visitor Njkita Nkruma Lindsay, who has lived in Ethiopia for about 19 years, Meskel carries a particularly deep spiritual and cultural meaning.   Lindsay, who described herself as an Orthodox Christian, said Ethiopia represents freedom and a sense of belonging for people of African descent whose ancestors were taken away during the transatlantic slave trade. “For us, Ethiopia is the land of freedom — freedom in every way, religious freedom and physical freedom,” she said. He said Meskel vividly reflects the enduring place of Christianity in Ethiopian cultural life and brings large numbers of people together in a shared celebration. “Meskel is representing Christianity. It’s the finding of the True Cross,” Lindsay said. What makes the festival especially distinctive, she added, is its nationwide character and the way it brings communities together through both faith and cultural tradition. “In Ethiopia, celebrating Meskel is for every Christian,” she said. Lindsay encouraged people from around the world to visit Ethiopia and experience the festival themselves. For Norwegian tourist Jorulf Husbyn, Meskel was an unexpected highlight of his first visit to Ethiopia.   “We didn’t know it was a festival, so we wanted to stop in Ethiopia on our way to Southern Africa and explore the culture, geography and history. So this is our lucky day to come by this festival,” Husbyn said. The unexpected encounter gave him a memorable introduction to Ethiopia’s cultural and religious traditions. Husbyn said he was impressed by the colorful celebration, the people and the atmosphere surrounding the event, describing it as an opportunity to discover another dimension of Ethiopia’s history and culture. As a Christian and Lutheran, he said witnessing Meskel was particularly meaningful. “I’m very excited to be here, to see and explore the culture and this part of Christianity,” he said. He also praised Ethiopia’s natural landscapes, history and hospitality, saying the country offers rich experiences for travelers interested in culture and heritage. German visitor Andreas Schaible, who was in Ethiopia for the second time, said Meskel was his first experience of the festival and offered him another perspective on Ethiopian culture.   “It’s very interesting to see the differences between the culture in Germany and in Ethiopia,” Schaible said. Having lived and worked in Addis Ababa, he said he had become increasingly interested in the country’s traditions and public celebrations. “It’s very good for me to learn about the culture here in Ethiopia,” he said, emphasizing the value of understanding both cultural differences and similarities. Schaible also pointed to Ethiopia’s traditions, food and coffee as some of the experiences that make the country distinctive as a tourist destination. His family, he added, plans to visit Ethiopia in the future. For Croatian visitor Zvonimir Rakigjija, Meskel was not simply a new cultural experience but a return to a country with which he has a decades-long connection. Rakigjija lived in Ethiopia from 1966 to 1973 and attended St. Joseph’s School. He returned to the country with his wife to revisit its festivals, traditions and places that had remained important to him.   He praised Ethiopia’s people, landscapes and cultural heritage and encouraged visitors to venture beyond Addis Ababa to experience the country’s diverse communities and scenery. From first-time visitors unexpectedly encountering the festival to those returning after decades, the international guests shared a common impression: Meskel offers an experience that goes beyond watching a religious ceremony. It brings Ethiopia’s living heritage into the public space—where faith, history, culture and community converge around the Demera, creating a celebration that visitors can witness, experience and remember. For international tourists, Meskel is therefore not simply a festival on Ethiopia’s calendar. It is a vivid gateway into the country’s enduring cultural and spiritual identity.

By Staff Writer Sept. 27, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia’s diplomacy is entering a new era—less confined to traditional political relations and increasingly driven by economic interests, strategic partnerships and a wider global footprint. Over the past eight years, Ethiopia has significantly broadened the arenas in which it engages the world. From Addis Ababa’s role as the diplomatic capital of Africa to its entry into BRICS, from the Pretoria peace process to the Ankara Declaration, from renewed WTO negotiations to a seat on the UN Human Rights Council, Ethiopia has expanded the platforms through which it seeks to shape regional and international affairs. The story is not about one diplomatic breakthrough. It is about the widening of Ethiopia’s diplomatic space. From Addis Ababa to BRICS One of the clearest symbols of this expansion is Ethiopia’s entry into BRICS. At the Johannesburg Summit in August 2023, BRICS leaders invited Ethiopia to become a full member, with membership taking effect on January 1, 2024. For Addis Ababa, BRICS opened another channel to engage major emerging economies and participate in discussions spanning politics and security, economic and financial cooperation, and people-to-people relations. More importantly, the move reflected a broader diplomatic strategy: diversification. Ethiopia has sought to deepen relations simultaneously with African partners, emerging economies, Western countries, Gulf states and Asian powers rather than allowing its international engagement to depend on a narrow circle of partners. Diplomacy With an Economic Purpose Perhaps the most important change has been the growing weight of economic diplomacy. Foreign policy is increasingly being connected to investment, trade, tourism, technology, infrastructure and market access. Diplomatic missions are expected not only to represent Ethiopia politically, but also to help connect the country with capital, markets and commercial opportunities. That shift mirrors Ethiopia’s own economic transformation. As the country seeks greater export capacity, investment and industrial development, diplomacy increasingly becomes an economic instrument. The embassy is no longer only a political bridge; it is increasingly part of the economic bridge. Regional Diplomacy Under Strategic Pressure Ethiopia’s geographic position makes regional diplomacy unavoidable. The country sits at the intersection of the Horn of Africa, the Nile Basin and the Red Sea, where security, trade, migration, infrastructure and political interests overlap. The Ankara Declaration with Somalia in December 2024 demonstrated the role of dialogue in addressing difficult regional questions. Ethiopia and Somalia reaffirmed respect for each other’s sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity and agreed to pursue cooperation toward shared prosperity. The significance extends beyond one declaration. It illustrates Ethiopia’s attempt to keep contentious regional questions within diplomatic channels while pursuing its strategic and economic interests. From Conflict Management to African Diplomacy Pretoria put Ethiopia at the center of one of Africa’s most consequential peace efforts. But even under the scrutiny of African and international mediators, the TPLF repeatedly came under fire for actions that threatened to undermine the commitments of the agreement—exposing the difficult path from a signed peace deal to durable stability. The broader lesson is that Ethiopia’s diplomatic weight is not derived only from its size or geographic position. It also comes from its role in continental institutions. Addis Ababa hosts the African Union headquarters, making the city a permanent meeting point for African leaders, diplomats and international organizations. That institutional position gives Ethiopia a distinctive platform from which to engage debates on peace, security, development and continental integration. A Seat at the Global Table Ethiopia’s election to the UN Human Rights Council for the 2025–2027 term further expanded its multilateral presence. The UN General Assembly elected Ethiopia among 18 members on October 9, 2024; the Council consists of 47 states. Such positions provide Ethiopia with additional opportunities to participate directly in international policymaking and multilateral diplomacy. The significance is therefore not simply symbolic. Representation creates another diplomatic channel through which Ethiopia can present its positions, negotiate interests and participate in shaping international discussions. The WTO Door Is Opening Wider Ethiopia’s long-running WTO accession process has also regained momentum. The WTO said in September 2025 that the process had entered a “decisive phase.” By April 2026, the organization described the negotiations as having reached a “decisive juncture,” with Ethiopia reporting further domestic reforms and continued engagement with WTO members. The accession process matters because it connects diplomacy directly to the structure of Ethiopia’s economy. Joining the multilateral trading system would deepen Ethiopia’s engagement with global markets while requiring continued reforms to trade-related institutions and regulations. In this sense, WTO diplomacy is not simply about Geneva.It is about transforming how Ethiopia trades with the world. The Red Sea Enters the Diplomatic Equation Few issues demonstrate the changing character of Ethiopian diplomacy more clearly than the Red Sea. For a landlocked country whose economy depends heavily on maritime trade, developments around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb have direct economic and strategic consequences. Maritime connectivity has consequently moved higher on Ethiopia’s diplomatic agenda. The issue intersects with trade, logistics, regional security and economic integration, bringing Ethiopia into discussions that extend well beyond its borders. The Red Sea question therefore illustrates the central feature of Ethiopia’s evolving diplomacy: national economic interests and regional strategy are becoming increasingly intertwined. A Wider Circle of Partners Ethiopia’s engagement with China, India, Russia, the United States, European countries and Gulf states has developed alongside its relationships with African neighbors and its participation in BRICS. The objective is not necessarily to choose one geopolitical camp. It is to expand Ethiopia’s room for diplomatic and economic engagement. That wider network gives Addis Ababa more channels for cooperation in investment, infrastructure, trade, technology, security and development. The result is a foreign policy increasingly built around multiple partnerships rather than a single diplomatic axis. The Real Test Begins Now Yet diplomatic expansion is not an end in itself. The coming years will determine whether Ethiopia can convert diplomatic access into concrete economic opportunities, stronger regional connectivity, expanded investment, deeper trade and durable partnerships. Memberships, declarations, elections and summits create platforms. What matters next is what Ethiopia builds on those platforms. The past eight years have nevertheless marked a notable expansion of Ethiopia’s diplomatic reach. BRICS has opened another global platform. The Human Rights Council has strengthened its multilateral presence. Pretoria demonstrated the potential of African-led diplomacy. Ankara created a framework for renewed engagement with Somalia. WTO negotiations have gained fresh momentum. Economic diplomacy has become increasingly central to foreign policy, while the Red Sea has emerged as a strategic priority. Consequently, these developments point to a broader transformation. Ethiopia is no longer approaching diplomacy simply as a means of maintaining relationships. It is increasingly using diplomacy to pursue markets, partnerships, connectivity, security and national development. From the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa to the BRICS table, from regional peace initiatives to global trade negotiations, Ethiopia’s diplomatic map has expanded considerably. The next chapter will be defined not by how many doors Ethiopia has opened, but by how effectively it turns those openings into lasting national and regional gains.

By Neway Abay S. Ethiopia has never truly been a stranger to the Red Sea. Long before modern borders redrew the map of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopian civilization was connected to the Red Sea through trade, diplomacy and coastal gateways linking the highlands with Arabia, the Mediterranean and the wider Indian Ocean world. That historic connection was eventually severed. But geography was not. Today, Ethiopia is a country of more than 130 million people, one of Africa’s largest economies and a major economic center in the Horn of Africa—yet it remains without a coastline. For decades, its international trade has depended heavily on neighboring ports, particularly Djibouti. The World Bank continues to describe Djibouti as Ethiopia’s primary maritime gateway, while recent assessments underline how disruptions along the corridor can translate directly into higher logistics costs and economic pressure inside Ethiopia. That reality has turned maritime access from a historical question into a contemporary economic, security and strategic one. Geography Cannot Be Negotiated Away Ethiopia’s loss of direct access to the sea did not erase its geographic position. The country remains at the center of the Horn of Africa, immediately adjoining one of the world’s most consequential maritime regions. The Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb connect Africa with the Middle East, Asia and Europe and disruptions there can reverberate through global trade, energy markets and supply chains. For Ethiopia, the consequences are particularly direct.   A landlocked economy of this scale cannot treat maritime connectivity as a peripheral concern. Every container entering or leaving the country ultimately depends on a corridor connecting the interior to the coast. The current system has created an important economic relationship with Djibouti, but it has also exposed the structural vulnerability of relying overwhelmingly on a single maritime gateway. The Addis-Djibouti corridor remains vital to Ethiopian trade, while the World Bank notes that disruptions and inefficiencies along the wider logistics chain can affect businesses and consumers. The question, therefore, is no longer whether Ethiopia is interested in the sea. It is how a country of Ethiopia’s demographic and economic weight can build reliable, diversified and sustainable maritime connectivity. Most importantly, the rapidly shifting political and military dynamics in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa have made sovereign sea access not merely desirable for Ethiopia, but increasingly unavoidable. The Red Sea Is No Longer Just a Trade Route The strategic importance of the Red Sea has become impossible to ignore. The Bab el-Mandeb is a critical maritime chokepoint. Recent disruptions have demonstrated how quickly insecurity at sea can become an economic problem on land, raising freight costs, extending shipping times and disrupting supply chains. UN Trade and Development has recently warned that renewed disruptions around Bab el-Mandeb are creating longer routes, higher fuel consumption, greater costs and additional pressure on global trade. For Ethiopia, this creates a striking paradox. Although the country has no coastline, instability along the Red Sea can affect its economy directly.   Ethiopia therefore has a substantial stake in the security of a maritime space in which it currently has limited direct presence. This is why the Red Sea question cannot be reduced to the search for a port. It is about connectivity, economic security and regional stability. From a Port to a Corridor Ethiopia’s maritime ambition makes greater sense when viewed not as a search for a single coastal facility, but as part of a much larger economic corridor. A functioning maritime connection would link the coast to Ethiopia’s roads, railways, dry ports, industrial parks, agricultural production centers and consumer markets. The objective would not simply be to move containers andiIt would be to move an economy. That distinction matters. A port without an efficient inland network is only a point on a map. A port connected to production, manufacturing, agriculture and regional markets becomes an engine of economic integration. Ethiopia’s experience with the Djibouti corridor already demonstrates the importance of this wider system. The World Bank’s recent work on Modjo Dry Port, for example, highlights how improvements in inland logistics can reduce processing delays and strengthen Ethiopia’s links to international markets. The next stage of Ethiopia’s maritime thinking can therefore be understood as the search for multiple corridors, multiple gateways and greater resilience. Economic Security Is Maritime Security The Red Sea has also exposed another reality: maritime security and economic security are increasingly inseparable. When shipping routes are threatened, insurance costs rise. When vessels divert around dangerous waters, delivery times increase. When freight costs rise, the consequences eventually reach factories, farmers, traders and households far from the coastline.   Ethiopia does not need to be a coastal country to experience these consequences. Indeed, its landlocked position makes reliable maritime access even more important. A diversified maritime strategy could give Ethiopia greater resilience against disruptions while creating additional opportunities for trade, investment and industrial development. It could also strengthen the economic interests that Ethiopia shares with its coastal neighbors. A Return to the Sea Need Not Mean a Return to Rivalry There is another dimension to Ethiopia’s maritime question that deserves greater attention. Access to the sea does not necessarily have to become another source of regional competition. It can become an instrument of regional integration. A port serving Ethiopian trade can generate business for a coastal state. A road or railway linking the interior to the coast can connect multiple economies. Industrial and logistics zones can create jobs and investment on both sides of a border. In that sense, Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations can be framed not simply as a national demand, but as part of a broader Horn of Africa economic equation. The region has spent decades treating geography as a source of strategic rivalry. It can also treat geography as an opportunity for integration. Ethiopia’s Maritime Question Is Growing, Not Fading Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly underscored that Ethiopia’s desire for sea access in terms of geography, economic necessity, dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation rather than military expansion. The Ethiopian government has stated that the country’s demographic and economic scale makes dependable maritime connectivity an important national interest. That argument sits within a broader reality. Ethiopia is not the same country it was three decades ago. Its population and economy have expanded. Its trade ambitions have grown. Its industrial and agricultural production is becoming more integrated with international markets. And its exposure to disruptions along global shipping routes is increasing. The maritime question will therefore become more—not less—important as Ethiopia’s economy expands. The revival of attention to maritime affairs, including the re-establishment of the Ethiopian Navy in 2018, reflects this broader strategic shift. But the ultimate objective need not be the projection of power. It can be the protection of economic interests, participation in regional maritime security and the creation of durable commercial links between the Ethiopian interior and the global economy. The Geography of the Future The central fact remains remarkably simple: Ethiopia’s landlocked status is a historical tragedy shaped by external forces and political decisions made during a turbulent period—decisions that profoundly altered the country’s relationship with the sea. Yet the giant nation has never truly been disconnected from the Red Sea. Its economy depends on maritime trade. Its security environment is shaped by the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. Its geographic position places it at the heart of the Horn of Africa. And its growing population and economy make dependable access to international trade routes increasingly consequential. The challenge, therefore, is not to recreate history exactly as it was. It is to build a new relationship with the sea suited to the realities of the 21st century. That means ports—but also corridors. It means trade—but also security. It means national interest—but also regional cooperation.   And above all, it means recognizing that the Red Sea is not a distant body of water separated from Ethiopia by political boundaries. It is part of the strategic geography in which Ethiopia’s future is being shaped. For a country whose civilization has been connected to the Red Sea for centuries, the renewed search for maritime connectivity is not simply a journey backward into history. It is Ethiopia looking toward the future and back toward the sea.

By Yordanos D.   Sept. 26, 2026 (ENA) Every year as Ethiopia approaches the festival of Meskel, communities across the country gather around towering bonfire structures known as Demera, carefully constructed from poles, branches, grass, and yellow Meskel flowers. As evening approaches, clergy, Sunday school students, families, and worshippers gather in public squares, church compounds, and local neighbourhoods. Together, they fill the air with prayers, hymns, traditional songs, and ceremonial rites in anticipation of lighting the central fire. The Demera bonfire serves as the primary ceremonial symbol of the Ethiopian Meskel celebration, which commemorates the discovery of the True Holy Cross of Christ. Although deeply anchored in the religious life of Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, the tradition has evolved into a vibrant expression of civic participation, cultural continuity, and social interaction. Beyond its spiritual significance, the sheer scale and distinctiveness of these public gatherings have given Demera growing importance as a driver of cultural tourism and local economic vitality. Recognizing its profound cultural value, UNESCO inscribed the Commemoration Feast of the Finding of the True Holy Cross of Christ on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2013. Official UNESCO documentation identifies Demera as the central catalyst of the celebration, noting that Meskel is observed across Ethiopia regardless of age, gender, language, or ethnicity, while highlighting the vital role local churches play in coordinating communities and safeguarding this living tradition. Expression of Faith At its core, Demera is a sacred religious observance. Every element, from the physical construction of the pyramid-shaped bonfire to the solemn prayers, liturgical chants, and ritual lighting, connects directly to Christian traditions surrounding Queen Helena's discovery of the Cross. Consequently, Demera is far more than a public spectacle for worshippers; it is a profound expression of faith, devotion, thanksgiving, and spiritual renewal. Gathering around the flame fosters a shared religious experience that binds individuals to their families, congregations, and broader communities. This religious meaning endures largely through active intergenerational transmission. Children and young people observe the preparation of the bonfire, listen to traditional chants, and actively join the festivities alongside their parents, elders, and spiritual leaders. Through this repeated participation, sacred knowledge and ritual practices are seamlessly passed from one generation to the next. This intergenerational dynamic is precisely why UNESCO recognized Meskel as a heritage deeply rooted in Ethiopian life. Because its continuity relies not on static written archives but on the active dedication of communities who build the bonfire, chant the hymns, and maintain the rituals, Demera remains a dynamic, living heritage. Social Unity Beyond its spiritual dimension, Demera provides a vital venue for communal gathering in shared public spaces. The festival brings together clergy, families, youth, elders, and visitors around a unifying cultural heritage. Because it is celebrated simultaneously across the nation, Demera allows local variations to thrive while maintaining a cohesive connection to the broader national tradition. UNESCO's 2013 inscription explicitly highlighted the festival's contribution to social cohesion, integration, and diversity. Furthermore, UNESCO documented the customary practice of resolving personal disputes and social grievances prior to the lighting of the fire, framing Meskel as a powerful ritual for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. The gathering around Demera creates a recurring opportunity for social interaction and family reunions, particularly as migrant workers return to their hometowns. In this sense, Demera serves as an annual bridge connecting religious devotion, family life, and civic harmony—facilitating the exchange of ideas, resources, and social ties between urban and rural populations. Cultural Tourism The vivid sensory details of Demera, the ceremonial vestments of the clergy, rhythmic chanting, traditional attire, and the dramatic blaze against the evening sky, create a uniquely authentic Ethiopian experience. This distinctiveness gives the festival immense potential for cultural and religious tourism. Celebrations at major venues, such as Addis Ababa's Meskel Square, draw hundreds of thousands of participants, serving as landmark events on the national cultural calendar. Domestic visitors travel across regions to participate in rituals and reconnect with relatives, while international visitors encounter a living, unmanufactured tradition rather than a staged performance. Over the past three years, tourist flow around the festival period has reflected a strong recovery and upward trajectory following post-pandemic and regional stabilization efforts. Nationwide international tourist arrivals rose from approximately 658,000 in 2023 to 725,000 in 2024, followed by a 15 percent increase in 2025 that brought annual arrivals past 830,000. This momentum accelerated further into 2026, with overall annual international visits surpassing 1.6 million. During the Meskel and Demera season each September, key urban centers, most notably Addis Ababa, experience significant seasonal spikes in visitor volume, as tens of thousands of international tourists and hundreds of thousands of domestic travelers gather for the ceremony. This movement of people stimulates demand for transportation, accommodation, food services, and artisanal crafts, generating economic activity that extends beyond the immediate site of the ceremony into the wider regional economy. The relationship between religious heritage and community development is supported by academic research. A 2013 study by Berhanu Esubalew at Addis Ababa University on religious tourism in Lalibela demonstrated that religious heritage can drive sustainable development and community empowerment when local populations are actively involved. Similarly, a 2019 study by Muluemebet Semaw highlighted how religious heritage generates intertwined economic and spiritual value for local residents. While these studies focused on Lalibela, their underlying insights apply directly to Demera: religious traditions yield meaningful economic value only when communities remain the primary stewards and beneficiaries. Economic Contribution, Community Bondage The economic benefits of Demera emerge naturally through the influx and gathering of visitors. Hotels, guesthouses, restaurants, transport providers, street vendors, and local craftspeople all experience heightened demand during the festival season. In alignment with UNESCO's guidelines on intangible cultural heritage, commercial activity can strengthen local economies as long as it does not threaten the authenticity of the tradition. The key is ensuring that economic benefits are not monopolized by large corporate players. Local traders, food providers, artisans, and small accommodation providers must be given opportunities to participate meaningfully in the tourism economy created around the celebration. As visitor interest in Demera expands, safeguarding its sacred identity becomes paramount. In line with UNESCO guidelines, commercial expansion must be carefully managed to prevent decontextualization or the conversion of a holy rite into mere entertainment. To preserve the integrity of Demera, local authorities and tourism organizers should focus on several key management practices. First, they must prioritize the sacred rite by ensuring that liturgical services, prayers, and long-standing community traditions remain the central focus, completely uninhibited by commercial staging. In addition, providing clear cultural context through pre-arrival digital guides and interpretive materials can help educate visitors on the theological and historical significance of the event. Furthermore, managing event infrastructure effectively, by implementing robust crowd control, public safety protocols, sanitation, and waste management, is vital to protecting church grounds and surrounding public spaces during large gatherings. Finally, organizers should actively distribute economic benefits by directing tourism opportunities toward local small businesses, artisans, traditional food vendors, and regional transport operators, ensuring that the community remains the primary beneficiary. Living Heritage The true strength of Demera lies in the fact that it is actively lived and practiced. Its value cannot be measured solely by tourist headcount or economic output; these are secondary benefits that arise naturally from protecting a tradition whose primary value is spiritual and social. As one of the most recognizable public expressions of Ethiopia's living cultural heritage, Demera brings together faith, family, and national identity. UNESCO's recognition reinforces its importance while bestowing a clear responsibility: as the festival becomes more visible globally, preserving its authenticity and keeping local communities at the center of its stewardship remain essential. In conclusion, Ethiopian Demera is far more than a ceremonial bonfire; it is a living testament to faith, communal solidarity, and cultural memory transmitted through generations. While its visual magnificence offers extraordinary potential for responsible tourism and local economic development, its true value remains anchored in its spiritual meaning and community ownership. By balancing heritage preservation with thoughtful management, Ethiopia can foster economic opportunities around Demera without altering its sacred character, ensuring that its flame continues to illuminate faith, unity, and shared identity for generations to come.

Mahder Nesibu from POA   Sept. 26, 2026 (ENA) An alignment between Cairo and Asmara has come to define much of the recent turbulence in the Horn of Africa. The two capitals are now coordinating in ways that deepen division across the region and, more troublingly, that foster rebellion and insurgency aimed at undermining legitimate governments and entrenching instability. The alignment has emerged directly from each capital's posture toward Addis Ababa. For Egypt, the driving factor is Nile basin politics. Unable to halt Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Cairo spent years pursuing other means of resistance, lobbying internationally and cultivating opposition to the dam among basin states. These efforts proved futile. On 9 September 2025, Ethiopia formally inaugurated the dam and presented it as an engine of regional prosperity, one already exporting electricity to neighbouring states with plans to expand that role. To the further detriment of Egyptian hegemony over the Nile, a hegemony Cairo has long asserted through claims of exclusive rights as the lower basin state, Ethiopia has signalled its intent to build additional dams on the Abbay, defying Egyptian objections and ushering in a new order on the river. Eritrea's logic is more conflict-prone. The regime in Asmara, one of the most authoritarian in the world and long defined by a policy of interference and destabilisation, has revived its antagonism toward Ethiopia, a posture it has held since Eritrea's secession in 1991. Framing the Ethiopian government as an adversary, Asmara has returned to a familiar instrument, indirect conflict. Over the decades this has played out across Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia, including support for Al-Shabaab, as well as inside Ethiopia itself, where Asmara has cultivated rebel groups and non-state actors against governments it regarded as hostile to its interests. That policy has been active again in recent years. Eritrea has gradually built-up rebel movements inside Ethiopia, among them the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Amhara Fano National Movement. Asmara has been providing backing through Ethiopia's Tigray border and through Sudan, whose own instability has made the latter route possible, supplying arms, finance and coordination, and playing a central role in engineering the coalition itself. Cairo's part has largely been played from the rear. As Eritrea cultivated these insurgencies, Egypt built closer ties with Asmara, calculating that a weakened, unstable Ethiopia would strengthen its own hand in the long-running rivalry between the two capitals. The emerging strategic alignment between Cairo and Asmara represents a dangerous shift in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, as both regimes increasingly resort to proxy politics and indirect warfare to destabilize the region. Driven by Cairo’s lingering anxieties over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Asmara’s deep-seated doctrine of viewing Ethiopia as a permanent regional rival, this coalition seeks to undermine Addis Ababa’s political stability from within. By cultivating, funding, and arming internal insurgencies—such as non-state actors along Ethiopia’s borders—and exploiting the ongoing civil war in Sudan as a staging ground, the regimes in Egypt and Eritrea are fostering conditions that risk fracturing the fragile security apparatus of the broader Horn. Ethiopia is not the only theatre. In Sudan, Cairo and Asmara have coordinated support for the Sudanese Armed Forces, one of the two belligerents that pushed out the civilian administration in 2021 alongside the Rapid Support Forces before turning on each other in 2023, plunging the country into civil war. Egypt and Eritrea have used their leverage with the Sudanese army to advance their own interests inside Sudan, among them using the country as a staging ground for the anti-Ethiopian elements. Eritrea has funnelled arms through Sudanese territory and established positions there, with TPLF forces operating from inside Sudan. That presence has fed directly into fighting along the Ethiopian border, With TPLF forces launching attacks against Ethiopia from the Sudanese side. The Horn of Africa is a vital global transit corridor and a linchpin of continental security, anchored by the strategic waters of the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Stability in this region is essential not only for surrounding nations, but also for international trade, energy corridors, and counter-terrorism efforts across East Africa and the Middle East. When regional powers actively promote rebellion, weaponize state fragmentation, and fuel cross-border warfare, the fallout extends far beyond diplomatic friction—it threatens to destabilize sea lines of communication, exacerbate severe humanitarian crises, and trigger massive population displacement across fragile borders. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly's high-level debate in New York this week, President Taye Atske-Selassie referred to external actors he described as habitually engaged in fomenting instability in the region. He said Ethiopia had exercised restraint despite continued interference in its internal affairs, and reaffirmed its conviction to becoming one of the continent's most dynamic centres of development. He called on those responsible to respect the right of the people of the Horn of Africa to live in peace and prosperity. For the international community, Ethiopia's stability, and that of the Horn more broadly, ought to be a matter of real concern. The most serious threat to that stability is not the domestic insurgencies and political divisions themselves, which remain amenable to negotiation and political consensus. It is the role played by outside states, Egypt and Eritrea foremost among them, that regard the weakening of Ethiopia and its neighbours as being in their own strategic interest. That conduct deserves to be named and addressed by those with the standing to do so. In the face of these coordinated provocations, Ethiopia's strategic patience has served as a critical bulwark against full-scale regional collapse. Rather than responding with immediate military escalation or matching proxy interventions, Addis Ababa has largely emphasized diplomatic restraint, regional integration, and economic interdependence—positioned around infrastructure projects and energy exports. This restrained posture, reinforced by public calls at international forums such as the UN General Assembly for external actors to respect regional sovereignty, highlights a commitment to peaceful development. However, as proxy pressures intensify along multiple borders, the international community must recognize that regional stability cannot rely indefinitely on Ethiopia's tolerance; holding outside actors accountable for covert interference is essential to securing long-term peace in the Horn.

By Henok Tadele Haile Sept. 25, 2026 (ENA) The Horn of Africa is on the cusp of a significant transformation, driven by a new 660 million USD infrastructure project. This project promises to revolutionize the way Ethiopia receives, stores, and distributes petroleum products. At the heart of this project is a 120-kilometer refined petroleum pipeline linking Damerjog in Djibouti with Dewele in Ethiopia. The project is expected to reduce the journey time for fuel from five days to just one day, significantly improving the efficiency of fuel distribution in the region. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed noted: "Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Dangote Group will develop a 120-kilometer pipeline connecting Demerjog to Dewele with more than 1 million cubic meters of combined storage capacity at the two ends."   The storage infrastructure is substantial, with 375,000 cubic meters at Damerjog and 875,000 cubic meters at Dewele. Dr. Brook Taye, CEO of Ethiopian Investment Holdings, explained, "The Dewele depot will play a dual role - first, it gives Ethiopia a major strategic reserve within our borders capable of sustaining the country for months; second, because it connects directly with our railway line, fuel distribution will occur via rail in addition to trucks, significantly cutting transit friction and overall transport costs."   The project is a result of a partnership between Ethiopian Investment Holdings and the Dangote Group, with an estimated investment cost of USD 660 million. The partnership reflects a broader approach to using public assets and strategic investment to attract capital, technology, and management expertise. Aliko Dangote, the founder of the Dangote Group, has been a key player in this partnership, bringing his expertise and resources to the table. The economic interdependence between Ethiopia and Djibouti is growing, with Djibouti providing Ethiopia with its principal maritime gateway and strategic access to international trade routes.   This partnership is a prime example of how regional integration can create mutually beneficial opportunities for economic growth and development. The two countries are working together to create a more integrated and connected economy, with the pipeline project being a key component of this effort. At the inauguration speech, President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti emphasized the importance of regional integration, saying, "We are committed to working together with our Ethiopian counterparts to create a more integrated and connected economy. This pipeline project is a key component of this effort, and we believe it will have a significant impact on the regional economy."   He also noted: "The development of our infrastructure is crucial to our economic growth, and we are working tirelessly to create a more favorable business environment." President Guelleh also highlighted the potential benefits of the project, saying, "This pipeline will not only reduce the journey time for fuel, but it will also create new opportunities for trade, investment, and economic growth. We believe that this project will be a game-changer for our region, and we are committed to seeing it through to completion." The project will have a significant impact on the regional economy, creating new opportunities for trade, investment, and economic growth. According to Aliko Dangote's vision, infrastructure gaps limit industrial growth and discourage investments. However, he views these gaps as an opportunity to build the foundations for economic transformation. With infrastructure, industry can thrive, jobs are created, and prosperity flows. In conclusion, the 660 million USD petroleum project is a significant development that promises to transform the economic landscape of the Horn of Africa. The project will create a new economic geography, connecting Djibouti's maritime gateway with Ethiopia's inland economy, and demonstrate how infrastructure can turn regional integration into a business reality.   Key Benefits of the Project Key Benefits of the Project includes reduced journey time for fuel from five days to one day, improved efficiency of fuel distribution, increased storage capacity, with 1.25 million cubic meters of combined storage, creation of a multimodal supply chain, connecting ports, storage facilities, pipelines, railways, and markets and enhanced economic interdependence between Ethiopia and Djibouti. The project is expected to be completed within two years, and its success will depend on the ability of the partners to deliver on their commitments. As Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said, "Announcements create expectations; delivery earns trust. We must now turn this commitment into a working pipeline." If delivered as planned, the project will have a lasting impact on the region, driving economic growth, and promoting regional integration. Future Prospects The project has the potential to create a new economic geography in the Horn of Africa, connecting Djibouti's maritime gateway with Ethiopia's inland economy. This will create new opportunities for trade, investment, and economic growth, and demonstrate how infrastructure can turn regional integration into a business reality. The success of the project will also depend on the ability of the partners to attract new investments, and to create a favorable business environment.   Regional Integration The project is part of a larger effort to promote regional integration in the Horn of Africa. The region has significant potential for economic growth, with a large and growing market, and abundant natural resources. However, the region also faces significant challenges, including infrastructure gaps, and limited economic diversification. The project will help to address these challenges, by creating a new economic geography, and promoting regional integration.

By Al-Aghbari (Djibouti) from POA On Thursday, in Djibouti's Damerjog Industrial Park, , Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh and Aliko Dangote of the Nigerian billionaire laid the foundation of a 160 million USD fuel storage and pipeline project. This was not a groundbreaking. It was a declaration. Ethiopia and Djibouti are not neighbors who trade. They are partners bound by something deeper — an organic economic relationship inseparable from the survival and prosperity of both nations. No unfounded allegation, from any partial source, can undo what was sealed today. A Bond Written in Necessity More than 95% of Ethiopia's petroleum products pass through Djibouti. More than 70% of Djibouti's electricity flows from Ethiopia. In 2025 alone, 4.23 million metric tonnes of refined fuels crossed Djiboutian soil bound for Ethiopian markets. This is not commerce. It is symbiosis. When Djibouti's port breathes, Ethiopia's economy inhales. When Ethiopia's turbines turn, Djibouti's homes illuminate. Such a bond is not renegotiated at will. It is lived — daily, by millions on both sides of the border. What Was Laid Today Eighty hectares. 375,000 m³ of storage. 5 million tonnes of annual transit. A 120-kilometre pipeline carrying Jet A-1, Gasoil, and Essence from Damerjog to Dawanleh. It will complement road and rail, not replace them. It will cut corridor logistics costs by 10 to 30%. It will remove nearly 1,000 tanker journeys from the roads each day. It will spare the atmosphere 15,000 to 20,000 tonnes of CO₂ a year. It will create up to 1,200 direct jobs at peak construction, and 110 to 120 permanent ones after. These are not abstractions. They are the measurable pulse of a partnership that delivers. The Facts Outlast the Rumours There are voices — partial, ill-informed, or both — that whisper of imbalance, of dependency, of hidden designs. Their allegations collapse under the weight of the obvious. The benefits are not decreed from above. They are embraced below — by governments and populations alike. Visible in the fuel that reaches Ethiopian stations. In the current that lights Djiboutian homes. In the livelihoods created on both sides of the frontier. An organic bond is not severed by insinuation. It strengthens with every shipment, every project, every shared achievement. Today, it was strengthened again — in full view of the world. A Model, Not an Exception What Ethiopia and Djibouti are building is not merely a bilateral success. It is a template. At a moment when Africa is urged to deepen intra-continental trade and harden its supply chains, these two nations show what integration actually looks like when rooted in geography, necessity, and trust. Sovereignty and interdependence are not adversaries. National interest and regional cooperation can march together. Mutual benefit is not a slogan. It is a lived, measurable fact. The Stone That Answers Yesterday, three men laid a first stone. They did not simply inaugurate a project. They reaffirmed a bond. They answered — with deeds, not words — those who traffic in doubt. As President Guelleh declared: " Energy independence is the condition of every other independence. " This project is a brick in that sovereignty, transforming a shared vulnerability into a shared strength. The stone has spoken. Ethiopia and Djibouti are not merely neighbours. They are partners in destiny. Their ties are organic. Their gains are shared. Their future is one.

By Staff Writer As geopolitical and politico-military dynamics reshape the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor, Ethiopia’s economic weight, strategic location and expanding regional engagement continue to make it a central actor in the region’s evolving balance. Ethiopia is undergoing a transformation that reaches far beyond economic growth. Across its economy, cities, digital infrastructure, environmental restoration, tourism, investment, energy and regional connectivity, the country is pursuing a broad development agenda aimed at reshaping its domestic foundations while expanding its role in the Horn of Africa and the wider continent. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the government has placed economic reform, infrastructure development, digitalization, environmental restoration and regional integration at the heart of its development strategy. The transformation is unfolding against a complicated geopolitical backdrop. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor have become increasingly important arenas for global trade, maritime security, strategic competition and shifting political alignments. Conflicts and political transitions in neighboring countries, competition over strategic ports and shipping routes, and the growing involvement of external powers have further elevated the region's geopolitical importance. In that changing environment, Ethiopia’s sheer demographic and economic weight, geographic position and expanding infrastructure make its trajectory consequential well beyond its borders. The question is therefore not simply how rapidly Ethiopia is growing. It is how the country's economic transformation, technological modernization, environmental agenda and search for deeper regional connectivity could reshape its position in a strategically vital part of Africa. Growth as the Foundation of Transformation Ethiopia’s economic reform program has become one of the central pillars of this transformation. The government has pursued a series of macroeconomic and structural reforms under the Homegrown Economic Reform agenda, seeking to move the economy toward greater private-sector participation, stronger exports, increased investment and a more market-oriented system. The government projects economic growth of around 10.2 percent for the current Ethiopian fiscal year, placing Ethiopia among the world's fastest-growing economies. Behind the headline figure is a broader structural effort. Infrastructure investment, agriculture, manufacturing, services, trade and construction are increasingly interconnected within a development strategy designed to expand productive capacity and create new economic opportunities. The reform process has also sought to address longstanding macroeconomic challenges, including foreign-exchange shortages, inflationary pressures and limited private-sector participation. The significance of the reforms lies not only in short-term growth, but in the attempt to change the underlying architecture of the economy. Ethiopia is seeking to move from a predominantly state-led economic model toward one in which private investment, competition and market mechanisms play a larger role. This represents one of the most consequential economic shifts in the country's recent history. Cities as Engines of a New Ethiopia The transformation is perhaps most visible in Ethiopia’s cities. What began as a major corridor-development program in Addis Ababa has evolved into a broader urban-development drive extending to cities across the country. The initiative combines road and transport infrastructure with pedestrian corridors, public spaces, greenery, recreational facilities and other urban improvements. Addis Ababa has become the most visible expression of this transformation. The capital is simultaneously Ethiopia’s political center, a diplomatic hub hosting the African Union and numerous international institutions, and an increasingly important commercial and investment center. The broader objective is to create cities capable of supporting a rapidly growing population and an expanding economy. Urban development is consequently being treated not simply as beautification, but as an economic and social infrastructure strategy. The Digital Leap Another defining feature of Ethiopia’s transformation is the rapid expansion of its digital economy. For decades, many public and financial services depended heavily on physical documents, face-to-face transactions and cash. That is changing. Digital public services, mobile money, electronic payments and national digital identification are increasingly becoming part of everyday economic and administrative life. The government's Mesob one-stop digital service initiative represents this shift toward integrated public services, bringing multiple services together through digital platforms and expanding access beyond the capital. At the foundation of this emerging ecosystem is Fayda, Ethiopia’s national digital identification system. A reliable digital identity can support access to financial services, social protection, government services and a growing range of digital applications. Meanwhile, mobile-money adoption has expanded rapidly. More than 58 million Ethiopians are reported to be using mobile-money services, while digital payments have recorded significant increases. The importance of this transformation goes beyond convenience. Digitalization can reduce transaction costs, widen financial inclusion, improve access to government services and create new opportunities for businesses and citizens. For a country of Ethiopia’s size, that represents a potentially significant change in the relationship between the state, the economy and its citizens. Investment and Tourism: Unlocking Untapped Potential Ethiopia’s economic transformation is also increasingly linked to investment and tourism. The country combines a large domestic market, a young population, substantial agricultural potential, a strategic geographic location, unique cultural heritage and diverse natural landscapes. Government initiatives have sought to turn those assets into economic opportunities. Projects associated with Dine for Sheger, Dine for Nation and Dine for Generation have contributed to a broader effort to develop urban tourism, hospitality, recreation and cultural destinations. Ethiopia is simultaneously seeking to expand its tourism offering beyond traditional historical routes by developing natural, cultural and urban destinations. The objective is increasingly clear: tourism is being positioned not merely as a source of foreign exchange, but as part of a wider urban-development, employment and investment strategy. The same logic applies to investment. Economic reforms are intended to create greater space for private capital and international investors while infrastructure expansion seeks to improve the conditions for doing business. The challenge is converting Ethiopia’s enormous potential into sustained investment, competitive exports and productive employment. Green Legacy: Development with an Environmental Dimension Perhaps no initiative better captures Ethiopia’s attempt to connect development with environmental restoration than the Green Legacy Initiative. Launched in 2019, the program has mobilized millions of Ethiopians around large-scale tree planting and environmental rehabilitation. More than 56 billion seedlings have been planted since the initiative began. But the significance of Green Legacy extends beyond the number of seedlings. The initiative increasingly encompasses watershed protection, land rehabilitation, climate resilience, biodiversity and efforts to restore degraded landscapes. It has also become an important component of Ethiopia’s international climate diplomacy. For a developing country facing the effects of climate change while seeking rapid economic growth, the underlying proposition is significant: environmental restoration and economic development do not necessarily have to be competing objectives. Ethiopia is attempting to demonstrate that ecological restoration can itself become part of a national development strategy. Energy and Regional Integration Energy is another area where Ethiopia’s domestic transformation intersects directly with regional ambitions. With more than 95 percent of its electricity generated from renewable sources, Ethiopia is seeking to position itself as an important clean-energy producer in East Africa. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is central to that strategy. Beyond meeting domestic electricity needs, Ethiopia has increasingly emphasized the potential of cross-border electricity trade to support economic integration. Power interconnections with neighboring countries can create new markets for electricity while providing energy-deficient economies with access to renewable power. The broader vision is therefore regional. Ethiopia is seeking to build infrastructure that connects markets rather than simply serving national consumption. Roads, electricity networks, aviation, telecommunications and trade corridors can collectively create a more integrated regional economy. This is where Ethiopia’s development agenda intersects with its regional diplomacy. The Red Sea Quest Few issues demonstrate this intersection more clearly than Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable maritime access. As one of Africa’s most populous countries and a major economy in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has repeatedly argued that dependable access to maritime trade routes is important for its long-term economic development and regional integration. The issue has acquired greater significance as the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have become increasingly important to global trade and maritime security. For Ethiopia, maritime access is fundamentally connected to logistics, trade competitiveness and integration into international markets. For the region, Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations intersect with questions of port infrastructure, shipping routes, security and regional economic cooperation. The challenge is therefore not merely geographic. Ethiopia’s approach has increasingly emphasized diplomatic engagement and negotiated arrangements, while presenting maritime connectivity as part of a broader regional integration agenda. A Strategic Actor in a Changing Region The Horn of Africa is experiencing a period of profound geopolitical change. The Red Sea shipping corridor has become increasingly important to global commerce. Competition over ports and maritime infrastructure has intensified. External powers are expanding their diplomatic, economic and security engagement. At the same time, conflicts and political instability continue to affect the region. Against this backdrop, Ethiopia remains one of the region’s central actors. Its large population, expanding economy, strategic location, military and institutional capacity, diplomatic role and infrastructure ambitions give it considerable regional weight. That does not mean Ethiopia is insulated from regional pressures. Far from it. The country continues to confront complex security, economic and diplomatic challenges, while its development ambitions are sometimes unfolding amid competing regional interests. But Ethiopia’s response has increasingly centered on strengthening its own economic foundations while expanding connectivity with its neighbors. Growing with the Region At the heart of Ethiopia’s development strategy is an increasingly visible proposition: national prosperity and regional prosperity are interconnected. Energy corridors can connect power markets. Transport infrastructure can connect economies. Digital networks can connect people and businesses. Tourism can connect cultures. Maritime connectivity can connect landlocked economies to global markets. And regional trade can create opportunities that individual countries may struggle to generate alone. This explains why Ethiopia’s development agenda increasingly extends beyond its national borders. The country is seeking to grow not in isolation, but through deeper economic and infrastructure connections with the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the wider continent. Taken together, these developments point to something larger than a collection of individual projects. They represent an attempt to redefine Ethiopia’s economic foundations and its regional role simultaneously.

By Guillermo Patria Sept. 24, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia is undertaking a broad transformation of its national defense system, seeking to build a military that is more professional, technologically advanced, operationally ready and increasingly capable of sustaining itself through domestic production. The transformation reaches across the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), Air Force, Special Operations Command, defense industries, drone production, military research and education, artificial intelligence and the rebuilding of the country's maritime capability. At its core is a strategic proposition: protecting Ethiopia's sovereignty and national interests requires not only soldiers and weapons, but also strong institutions, technology, industrial capacity and human capital capable of sustaining them. ENDF Chief of General Staff Field Marshal Birhanu Jula has described the reform as a historic transformation aimed at strengthening the force's organizational structure, unity, professionalism, readiness and technological capacity. The objective is therefore not simply to increase military hardware, but to change the character and capabilities of the force.   A force adapted to modern warfare The battlefield is changing rapidly. Traditional manpower and conventional weapons remain important, but military effectiveness increasingly depends on information, precision, communications, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare and the ability to make decisions rapidly. Ethiopia's reforms are increasingly responding to this reality. In February 2026, Field Marshal Birhanu described the modernized ENDF in terms of quantity, quality and technology, stressing the need to adapt military capabilities to changing technologies and security threats. The technological shift is also becoming institutional. In August 2026, the ENDF signed an agreement with the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute to explore AI applications in logistics, military training, cybersecurity, military healthcare, air operations and electronic warfare. Yet technology alone does not create military strength. It must be matched by trained personnel, effective institutions and operational readiness. Ethiopia's reform therefore also emphasizes professional military education, specialized training, engineering and technical expertise. Readiness at the center The ultimate purpose of a defense force is its ability to respond when national interests are threatened. Field Marshal Birhanu has repeatedly emphasized ENDF readiness amid what Ethiopia describes as a complex and changing security environment. In July 2026, he said reforms had strengthened the force's organizational structure and unity while maintaining a high level of readiness and introducing modern military technology. The Special Operations Command represents another dimension of this approach, with military leadership presenting it as a highly capable force designed for rapid response and proactive action against emerging threats. For Ethiopia, the broader objective is clear: national sovereignty must be protected by a force capable of detecting threats, mobilizing rapidly and responding effectively when national interests are at stake. From buying weapons to building them Perhaps the most important part of Ethiopia's defense transformation is taking place away from the battlefield—in factories, laboratories and engineering facilities. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has increasingly linked defense manufacturing with economic resilience and technological self-reliance. He has said Ethiopia is developing domestic capabilities to manufacture unmanned aerial vehicles, armored military vehicles, heavy weapons, artillery and ammunition. The significance goes beyond the products themselves. Defense manufacturing requires engineers, technicians, researchers, specialized machinery and reliable industrial systems, creating technological capabilities that can strengthen the wider economy.   The Homicho Ammunition Engineering Complex illustrates this trajectory. Its growing production capacity has enabled Ethiopia not only to supply domestic requirements but also to enter foreign markets, with the government reporting ammunition export contracts worth more than 30 million US dollars. The direction is therefore shifting from simply acquiring finished products toward developing the capacity to produce, maintain and improve critical systems domestically. The Air Force and the technology ecosystem The Ethiopian Air Force provides perhaps the clearest example of the transformation. The institution says it has moved from an analog operating environment toward the digital era while expanding aircraft maintenance, upgrading, spare-parts production and unmanned aviation. The significance is that a modern Air Force requires an entire technological ecosystem—pilots, engineers, technicians, maintenance facilities, spare parts, research, communications and digital systems. Ethiopia is increasingly seeking to develop these capabilities locally. The Air Force has reported increased production of components and spare parts while Ethiopian engineers and technicians take greater roles in aircraft maintenance, upgrading and unmanned systems. The objective is therefore not simply to acquire aircraft from abroad, but to develop the knowledge required to operate, maintain, upgrade and eventually develop increasingly sophisticated systems. This also explains the emphasis on human capital. Prime Minister Abiy has stressed that sophisticated aircraft alone cannot create an effective Air Force. Highly trained pilots, engineers, technicians, scientists and commanders are essential to converting technology into military capability.   Drones and artificial intelligence Few developments demonstrate the technological shift more clearly than Ethiopia's growing drone industry. The establishment of SkyWin Aeronautics Industries marked an important step in domestic UAV production. Drones bring together aviation, electronics, sensors, communications, software, data processing and increasingly artificial intelligence. In June 2026, the Information Network Security Administration and the Ethiopian Air Force agreed to establish a Drone Technology Center dedicated to research, innovation and development in unmanned aerial systems. The initiative connects defense requirements with research, laboratories, human-capital development and technology transfer—helping create a domestic technological chain from research and engineering to production and deployment. AI represents the next layer of this transformation. The ENDF's cooperation with the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute is intended to explore AI applications across logistics, training, cybersecurity, military healthcare, air operations and electronic warfare. The broader significance is that Ethiopia's defense modernization is moving beyond hardware toward technologies that can improve how information is collected, processed and used.   Fourth-generation capability, fifth-generation ambition Ethiopia's Air Force ambitions extend further. In January 2026, Prime Minister Abiy said the Ethiopian Air Force had developed fourth-generation combat capability and set an objective of moving toward fifth-generation capability by 2030, alongside plans to double the country's combat-aircraft capacity. These are stated government objectives rather than capabilities already fully achieved. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the direction of Ethiopia's military planning: keeping defense capabilities aligned with rapidly evolving technologies while continuing to invest in the human expertise required to operate them. The transformation therefore cannot be measured only by the number of aircraft acquired, but also by the country's ability to operate, maintain, upgrade and increasingly develop sophisticated systems. Land, air and sea Ethiopia's defense transformation also has a maritime dimension. The country lost direct access to the Red Sea following Eritrea's independence, and the Ethiopian Navy was subsequently disbanded. Its reconstruction now forms part of the country's evolving national security architecture. Vice Admiral Kindu Gezu, Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian Navy, has highlighted the changing security environment in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including piracy, arms trafficking, irregular migration, insurgent networks and geopolitical competition. For Ethiopia, maritime security has implications beyond naval operations. Trade routes, ports, energy supplies, commercial shipping and regional security are all connected to the wider maritime environment. The Navy consequently adds another dimension to the defense transformation, with land, air, cyber and maritime capabilities increasingly forming part of one national security architecture. Building strategic self-reliance Taken together, these developments reveal the broader direction of Ethiopia's defense reform. The ENDF is being reorganized and professionalized. Specialized forces are being developed around rapid response. The Air Force is expanding its digital, maintenance and engineering capabilities. Domestic drone production is emerging. Defense industries are producing ammunition, armored vehicles and other military equipment. AI is being explored for defense applications, while military universities and laboratories are becoming part of technological research and development. The Navy is rebuilding maritime capabilities. Individually, each represents a military reform. Together, they point toward an effort to build strategic self-reliance. A country cannot guarantee the sustainability of its defense capability if every critical component depends on external suppliers. Domestic production does not eliminate the need for international cooperation or foreign technology, but it can strengthen Ethiopia's ability to maintain essential capabilities, respond to emergencies and develop technologies suited to its own requirements. That is the broader bargain emerging from Ethiopia's defense transformation. The objective is not simply to possess modern weapons. It is to create a defense institution capable of using technology effectively, sustaining its equipment, developing its own technical expertise and responding rapidly when national interests are threatened. The deeper story is therefore being written not only on military grounds, but also in aircraft workshops, drone factories, ammunition plants, laboratories, military academies and technology institutes. The soldier remains at the center. But alongside the soldier stands an increasingly important network of pilots, engineers, scientists, technicians, programmers, researchers and manufacturers. Together, they represent a changing conception of military power. For Ethiopia, the emerging objective is a defense force that is professional in structure, ready in operation, technologically capable and increasingly self-reliant in production. In an era when national security is shaped by technology as much as manpower, the ability to build and sustain that capability may become as important as the weapons themselves. Ethiopia's defense transformation is therefore not simply about building a stronger army. It is about building the technological, industrial and human foundations that enable the country to defend its sovereignty and national interests with greater confidence and readiness.

Addis Ababa, September 24, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopia has used the 81st United Nations General Assembly to put a broader strategic question before the international community: can a global system facing profound geopolitical, economic, technological and environmental change remain credible without giving greater weight to Africa and the Global South? For President Taye Atske Selassie, the answer is increasingly tied to how the international system distributes voice, opportunity and responsibility.   Addressing the General Debate in New York on September 23, President Taye linked Ethiopia’s national priorities to a wider case for stronger multilateralism, greater African representation in global institutions, peaceful regional integration, reliable maritime connectivity, climate justice, energy transformation, food security and technological inclusion. His message came as the 81st General Assembly meets under the theme “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations That Delivers for All.” The theme itself reflects an international system under pressure from armed conflicts, widening inequalities, climate emergencies, rapid technological change and declining confidence in multilateral institutions. Against that backdrop, Ethiopia’s intervention was more than a statement of national interests. It was an attempt to place those interests within a larger African and Global South agenda. Africa’s Voice and the Question of Global Legitimacy At the center of Ethiopia’s message is the longstanding question of African representation in global decision-making. President Taye renewed Ethiopia’s call for reform of the United Nations Security Council, arguing that Africa cannot remain structurally underrepresented in an institution whose decisions have profound consequences for international peace and security.   Ethiopia has consistently supported the African Common Position, including the call for two permanent African seats with full rights and responsibilities as well as veto power, alongside additional non-permanent representation. President Taye articulated that position explicitly in earlier engagements with UN leadership and has continued to frame Security Council reform as an issue of fairness, representation and institutional credibility. The argument has gained renewed relevance during this year’s General Assembly. The President of the 81st General Assembly, Khalilur Rahman, has himself identified inclusive global governance and UN reform as central pillars of his programme. In his opening remarks, he said reform must make the Organization more representative and responsive, while emphasizing that Africa’s underrepresentation in the Security Council is particularly significant. For Ethiopia, therefore, the issue is not simply about obtaining a larger African presence in New York. It is about whether institutions created in a very different geopolitical era can adequately represent the world as it exists today. Africa’s demographic weight, economic potential and growing strategic importance have expanded considerably, while its formal representation in the UN’s most powerful decision-making body remains limited. That tension lies at the heart of Ethiopia’s diplomatic argument.   From Multilateralism as Principle to Multilateralism as Security Ethiopia’s position also draws on its own diplomatic history. The country’s experience with the League of Nations and the failure of the international system to prevent fascist aggression in the 1930s has long shaped Addis Ababa’s view of collective security. That history gives Ethiopia a particular reason to treat multilateralism not simply as diplomatic architecture, but as a mechanism whose effectiveness can have direct consequences for national and regional security. The lesson Ethiopia draws is straightforward: international institutions lose credibility when their principles are applied selectively or when entire regions remain inadequately represented in decisions concerning war, peace and security. This perspective also fits Ethiopia’s longstanding diplomatic identity as an African state with deep multilateral engagement and as host of the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. The result is a foreign-policy narrative in which Ethiopia seeks to speak simultaneously as a national actor and as part of a broader African diplomatic constituency. Sea Access: From National Interest to Regional Connectivity Perhaps the most strategically consequential dimension of President Taye’s message is Ethiopia’s renewed emphasis on reliable sea outlet. For Africa’s second-most populous country and one of the continent’s largest economies, dependence on external maritime infrastructure is not simply a logistical matter. It affects trade costs, supply chains, industrial competitiveness and the country’s ability to integrate more deeply into global markets. President Taye has therefore linked Ethiopia’s economic ambitions with the need for dependable maritime connectivity, while emphasizing diplomatic engagement and arrangements that can serve wider regional interests. That framing matters. Ethiopia is increasingly presenting maritime access not merely as a national demand, but as part of a broader regional connectivity equation involving security, trade, infrastructure, ports, logistics and economic integration across the Horn of Africa. This places the issue within the strategic geography of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. The Ethiopian argument is that a large landlocked economy cannot fully realize its economic potential without predictable access to international maritime trade. At the same time, Addis Ababa has sought to frame connectivity as potentially mutually beneficial: coastal states can gain from investment, logistics, infrastructure and expanded trade generated by stronger links with Ethiopia. The question, therefore, is increasingly about how maritime connectivity can be incorporated into a regional economic architecture and a security lens.   Energy: Turning Africa’s Resources into African Growth President Taye’s message on energy follows a similar logic. Africa possesses enormous renewable-energy potential, yet millions of people remain without reliable electricity and many countries lack the transmission networks, financing and infrastructure required to convert generation capacity into productive economic activity. Ethiopia has sought to position itself at the center of this debate through its renewable-energy expansion and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). For Addis Ababa, the GERD is not presented simply as a national power project. It is part of a broader development model centered on domestic resource mobilization, renewable energy and regional electricity connectivity. The larger challenge, however, extends beyond generation. Africa needs transmission lines, interconnected grids, storage capacity, investment and industries capable of using electricity productively. This is where Ethiopia’s argument intersects with the wider global debate over energy access: building generation capacity is only one part of an energy transition. The more difficult question is how to finance and connect that capacity so that electricity becomes a foundation for industrialization, digital services, agriculture and employment. In that sense, Ethiopia is attempting to shift the conversation from Africa’s renewable-energy potential to Africa’s ability to convert that potential into economic transformation.   Climate Diplomacy and the Politics of Development Climate change provides another bridge between Ethiopia’s domestic priorities and its international diplomacy. President Taye has emphasized the disparity between countries’ historical contributions to global emissions and their exposure to climate-related consequences, placing questions of climate finance, equity and development at the center of Ethiopia’s position. Ethiopia’s selection to host COP32 in 2027 gives Addis Ababa an additional platform from which to pursue that agenda. The country’s Green Legacy Initiative, renewable-energy expansion and environmental restoration efforts form part of the domestic narrative Ethiopia is taking into international climate diplomacy. But the strategic question extends beyond tree planting or emissions. For many African countries, the climate debate is fundamentally connected to development finance. The continent requires resources not only to mitigate emissions but also to adapt infrastructure, strengthen food systems, expand energy access and protect vulnerable communities. Ethiopia’s message therefore seeks to connect climate responsibility with development opportunity. Food Security as Economic and Strategic Resilience Food security occupies a similar position. President Taye’s reference to Ethiopia’s expansion of wheat production reflects a broader effort to portray domestic agricultural production as a pillar of resilience. The lesson Ethiopia is advancing is that food security cannot be separated from economic stability, national resilience and geopolitical vulnerability. The disruptions of recent years—from conflicts and supply-chain shocks to climate-related disasters—have demonstrated how quickly dependence on international food markets can become a strategic concern. For Ethiopia and other African states, increasing domestic agricultural productivity is therefore increasingly framed not simply as an agricultural policy, but as part of a wider strategy to strengthen economic sovereignty and withstand external shocks. Technology and the Battle Over the Future Technology introduces another dimension to Ethiopia’s international message. Artificial intelligence is rapidly changing economies, labor markets, education, security and global competitiveness. Yet access to computing infrastructure, data, skills and investment remains highly unequal. The danger for Africa is not simply being left behind in the next technological revolution. It is becoming permanently dependent on technologies designed, owned and controlled elsewhere. President Taye’s emphasis on initiatives such as Ethiopia’s 5 Million Coders programme and the country’s efforts to expand digital and AI capabilities reflects an attempt to position technology as a development instrument rather than merely a consumer market. The question is increasingly whether African countries can participate in the creation of the next generation of technologies—and whether global AI governance will give developing countries a meaningful voice. That debate is particularly relevant at this year’s UNGA, where AI governance and the digital divide are prominent elements of the wider discussion on transforming multilateral cooperation. The General Assembly presidency has identified “Innovation with Inclusion” as one of its six pillars, emphasizing inclusive governance and investment to close the digital divide.   The Horn of Africa: Connectivity Cannot Be Separated from Stability Ethiopia’s global message ultimately returns to its immediate neighborhood. The Horn of Africa is simultaneously a zone of immense economic potential and persistent geopolitical vulnerability. Conflict, maritime insecurity, fragile political settlements and competition over strategic infrastructure continue to shape the region. President Taye’s engagement with UN Secretary-General António Guterres on the margins of UNGA 81 focused on peace and security in the Horn of Africa, regional connectivity and sustainable development. Guterres also reaffirmed UN support for Ethiopia’s preparations to host COP32. That combination is revealing. For Ethiopia, security and development are increasingly presented as interconnected rather than separate policy tracks. A stable Horn facilitates trade and infrastructure. Improved connectivity creates economic incentives for cooperation. Greater economic integration can, in turn, strengthen the foundations for regional stability. This is the broader logic behind Ethiopia’s emphasis on maritime access, regional integration and diplomatic engagement. Ethiopia’s UN Message Is About More Than Ethiopia Taken together, President Taye’s UN message forms a relatively coherent strategic picture. Ethiopia is seeking to connect Africa’s voice in global governance with Africa’s ability to drive its own development. Security Council reform addresses political representation. Maritime access addresses connectivity and trade. Renewable energy addresses industrialization and energy access. Food production addresses resilience. Technology addresses future competitiveness. Climate diplomacy addresses development finance and environmental vulnerability. Regional diplomacy addresses the stability required for these ambitions to advance. The common thread is agency. Ethiopia’s argument is that Africa should have greater influence not only over how global institutions make decisions, but also over how the continent’s resources, markets, technologies and development priorities are integrated into the global economy. That makes the message broader than a conventional foreign-policy statement. It is an argument about the architecture of the international system itself. From New York Rhetoric to Concrete Outcomes The harder question begins after the speeches. Calls for reform, representation, connectivity and equitable development are increasingly common in international diplomacy. Their significance ultimately depends on whether they generate institutional changes, financing, infrastructure, partnerships and durable political agreements. For Ethiopia, that means translating its growing diplomatic engagement into tangible outcomes: expanded trade and investment, stronger regional infrastructure, reliable maritime connectivity, renewable-energy partnerships, climate finance, technological capacity and a greater African role in global decision-making. The challenge is substantial. But so is the opportunity. At a moment when the UN itself is confronting questions about relevance, representation and trust, Ethiopia has chosen to place its national interests inside a much larger African and Global South conversation. The message from New York is therefore not simply that Ethiopia wants a stronger voice. It is that Africa wants a greater role in defining the rules of the international system—and Ethiopia intends to be part of that conversation. The measure of the strategy will now be what follows: whether diplomatic principles can be converted into practical partnerships, regional connectivity, development gains and institutional change. That is where Ethiopia’s UN message moves from rhetoric to strategy.

By Staff Writer Sept. 23, 2026 (ENA) No matter a government change or leadership in Egypt, one thing remains constant in the official Egyptian discourse regarding the Nile River, which is dealing with the resources of the basin countries from a perspective of guardianship and considering development in the upstream countries an issue that requires Cairo’s approval. However, this pathetic hydro-imperialist mentality is no longer capable of explaining the reality of the Nile today. Africa has changed and the regional system of the Nile Basin has changed, while the Egyptian discourse continues to use language belonging to a historical era that the continent moved beyond decades ago. As aptly put by the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy the recent statements by the Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation reflect a “crude colonial mentality” that characterizes Egypt’s policy toward African countries. This characterization was not prompted solely by the latest statements, as the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy had previously warned against the continuation of what it described as a mentality associated with the colonial era in dealing with the Nile issue, affirming that Ethiopia would not relinquish its right to use the river to meet the development needs of its people. The oft repeated official Egyptian discourse and the phrases used in reference to the Nile are “historical rights,” “all available measures,” and “water security”; as though repeating these terms could in itself grant a state additional rights in a transboundary river. But words, no matter how sharp and undiplomatic they may be, cannot change the fact that Ethiopia is a sovereign state and that its natural resources located within its territory are part of its right to development. Ethiopia's Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa had previously stated that Ethiopia does not need permission from any country to develop its water resources, explaining that the country built the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam without obtaining permission from anyone and that it would continue developing other dams in its river basins when the needs arise. This is not mere political statement, but reflects a reality that has already been established on the ground. The dam has been completed and is producing energy; and Ethiopia has transformed from a country that faced major electricity-generation deficit into a country expanding energy exports to its neighbors, while moving toward exploiting its enormous hydropower potential to provide electricity access for its people, support industrialization and development. The unbridled double standard One of the clearest paradoxes in the Egyptian discourse is Cairo's insistence on the need for consultation and approval by it before upstream countries establish projects, while Egypt itself proceeded with the construction of the Aswan High Dam without the upstream countries having a comparable role in deciding the project. The Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy pointed to this double standard in its statement issued, stressing that Cairo treats its approval as a prerequisite for the Nile Basin countries to develop their water resources, despite the fact that Egypt built the Aswan High Dam without consulting the upstream countries. Here emerges the question that political discourse cannot evade: If Egypt has the right to develop its water resources within its territory without seeking permission from the upstream countries, why does not the same principle apply to Ethiopia and the other countries? Unbridled double standards do not create a fair system for managing transboundary rivers. Unjust legacy cannot govern the future A fundamental part of the Egyptian position has remained based on historical arrangements and agreements dating back to political circumstances entirely different from today’s African reality. Ethiopia was not a party to the 1959 Agreement, nor did the other upstream countries participate in shaping a system that sought to determine the future of Nile waters without their participation. Therefore, attempting to present those arrangements as a definitive basis for the rights of all basin countries ignores a fundamental fact: A state that was not a party to an agreement cannot, with the passage of time, become bound by it merely because another state insists on it. Africa has changed politically, demographically, and economically. The needs for electricity, food, and water have multiplied, new regional integration projects have emerged, and the upstream countries have become more capable of developing their natural resources. Therefore, reproducing past arrangements as the only solution for the future is not cooperation. It is an attempt to preserve an unjust legacy despite the changing circumstances that produced it. Ethiopia maintains that transboundary rivers should be bridges for cooperation, development, and integration, not tools for excluding upstream countries or imposing restrictions on their right to development. In January 2026, Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa affirmed that Ethiopian transboundary rivers should be viewed as shared resources and opportunities for cooperation and green growth, stressing that the availability of water in Ethiopia could bring potential benefits to Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Egypt. This is the Ethiopian position: Water is not the exclusive property of Ethiopia, but neither is it the exclusive property of Egypt. Ethiopia is not demanding a monopoly over the Nile; rather, it rejects turning participation in the river into a pretext for depriving it of the use of its resources. The difference between the two positions is fundamental. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: A counter-hegemonic project The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is no longer a project that can be influenced by political statements or Egypt’s media-worn diplomatic warnings. It has become a developmental and strategic reality. Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa said that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam contributed to doubling Ethiopia’s electricity-generation capacity to about 9.6 gigawatts, and has also become a catalyst for electricity interconnection and regional economic cooperation. He also explained that Ethiopia exports electricity to Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, and seeks to expand its electricity interconnection network with other countries. Thus, the project that Egyptian discourse attempted for years to portray as a source of threat has, in reality, become part of a broader transformation in Africa’s energy system. More importantly, Ethiopia does not view its water resources as a means of exercising influence over others, but as a foundation for overcoming energy poverty and achieving industrialization and economic growth. Egypt's problem is not however only about the GERD. For those who read between the lines, the underlying desire of the country has been repeatedly expressed by its official statements. Cairo is never prepared to accept Ethiopia as a strong developing country capable of investing in its natural resources without waiting for external approval. But Ethiopia has already demonstrated that it is capable and determined to develop its resources without any one's permission. Accepting this reality and mutually developing the region is the right answer. In August, the Ethiopian Water and Energy Minister affirmed that his country would continue developing its water resources and would build other dams when necessary. The minister also stressed that Ethiopia’s future is closely linked to the Abay River and the Red Sea, and that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam represents a transformative project that has changed the country’s position in the fields of energy, development, and regional integration. Thus, betting that strong political statements can return Ethiopia to a stage of hesitation or waiting is a bet on a reality that no longer exists. Ethiopia has repeatedly declared that transboundary rivers should be drivers of cooperation and shared prosperity, while at the same time rejecting any concept of water hegemony that deprives upstream countries of their sovereign rights. This is the position reaffirmed by the Ministry of Water and Energy. Consistent with this principle, Ethiopia continues to build its capabilities, continues to generate electricity and export energy, and continues to invest in its water resources. It also continues to work on watershed rehabilitation, afforestation, environmental conservation, and strengthening the sustainability of the Abay Basin, a point highlighted by the Ministry of Water and Energy in its latest statement. Ethiopia is not going back Repeated Egyptian statements will not change this course, nor will sharp rhetoric grant Cairo authority that neither law nor reality has given it. Past agreements will not turn back the clock, and they will not make Ethiopia relinquish its right to use its natural resources. Rather, the continuation of this discourse may produce the opposite result: Exposing the depth of a mentality that still views Ethiopian development as a threat instead of seeing it as an opportunity for African cooperation. Hence, the time has come for Egypt to deal with the Nile as a shared African basin, not a sphere of unilateral influence. The time has also come to recognize that Ethiopia is not a country waiting for permission to decide its future. The Nile will not be a tool of domination and Ethiopian development will not stop because of political rhetoric, no matter how loudly it is expressed. The reality of the 21st century imposes a different rule. Mutual respect instead of guardianship, cooperation instead of hegemony, and shared development instead of exclusion. This is not merely an Ethiopian vision. It is the only path capable of moving the Nile Basin from a legacy of conflict into a space of African integration.

By staff writer Sept. 23, 2026 (ENA) For years, the Federal Government of Ethiopia has demonstrated a clear and consistent commitment to peace, dialogue, and national stability. Even in moments of grave provocation, it has repeatedly chosen restraint over revenge, negotiation over escalation, and reconstruction over retaliation. This posture has not been accidental. It reflects a deep responsibility to the Ethiopian people, a recognition of the terrible cost of war, and an enduring belief that political differences should be settled through dialogue rather than destruction. Yet, despite this sustained effort, the TPLF has repeatedly shown an unwillingness to abandon antagonism, suspicion, and confrontation. Time and again, it has acted in ways that have deepened political division, threatened regional peace, and endangered the very people it claims to represent. The roots of the current crisis did not emerge overnight. They were fed over decades by a political culture that normalized distrust toward the central government and made confrontation appear to be a strategy rather than a failure. Even after Ethiopia entered a new political phase, the TPLF reacted not with sober reflection, but with resistance and resentment. The change in national leadership, and the public warmth shown to the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Tigray, appeared to unsettle a group that had long been accustomed to dominating political life. Rather than adapting to the country’s evolving political reality, it allegedly worked to obstruct reform, resist the formation of a broader political order, and undermine the very process that was intended to unify the country’s governing institutions. Emerging as a unifying national leader, Prime Minister Abiy traveled to the Tigray region initially, where he received an overwhelming welcome from the people. The enthusiasm and public reception were unprecedented, reflecting a strong sense of hope and acceptance in that part of the country. Unfortunately, the TPLF reacted with discomfort and quickly turned to hostile rhetoric, seeking to distance the people of Tigray from the national reconciliation narrative by fueling resentment. This belligerent group is now at the eleventh hour for another round of destruction. The banned TPLF has once again been portrayed as a Trojan horse for anti-Ethiopian forces. Let us count the record of the group since it entered Ethiopia’s political landscape. When efforts were made to merge the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its allied parties into a broader political framework, the TPLF reportedly opposed the initiative at every stage. Even after it became clear that the country was moving in a new direction, it refused to participate constructively in the Prosperity Party project and instead positioned itself outside the national consensus. The result was not principled disagreement, but a deliberate widening of political distance. In the process, it alienated itself from national institutions and severed its active role in federal political life, leaving Tigray politically isolated at a moment when unity was most needed. Worse still, while publicly speaking the language of rights and legitimacy, the group was allegedly preparing for confrontation. Reports of militarization, commandos training, and the strengthening of regional armed capability pointed to a dangerous direction. Rather than supporting peace, it appears to have chosen a path that placed military calculation above political responsibility. The tragedy that followed was not simply the result of battlefield developments; it was the outcome of a long chain of calculated decisions that pushed the country closer to conflict. The attack on the Northern Command remains one of the darkest and most painful chapters of this period. According to the federal position, the TPLF exploited the trust and affection that the people had toward the national army, used that trust to keep the Northern Command in place, and then turned against it in a shocking act of betrayal. This was followed by a campaign of misinformation designed to invert the truth and portray the aggressor as the victim. Such conduct did not merely fuel war; it wounded national trust and inflicted deep harm on Ethiopia’s social and political fabric. Even after the outbreak of war, the federal government continued to pursue peace. It called on elders, religious leaders, and all responsible voices to intervene. It gave opportunities for dialogue, restraint, and de-escalation. Yet the TPLF, according to the federal narrative, mocked these appeals and pressed ahead with war rhetoric, treating conflict as an instrument of power. It dragged young people into violence, placing them in the front lines of a struggle that could have been avoided. It also widened the war by attacking across borders, deepening the suffering of the region and pulling neighboring forces into an already devastating conflict. Despite all this, the federal government still did not abandon its responsibility to seek peace. The Pretoria peace agreement was a turning point that ended the war in Northern Ethiopia and offered a chance for recovery. Even then, the federal government chose magnanimity. It supported the restoration of services, allocated substantial resources for reconstruction, and worked to stabilize Tigray. It extended help through federal institutions, regional administrations, and development partners, showing once again that its priority was not punishment, but national healing. If the goal had been revenge, the outcome could have been very different. Instead, the government chose restraint, allowing the people of Tigray the space to recover and reflect. Yet the promise of peace was repeatedly weakened by conduct attributed to the TPLF itself. Instead of fully embracing disarmament and political normalization, it allegedly engaged in concealment, obstruction, and diversion. The implementation of the agreement was complicated by continued interference, including the manipulation of aid, the obstruction of movement, and the persistence of illicit practices that harmed ordinary civilians. Rather than using the peace process to rebuild trust, it appears to have treated it as a pause, a tactical opportunity to regroup rather than a genuine path toward reconciliation. The federal government, meanwhile, continued to act with unusual patience. It refrained from deploying forces in major locations in Tigray even when it had legal and practical grounds to do so. It respected the sensitivities of the moment, accepted political criticism, and chose to preserve peace even when it was not being fully reciprocated. This was not weakness; it was statesmanship. It reflected a deliberate effort to prevent renewed civilian suffering and to keep the country from sliding back into full-scale war. Today, the greatest burden falls not only on the federal state, but also on the people of Tigray themselves. Parents, youth, elders, and intellectuals cannot remain silent while history threatens to repeat itself. No political force should be allowed to sacrifice another generation in the name of power, grievance, or revenge. The youth of Tigray deserve education, work, dignity, and hope, not to be used as instruments in another cycle of destruction. Parents must raise their voices against those who turn the lives of their children into fuel for war. Community leaders and elites must choose responsibility over silence, truth over fear, and peace over factional loyalty. Ethiopia has paid too high a price for war. What the country needs now is not another round of bloodshed, but a shared commitment to stability, accountability, and reconstruction. The federal government has shown patience, made concessions, and opened doors to peace more than once. If peace is to hold, every actor must now choose it honestly. The people of Tigray, like all Ethiopians, deserve a future built on development and dignity. Those who continue to gamble with that future must be told clearly: enough is enough.