By Staff Writer As geopolitical and politico-military dynamics reshape the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor, Ethiopia’s economic weight, strategic location and expanding regional engagement continue to make it a central actor in the region’s evolving balance. Ethiopia is undergoing a transformation that reaches far beyond economic growth. Across its economy, cities, digital infrastructure, environmental restoration, tourism, investment, energy and regional connectivity, the country is pursuing a broad development agenda aimed at reshaping its domestic foundations while expanding its role in the Horn of Africa and the wider continent. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the government has placed economic reform, infrastructure development, digitalization, environmental restoration and regional integration at the heart of its development strategy. The transformation is unfolding against a complicated geopolitical backdrop. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor have become increasingly important arenas for global trade, maritime security, strategic competition and shifting political alignments. Conflicts and political transitions in neighboring countries, competition over strategic ports and shipping routes, and the growing involvement of external powers have further elevated the region's geopolitical importance. In that changing environment, Ethiopia’s sheer demographic and economic weight, geographic position and expanding infrastructure make its trajectory consequential well beyond its borders. The question is therefore not simply how rapidly Ethiopia is growing. It is how the country's economic transformation, technological modernization, environmental agenda and search for deeper regional connectivity could reshape its position in a strategically vital part of Africa. Growth as the Foundation of Transformation Ethiopia’s economic reform program has become one of the central pillars of this transformation. The government has pursued a series of macroeconomic and structural reforms under the Homegrown Economic Reform agenda, seeking to move the economy toward greater private-sector participation, stronger exports, increased investment and a more market-oriented system. The government projects economic growth of around 10.2 percent for the current Ethiopian fiscal year, placing Ethiopia among the world's fastest-growing economies. Behind the headline figure is a broader structural effort. Infrastructure investment, agriculture, manufacturing, services, trade and construction are increasingly interconnected within a development strategy designed to expand productive capacity and create new economic opportunities. The reform process has also sought to address longstanding macroeconomic challenges, including foreign-exchange shortages, inflationary pressures and limited private-sector participation. The significance of the reforms lies not only in short-term growth, but in the attempt to change the underlying architecture of the economy. Ethiopia is seeking to move from a predominantly state-led economic model toward one in which private investment, competition and market mechanisms play a larger role. This represents one of the most consequential economic shifts in the country's recent history. Cities as Engines of a New Ethiopia The transformation is perhaps most visible in Ethiopia’s cities. What began as a major corridor-development program in Addis Ababa has evolved into a broader urban-development drive extending to cities across the country. The initiative combines road and transport infrastructure with pedestrian corridors, public spaces, greenery, recreational facilities and other urban improvements. Addis Ababa has become the most visible expression of this transformation. The capital is simultaneously Ethiopia’s political center, a diplomatic hub hosting the African Union and numerous international institutions, and an increasingly important commercial and investment center. The broader objective is to create cities capable of supporting a rapidly growing population and an expanding economy. Urban development is consequently being treated not simply as beautification, but as an economic and social infrastructure strategy. The Digital Leap Another defining feature of Ethiopia’s transformation is the rapid expansion of its digital economy. For decades, many public and financial services depended heavily on physical documents, face-to-face transactions and cash. That is changing. Digital public services, mobile money, electronic payments and national digital identification are increasingly becoming part of everyday economic and administrative life. The government's Mesob one-stop digital service initiative represents this shift toward integrated public services, bringing multiple services together through digital platforms and expanding access beyond the capital. At the foundation of this emerging ecosystem is Fayda, Ethiopia’s national digital identification system. A reliable digital identity can support access to financial services, social protection, government services and a growing range of digital applications. Meanwhile, mobile-money adoption has expanded rapidly. More than 58 million Ethiopians are reported to be using mobile-money services, while digital payments have recorded significant increases. The importance of this transformation goes beyond convenience. Digitalization can reduce transaction costs, widen financial inclusion, improve access to government services and create new opportunities for businesses and citizens. For a country of Ethiopia’s size, that represents a potentially significant change in the relationship between the state, the economy and its citizens. Investment and Tourism: Unlocking Untapped Potential Ethiopia’s economic transformation is also increasingly linked to investment and tourism. The country combines a large domestic market, a young population, substantial agricultural potential, a strategic geographic location, unique cultural heritage and diverse natural landscapes. Government initiatives have sought to turn those assets into economic opportunities. Projects associated with Dine for Sheger, Dine for Nation and Dine for Generation have contributed to a broader effort to develop urban tourism, hospitality, recreation and cultural destinations. Ethiopia is simultaneously seeking to expand its tourism offering beyond traditional historical routes by developing natural, cultural and urban destinations. The objective is increasingly clear: tourism is being positioned not merely as a source of foreign exchange, but as part of a wider urban-development, employment and investment strategy. The same logic applies to investment. Economic reforms are intended to create greater space for private capital and international investors while infrastructure expansion seeks to improve the conditions for doing business. The challenge is converting Ethiopia’s enormous potential into sustained investment, competitive exports and productive employment. Green Legacy: Development with an Environmental Dimension Perhaps no initiative better captures Ethiopia’s attempt to connect development with environmental restoration than the Green Legacy Initiative. Launched in 2019, the program has mobilized millions of Ethiopians around large-scale tree planting and environmental rehabilitation. More than 56 billion seedlings have been planted since the initiative began. But the significance of Green Legacy extends beyond the number of seedlings. The initiative increasingly encompasses watershed protection, land rehabilitation, climate resilience, biodiversity and efforts to restore degraded landscapes. It has also become an important component of Ethiopia’s international climate diplomacy. For a developing country facing the effects of climate change while seeking rapid economic growth, the underlying proposition is significant: environmental restoration and economic development do not necessarily have to be competing objectives. Ethiopia is attempting to demonstrate that ecological restoration can itself become part of a national development strategy. Energy and Regional Integration Energy is another area where Ethiopia’s domestic transformation intersects directly with regional ambitions. With more than 95 percent of its electricity generated from renewable sources, Ethiopia is seeking to position itself as an important clean-energy producer in East Africa. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is central to that strategy. Beyond meeting domestic electricity needs, Ethiopia has increasingly emphasized the potential of cross-border electricity trade to support economic integration. Power interconnections with neighboring countries can create new markets for electricity while providing energy-deficient economies with access to renewable power. The broader vision is therefore regional. Ethiopia is seeking to build infrastructure that connects markets rather than simply serving national consumption. Roads, electricity networks, aviation, telecommunications and trade corridors can collectively create a more integrated regional economy. This is where Ethiopia’s development agenda intersects with its regional diplomacy. The Red Sea Quest Few issues demonstrate this intersection more clearly than Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable maritime access. As one of Africa’s most populous countries and a major economy in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has repeatedly argued that dependable access to maritime trade routes is important for its long-term economic development and regional integration. The issue has acquired greater significance as the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have become increasingly important to global trade and maritime security. For Ethiopia, maritime access is fundamentally connected to logistics, trade competitiveness and integration into international markets. For the region, Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations intersect with questions of port infrastructure, shipping routes, security and regional economic cooperation. The challenge is therefore not merely geographic. Ethiopia’s approach has increasingly emphasized diplomatic engagement and negotiated arrangements, while presenting maritime connectivity as part of a broader regional integration agenda. A Strategic Actor in a Changing Region The Horn of Africa is experiencing a period of profound geopolitical change. The Red Sea shipping corridor has become increasingly important to global commerce. Competition over ports and maritime infrastructure has intensified. External powers are expanding their diplomatic, economic and security engagement. At the same time, conflicts and political instability continue to affect the region. Against this backdrop, Ethiopia remains one of the region’s central actors. Its large population, expanding economy, strategic location, military and institutional capacity, diplomatic role and infrastructure ambitions give it considerable regional weight. That does not mean Ethiopia is insulated from regional pressures. Far from it. The country continues to confront complex security, economic and diplomatic challenges, while its development ambitions are sometimes unfolding amid competing regional interests. But Ethiopia’s response has increasingly centered on strengthening its own economic foundations while expanding connectivity with its neighbors. Growing with the Region At the heart of Ethiopia’s development strategy is an increasingly visible proposition: national prosperity and regional prosperity are interconnected. Energy corridors can connect power markets. Transport infrastructure can connect economies. Digital networks can connect people and businesses. Tourism can connect cultures. Maritime connectivity can connect landlocked economies to global markets. And regional trade can create opportunities that individual countries may struggle to generate alone. This explains why Ethiopia’s development agenda increasingly extends beyond its national borders. The country is seeking to grow not in isolation, but through deeper economic and infrastructure connections with the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the wider continent. Taken together, these developments point to something larger than a collection of individual projects. They represent an attempt to redefine Ethiopia’s economic foundations and its regional role simultaneously.

Addis Ababa, September 24, 2026 (ENA) — Ethiopian Water and Energy Minister’s Advisor, Mohammed Al-Arousi, underscored that Ethiopia will not accept interference in its sovereign decisions or restrictions on its right to development. Strongly condemning the recent remarks of Egypt's Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), he told ENA that Ethiopia does not view the issue of dam construction as a confrontation with the Egyptian people. The Advisor and member of the House of People's Representatives called on the Egyptian side to focus on its domestic challenges and work toward mechanisms that strengthen cooperation among Nile Basin countries. Mohammed noted that Ethiopia’s dam development does not end with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, pointing out that three new dams are in the pipeline. The projects demonstrate Ethiopia’s continued implementation of its development agenda, despite external criticism and objections. “Some of our brothers in Egypt may think that we are provoking them when we say that we are building dams on the Nile River. However, we affirm that these are Ethiopian rights from which we have been deprived; and Ethiopia is working to reclaim these rights,” the Advisor explained. Mohammed added that Ethiopia does not view water development as a privilege requiring permission from another country, stressing that its natural resources constitute the foundation of its plans to expand electricity access and improve the living standards of its citizens. Ethiopia will continue utilizing its natural resources and dam construction is part of the country’s right to pursue development and provide energy to its people, he underlined. “We categorically reject all these (Egyptian) statements. Our country is a sovereign and independent state, and we absolutely do not accept interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs.” He elaborated that Ethiopia has long been deprived of exercising its full development rights in the areas of water and energy, and is now working to reclaim these rights through practical projects on the ground. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was not constructed to target Egypt, but rather to generate electricity and support Ethiopia’s economic and social development, the Advisor added. Furthermore, the Advisor noted that the Nile Basin countries have become increasingly aware of the importance of protecting their natural resources and preserving their sovereignty, calling for cooperation mechanisms based on shared interests rather than continued disagreements. Mohammed criticized Egyptian statements, including the remarks of the Egyptian minister, as provocative; saying that discourse among countries in the region should contribute to rapprochement and dialogue rather than deepen tensions. He explained that Ethiopia responds to criticisms directed against it through the development projects it implements, rather than engaging in repeated political disputes. Ethiopia’s dam and energy projects represent, according to him, a practical response to the need to expand access to electricity and advance economic and social development as the country continues implementing its plans in the energy sector. The country will continue utilizing its natural resources in the interest of its people, the Advisor said, affirming that the development trajectory will not be halted by statements issued from abroad. In conclusion, Mohammed emphasized that cooperation among Nile Basin countries remains the path toward addressing common challenges.

By Guillermo Patria Sept. 24, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia is undertaking a broad transformation of its national defense system, seeking to build a military that is more professional, technologically advanced, operationally ready and increasingly capable of sustaining itself through domestic production. The transformation reaches across the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), Air Force, Special Operations Command, defense industries, drone production, military research and education, artificial intelligence and the rebuilding of the country's maritime capability. At its core is a strategic proposition: protecting Ethiopia's sovereignty and national interests requires not only soldiers and weapons, but also strong institutions, technology, industrial capacity and human capital capable of sustaining them. ENDF Chief of General Staff Field Marshal Birhanu Jula has described the reform as a historic transformation aimed at strengthening the force's organizational structure, unity, professionalism, readiness and technological capacity. The objective is therefore not simply to increase military hardware, but to change the character and capabilities of the force.   A force adapted to modern warfare The battlefield is changing rapidly. Traditional manpower and conventional weapons remain important, but military effectiveness increasingly depends on information, precision, communications, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare and the ability to make decisions rapidly. Ethiopia's reforms are increasingly responding to this reality. In February 2026, Field Marshal Birhanu described the modernized ENDF in terms of quantity, quality and technology, stressing the need to adapt military capabilities to changing technologies and security threats. The technological shift is also becoming institutional. In August 2026, the ENDF signed an agreement with the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute to explore AI applications in logistics, military training, cybersecurity, military healthcare, air operations and electronic warfare. Yet technology alone does not create military strength. It must be matched by trained personnel, effective institutions and operational readiness. Ethiopia's reform therefore also emphasizes professional military education, specialized training, engineering and technical expertise. Readiness at the center The ultimate purpose of a defense force is its ability to respond when national interests are threatened. Field Marshal Birhanu has repeatedly emphasized ENDF readiness amid what Ethiopia describes as a complex and changing security environment. In July 2026, he said reforms had strengthened the force's organizational structure and unity while maintaining a high level of readiness and introducing modern military technology. The Special Operations Command represents another dimension of this approach, with military leadership presenting it as a highly capable force designed for rapid response and proactive action against emerging threats. For Ethiopia, the broader objective is clear: national sovereignty must be protected by a force capable of detecting threats, mobilizing rapidly and responding effectively when national interests are at stake. From buying weapons to building them Perhaps the most important part of Ethiopia's defense transformation is taking place away from the battlefield—in factories, laboratories and engineering facilities. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has increasingly linked defense manufacturing with economic resilience and technological self-reliance. He has said Ethiopia is developing domestic capabilities to manufacture unmanned aerial vehicles, armored military vehicles, heavy weapons, artillery and ammunition. The significance goes beyond the products themselves. Defense manufacturing requires engineers, technicians, researchers, specialized machinery and reliable industrial systems, creating technological capabilities that can strengthen the wider economy.   The Homicho Ammunition Engineering Complex illustrates this trajectory. Its growing production capacity has enabled Ethiopia not only to supply domestic requirements but also to enter foreign markets, with the government reporting ammunition export contracts worth more than 30 million US dollars. The direction is therefore shifting from simply acquiring finished products toward developing the capacity to produce, maintain and improve critical systems domestically. The Air Force and the technology ecosystem The Ethiopian Air Force provides perhaps the clearest example of the transformation. The institution says it has moved from an analog operating environment toward the digital era while expanding aircraft maintenance, upgrading, spare-parts production and unmanned aviation. The significance is that a modern Air Force requires an entire technological ecosystem—pilots, engineers, technicians, maintenance facilities, spare parts, research, communications and digital systems. Ethiopia is increasingly seeking to develop these capabilities locally. The Air Force has reported increased production of components and spare parts while Ethiopian engineers and technicians take greater roles in aircraft maintenance, upgrading and unmanned systems. The objective is therefore not simply to acquire aircraft from abroad, but to develop the knowledge required to operate, maintain, upgrade and eventually develop increasingly sophisticated systems. This also explains the emphasis on human capital. Prime Minister Abiy has stressed that sophisticated aircraft alone cannot create an effective Air Force. Highly trained pilots, engineers, technicians, scientists and commanders are essential to converting technology into military capability.   Drones and artificial intelligence Few developments demonstrate the technological shift more clearly than Ethiopia's growing drone industry. The establishment of SkyWin Aeronautics Industries marked an important step in domestic UAV production. Drones bring together aviation, electronics, sensors, communications, software, data processing and increasingly artificial intelligence. In June 2026, the Information Network Security Administration and the Ethiopian Air Force agreed to establish a Drone Technology Center dedicated to research, innovation and development in unmanned aerial systems. The initiative connects defense requirements with research, laboratories, human-capital development and technology transfer—helping create a domestic technological chain from research and engineering to production and deployment. AI represents the next layer of this transformation. The ENDF's cooperation with the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute is intended to explore AI applications across logistics, training, cybersecurity, military healthcare, air operations and electronic warfare. The broader significance is that Ethiopia's defense modernization is moving beyond hardware toward technologies that can improve how information is collected, processed and used.   Fourth-generation capability, fifth-generation ambition Ethiopia's Air Force ambitions extend further. In January 2026, Prime Minister Abiy said the Ethiopian Air Force had developed fourth-generation combat capability and set an objective of moving toward fifth-generation capability by 2030, alongside plans to double the country's combat-aircraft capacity. These are stated government objectives rather than capabilities already fully achieved. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the direction of Ethiopia's military planning: keeping defense capabilities aligned with rapidly evolving technologies while continuing to invest in the human expertise required to operate them. The transformation therefore cannot be measured only by the number of aircraft acquired, but also by the country's ability to operate, maintain, upgrade and increasingly develop sophisticated systems. Land, air and sea Ethiopia's defense transformation also has a maritime dimension. The country lost direct access to the Red Sea following Eritrea's independence, and the Ethiopian Navy was subsequently disbanded. Its reconstruction now forms part of the country's evolving national security architecture. Vice Admiral Kindu Gezu, Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian Navy, has highlighted the changing security environment in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including piracy, arms trafficking, irregular migration, insurgent networks and geopolitical competition. For Ethiopia, maritime security has implications beyond naval operations. Trade routes, ports, energy supplies, commercial shipping and regional security are all connected to the wider maritime environment. The Navy consequently adds another dimension to the defense transformation, with land, air, cyber and maritime capabilities increasingly forming part of one national security architecture. Building strategic self-reliance Taken together, these developments reveal the broader direction of Ethiopia's defense reform. The ENDF is being reorganized and professionalized. Specialized forces are being developed around rapid response. The Air Force is expanding its digital, maintenance and engineering capabilities. Domestic drone production is emerging. Defense industries are producing ammunition, armored vehicles and other military equipment. AI is being explored for defense applications, while military universities and laboratories are becoming part of technological research and development. The Navy is rebuilding maritime capabilities. Individually, each represents a military reform. Together, they point toward an effort to build strategic self-reliance. A country cannot guarantee the sustainability of its defense capability if every critical component depends on external suppliers. Domestic production does not eliminate the need for international cooperation or foreign technology, but it can strengthen Ethiopia's ability to maintain essential capabilities, respond to emergencies and develop technologies suited to its own requirements. That is the broader bargain emerging from Ethiopia's defense transformation. The objective is not simply to possess modern weapons. It is to create a defense institution capable of using technology effectively, sustaining its equipment, developing its own technical expertise and responding rapidly when national interests are threatened. The deeper story is therefore being written not only on military grounds, but also in aircraft workshops, drone factories, ammunition plants, laboratories, military academies and technology institutes. The soldier remains at the center. But alongside the soldier stands an increasingly important network of pilots, engineers, scientists, technicians, programmers, researchers and manufacturers. Together, they represent a changing conception of military power. For Ethiopia, the emerging objective is a defense force that is professional in structure, ready in operation, technologically capable and increasingly self-reliant in production. In an era when national security is shaped by technology as much as manpower, the ability to build and sustain that capability may become as important as the weapons themselves. Ethiopia's defense transformation is therefore not simply about building a stronger army. It is about building the technological, industrial and human foundations that enable the country to defend its sovereignty and national interests with greater confidence and readiness.

Addis Ababa, September 24, 2026 (ENA) —Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed arrived in Djibouti, where he was welcomed by Djiboutian President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh. The two leaders are expected to preside over the announcement of a joint project aimed at further strengthening economic ties and cooperation between Ethiopia and Djibouti, according to Office of the Prime Minister.   Moreover, the project is anticipated to add momentum to the longstanding economic partnership between the two neighboring countries and deepen cooperation in areas of shared strategic interest.

Addis Ababa, September 24, 2026 (ENA) — Ethiopia has the sovereign right to develop its water resources and construct dams for various purposes within its territory, Ambassador Zerihun Abebe, Director General for African Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said. Speaking to ENA, Ambassador Zerihun emphasized that Ethiopia rejects Egypt’s attempt to exercise a monopolistic approach to the Nile waters. He stressed that Ethiopia's position is based on the principles of sovereignty and equality among states. "Ethiopia has every right to construct dams, whether for irrigation, hydropower, domestic use, or industrial purposes, anywhere and at any time within its territory," he explained. The Director General argued that Ethiopia is not required to obtain permission from another country to undertake development projects within its territory. He noted that Ethiopia's position is also informed by its interpretation of international law and the historical practice of water development by states along shared river systems. To illustrate his point, Ambassador Zerihun cited examples from other parts of the world. He mentioned China’s development of dams along the Mekong, the United States’ management of rivers such as the Colorado and Rio Grande, and Turkey’s development of the Euphrates and Tigris river systems. "No one can impede Ethiopia’s right to use its water resources for its development purposes," he asserted. Ambassador Zerihun also criticized Egypt’s past unilateral water development activities, including the construction of the High Aswan Dam and diversion projects associated with Toshka. Ethiopia has previously raised similar concerns at the United Nations, arguing that Egypt’s projects were undertaken without consultation with upstream riparian states. Furthermore, Ambassador Zerihun referred to Sudanese dams, including Roseires, Merowe, Jebel Aulia, and projects in the Setit and Atbara river systems, arguing that Ethiopia was not involved in their development. Against this backdrop, he said, Ethiopia rejects the argument that its own water development projects should be subject to approval by downstream countries. Egypt has continued to argue that upstream projects should not be undertaken unilaterally because of their potential effects on downstream water security, while Ethiopia maintains that it has a sovereign right to use its water resources for development. The legal and diplomatic dispute also involves differing interpretations of earlier Nile agreements. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement is a bilateral accord between Egypt and Sudan, according to United Nations treaty records. Ethiopia has consistently rejected the agreement as a basis for determining its rights over the Nile waters. Condemning calls for Ethiopia to seek permission from Cairo before undertaking water development projects, Ambassador Zerihun described such an approach as rooted in a colonial-era conception of relations among African states. "We are living in a world where all states are equal," he underscored. "Ethiopia will continue to exercise its sovereign rights without interference."

Addis Ababa, September 24, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopia has used the 81st United Nations General Assembly to put a broader strategic question before the international community: can a global system facing profound geopolitical, economic, technological and environmental change remain credible without giving greater weight to Africa and the Global South? For President Taye Atske Selassie, the answer is increasingly tied to how the international system distributes voice, opportunity and responsibility.   Addressing the General Debate in New York on September 23, President Taye linked Ethiopia’s national priorities to a wider case for stronger multilateralism, greater African representation in global institutions, peaceful regional integration, reliable maritime connectivity, climate justice, energy transformation, food security and technological inclusion. His message came as the 81st General Assembly meets under the theme “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations That Delivers for All.” The theme itself reflects an international system under pressure from armed conflicts, widening inequalities, climate emergencies, rapid technological change and declining confidence in multilateral institutions. Against that backdrop, Ethiopia’s intervention was more than a statement of national interests. It was an attempt to place those interests within a larger African and Global South agenda. Africa’s Voice and the Question of Global Legitimacy At the center of Ethiopia’s message is the longstanding question of African representation in global decision-making. President Taye renewed Ethiopia’s call for reform of the United Nations Security Council, arguing that Africa cannot remain structurally underrepresented in an institution whose decisions have profound consequences for international peace and security.   Ethiopia has consistently supported the African Common Position, including the call for two permanent African seats with full rights and responsibilities as well as veto power, alongside additional non-permanent representation. President Taye articulated that position explicitly in earlier engagements with UN leadership and has continued to frame Security Council reform as an issue of fairness, representation and institutional credibility. The argument has gained renewed relevance during this year’s General Assembly. The President of the 81st General Assembly, Khalilur Rahman, has himself identified inclusive global governance and UN reform as central pillars of his programme. In his opening remarks, he said reform must make the Organization more representative and responsive, while emphasizing that Africa’s underrepresentation in the Security Council is particularly significant. For Ethiopia, therefore, the issue is not simply about obtaining a larger African presence in New York. It is about whether institutions created in a very different geopolitical era can adequately represent the world as it exists today. Africa’s demographic weight, economic potential and growing strategic importance have expanded considerably, while its formal representation in the UN’s most powerful decision-making body remains limited. That tension lies at the heart of Ethiopia’s diplomatic argument.   From Multilateralism as Principle to Multilateralism as Security Ethiopia’s position also draws on its own diplomatic history. The country’s experience with the League of Nations and the failure of the international system to prevent fascist aggression in the 1930s has long shaped Addis Ababa’s view of collective security. That history gives Ethiopia a particular reason to treat multilateralism not simply as diplomatic architecture, but as a mechanism whose effectiveness can have direct consequences for national and regional security. The lesson Ethiopia draws is straightforward: international institutions lose credibility when their principles are applied selectively or when entire regions remain inadequately represented in decisions concerning war, peace and security. This perspective also fits Ethiopia’s longstanding diplomatic identity as an African state with deep multilateral engagement and as host of the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. The result is a foreign-policy narrative in which Ethiopia seeks to speak simultaneously as a national actor and as part of a broader African diplomatic constituency. Sea Access: From National Interest to Regional Connectivity Perhaps the most strategically consequential dimension of President Taye’s message is Ethiopia’s renewed emphasis on reliable sea outlet. For Africa’s second-most populous country and one of the continent’s largest economies, dependence on external maritime infrastructure is not simply a logistical matter. It affects trade costs, supply chains, industrial competitiveness and the country’s ability to integrate more deeply into global markets. President Taye has therefore linked Ethiopia’s economic ambitions with the need for dependable maritime connectivity, while emphasizing diplomatic engagement and arrangements that can serve wider regional interests. That framing matters. Ethiopia is increasingly presenting maritime access not merely as a national demand, but as part of a broader regional connectivity equation involving security, trade, infrastructure, ports, logistics and economic integration across the Horn of Africa. This places the issue within the strategic geography of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. The Ethiopian argument is that a large landlocked economy cannot fully realize its economic potential without predictable access to international maritime trade. At the same time, Addis Ababa has sought to frame connectivity as potentially mutually beneficial: coastal states can gain from investment, logistics, infrastructure and expanded trade generated by stronger links with Ethiopia. The question, therefore, is increasingly about how maritime connectivity can be incorporated into a regional economic architecture and a security lens.   Energy: Turning Africa’s Resources into African Growth President Taye’s message on energy follows a similar logic. Africa possesses enormous renewable-energy potential, yet millions of people remain without reliable electricity and many countries lack the transmission networks, financing and infrastructure required to convert generation capacity into productive economic activity. Ethiopia has sought to position itself at the center of this debate through its renewable-energy expansion and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). For Addis Ababa, the GERD is not presented simply as a national power project. It is part of a broader development model centered on domestic resource mobilization, renewable energy and regional electricity connectivity. The larger challenge, however, extends beyond generation. Africa needs transmission lines, interconnected grids, storage capacity, investment and industries capable of using electricity productively. This is where Ethiopia’s argument intersects with the wider global debate over energy access: building generation capacity is only one part of an energy transition. The more difficult question is how to finance and connect that capacity so that electricity becomes a foundation for industrialization, digital services, agriculture and employment. In that sense, Ethiopia is attempting to shift the conversation from Africa’s renewable-energy potential to Africa’s ability to convert that potential into economic transformation.   Climate Diplomacy and the Politics of Development Climate change provides another bridge between Ethiopia’s domestic priorities and its international diplomacy. President Taye has emphasized the disparity between countries’ historical contributions to global emissions and their exposure to climate-related consequences, placing questions of climate finance, equity and development at the center of Ethiopia’s position. Ethiopia’s selection to host COP32 in 2027 gives Addis Ababa an additional platform from which to pursue that agenda. The country’s Green Legacy Initiative, renewable-energy expansion and environmental restoration efforts form part of the domestic narrative Ethiopia is taking into international climate diplomacy. But the strategic question extends beyond tree planting or emissions. For many African countries, the climate debate is fundamentally connected to development finance. The continent requires resources not only to mitigate emissions but also to adapt infrastructure, strengthen food systems, expand energy access and protect vulnerable communities. Ethiopia’s message therefore seeks to connect climate responsibility with development opportunity. Food Security as Economic and Strategic Resilience Food security occupies a similar position. President Taye’s reference to Ethiopia’s expansion of wheat production reflects a broader effort to portray domestic agricultural production as a pillar of resilience. The lesson Ethiopia is advancing is that food security cannot be separated from economic stability, national resilience and geopolitical vulnerability. The disruptions of recent years—from conflicts and supply-chain shocks to climate-related disasters—have demonstrated how quickly dependence on international food markets can become a strategic concern. For Ethiopia and other African states, increasing domestic agricultural productivity is therefore increasingly framed not simply as an agricultural policy, but as part of a wider strategy to strengthen economic sovereignty and withstand external shocks. Technology and the Battle Over the Future Technology introduces another dimension to Ethiopia’s international message. Artificial intelligence is rapidly changing economies, labor markets, education, security and global competitiveness. Yet access to computing infrastructure, data, skills and investment remains highly unequal. The danger for Africa is not simply being left behind in the next technological revolution. It is becoming permanently dependent on technologies designed, owned and controlled elsewhere. President Taye’s emphasis on initiatives such as Ethiopia’s 5 Million Coders programme and the country’s efforts to expand digital and AI capabilities reflects an attempt to position technology as a development instrument rather than merely a consumer market. The question is increasingly whether African countries can participate in the creation of the next generation of technologies—and whether global AI governance will give developing countries a meaningful voice. That debate is particularly relevant at this year’s UNGA, where AI governance and the digital divide are prominent elements of the wider discussion on transforming multilateral cooperation. The General Assembly presidency has identified “Innovation with Inclusion” as one of its six pillars, emphasizing inclusive governance and investment to close the digital divide.   The Horn of Africa: Connectivity Cannot Be Separated from Stability Ethiopia’s global message ultimately returns to its immediate neighborhood. The Horn of Africa is simultaneously a zone of immense economic potential and persistent geopolitical vulnerability. Conflict, maritime insecurity, fragile political settlements and competition over strategic infrastructure continue to shape the region. President Taye’s engagement with UN Secretary-General António Guterres on the margins of UNGA 81 focused on peace and security in the Horn of Africa, regional connectivity and sustainable development. Guterres also reaffirmed UN support for Ethiopia’s preparations to host COP32. That combination is revealing. For Ethiopia, security and development are increasingly presented as interconnected rather than separate policy tracks. A stable Horn facilitates trade and infrastructure. Improved connectivity creates economic incentives for cooperation. Greater economic integration can, in turn, strengthen the foundations for regional stability. This is the broader logic behind Ethiopia’s emphasis on maritime access, regional integration and diplomatic engagement. Ethiopia’s UN Message Is About More Than Ethiopia Taken together, President Taye’s UN message forms a relatively coherent strategic picture. Ethiopia is seeking to connect Africa’s voice in global governance with Africa’s ability to drive its own development. Security Council reform addresses political representation. Maritime access addresses connectivity and trade. Renewable energy addresses industrialization and energy access. Food production addresses resilience. Technology addresses future competitiveness. Climate diplomacy addresses development finance and environmental vulnerability. Regional diplomacy addresses the stability required for these ambitions to advance. The common thread is agency. Ethiopia’s argument is that Africa should have greater influence not only over how global institutions make decisions, but also over how the continent’s resources, markets, technologies and development priorities are integrated into the global economy. That makes the message broader than a conventional foreign-policy statement. It is an argument about the architecture of the international system itself. From New York Rhetoric to Concrete Outcomes The harder question begins after the speeches. Calls for reform, representation, connectivity and equitable development are increasingly common in international diplomacy. Their significance ultimately depends on whether they generate institutional changes, financing, infrastructure, partnerships and durable political agreements. For Ethiopia, that means translating its growing diplomatic engagement into tangible outcomes: expanded trade and investment, stronger regional infrastructure, reliable maritime connectivity, renewable-energy partnerships, climate finance, technological capacity and a greater African role in global decision-making. The challenge is substantial. But so is the opportunity. At a moment when the UN itself is confronting questions about relevance, representation and trust, Ethiopia has chosen to place its national interests inside a much larger African and Global South conversation. The message from New York is therefore not simply that Ethiopia wants a stronger voice. It is that Africa wants a greater role in defining the rules of the international system—and Ethiopia intends to be part of that conversation. The measure of the strategy will now be what follows: whether diplomatic principles can be converted into practical partnerships, regional connectivity, development gains and institutional change. That is where Ethiopia’s UN message moves from rhetoric to strategy.

Addis Ababa, September 24, 2026 (ENA) — Ethiopia has placed its pursuit of reliable maritime access firmly on the global diplomatic agenda, with President Taye Atske-Selassie telling the United Nations that securing access to the sea is essential to sustaining the country’s economic transformation and deepening its integration into global trade. Addressing the General Debate of the 81st Session of the UN General Assembly today, President Taye said Ethiopia is pursuing all possible diplomatic avenues to secure access to and from the sea. He also stressed that the issue can be addressed in a way that serves the common interests and development of countries in the region.   “Despite these tremendous achievements, Mr. President, we have come to recognize that our efforts to build a strong economy cannot generate a sustained development without reliable and dependable access to the sea,” he said. The President framed Ethiopia’s sea outlet aspiration within a broader vision of regional connectivity, economic integration and shared prosperity, rather than as an isolated national objective. He said Ethiopia remains committed to strengthening cooperation and integration in the Horn of Africa through infrastructure development, trade and people-to-people relations, while urging respect for the region’s right to peace and development. President Taye’s address also linked Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions to its expanding economic and infrastructure agenda, highlighting a planned 12.5 billion USD international airport designed to handle up to 110 million passengers and about four million tons of cargo annually. He said the project would strengthen Ethiopia’s connectivity and contribute to the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area.   Opening his address with a reference to Emperor Haile Selassie’s historic 1963 UN speech, President Taye said lasting peace depends on cooperation grounded in sovereign equality rather than domination. He warned that the international community must reinforce collective security and reform multilateral institutions to reflect today’s global realities. President Taye also renewed Ethiopia’s call for comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council, arguing that Africa has waited too long for equitable representation in global decision-making. He highlighted Ethiopia’s progress in renewable energy, food security, environmental restoration and digital development, including the Green Legacy Initiative and the 5 Million Coders program, while reaffirming Ethiopia’s readiness to host COP32 in 2027.   The President called for sustained regional and international cooperation to advance renewable energy, connectivity, food security, manufacturing and urban development. Concluding his address, President Taye reaffirmed Ethiopia’s commitment to multilateralism, human dignity, justice and solidarity, saying stronger international cooperation is essential to confronting the challenges facing current and future generations.

Addis Ababa, September 23, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopian President Taye Atske Selassie called for a stronger and more equitable multilateral system, urging the international community to reinforce collective security, address global inequality and give Africa a meaningful voice in global decision-making. Addressing the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, President Taye said lasting peace can only be achieved through cooperation based on sovereign equality, recalling Emperor Haile Selassie’s historic appeal to the UN in 1963. He warned that weakening collective security and rising power politics are undermining the foundations of the international order, stressing that multilateralism must remain a central safeguard against conflict. President Taye identified climate change, artificial intelligence and widening inequality among the defining challenges facing humanity, calling for greater political commitment to ensure that technological and economic progress benefits the Global South. He reaffirmed Ethiopia’s readiness to host COP32 in 2027, inviting world leaders and international stakeholders to Ethiopia to advance practical and inclusive climate solutions. The President also renewed Ethiopia’s call for comprehensive UN reform, particularly reform of the Security Council, saying Africa has waited too long for equitable representation in global decision-making. “Africa has waited far too long in the shadows of global decision-making,” he said, questioning how the denial of meaningful representation to more than 1.6 billion Africans can be justified. On regional affairs, President Taye reaffirmed Ethiopia’s commitment to peace, regional integration and development in the Horn of Africa, while calling for a Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned solution to the conflict in Sudan. He also highlighted Ethiopia’s progress in food security, renewable energy, environmental restoration and digital development, including the Green Legacy Initiative, the 5 Million Coders program and the country’s clean-energy ambitions. The President described the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a major Pan-African clean-energy project capable of contributing to regional prosperity. He further emphasized Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable maritime access, saying dependable access to the sea is essential to sustaining the country’s economic transformation and integration into global trade. “We are pursuing all possible diplomatic avenues to secure access to and from the sea to ensure Ethiopia’s integration into the global trading system,” he said. President Taye concluded by reaffirming Ethiopia’s commitment to multilateralism, human dignity, justice and solidarity, urging nations to collectively reshape international cooperation to meet the challenges facing current and future generations.

Addis Ababa, September 23, 2026 (ENA) — Ambassador Zerihun Abebe, Director General for African Affairs at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has criticized recent statements by Egyptian officials over the Nile, describing them as reflective of outdated colonial attitudes that have no place in the modern diplomatic landscape. Speaking to ENA, Ambassador Zerihun particularly criticized Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam over remarks reportedly suggesting that Ethiopians need to be educated about international law governing the Nile River. Zerihun described the remarks as “very unfortunate, regrettable, and even laughable,” saying they reflect misunderstanding of Ethiopia’s position and its rights under international law. He said Ethiopia is well versed in the legal principles governing the use of transboundary water resources and has consistently based its position on established principles of international law. Regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the Director General said Ethiopia constructed the project in accordance with internationally recognized principles, including the equitable and reasonable utilization of shared water resources. He described the Egyptian position as a “confusion” and “caricature” of Ethiopia’s stance, arguing that the remarks reflect lingering 19th century mindset toward Africa and its nations. “Such remarks are a direct reflection of colonial sentiment, an attitude rooted in the 19th century, toward Africa and its nations,” Zerihun said. He stressed that Ethiopia’s sovereignty and what it considers its legitimate rights are recognized under international law, adding that the country would continue to defend its national interests. Zerihun also called for Nile basin relations to be guided by contemporary diplomatic principles and cooperation among riparian countries rather than imperialist or monopolistic approaches. “We are not living in an imperialist world,” he said. “It’s time for Egypt to make its way into the modern age of diplomacy.” The Director General reaffirmed Ethiopia’s stated commitment to regional integration, cooperation and the sustainable utilization of shared water resources. He said Ethiopia has demonstrated its willingness to engage with downstream countries and address their concerns regarding the GERD while pursuing what it considers its rights to equitable use of the Nile.

By Staff Writer Sept. 23, 2026 (ENA) No matter a government change or leadership in Egypt, one thing remains constant in the official Egyptian discourse regarding the Nile River, which is dealing with the resources of the basin countries from a perspective of guardianship and considering development in the upstream countries an issue that requires Cairo’s approval. However, this pathetic hydro-imperialist mentality is no longer capable of explaining the reality of the Nile today. Africa has changed and the regional system of the Nile Basin has changed, while the Egyptian discourse continues to use language belonging to a historical era that the continent moved beyond decades ago. As aptly put by the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy the recent statements by the Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation reflect a “crude colonial mentality” that characterizes Egypt’s policy toward African countries. This characterization was not prompted solely by the latest statements, as the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy had previously warned against the continuation of what it described as a mentality associated with the colonial era in dealing with the Nile issue, affirming that Ethiopia would not relinquish its right to use the river to meet the development needs of its people. The oft repeated official Egyptian discourse and the phrases used in reference to the Nile are “historical rights,” “all available measures,” and “water security”; as though repeating these terms could in itself grant a state additional rights in a transboundary river. But words, no matter how sharp and undiplomatic they may be, cannot change the fact that Ethiopia is a sovereign state and that its natural resources located within its territory are part of its right to development. Ethiopia's Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa had previously stated that Ethiopia does not need permission from any country to develop its water resources, explaining that the country built the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam without obtaining permission from anyone and that it would continue developing other dams in its river basins when the needs arise. This is not mere political statement, but reflects a reality that has already been established on the ground. The dam has been completed and is producing energy; and Ethiopia has transformed from a country that faced major electricity-generation deficit into a country expanding energy exports to its neighbors, while moving toward exploiting its enormous hydropower potential to provide electricity access for its people, support industrialization and development. The unbridled double standard One of the clearest paradoxes in the Egyptian discourse is Cairo's insistence on the need for consultation and approval by it before upstream countries establish projects, while Egypt itself proceeded with the construction of the Aswan High Dam without the upstream countries having a comparable role in deciding the project. The Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy pointed to this double standard in its statement issued, stressing that Cairo treats its approval as a prerequisite for the Nile Basin countries to develop their water resources, despite the fact that Egypt built the Aswan High Dam without consulting the upstream countries. Here emerges the question that political discourse cannot evade: If Egypt has the right to develop its water resources within its territory without seeking permission from the upstream countries, why does not the same principle apply to Ethiopia and the other countries? Unbridled double standards do not create a fair system for managing transboundary rivers. Unjust legacy cannot govern the future A fundamental part of the Egyptian position has remained based on historical arrangements and agreements dating back to political circumstances entirely different from today’s African reality. Ethiopia was not a party to the 1959 Agreement, nor did the other upstream countries participate in shaping a system that sought to determine the future of Nile waters without their participation. Therefore, attempting to present those arrangements as a definitive basis for the rights of all basin countries ignores a fundamental fact: A state that was not a party to an agreement cannot, with the passage of time, become bound by it merely because another state insists on it. Africa has changed politically, demographically, and economically. The needs for electricity, food, and water have multiplied, new regional integration projects have emerged, and the upstream countries have become more capable of developing their natural resources. Therefore, reproducing past arrangements as the only solution for the future is not cooperation. It is an attempt to preserve an unjust legacy despite the changing circumstances that produced it. Ethiopia maintains that transboundary rivers should be bridges for cooperation, development, and integration, not tools for excluding upstream countries or imposing restrictions on their right to development. In January 2026, Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa affirmed that Ethiopian transboundary rivers should be viewed as shared resources and opportunities for cooperation and green growth, stressing that the availability of water in Ethiopia could bring potential benefits to Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Egypt. This is the Ethiopian position: Water is not the exclusive property of Ethiopia, but neither is it the exclusive property of Egypt. Ethiopia is not demanding a monopoly over the Nile; rather, it rejects turning participation in the river into a pretext for depriving it of the use of its resources. The difference between the two positions is fundamental. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: A counter-hegemonic project The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is no longer a project that can be influenced by political statements or Egypt’s media-worn diplomatic warnings. It has become a developmental and strategic reality. Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa said that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam contributed to doubling Ethiopia’s electricity-generation capacity to about 9.6 gigawatts, and has also become a catalyst for electricity interconnection and regional economic cooperation. He also explained that Ethiopia exports electricity to Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, and seeks to expand its electricity interconnection network with other countries. Thus, the project that Egyptian discourse attempted for years to portray as a source of threat has, in reality, become part of a broader transformation in Africa’s energy system. More importantly, Ethiopia does not view its water resources as a means of exercising influence over others, but as a foundation for overcoming energy poverty and achieving industrialization and economic growth. Egypt's problem is not however only about the GERD. For those who read between the lines, the underlying desire of the country has been repeatedly expressed by its official statements. Cairo is never prepared to accept Ethiopia as a strong developing country capable of investing in its natural resources without waiting for external approval. But Ethiopia has already demonstrated that it is capable and determined to develop its resources without any one's permission. Accepting this reality and mutually developing the region is the right answer. In August, the Ethiopian Water and Energy Minister affirmed that his country would continue developing its water resources and would build other dams when necessary. The minister also stressed that Ethiopia’s future is closely linked to the Abay River and the Red Sea, and that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam represents a transformative project that has changed the country’s position in the fields of energy, development, and regional integration. Thus, betting that strong political statements can return Ethiopia to a stage of hesitation or waiting is a bet on a reality that no longer exists. Ethiopia has repeatedly declared that transboundary rivers should be drivers of cooperation and shared prosperity, while at the same time rejecting any concept of water hegemony that deprives upstream countries of their sovereign rights. This is the position reaffirmed by the Ministry of Water and Energy. Consistent with this principle, Ethiopia continues to build its capabilities, continues to generate electricity and export energy, and continues to invest in its water resources. It also continues to work on watershed rehabilitation, afforestation, environmental conservation, and strengthening the sustainability of the Abay Basin, a point highlighted by the Ministry of Water and Energy in its latest statement. Ethiopia is not going back Repeated Egyptian statements will not change this course, nor will sharp rhetoric grant Cairo authority that neither law nor reality has given it. Past agreements will not turn back the clock, and they will not make Ethiopia relinquish its right to use its natural resources. Rather, the continuation of this discourse may produce the opposite result: Exposing the depth of a mentality that still views Ethiopian development as a threat instead of seeing it as an opportunity for African cooperation. Hence, the time has come for Egypt to deal with the Nile as a shared African basin, not a sphere of unilateral influence. The time has also come to recognize that Ethiopia is not a country waiting for permission to decide its future. The Nile will not be a tool of domination and Ethiopian development will not stop because of political rhetoric, no matter how loudly it is expressed. The reality of the 21st century imposes a different rule. Mutual respect instead of guardianship, cooperation instead of hegemony, and shared development instead of exclusion. This is not merely an Ethiopian vision. It is the only path capable of moving the Nile Basin from a legacy of conflict into a space of African integration.

By staff writer Sept. 23, 2026 (ENA) For years, the Federal Government of Ethiopia has demonstrated a clear and consistent commitment to peace, dialogue, and national stability. Even in moments of grave provocation, it has repeatedly chosen restraint over revenge, negotiation over escalation, and reconstruction over retaliation. This posture has not been accidental. It reflects a deep responsibility to the Ethiopian people, a recognition of the terrible cost of war, and an enduring belief that political differences should be settled through dialogue rather than destruction. Yet, despite this sustained effort, the TPLF has repeatedly shown an unwillingness to abandon antagonism, suspicion, and confrontation. Time and again, it has acted in ways that have deepened political division, threatened regional peace, and endangered the very people it claims to represent. The roots of the current crisis did not emerge overnight. They were fed over decades by a political culture that normalized distrust toward the central government and made confrontation appear to be a strategy rather than a failure. Even after Ethiopia entered a new political phase, the TPLF reacted not with sober reflection, but with resistance and resentment. The change in national leadership, and the public warmth shown to the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Tigray, appeared to unsettle a group that had long been accustomed to dominating political life. Rather than adapting to the country’s evolving political reality, it allegedly worked to obstruct reform, resist the formation of a broader political order, and undermine the very process that was intended to unify the country’s governing institutions. Emerging as a unifying national leader, Prime Minister Abiy traveled to the Tigray region initially, where he received an overwhelming welcome from the people. The enthusiasm and public reception were unprecedented, reflecting a strong sense of hope and acceptance in that part of the country. Unfortunately, the TPLF reacted with discomfort and quickly turned to hostile rhetoric, seeking to distance the people of Tigray from the national reconciliation narrative by fueling resentment. This belligerent group is now at the eleventh hour for another round of destruction. The banned TPLF has once again been portrayed as a Trojan horse for anti-Ethiopian forces. Let us count the record of the group since it entered Ethiopia’s political landscape. When efforts were made to merge the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its allied parties into a broader political framework, the TPLF reportedly opposed the initiative at every stage. Even after it became clear that the country was moving in a new direction, it refused to participate constructively in the Prosperity Party project and instead positioned itself outside the national consensus. The result was not principled disagreement, but a deliberate widening of political distance. In the process, it alienated itself from national institutions and severed its active role in federal political life, leaving Tigray politically isolated at a moment when unity was most needed. Worse still, while publicly speaking the language of rights and legitimacy, the group was allegedly preparing for confrontation. Reports of militarization, commandos training, and the strengthening of regional armed capability pointed to a dangerous direction. Rather than supporting peace, it appears to have chosen a path that placed military calculation above political responsibility. The tragedy that followed was not simply the result of battlefield developments; it was the outcome of a long chain of calculated decisions that pushed the country closer to conflict. The attack on the Northern Command remains one of the darkest and most painful chapters of this period. According to the federal position, the TPLF exploited the trust and affection that the people had toward the national army, used that trust to keep the Northern Command in place, and then turned against it in a shocking act of betrayal. This was followed by a campaign of misinformation designed to invert the truth and portray the aggressor as the victim. Such conduct did not merely fuel war; it wounded national trust and inflicted deep harm on Ethiopia’s social and political fabric. Even after the outbreak of war, the federal government continued to pursue peace. It called on elders, religious leaders, and all responsible voices to intervene. It gave opportunities for dialogue, restraint, and de-escalation. Yet the TPLF, according to the federal narrative, mocked these appeals and pressed ahead with war rhetoric, treating conflict as an instrument of power. It dragged young people into violence, placing them in the front lines of a struggle that could have been avoided. It also widened the war by attacking across borders, deepening the suffering of the region and pulling neighboring forces into an already devastating conflict. Despite all this, the federal government still did not abandon its responsibility to seek peace. The Pretoria peace agreement was a turning point that ended the war in Northern Ethiopia and offered a chance for recovery. Even then, the federal government chose magnanimity. It supported the restoration of services, allocated substantial resources for reconstruction, and worked to stabilize Tigray. It extended help through federal institutions, regional administrations, and development partners, showing once again that its priority was not punishment, but national healing. If the goal had been revenge, the outcome could have been very different. Instead, the government chose restraint, allowing the people of Tigray the space to recover and reflect. Yet the promise of peace was repeatedly weakened by conduct attributed to the TPLF itself. Instead of fully embracing disarmament and political normalization, it allegedly engaged in concealment, obstruction, and diversion. The implementation of the agreement was complicated by continued interference, including the manipulation of aid, the obstruction of movement, and the persistence of illicit practices that harmed ordinary civilians. Rather than using the peace process to rebuild trust, it appears to have treated it as a pause, a tactical opportunity to regroup rather than a genuine path toward reconciliation. The federal government, meanwhile, continued to act with unusual patience. It refrained from deploying forces in major locations in Tigray even when it had legal and practical grounds to do so. It respected the sensitivities of the moment, accepted political criticism, and chose to preserve peace even when it was not being fully reciprocated. This was not weakness; it was statesmanship. It reflected a deliberate effort to prevent renewed civilian suffering and to keep the country from sliding back into full-scale war. Today, the greatest burden falls not only on the federal state, but also on the people of Tigray themselves. Parents, youth, elders, and intellectuals cannot remain silent while history threatens to repeat itself. No political force should be allowed to sacrifice another generation in the name of power, grievance, or revenge. The youth of Tigray deserve education, work, dignity, and hope, not to be used as instruments in another cycle of destruction. Parents must raise their voices against those who turn the lives of their children into fuel for war. Community leaders and elites must choose responsibility over silence, truth over fear, and peace over factional loyalty. Ethiopia has paid too high a price for war. What the country needs now is not another round of bloodshed, but a shared commitment to stability, accountability, and reconstruction. The federal government has shown patience, made concessions, and opened doors to peace more than once. If peace is to hold, every actor must now choose it honestly. The people of Tigray, like all Ethiopians, deserve a future built on development and dignity. Those who continue to gamble with that future must be told clearly: enough is enough.

Why There Can Be No Lasting Red Sea Stability Without Ethiopia By Yordanos D.   Sept. 22, 2026 (ENA) The Red Sea is no longer merely a maritime corridor. It has become one of the world’s most exposed geopolitical fault lines—and the latest crisis around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is making one reality increasingly difficult to ignore: the security of the Red Sea cannot be separated from the security of the Horn of Africa, and the security of the Horn cannot be meaningfully addressed while Ethiopia remains on the margins of maritime decision-making. On September 15, 2026, UN Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari told the Security Council that the situation around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait had become increasingly volatile as fighting intensified along Yemen’s western coast and Houthi forces advanced toward the strategic waterway. He called for restraint, dialogue and the restoration and respect of navigational rights and freedoms under international law. The warning was not about Yemen alone. The Bab el-Mandeb is the narrow maritime gateway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Any sustained disruption there can ripple through shipping, insurance, energy markets, food supplies and global supply chains. The consequences do not stop at the shores of Yemen or the countries bordering the Red Sea. They can reach factories in Asia, markets in Europe and consumers thousands of kilometres away. And sitting directly across the African side of this strategic equation is Ethiopia. For more than three decades, Ethiopia has been landlocked following Eritrea’s independence in 1993. Yet geography has never made Ethiopia separate from the Red Sea. Quite the opposite: Ethiopia’s history, economy, security and diplomacy have remained deeply intertwined with the maritime corridor. Today, the dependence is brutally practical. Ethiopia’s international trade relies heavily on the Djibouti corridor, meaning that instability affecting Red Sea shipping, ports, insurance or maritime routes can quickly become an economic concern inside Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s own Institute of Foreign Affairs has described this exposure as a strategic vulnerability arising from the country’s dependence on a maritime corridor whose security is largely shaped beyond its direct institutional control. That reality should change the way the world understands Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations. Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable access to the sea is too often reduced to a territorial or political dispute. That is an incomplete reading of the issue. At its core, Ethiopia is confronting a structural problem: a major African economy and one of the continent’s most populous states is deeply dependent on a maritime system in which it has limited direct access and limited influence over the security architecture. That is not simply an Ethiopian problem. It is a regional problem. It is also becoming a global problem. The Red Sea Cannot Be Secured From Offshore The latest crisis around Bab el-Mandeb exposes the weakness of treating Red Sea security as a matter primarily for naval powers operating from outside the region. Warships can protect vessels. Military deployments can deter attacks. International missions can escort commercial shipping. But no naval fleet, however powerful, can by itself resolve the political, economic and institutional vulnerabilities that make the Red Sea susceptible to recurring instability. The UN itself has emphasized that protecting freedom of navigation must go together with preventing further escalation in Yemen and pursuing a political solution. That means maritime security cannot be divorced from regional diplomacy. And regional diplomacy cannot be divorced from the countries whose economies and security are directly exposed to the Red Sea. Ethiopia is one of those countries. Indeed, the regional stakes are now being recognized institutionally. On September 15, the IGAD Council of Ministers identified the safety and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as core regional peace, security and development priorities. It directed the IGAD Secretariat to strengthen regional maritime governance, cooperation and coordination in response to changing geopolitical and security dynamics. That decision carries an important message: Red Sea security is no longer a distant maritime issue. It is a Horn of Africa security issue. And if it is a Horn issue, Ethiopia cannot be treated as an afterthought. Ethiopia Is Not Asking to Be a Spectator Ethiopia’s argument for maritime access should therefore be understood against this wider strategic background. A country of Ethiopia’s economic and demographic weight cannot indefinitely remain almost entirely dependent on a single external maritime corridor while the security of that corridor is vulnerable to conflicts, geopolitical rivalries and disruptions beyond its control. That does not mean that Ethiopia is entitled to disregard the sovereignty of coastal states. Quite the contrary. The strongest case for Ethiopia’s maritime future is one based on negotiation, mutual benefit, international law and respect for the sovereignty of neighboring countries. Ethiopian has repeatedly framed maritime access in precisely these terms. Recent discussions have linked access to the sea with economic development, national security, regional integration and diplomatic cooperation, while emphasizing peaceful dialogue and mutually beneficial arrangements. This distinction matters. Ethiopia does not need confrontation to establish a maritime role. It needs a sustainable arrangement that aligns Ethiopian economic interests with the interests of coastal states. Such an arrangement could transform maritime access from a source of regional anxiety into an engine of regional interdependence. From Landlocked Vulnerability to Regional Stakeholder There is another dimension that deserves far greater international attention. If Ethiopia secures reliable sea access through a negotiated arrangement, it would not simply gain another route for imports and exports. It would acquire a stronger economic and institutional stake in the security of the maritime corridor itself. That could change the strategic equation. A country whose trade, infrastructure and economic future are directly connected to a maritime corridor has powerful reasons to protect that corridor. Ethiopia could contribute to maritime information-sharing, port security, search and rescue, emergency preparedness, anti-trafficking efforts, customs cooperation and the prevention of organized maritime crime. The foundations for such engagement are already emerging. In August 2026, the International Maritime Organization supported a workshop in Addis Ababa aimed at developing a roadmap for a National Maritime Information Sharing Centre, designed to strengthen coordination among Ethiopia’s maritime institutions and contribute to regional maritime security under the Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah Amendment. This is important because maritime security is not synonymous with military power. It is also about information. It is about institutions. It is about ports, customs, coast guards, shipping authorities, intelligence services, emergency response and civilian maritime governance. In other words, Ethiopia can become part of the solution without turning the Red Sea into another theatre of military competition. Addis Ababa Has Something Others Cannot Easily Replicate Ethiopia also possesses a diplomatic asset that should not be underestimated: Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian capital hosts the African Union and remains one of the continent’s principal diplomatic centers. Ethiopia is a member of IGAD and has decades of experience in African peace and security initiatives. This gives Ethiopia potential diplomatic channels extending beyond the immediate Red Sea littoral. The country maintains relationships across Africa, the Gulf and the broader Middle East. Its diplomatic position can therefore provide opportunities for dialogue among actors whose interests frequently collide. This does not mean Ethiopia should become a party to every conflict surrounding the Red Sea. It means Ethiopia has an interest—and potentially a role—in defending principles that should concern every maritime state: freedom of navigation, protection of civilian shipping, respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Dangerous Illusion of a Red Sea Without Ethiopia There is a persistent strategic contradiction in the way the region is sometimes approached. External powers recognize the enormous importance of the Red Sea. Naval forces are deployed. Military bases expand. International missions patrol the waters. Governments warn about threats to shipping. Yet the countries whose economies and security are most directly tied to the Horn of Africa are not always placed at the center of the security conversation. That approach is unsustainable. The Red Sea cannot be permanently stabilized by looking only northward toward the Middle East or outward toward global powers. Its African dimension is equally fundamental. The security problems on one side of Bab el-Mandeb inevitably interact with those on the other. Conflict in Yemen, instability in Sudan, terrorism, trafficking, piracy, arms smuggling and organized crime can reinforce one another across maritime and land borders. Recent UN discussions have explicitly linked the instability around Bab el-Mandeb to wider threats affecting international shipping and the Horn of Africa. The lesson is straightforward: the Red Sea is one security space, even when political borders divide it. Connectivity Can Become a Peace Strategy Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions should therefore be connected to a broader regional economic vision. Ports should not merely be places where ships load and unload. They can become gateways connecting inland economies with coastal markets. Roads, railways, logistics centers, digital customs systems and trade corridors can turn maritime access into regional economic integration. For Ethiopia, diversification of maritime routes would not necessarily mean abandoning its existing economic relationship with Djibouti. It could complement it. More routes can mean greater resilience. More partnerships can mean greater economic interdependence. And greater interdependence can create additional incentives for governments to protect infrastructure, trade corridors and regional stability. Connectivity cannot guarantee peace. But economic isolation rarely creates durable regional interdependence. A more interconnected Horn of Africa would give countries more to lose from conflict—and more to gain from cooperation. The Red Sea Needs African Ownership The deeper question, therefore, is not whether Ethiopia should be allowed to have a role in the Red Sea. The more consequential question is whether the region can realistically build lasting maritime stability while excluding one of Africa’s largest economies and most influential diplomatic centers from the strategic architecture surrounding that sea. The answer is increasingly difficult to justify. Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations should not be framed as a demand for confrontation with coastal states. They should be framed as part of a broader African agenda for connectivity, economic resilience and collective security. That requires diplomacy, not brinkmanship what Ethiopia is practically pursuing. It requires negotiated arrangements, not unilateral action. It requires regional institutions, not another contest among external powers. And above all, it requires recognition that the security of the Red Sea is a shared responsibility. A Strategic Opportunity Hidden Inside a Crisis The present crisis around Bab el-Mandeb is a warning—but it is also an opportunity. It demonstrates how quickly instability in a narrow waterway can become a global economic problem. It also demonstrates the limits of security arrangements that rely too heavily on military responses while neglecting regional institutions and political solutions. For Ethiopia, the crisis underscores the cost of remaining economically exposed to a maritime system over which it has limited direct influence. But it also creates an opportunity to articulate a more ambitious vision. Ethiopia can pursue maritime access while simultaneously strengthening regional maritime governance. It can deepen cooperation with coastal states while maintaining respect for their sovereignty. It can work through IGAD, the African Union and the United Nations. It can invest in maritime information systems, logistics, emergency response and security institutions. And it can use its diplomatic position in Addis Ababa to promote dialogue rather than deepen confrontation. The objective should be to institutionalize Ethiopia’s legitimate economic and security stake in the Red Sea through peaceful, lawful and mutually beneficial arrangements. No Durable Red Sea Security Without Ethiopia The future of the Red Sea will ultimately be decided not by geography alone, but by whether the states surrounding and depending on it can build a system capable of managing their shared vulnerabilities. Ethiopia is too large to be economically detached from that system. Too geographically connected to be strategically ignored. Too diplomatically significant to be treated merely as an inland observer. And too deeply exposed to Red Sea disruptions to remain permanently outside meaningful maritime security arrangements. The current crisis has made one fact unmistakable: what happens around Bab el-Mandeb does not remain around Bab el-Mandeb. It reaches the Horn of Africa. It reaches Ethiopia and global trade. And if the region genuinely wants a durable Red Sea security architecture, Ethiopia cannot simply be a country affected by decisions made about the sea. It must have a seat at the table where those decisions are shaped. Because lasting stability will not come from securing the water while ignoring the land, nor from protecting shipping while overlooking the economies and societies that depend on it. Thus, the Red Sea’s future is inseparable from the Horn of Africa’s future—and the Horn’s future cannot be designed without Ethiopia.

Addis Ababa, September 22, 2026 (ENA) — The Policy Studies Institute (PSI) has stressed the need for coordinated institutional, technological and human-capital efforts to accelerate smart city development and improve the competitiveness of Ethiopian cities, recommending the establishment of a dedicated institution with clear authority for smart city development. The study presented at a workshop under the theme “Smart City Development Practice in Ethiopia: From Smart Governance, Mobility and Environment Dimension” today, recommended the establishment of a dedicated institution with clear authority for smart city development, integrating institutional work flows and technology-based transport services, and developing competitive technological infrastructure and structured information management systems. It also recommended smart city management that provides convenient, safe and environmentally sustainable urban spaces, as well as continuous investment in human resource development. The study conducted by PSI’s Policy Research Center for Industry, Urban, and Infrastructure Development looked at how Ethiopian cities can improve governance, mobility and environmental management through technology and stronger institutional systems. It also identified challenges in current urban development practices and proposes measures to support the development of modern, efficient and sustainable cities. Opening the workshop, PSI Deputy Director-General Major General Ahmed Hamza said Ethiopia needs to make better use of its human, financial and technological resources and coordinate efforts in developing smart cities. “Considering our country’s limited resources, focusing on synchronized efforts toward smart city development and optimizing human capital, financial management, and technology adoption systems are vital for the growth and competitiveness of Ethiopian cities,” he noted. According to him, Ethiopia’s urban development practices need to be modernized through technology transfer, human resource development, sector prioritization and improved implementation capacity. “Building smart cities demands reviewing and restructuring existing sector institutions,” Major General Ahmed said, stressing the need for harmonized legal frameworks, stronger data management and timely corrective action. The Policy Studies Institute (PSI) is a government research institution that conducts policy studies and research and develops policy and strategy recommendations to support national development. PSI's work is aligned with national development priorities, including the 10-Year Development Plan and Digital Ethiopia 2030. Established by the merger of the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) and the Policy Study and Research Center (PSRC) in November 2018, it has been conducting rigorous research and policy analysis that provide knowledge-based inputs to policy making and policy implementations, and disseminate research outputs and findings to the policy and research community, academia, the development community and other stakeholders.  

By staff writer Sept. 22, 2026 (ENA) As the world grapples with the challenges of water scarcity and sustainable development, Egypt's stance on these issues has raised eyebrows. Despite having vast underground water reserves that could last for centuries, even if rainfall in Ethiopia were to cease, Egypt continues to cry foul over the use of the Abay (Nile) River's waters. But is this concern genuinely about water scarcity, or is it a thinly veiled attempt to stifle the development of its neighboring countries? A History of Water Mismanagement Egypt's water management practices are, in fact, among the worst in the world. The country's agricultural sector, which consumes the lion's share of its water resources, is dominated by water-intensive crops like sugarcane and rice. These crops are not only unsustainable but also contribute to the country's water woes. It is ironic that while Egypt is willing to squander its water resources on these crops, it expects other countries, like Ethiopia, to forgo their own development and limit their water usage to a mere trickle.   A Double Standard Egypt's approach to water management is a classic case of "do as I say, not as I do." On one hand, the country is willing to waste its water resources on lavish projects, such as sprawling cities in the desert, while on the other hand, it expects Ethiopians to live in darkness, without even the basic amenities of electricity and clean water. This double standard is not only hypocritical but also a stark reminder of Egypt's proclivity for splashing water into the desert, while denying its neighbors the right to develop their own water resources. A Lack of Gratitude Despite Ethiopia's efforts to plant over 56 billion seedlings, a move that will not only help to reduce water evaporation from the Nile River but also contribute to the global fight against climate change, Egypt has chosen to respond with ingratitude. Instead of thanking Ethiopia for its environmental stewardship, Egypt has opted to destabilize the country, using every trick in the book to undermine its development. This twisted logic is a testament to Egypt's shortsightedness and its inability to see the bigger picture. A Neocolonial Mindset Egypt's behavior towards its neighbors, particularly Sudan, is a stark reminder of its neocolonial mindset. By treating Sudan as an appendage, Egypt is attempting to dismantle the country's sovereignty and reduce it to a mere vassal state. This approach is not only counterproductive but also a threat to regional stability and security. A Brinksmanship Strategy Egypt's ultimate goal is to ensure that no country on either side of the Red Sea thrives. This brinksmanship strategy is a recipe for disaster, as it will only serve to exacerbate tensions and create an environment of mistrust and hostility. By adopting this approach, Egypt is not only harming its neighbors but also undermining its own long-term interests.   In conclusion, Egypt's water woes are a self-inflicted wound, caused by its own mismanagement and hypocrisy. Instead of blaming its neighbors for its water scarcity, Egypt should take a long, hard look at its own practices and policies. By adopting a more sustainable and equitable approach to water management, Egypt can not only ensure its own water security but also contribute to the development and prosperity of its neighboring countries. Until then, Egypt's cries of water scarcity will remain nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to stifle the development of others, while it continues to waste its own water resources with impunity.

Addis Ababa, September 22, 2026 (ENA) —Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation recent statement suggesting that Ethiopians lack education is a manifestation of a crude colonial mentality that defines Cairo’s policy in its relations with African states, Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy underscored. Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Hani Sewilam, recent remarks are deeply regrettable, the ministry said today in a statement issued in response to Sewilam’s remarks. “The statement is a manifestation of a crude colonial mentality that defines Cairo’s policy in its relations with African states,” the said in its statement. For Cairo, its approval is a prerequisite for riparian countries of the Abay/Nile to develop their water resources. This is despite the fact that Egypt proceeded with the construction of the Aswan High Dam with no consultation with any upstream riparian state. The statement issued by Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy noted that inflammatory remarks by Egyptian officials and the double standards they espouse have no place in the context of basin wide cooperation. Ethiopia reaffirms its sovereign right to utilize its natural resources including Abbay River to meet the needs of its present and future generations, it added. It pointed out that Ethiopia has consistently maintained that transboundary rivers should drive cooperation, shared prosperity, and regional integration rather than monopolistic contention, and exclusion, rejecting any notion of hydro-imperialism that seeks to deny source countries their inherent rights as sovereign nations. While some continue to frame the Abay River primarily through the lens of security and zero-sum competition, Ethiopia has invested heavily in watershed rehabilitation, afforestation, and environmental conservation to strengthen the long-term sustainability of the basin. Ethiopia's approach stands in sharp contrast to the hostile narrative that has too often dominated official discourse in Cairo. It is time for Cairo to move from its obsolete policy and approach the matter with a 21st century outlook grounded in mutual respect and the enlightened long-term interests of all, the Ministry underscored, stressing to retire outdated hegemonic dreams and embrace the dawn of a new reality.

September 22, 2026 (ENA) Egypt stands out for its chronic mismanagement of water resources, despite contributing virtually nothing to the flow of the Abay (Nile)—a striking paradox at the heart of the Nile debate. For many hydropower analysts and transboundary water experts, water stored in Egypt’s downstream reservoirs suffers from high rates of evaporation due to the country’s hot desert climate. For Fekahmed Negash, Chairperson of the Advisory Team on Transboundary Water and GERD at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Water and Energy, this downstream nation’s vast reservoir lies in Egypt’s hot desert environment and is exposed to substantial evaporation losses. He estimated that the Aswan High Dam loses about 15 to 16 billion cubic meters of water annually through evaporation. Contrary to popular belief, this hard fact and the UN’s designation of Egypt as a water-scarce country, the nation possesses immense water potential that remains hugely misunderstood. Egypt has underground water enough for hundreds of years even if rain stops in Ethiopia for years. Egypt wastes water and has some of the worst practices in doing so. Egypt acts as if it has a swath of marshland and produces sugarcane and rice. What is appealing is that it wishes others not even to drink fresh water and produce cabbages for it to continue wasting water. Egypt wants Ethiopia to forgo its development and wallow in poverty for Egyptians to enjoy affluence. Egypt has proclivities of splashing water into a desert and creating sprawled cities, while it does not wish Ethiopians to have even light and stoves in their houses. Egypt doesn’t know how to be grateful. They pretend they are scared of water scarcity, but they don’t wish to thank Ethiopia for planning more than 50 billion seedlings. Rather, it leaves no stone unturned to destabilize Ethiopia—what a twist. Egypt believes it is a neighbor to Ethiopia because it considers Sudan just as an appendage. That’s why it is bent on dismantling Sudan using sellouts. Egypt doesn’t wish any country on both sides of the Red Sea to thrive—what a brinkmanship!

The signing of the Pretoria Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in November 2022 was widely hailed as a watershed moment for Ethiopia. After two years of devastating conflict in the northern part of the country, the agreement established a clear, lawful framework to restore constitutional order, demobilize combatants, deliver humanitarian relief, and rebuild shattered communities. Since the signing of the CoHA, the Ethiopian Federal Government has consistently demonstrated its dedication to the spirit and letter of the Pretoria Agreement. Federal institutions moved swiftly to reconnect Tigray to the national grid, restore banking and telecommunications, and reopen commercial air links to Mekelle. The government also facilitated unhindered humanitarian aid access across the region while allocating significant state resources toward rebuilding damaged infrastructure, schools, and healthcare facilities. Fulfilling a core diplomatic requirement, the Federal Parliament officially removed the TPLF from the national list of terrorist organizations to enable inclusive political engagement. Furthermore, in strict adherence to Article 10 of the agreement, the federal government facilitated the setup of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (IRA) to ensure local governance, service delivery, and transitional stability. Beyond initial diplomatic concessions, the Federal Government of Ethiopia backed its commitment to the Pretoria Accord with massive fiscal capital, allocating billions of Birr from the national treasury to finance the immediate reconstruction and socio-economic recovery of the Tigray region. Recognizing that peace cannot take root amid economic ruin, Addis Ababa prioritized funding to rebuild shattered health systems, reconstruct damaged schools, and repair critical transport, power, and telecommunications corridors—treating Tigray’s revitalization as a top national priority. These federal budget transfers, disbursed directly to fund public services, pay civil servants, and subsidize essential commodities, served as tangible proof of the state's determination to integrate Tigray back into the national fabric. Yet, this massive financial goodwill and capital investment have been met with profound bad faith from TPLF hardliners, who have diverted local resources, obstructed federal development projects, and funneled regional administrative funds toward covert re-militarization rather than the civilian welfare the money was meant to secure Rather than channeling its efforts into peaceful political competition and regional recovery, the TPLF leadership has actively undermined the governance framework envisioned at Pretoria. Behind this resistance lies a calculated objective: the hardline Debretsion Gebremichael-led faction seeks to reclaim the unbridled single-party hegemony it once wielded over Ethiopia. Reeling from its loss of federal dominance and resisting the constitutional order, the TPLF's core ambition is to manufacture regional instability, paralyze state institutions, and force a total renegotiation of the Pretoria Accord on terms that insulate its elite leadership from accountability. A central pillar of the peace deal was the establishment of an inclusive Interim Regional Administration, yet hardline factional leaders within the TPLF have systematically moved to dismantle it. By attempting to unilaterally oust IRA leadership, seize regional administrative bodies by force, and reject federal mandates extended to preserve regional stability, the group has shown an alarming disregard for lawful transitional governance. This systematic takeover replaces an inclusive, transitional public administration with single-party rule, directly violating the core principles of the Pretoria Agreement and stripping Tigrayan citizens of civilian-led, accountable governance. To achieve these disruptive ambitions, the TPLF hardliners have entered into unholy, opportunistic alignments with external spoilers and regional adversaries. Taking advantage of broader Horn of Africa geopolitical friction, the faction has cultivated tacit backing from foreign actors seeking to exploit Ethiopia’s internal vulnerabilities. Chief among these actors are the regimes in Cairo and Asmara, whose historic and strategic interests align with maintaining a fractured, vulnerable Ethiopian state. For the regime in Egypt, the motive is rooted in an existential paranoia over the Nile waters and the operational reality of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Cairo has long viewed any strong, unified, and economically sovereign Ethiopia as a direct threat to its centuries-old hydro-hegemony over the Abay River. Unable to halt the completion of the GERD through international diplomacy or legal coercion, Egypt’s intelligence and diplomatic apparatus has pivoted toward zero-sum encirclement. By funneling indirect backing, diplomatic cover, and operational logistical channels to dissident Ethiopian factions, Cairo seeks to keep Addis Ababa consumed by internal fires. For Egypt, an Ethiopia locked in civil strife is an Ethiopia incapable of projecting power, advancing downstream development, or asserting its sovereign rights over regional trade and maritime infrastructure. Eritrea’s totalitarian regime, led by Isaias Afwerki, operates under a parallel strategy driven by deeply rooted hostility toward Ethiopian regional dominance and a toxic political history with TPLF elites. Though Asmara and the TPLF fought a brutal war from 1998 to 2000, current tactical interests have forced an opportunistic convergence. As Ethiopia asserts its sovereign ambition to secure reliable access to the Red Sea, President Isaias views a consolidated, economically dynamic Ethiopia as a threat to his regime’s regional influence and maritime monopoly. Capitalizing on internal Ethio-Tigrayan political friction, Asmara has quietly opened channels with TPLF hardliners and other insurgent actors, stoking localized militarization to wrap Ethiopia in a web of perpetual border security crises. Together, Cairo and Asmara have turned the Horn of Africa into a theater of proxy warfare, leveraging the TPLF hardline faction as an instrumental lever to destabilize the nation from within. These external allies provide diplomatic cover, logistics, and material support to keep northern Ethiopia in a state of perpetual crisis. By acting as a proxy for regional forces hostile to Ethiopia’s economic self-determination and territorial integrity, the TPLF leadership is actively outsourcing the destabilization of its own homeland. The Pretoria Agreement explicitly mandated the complete Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Tigrayan armed forces, establishing that Ethiopia has only one unified national defense force. While the federal government created the national DDR framework, the TPLF has resisted full disarmament. Large contingents of combatants remain armed, active, and organized under regional command structures. Reports of re-armament, forced recruitment, and offensive troop movements near regional borders—coordinated with external elements—signal that the group is actively preparing for another round of war rather than choosing peace. Holding civilian populations hostage to the threat of renewed hostility severely jeopardizes regional security, stalls economic recovery, and prolongs human suffering across northern Ethiopia. The international community, including the African Union, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union, played a constructive role in bringing the parties to the negotiating table in 2022, and international partners must now step up enforcement to protect that investment in peace. International actors must clearly name and condemn actions that violate the CoHA, particularly the dismantling of the Interim Administration and refusals to complete disarmament. Support for transitional programs should be tied directly to measurable, verified progress in the DDR process, alongside unequivocal support for legitimate federal authority and legally recognized interim governance. Additionally, international aid agencies must ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches the civilian population directly without being diverted or hijacked by armed factions. A growing awareness among key international stakeholders reveals that the primary bottleneck to lasting peace in northern Ethiopia is no longer a lack of federal goodwill, but the deliberate subversion orchestrated by hardline TPLF factions and their external regional enablers. Recent diplomatic measures by the U.S. government—specifically targeted visa restrictions imposed under Section 212(a)(3)(C) against hardline TPLF figures and associated actors complicit in eroding the Pretoria Accord—mark a vital shift toward accountability. By directly penalizing those responsible for dismantling the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, delaying disarmament, and orchestrating illegal re-militarization, Washington has effectively validated the Ethiopian state's long-standing position: that recalcitrant internal elites and external spoilers, particularly those aligning with foreign interests in Asmara and Cairo, are the true perpetrators of volatility in the Horn of Africa. To protect the immense investment in peace, international partners must build upon these initial accountability steps and construct a systematic enforcement architecture. Diplomatic declarations must evolve into rigorous, conditional enforcement where developmental aid, transitional support, and international legitimacy are strictly contingent upon verifiable compliance with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) protocols. Furthermore, aid agencies and international monitors must audit humanitarian delivery mechanisms to prevent armed factions from hijacking relief supplies to fuel illicit mobilization. By unequivocally backing legitimate, constitutionally recognized interim governance and escalating targeted sanctions against both internal hardliners and external spoilers, the African Union, United Nations, United States, and European Union can ensure that the Pretoria Agreement remains a durable bridge to peace rather than a temporary pause in conflict. To secure a lasting peace in the Horn of Africa, the international community can no longer afford the dangerous posture of false equivalence. The Pretoria Agreement provided a clear, legal path toward national restoration, yet its fulfillment remains hostage to the revisionist ambitions of TPLF hardliners and the zero-sum geopolitical games of foreign spoilers in Cairo and Asmara. Allowing internal actors to dismantle lawful interim governance and re-militarize under the cover of foreign backing risks not only unraveling Ethiopia’s hard-won stability, but also igniting a wider regional conflagration. The global community—led by the AU, UN, US, and EU—must move decisively beyond passive rhetoric. By enforcing strict accountability, conditioning support on verified disarmament, and confronting foreign intervention, international stakeholders can neutralize these disruptive forces, protect the integrity of the Pretoria Accord, and ensure that Ethiopia’s sovereign trajectory remains defined by peace, unity, and economic progress.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopia’s President Taye Atske Selassie called for a fundamental shift in the global renewable-energy agenda—from simply expanding power generation to building the grids, storage, financing and productive systems needed to turn clean electricity into economic transformation. Addressing the “Delivering Electrify Now” High-Level Leaders Dialogue of the Global Renewables Summit in New York, President Taye said countries endowed with abundant renewable resources need stronger international support to convert their energy potential into reliable electricity access, industrial growth and inclusive prosperity. “Generation without grids, storage and robust utility capacity cannot drive economic transformation,” the President said, stressing that international financing must support the entire electricity value chain—from generation and transmission to distribution, storage and last-mile connections. The Global Renewables Summit, held during Climate Week NYC alongside the UN General Assembly, is bringing together political leaders, businesses, investors and international institutions to accelerate renewable-powered electrification and address the infrastructure and investment barriers slowing the energy transition.   President Taye said Ethiopia brings substantial renewable-energy potential to the global discussion, with more than 95 percent of its installed generation capacity coming from renewable sources. He highlighted the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and other renewable-energy investments as key foundations for expanding electricity access and powering the country’s industrialization. He outlined three interconnected priorities for Ethiopia: expanding and diversifying renewable generation, with installed capacity targeted to reach up to 14,000 MW by 2030 and non-hydro renewables accounting for at least 15 percent; using clean and affordable electricity to strengthen industrial competitiveness, including through industrial parks; and pursuing macroeconomic and energy-sector reforms to attract greater private investment, including increased private-sector participation in transmission and distribution. But the President emphasized that finance remains the critical link between renewable-energy potential and actual development. He called for more bankable projects supported by public resources and international partners, including the World Bank, African Development Bank and the European Union through Global Gateway. Particular attention, he said, should go to transmission infrastructure, substations, grid reinforcement, reconductoring and last-mile connections.   President Taye cited Ethiopia’s experience financing the GERD through domestic resources and broad public mobilization as an example of the importance of national ownership and commitment. At the same time, he stressed that international financial cooperation remains essential for developing countries seeking to build modern, reliable and interconnected electricity systems. He expressed appreciation for international support to Ethiopia’s power sector, including the European Union’s RISED programme, as well as assistance from the World Bank and African Development Bank in modernizing, rehabilitating and digitalizing electricity infrastructure. The President also warned that the global energy transition cannot deliver its full promise if renewable investment remains concentrated in a limited number of wealthy regions. For developing countries, he said, the ambition must go beyond generating renewable power: from energy potential to electricity access, from access to productive use, and from productive use to industrialization and job creation.   As Ethiopia prepares to host COP32 in Addis Ababa in 2027, President Taye said the country will work to help ensure that global climate and renewable-energy commitments translate into concrete implementation across Africa. His message comes as the international renewable-energy agenda increasingly focuses not only on expanding generation but also on scaling grids, storage and electrification to make clean power usable across economies.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) — Ethiopia’s pursuit of equitable access to the sea is an imperative agenda for the country’s economic growth, national security, regional stability and integration, House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR) member Ambassador Dina Mufti said. In an exclusive interview with ENA, Ambassador Dina said Ethiopia’s growing population and economy, coupled with evolving regional security dynamics, have made access to the sea an increasingly important national interest. He emphasized that Ethiopia is pursuing its quest for sea access through diplomatic means and seeks arrangements based on mutual benefit and respect for the interests and sovereignty of neighboring countries. According to Dina, Ethiopia’s interest in securing sea access is underpinned by historical, geographic, economic and security considerations. He noted that Ethiopia historically had access to the sea and used maritime routes for trade for many years, adding that the country’s loss of direct access to the sea has had significant economic and strategic implications. The ambassador also pointed to Ethiopia’s geographic proximity to the Red Sea as another factor underpinning its interest in securing access. He noted that some parts of Ethiopia are located relatively close to the Red Sea coastline and argued that the country has historical and legal grounds to pursue equitable access. Dina further explained that Ethiopia’s rapidly growing population and expanding economy are increasing the volume of international trade, thereby strengthening the need for diversified and reliable access to maritime routes. He said Ethiopia currently depends heavily on the Port of Djibouti for its maritime trade, noting that reliance on a single port can increase transportation costs, create logistical delays and expose the country’s trade to congestion and other disruptions. As Ethiopia’s imports and exports continue to expand, the diversification of port access has consequently become increasingly important, he added. Beyond economic considerations, Dina linked Ethiopia’s sea access agenda to regional peace and security, particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. He noted that the region continues to face security challenges, while piracy, human trafficking, arms and drug trafficking and other illicit activities pose risks to maritime security and international trade. According to the lawmaker, Ethiopia could make a meaningful contribution to addressing such challenges by strengthening its engagement in maritime affairs and maintaining the capacity to monitor developments that could affect its national interests and regional security. Ethiopia needs to be present in maritime areas in order to monitor developments at sea and better address issues that could affect the country, he added. Dina stressed that Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access is being advanced through diplomacy and is not intended to undermine the sovereignty or territorial integrity of neighboring countries. “Ethiopia is not interested in hurting or invading anyone,” Dina said, stressing that the country seeks sea access through a “win-win” approach. He further said Ethiopia’s economic prosperity and development could generate benefits for neighboring countries as well, given the close economic, social and security interdependence among countries of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s prosperity, growth and advancement would also be in the interest of neighboring countries, Dina said, underscoring the importance of cooperation and mutually beneficial regional integration.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) —Sudan’s warring parties should acknowledge that neither can secure an outright military victory and give negotiations a chance to end the conflict, Getachew Reda, adviser to the Ethiopian Prime Minister on East African affairs, said. Speaking to Pulse of Africa, Getachew said “Sudan deserves to be at peace,” warning that continued fighting is worsening displacement and humanitarian suffering. The war, which erupted in April 2023 between Sudan’s army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has devastated the country, driving millions from their homes, disrupting basic services and deepening a humanitarian crisis. The advisor said the best path forward would be for army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, to recognize that neither side was likely to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. As a result, Getachew said, millions of people have been forced to flee their homes and leave Sudan, as the conflict continues to deepen the country’s fragmentation. “Sudan has faced disintegration,” he said, pointing to the emergence of competing authorities and the division of control between the RSF and the Sudanese national army. “The best scenario is going to be for the two sides to realize that they cannot win an outright victory and to give negotiation a chance,” he said. Getachew said the conflict had also undermined what he described as a longstanding tradition of political accommodation in Sudan, where rival political figures had historically been able to coexist after changes of government. “You remove him from power. He removes you from power. But still, killing has hardly been the characteristic of the political class in Sudan,” he said. That tradition of political accommodation had been severely damaged by the current conflict, he said, describing the situation as “absolutely chaotic” and accusing both sides of contributing to the destruction of civilian areas and infrastructure. The war has also produced one of the world’s largest displacement crises. A UN report shows that since the conflict began, around 8.6 million people have been internally displaced, while about 19.5 million people are facing crisis levels of food insecurity. For Ethiopia, which shares a long border with Sudan, the conflict has wider implications, Getachew said, citing the influx of Sudanese refugees and the potential for instability in Sudan to affect Ethiopia. He warned that prolonged lawlessness could create opportunities for armed groups and other actors seeking to destabilize Ethiopia. “The elements that are given assignments to destabilize Ethiopia consider the lawlessness in Sudan a very classic environment for them to operate,” he said. Getachew also said Ethiopia should remain alert to the presence of what he described as anti-Ethiopian extremist elements within the broader Sudanese conflict. Despite those security concerns, he said Ethiopia’s interest was in seeing Sudan move toward a negotiated political settlement rather than a military victory by either side. He said any transition should ultimately be driven by civilians and smaller political forces, which he argued should come together to chart a future for Sudan. “Unfortunately, reason seems to be missing in action when it comes to the bigger players in the Sudanese conflict,” Getachew said. Since the war began in April 2023, IGAD, the African Union, the United Nations and other partners have pursued mediation efforts to end the conflict, but without a lasting breakthrough The mediators continue to stress that a sustainable solution must be Sudanese-led and owned by the Sudanese people. Despite these efforts, the war has continued and the humanitarian crisis has worsened. Last week, UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued a “mea culpa” (admission of fault) over the international community’s inadequate response, calling for greater attention to the suffering caused by the war.