Addis Ababa, September 23, 2026 (ENA) — Ambassador Zerihun Abebe, Director General for African Affairs at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has criticized recent statements by Egyptian officials over the Nile, describing them as reflective of outdated colonial attitudes that have no place in the modern diplomatic landscape. Speaking to ENA, Ambassador Zerihun particularly criticized Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam over remarks reportedly suggesting that Ethiopians need to be educated about international law governing the Nile River. Zerihun described the remarks as “very unfortunate, regrettable, and even laughable,” saying they reflect misunderstanding of Ethiopia’s position and its rights under international law. He said Ethiopia is well versed in the legal principles governing the use of transboundary water resources and has consistently based its position on established principles of international law. Regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the Director General said Ethiopia constructed the project in accordance with internationally recognized principles, including the equitable and reasonable utilization of shared water resources. He described the Egyptian position as a “confusion” and “caricature” of Ethiopia’s stance, arguing that the remarks reflect lingering 19th century mindset toward Africa and its nations. “Such remarks are a direct reflection of colonial sentiment, an attitude rooted in the 19th century, toward Africa and its nations,” Zerihun said. He stressed that Ethiopia’s sovereignty and what it considers its legitimate rights are recognized under international law, adding that the country would continue to defend its national interests. Zerihun also called for Nile basin relations to be guided by contemporary diplomatic principles and cooperation among riparian countries rather than imperialist or monopolistic approaches. “We are not living in an imperialist world,” he said. “It’s time for Egypt to make its way into the modern age of diplomacy.” The Director General reaffirmed Ethiopia’s stated commitment to regional integration, cooperation and the sustainable utilization of shared water resources. He said Ethiopia has demonstrated its willingness to engage with downstream countries and address their concerns regarding the GERD while pursuing what it considers its rights to equitable use of the Nile.

By Staff Writer Sept. 23, 2026 (ENA) No matter a government change or leadership in Egypt, one thing remains constant in the official Egyptian discourse regarding the Nile River, which is dealing with the resources of the basin countries from a perspective of guardianship and considering development in the upstream countries an issue that requires Cairo’s approval. However, this pathetic hydro-imperialist mentality is no longer capable of explaining the reality of the Nile today. Africa has changed and the regional system of the Nile Basin has changed, while the Egyptian discourse continues to use language belonging to a historical era that the continent moved beyond decades ago. As aptly put by the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy the recent statements by the Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation reflect a “crude colonial mentality” that characterizes Egypt’s policy toward African countries. This characterization was not prompted solely by the latest statements, as the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy had previously warned against the continuation of what it described as a mentality associated with the colonial era in dealing with the Nile issue, affirming that Ethiopia would not relinquish its right to use the river to meet the development needs of its people. The oft repeated official Egyptian discourse and the phrases used in reference to the Nile are “historical rights,” “all available measures,” and “water security”; as though repeating these terms could in itself grant a state additional rights in a transboundary river. But words, no matter how sharp and undiplomatic they may be, cannot change the fact that Ethiopia is a sovereign state and that its natural resources located within its territory are part of its right to development. Ethiopia's Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa had previously stated that Ethiopia does not need permission from any country to develop its water resources, explaining that the country built the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam without obtaining permission from anyone and that it would continue developing other dams in its river basins when the needs arise. This is not mere political statement, but reflects a reality that has already been established on the ground. The dam has been completed and is producing energy; and Ethiopia has transformed from a country that faced major electricity-generation deficit into a country expanding energy exports to its neighbors, while moving toward exploiting its enormous hydropower potential to provide electricity access for its people, support industrialization and development. The unbridled double standard One of the clearest paradoxes in the Egyptian discourse is Cairo's insistence on the need for consultation and approval by it before upstream countries establish projects, while Egypt itself proceeded with the construction of the Aswan High Dam without the upstream countries having a comparable role in deciding the project. The Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy pointed to this double standard in its statement issued, stressing that Cairo treats its approval as a prerequisite for the Nile Basin countries to develop their water resources, despite the fact that Egypt built the Aswan High Dam without consulting the upstream countries. Here emerges the question that political discourse cannot evade: If Egypt has the right to develop its water resources within its territory without seeking permission from the upstream countries, why does not the same principle apply to Ethiopia and the other countries? Unbridled double standards do not create a fair system for managing transboundary rivers. Unjust legacy cannot govern the future A fundamental part of the Egyptian position has remained based on historical arrangements and agreements dating back to political circumstances entirely different from today’s African reality. Ethiopia was not a party to the 1959 Agreement, nor did the other upstream countries participate in shaping a system that sought to determine the future of Nile waters without their participation. Therefore, attempting to present those arrangements as a definitive basis for the rights of all basin countries ignores a fundamental fact: A state that was not a party to an agreement cannot, with the passage of time, become bound by it merely because another state insists on it. Africa has changed politically, demographically, and economically. The needs for electricity, food, and water have multiplied, new regional integration projects have emerged, and the upstream countries have become more capable of developing their natural resources. Therefore, reproducing past arrangements as the only solution for the future is not cooperation. It is an attempt to preserve an unjust legacy despite the changing circumstances that produced it. Ethiopia maintains that transboundary rivers should be bridges for cooperation, development, and integration, not tools for excluding upstream countries or imposing restrictions on their right to development. In January 2026, Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa affirmed that Ethiopian transboundary rivers should be viewed as shared resources and opportunities for cooperation and green growth, stressing that the availability of water in Ethiopia could bring potential benefits to Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Egypt. This is the Ethiopian position: Water is not the exclusive property of Ethiopia, but neither is it the exclusive property of Egypt. Ethiopia is not demanding a monopoly over the Nile; rather, it rejects turning participation in the river into a pretext for depriving it of the use of its resources. The difference between the two positions is fundamental. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: A counter-hegemonic project The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is no longer a project that can be influenced by political statements or Egypt’s media-worn diplomatic warnings. It has become a developmental and strategic reality. Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa said that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam contributed to doubling Ethiopia’s electricity-generation capacity to about 9.6 gigawatts, and has also become a catalyst for electricity interconnection and regional economic cooperation. He also explained that Ethiopia exports electricity to Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, and seeks to expand its electricity interconnection network with other countries. Thus, the project that Egyptian discourse attempted for years to portray as a source of threat has, in reality, become part of a broader transformation in Africa’s energy system. More importantly, Ethiopia does not view its water resources as a means of exercising influence over others, but as a foundation for overcoming energy poverty and achieving industrialization and economic growth. Egypt's problem is not however only about the GERD. For those who read between the lines, the underlying desire of the country has been repeatedly expressed by its official statements. Cairo is never prepared to accept Ethiopia as a strong developing country capable of investing in its natural resources without waiting for external approval. But Ethiopia has already demonstrated that it is capable and determined to develop its resources without any one's permission. Accepting this reality and mutually developing the region is the right answer. In August, the Ethiopian Water and Energy Minister affirmed that his country would continue developing its water resources and would build other dams when necessary. The minister also stressed that Ethiopia’s future is closely linked to the Abay River and the Red Sea, and that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam represents a transformative project that has changed the country’s position in the fields of energy, development, and regional integration. Thus, betting that strong political statements can return Ethiopia to a stage of hesitation or waiting is a bet on a reality that no longer exists. Ethiopia has repeatedly declared that transboundary rivers should be drivers of cooperation and shared prosperity, while at the same time rejecting any concept of water hegemony that deprives upstream countries of their sovereign rights. This is the position reaffirmed by the Ministry of Water and Energy. Consistent with this principle, Ethiopia continues to build its capabilities, continues to generate electricity and export energy, and continues to invest in its water resources. It also continues to work on watershed rehabilitation, afforestation, environmental conservation, and strengthening the sustainability of the Abay Basin, a point highlighted by the Ministry of Water and Energy in its latest statement. Ethiopia is not going back Repeated Egyptian statements will not change this course, nor will sharp rhetoric grant Cairo authority that neither law nor reality has given it. Past agreements will not turn back the clock, and they will not make Ethiopia relinquish its right to use its natural resources. Rather, the continuation of this discourse may produce the opposite result: Exposing the depth of a mentality that still views Ethiopian development as a threat instead of seeing it as an opportunity for African cooperation. Hence, the time has come for Egypt to deal with the Nile as a shared African basin, not a sphere of unilateral influence. The time has also come to recognize that Ethiopia is not a country waiting for permission to decide its future. The Nile will not be a tool of domination and Ethiopian development will not stop because of political rhetoric, no matter how loudly it is expressed. The reality of the 21st century imposes a different rule. Mutual respect instead of guardianship, cooperation instead of hegemony, and shared development instead of exclusion. This is not merely an Ethiopian vision. It is the only path capable of moving the Nile Basin from a legacy of conflict into a space of African integration.

By staff writer Sept. 23, 2026 (ENA) For years, the Federal Government of Ethiopia has demonstrated a clear and consistent commitment to peace, dialogue, and national stability. Even in moments of grave provocation, it has repeatedly chosen restraint over revenge, negotiation over escalation, and reconstruction over retaliation. This posture has not been accidental. It reflects a deep responsibility to the Ethiopian people, a recognition of the terrible cost of war, and an enduring belief that political differences should be settled through dialogue rather than destruction. Yet, despite this sustained effort, the TPLF has repeatedly shown an unwillingness to abandon antagonism, suspicion, and confrontation. Time and again, it has acted in ways that have deepened political division, threatened regional peace, and endangered the very people it claims to represent. The roots of the current crisis did not emerge overnight. They were fed over decades by a political culture that normalized distrust toward the central government and made confrontation appear to be a strategy rather than a failure. Even after Ethiopia entered a new political phase, the TPLF reacted not with sober reflection, but with resistance and resentment. The change in national leadership, and the public warmth shown to the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Tigray, appeared to unsettle a group that had long been accustomed to dominating political life. Rather than adapting to the country’s evolving political reality, it allegedly worked to obstruct reform, resist the formation of a broader political order, and undermine the very process that was intended to unify the country’s governing institutions. Emerging as a unifying national leader, Prime Minister Abiy traveled to the Tigray region initially, where he received an overwhelming welcome from the people. The enthusiasm and public reception were unprecedented, reflecting a strong sense of hope and acceptance in that part of the country. Unfortunately, the TPLF reacted with discomfort and quickly turned to hostile rhetoric, seeking to distance the people of Tigray from the national reconciliation narrative by fueling resentment. This belligerent group is now at the eleventh hour for another round of destruction. The banned TPLF has once again been portrayed as a Trojan horse for anti-Ethiopian forces. Let us count the record of the group since it entered Ethiopia’s political landscape. When efforts were made to merge the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its allied parties into a broader political framework, the TPLF reportedly opposed the initiative at every stage. Even after it became clear that the country was moving in a new direction, it refused to participate constructively in the Prosperity Party project and instead positioned itself outside the national consensus. The result was not principled disagreement, but a deliberate widening of political distance. In the process, it alienated itself from national institutions and severed its active role in federal political life, leaving Tigray politically isolated at a moment when unity was most needed. Worse still, while publicly speaking the language of rights and legitimacy, the group was allegedly preparing for confrontation. Reports of militarization, commandos training, and the strengthening of regional armed capability pointed to a dangerous direction. Rather than supporting peace, it appears to have chosen a path that placed military calculation above political responsibility. The tragedy that followed was not simply the result of battlefield developments; it was the outcome of a long chain of calculated decisions that pushed the country closer to conflict. The attack on the Northern Command remains one of the darkest and most painful chapters of this period. According to the federal position, the TPLF exploited the trust and affection that the people had toward the national army, used that trust to keep the Northern Command in place, and then turned against it in a shocking act of betrayal. This was followed by a campaign of misinformation designed to invert the truth and portray the aggressor as the victim. Such conduct did not merely fuel war; it wounded national trust and inflicted deep harm on Ethiopia’s social and political fabric. Even after the outbreak of war, the federal government continued to pursue peace. It called on elders, religious leaders, and all responsible voices to intervene. It gave opportunities for dialogue, restraint, and de-escalation. Yet the TPLF, according to the federal narrative, mocked these appeals and pressed ahead with war rhetoric, treating conflict as an instrument of power. It dragged young people into violence, placing them in the front lines of a struggle that could have been avoided. It also widened the war by attacking across borders, deepening the suffering of the region and pulling neighboring forces into an already devastating conflict. Despite all this, the federal government still did not abandon its responsibility to seek peace. The Pretoria peace agreement was a turning point that ended the war in Northern Ethiopia and offered a chance for recovery. Even then, the federal government chose magnanimity. It supported the restoration of services, allocated substantial resources for reconstruction, and worked to stabilize Tigray. It extended help through federal institutions, regional administrations, and development partners, showing once again that its priority was not punishment, but national healing. If the goal had been revenge, the outcome could have been very different. Instead, the government chose restraint, allowing the people of Tigray the space to recover and reflect. Yet the promise of peace was repeatedly weakened by conduct attributed to the TPLF itself. Instead of fully embracing disarmament and political normalization, it allegedly engaged in concealment, obstruction, and diversion. The implementation of the agreement was complicated by continued interference, including the manipulation of aid, the obstruction of movement, and the persistence of illicit practices that harmed ordinary civilians. Rather than using the peace process to rebuild trust, it appears to have treated it as a pause, a tactical opportunity to regroup rather than a genuine path toward reconciliation. The federal government, meanwhile, continued to act with unusual patience. It refrained from deploying forces in major locations in Tigray even when it had legal and practical grounds to do so. It respected the sensitivities of the moment, accepted political criticism, and chose to preserve peace even when it was not being fully reciprocated. This was not weakness; it was statesmanship. It reflected a deliberate effort to prevent renewed civilian suffering and to keep the country from sliding back into full-scale war. Today, the greatest burden falls not only on the federal state, but also on the people of Tigray themselves. Parents, youth, elders, and intellectuals cannot remain silent while history threatens to repeat itself. No political force should be allowed to sacrifice another generation in the name of power, grievance, or revenge. The youth of Tigray deserve education, work, dignity, and hope, not to be used as instruments in another cycle of destruction. Parents must raise their voices against those who turn the lives of their children into fuel for war. Community leaders and elites must choose responsibility over silence, truth over fear, and peace over factional loyalty. Ethiopia has paid too high a price for war. What the country needs now is not another round of bloodshed, but a shared commitment to stability, accountability, and reconstruction. The federal government has shown patience, made concessions, and opened doors to peace more than once. If peace is to hold, every actor must now choose it honestly. The people of Tigray, like all Ethiopians, deserve a future built on development and dignity. Those who continue to gamble with that future must be told clearly: enough is enough.

Why There Can Be No Lasting Red Sea Stability Without Ethiopia By Yordanos D.   Sept. 22, 2026 (ENA) The Red Sea is no longer merely a maritime corridor. It has become one of the world’s most exposed geopolitical fault lines—and the latest crisis around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is making one reality increasingly difficult to ignore: the security of the Red Sea cannot be separated from the security of the Horn of Africa, and the security of the Horn cannot be meaningfully addressed while Ethiopia remains on the margins of maritime decision-making. On September 15, 2026, UN Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari told the Security Council that the situation around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait had become increasingly volatile as fighting intensified along Yemen’s western coast and Houthi forces advanced toward the strategic waterway. He called for restraint, dialogue and the restoration and respect of navigational rights and freedoms under international law. The warning was not about Yemen alone. The Bab el-Mandeb is the narrow maritime gateway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Any sustained disruption there can ripple through shipping, insurance, energy markets, food supplies and global supply chains. The consequences do not stop at the shores of Yemen or the countries bordering the Red Sea. They can reach factories in Asia, markets in Europe and consumers thousands of kilometres away. And sitting directly across the African side of this strategic equation is Ethiopia. For more than three decades, Ethiopia has been landlocked following Eritrea’s independence in 1993. Yet geography has never made Ethiopia separate from the Red Sea. Quite the opposite: Ethiopia’s history, economy, security and diplomacy have remained deeply intertwined with the maritime corridor. Today, the dependence is brutally practical. Ethiopia’s international trade relies heavily on the Djibouti corridor, meaning that instability affecting Red Sea shipping, ports, insurance or maritime routes can quickly become an economic concern inside Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s own Institute of Foreign Affairs has described this exposure as a strategic vulnerability arising from the country’s dependence on a maritime corridor whose security is largely shaped beyond its direct institutional control. That reality should change the way the world understands Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations. Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable access to the sea is too often reduced to a territorial or political dispute. That is an incomplete reading of the issue. At its core, Ethiopia is confronting a structural problem: a major African economy and one of the continent’s most populous states is deeply dependent on a maritime system in which it has limited direct access and limited influence over the security architecture. That is not simply an Ethiopian problem. It is a regional problem. It is also becoming a global problem. The Red Sea Cannot Be Secured From Offshore The latest crisis around Bab el-Mandeb exposes the weakness of treating Red Sea security as a matter primarily for naval powers operating from outside the region. Warships can protect vessels. Military deployments can deter attacks. International missions can escort commercial shipping. But no naval fleet, however powerful, can by itself resolve the political, economic and institutional vulnerabilities that make the Red Sea susceptible to recurring instability. The UN itself has emphasized that protecting freedom of navigation must go together with preventing further escalation in Yemen and pursuing a political solution. That means maritime security cannot be divorced from regional diplomacy. And regional diplomacy cannot be divorced from the countries whose economies and security are directly exposed to the Red Sea. Ethiopia is one of those countries. Indeed, the regional stakes are now being recognized institutionally. On September 15, the IGAD Council of Ministers identified the safety and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as core regional peace, security and development priorities. It directed the IGAD Secretariat to strengthen regional maritime governance, cooperation and coordination in response to changing geopolitical and security dynamics. That decision carries an important message: Red Sea security is no longer a distant maritime issue. It is a Horn of Africa security issue. And if it is a Horn issue, Ethiopia cannot be treated as an afterthought. Ethiopia Is Not Asking to Be a Spectator Ethiopia’s argument for maritime access should therefore be understood against this wider strategic background. A country of Ethiopia’s economic and demographic weight cannot indefinitely remain almost entirely dependent on a single external maritime corridor while the security of that corridor is vulnerable to conflicts, geopolitical rivalries and disruptions beyond its control. That does not mean that Ethiopia is entitled to disregard the sovereignty of coastal states. Quite the contrary. The strongest case for Ethiopia’s maritime future is one based on negotiation, mutual benefit, international law and respect for the sovereignty of neighboring countries. Ethiopian has repeatedly framed maritime access in precisely these terms. Recent discussions have linked access to the sea with economic development, national security, regional integration and diplomatic cooperation, while emphasizing peaceful dialogue and mutually beneficial arrangements. This distinction matters. Ethiopia does not need confrontation to establish a maritime role. It needs a sustainable arrangement that aligns Ethiopian economic interests with the interests of coastal states. Such an arrangement could transform maritime access from a source of regional anxiety into an engine of regional interdependence. From Landlocked Vulnerability to Regional Stakeholder There is another dimension that deserves far greater international attention. If Ethiopia secures reliable sea access through a negotiated arrangement, it would not simply gain another route for imports and exports. It would acquire a stronger economic and institutional stake in the security of the maritime corridor itself. That could change the strategic equation. A country whose trade, infrastructure and economic future are directly connected to a maritime corridor has powerful reasons to protect that corridor. Ethiopia could contribute to maritime information-sharing, port security, search and rescue, emergency preparedness, anti-trafficking efforts, customs cooperation and the prevention of organized maritime crime. The foundations for such engagement are already emerging. In August 2026, the International Maritime Organization supported a workshop in Addis Ababa aimed at developing a roadmap for a National Maritime Information Sharing Centre, designed to strengthen coordination among Ethiopia’s maritime institutions and contribute to regional maritime security under the Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah Amendment. This is important because maritime security is not synonymous with military power. It is also about information. It is about institutions. It is about ports, customs, coast guards, shipping authorities, intelligence services, emergency response and civilian maritime governance. In other words, Ethiopia can become part of the solution without turning the Red Sea into another theatre of military competition. Addis Ababa Has Something Others Cannot Easily Replicate Ethiopia also possesses a diplomatic asset that should not be underestimated: Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian capital hosts the African Union and remains one of the continent’s principal diplomatic centers. Ethiopia is a member of IGAD and has decades of experience in African peace and security initiatives. This gives Ethiopia potential diplomatic channels extending beyond the immediate Red Sea littoral. The country maintains relationships across Africa, the Gulf and the broader Middle East. Its diplomatic position can therefore provide opportunities for dialogue among actors whose interests frequently collide. This does not mean Ethiopia should become a party to every conflict surrounding the Red Sea. It means Ethiopia has an interest—and potentially a role—in defending principles that should concern every maritime state: freedom of navigation, protection of civilian shipping, respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Dangerous Illusion of a Red Sea Without Ethiopia There is a persistent strategic contradiction in the way the region is sometimes approached. External powers recognize the enormous importance of the Red Sea. Naval forces are deployed. Military bases expand. International missions patrol the waters. Governments warn about threats to shipping. Yet the countries whose economies and security are most directly tied to the Horn of Africa are not always placed at the center of the security conversation. That approach is unsustainable. The Red Sea cannot be permanently stabilized by looking only northward toward the Middle East or outward toward global powers. Its African dimension is equally fundamental. The security problems on one side of Bab el-Mandeb inevitably interact with those on the other. Conflict in Yemen, instability in Sudan, terrorism, trafficking, piracy, arms smuggling and organized crime can reinforce one another across maritime and land borders. Recent UN discussions have explicitly linked the instability around Bab el-Mandeb to wider threats affecting international shipping and the Horn of Africa. The lesson is straightforward: the Red Sea is one security space, even when political borders divide it. Connectivity Can Become a Peace Strategy Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions should therefore be connected to a broader regional economic vision. Ports should not merely be places where ships load and unload. They can become gateways connecting inland economies with coastal markets. Roads, railways, logistics centers, digital customs systems and trade corridors can turn maritime access into regional economic integration. For Ethiopia, diversification of maritime routes would not necessarily mean abandoning its existing economic relationship with Djibouti. It could complement it. More routes can mean greater resilience. More partnerships can mean greater economic interdependence. And greater interdependence can create additional incentives for governments to protect infrastructure, trade corridors and regional stability. Connectivity cannot guarantee peace. But economic isolation rarely creates durable regional interdependence. A more interconnected Horn of Africa would give countries more to lose from conflict—and more to gain from cooperation. The Red Sea Needs African Ownership The deeper question, therefore, is not whether Ethiopia should be allowed to have a role in the Red Sea. The more consequential question is whether the region can realistically build lasting maritime stability while excluding one of Africa’s largest economies and most influential diplomatic centers from the strategic architecture surrounding that sea. The answer is increasingly difficult to justify. Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations should not be framed as a demand for confrontation with coastal states. They should be framed as part of a broader African agenda for connectivity, economic resilience and collective security. That requires diplomacy, not brinkmanship what Ethiopia is practically pursuing. It requires negotiated arrangements, not unilateral action. It requires regional institutions, not another contest among external powers. And above all, it requires recognition that the security of the Red Sea is a shared responsibility. A Strategic Opportunity Hidden Inside a Crisis The present crisis around Bab el-Mandeb is a warning—but it is also an opportunity. It demonstrates how quickly instability in a narrow waterway can become a global economic problem. It also demonstrates the limits of security arrangements that rely too heavily on military responses while neglecting regional institutions and political solutions. For Ethiopia, the crisis underscores the cost of remaining economically exposed to a maritime system over which it has limited direct influence. But it also creates an opportunity to articulate a more ambitious vision. Ethiopia can pursue maritime access while simultaneously strengthening regional maritime governance. It can deepen cooperation with coastal states while maintaining respect for their sovereignty. It can work through IGAD, the African Union and the United Nations. It can invest in maritime information systems, logistics, emergency response and security institutions. And it can use its diplomatic position in Addis Ababa to promote dialogue rather than deepen confrontation. The objective should be to institutionalize Ethiopia’s legitimate economic and security stake in the Red Sea through peaceful, lawful and mutually beneficial arrangements. No Durable Red Sea Security Without Ethiopia The future of the Red Sea will ultimately be decided not by geography alone, but by whether the states surrounding and depending on it can build a system capable of managing their shared vulnerabilities. Ethiopia is too large to be economically detached from that system. Too geographically connected to be strategically ignored. Too diplomatically significant to be treated merely as an inland observer. And too deeply exposed to Red Sea disruptions to remain permanently outside meaningful maritime security arrangements. The current crisis has made one fact unmistakable: what happens around Bab el-Mandeb does not remain around Bab el-Mandeb. It reaches the Horn of Africa. It reaches Ethiopia and global trade. And if the region genuinely wants a durable Red Sea security architecture, Ethiopia cannot simply be a country affected by decisions made about the sea. It must have a seat at the table where those decisions are shaped. Because lasting stability will not come from securing the water while ignoring the land, nor from protecting shipping while overlooking the economies and societies that depend on it. Thus, the Red Sea’s future is inseparable from the Horn of Africa’s future—and the Horn’s future cannot be designed without Ethiopia.

Addis Ababa, September 22, 2026 (ENA) — The Policy Studies Institute (PSI) has stressed the need for coordinated institutional, technological and human-capital efforts to accelerate smart city development and improve the competitiveness of Ethiopian cities, recommending the establishment of a dedicated institution with clear authority for smart city development. The study presented at a workshop under the theme “Smart City Development Practice in Ethiopia: From Smart Governance, Mobility and Environment Dimension” today, recommended the establishment of a dedicated institution with clear authority for smart city development, integrating institutional work flows and technology-based transport services, and developing competitive technological infrastructure and structured information management systems. It also recommended smart city management that provides convenient, safe and environmentally sustainable urban spaces, as well as continuous investment in human resource development. The study conducted by PSI’s Policy Research Center for Industry, Urban, and Infrastructure Development looked at how Ethiopian cities can improve governance, mobility and environmental management through technology and stronger institutional systems. It also identified challenges in current urban development practices and proposes measures to support the development of modern, efficient and sustainable cities. Opening the workshop, PSI Deputy Director-General Major General Ahmed Hamza said Ethiopia needs to make better use of its human, financial and technological resources and coordinate efforts in developing smart cities. “Considering our country’s limited resources, focusing on synchronized efforts toward smart city development and optimizing human capital, financial management, and technology adoption systems are vital for the growth and competitiveness of Ethiopian cities,” he noted. According to him, Ethiopia’s urban development practices need to be modernized through technology transfer, human resource development, sector prioritization and improved implementation capacity. “Building smart cities demands reviewing and restructuring existing sector institutions,” Major General Ahmed said, stressing the need for harmonized legal frameworks, stronger data management and timely corrective action. The Policy Studies Institute (PSI) is a government research institution that conducts policy studies and research and develops policy and strategy recommendations to support national development. PSI's work is aligned with national development priorities, including the 10-Year Development Plan and Digital Ethiopia 2030. Established by the merger of the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) and the Policy Study and Research Center (PSRC) in November 2018, it has been conducting rigorous research and policy analysis that provide knowledge-based inputs to policy making and policy implementations, and disseminate research outputs and findings to the policy and research community, academia, the development community and other stakeholders.  

By staff writer Sept. 22, 2026 (ENA) As the world grapples with the challenges of water scarcity and sustainable development, Egypt's stance on these issues has raised eyebrows. Despite having vast underground water reserves that could last for centuries, even if rainfall in Ethiopia were to cease, Egypt continues to cry foul over the use of the Abay (Nile) River's waters. But is this concern genuinely about water scarcity, or is it a thinly veiled attempt to stifle the development of its neighboring countries? A History of Water Mismanagement Egypt's water management practices are, in fact, among the worst in the world. The country's agricultural sector, which consumes the lion's share of its water resources, is dominated by water-intensive crops like sugarcane and rice. These crops are not only unsustainable but also contribute to the country's water woes. It is ironic that while Egypt is willing to squander its water resources on these crops, it expects other countries, like Ethiopia, to forgo their own development and limit their water usage to a mere trickle.   A Double Standard Egypt's approach to water management is a classic case of "do as I say, not as I do." On one hand, the country is willing to waste its water resources on lavish projects, such as sprawling cities in the desert, while on the other hand, it expects Ethiopians to live in darkness, without even the basic amenities of electricity and clean water. This double standard is not only hypocritical but also a stark reminder of Egypt's proclivity for splashing water into the desert, while denying its neighbors the right to develop their own water resources. A Lack of Gratitude Despite Ethiopia's efforts to plant over 56 billion seedlings, a move that will not only help to reduce water evaporation from the Nile River but also contribute to the global fight against climate change, Egypt has chosen to respond with ingratitude. Instead of thanking Ethiopia for its environmental stewardship, Egypt has opted to destabilize the country, using every trick in the book to undermine its development. This twisted logic is a testament to Egypt's shortsightedness and its inability to see the bigger picture. A Neocolonial Mindset Egypt's behavior towards its neighbors, particularly Sudan, is a stark reminder of its neocolonial mindset. By treating Sudan as an appendage, Egypt is attempting to dismantle the country's sovereignty and reduce it to a mere vassal state. This approach is not only counterproductive but also a threat to regional stability and security. A Brinksmanship Strategy Egypt's ultimate goal is to ensure that no country on either side of the Red Sea thrives. This brinksmanship strategy is a recipe for disaster, as it will only serve to exacerbate tensions and create an environment of mistrust and hostility. By adopting this approach, Egypt is not only harming its neighbors but also undermining its own long-term interests.   In conclusion, Egypt's water woes are a self-inflicted wound, caused by its own mismanagement and hypocrisy. Instead of blaming its neighbors for its water scarcity, Egypt should take a long, hard look at its own practices and policies. By adopting a more sustainable and equitable approach to water management, Egypt can not only ensure its own water security but also contribute to the development and prosperity of its neighboring countries. Until then, Egypt's cries of water scarcity will remain nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to stifle the development of others, while it continues to waste its own water resources with impunity.

Addis Ababa, September 22, 2026 (ENA) —Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation recent statement suggesting that Ethiopians lack education is a manifestation of a crude colonial mentality that defines Cairo’s policy in its relations with African states, Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy underscored. Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Hani Sewilam, recent remarks are deeply regrettable, the ministry said today in a statement issued in response to Sewilam’s remarks. “The statement is a manifestation of a crude colonial mentality that defines Cairo’s policy in its relations with African states,” the said in its statement. For Cairo, its approval is a prerequisite for riparian countries of the Abay/Nile to develop their water resources. This is despite the fact that Egypt proceeded with the construction of the Aswan High Dam with no consultation with any upstream riparian state. The statement issued by Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy noted that inflammatory remarks by Egyptian officials and the double standards they espouse have no place in the context of basin wide cooperation. Ethiopia reaffirms its sovereign right to utilize its natural resources including Abbay River to meet the needs of its present and future generations, it added. It pointed out that Ethiopia has consistently maintained that transboundary rivers should drive cooperation, shared prosperity, and regional integration rather than monopolistic contention, and exclusion, rejecting any notion of hydro-imperialism that seeks to deny source countries their inherent rights as sovereign nations. While some continue to frame the Abay River primarily through the lens of security and zero-sum competition, Ethiopia has invested heavily in watershed rehabilitation, afforestation, and environmental conservation to strengthen the long-term sustainability of the basin. Ethiopia's approach stands in sharp contrast to the hostile narrative that has too often dominated official discourse in Cairo. It is time for Cairo to move from its obsolete policy and approach the matter with a 21st century outlook grounded in mutual respect and the enlightened long-term interests of all, the Ministry underscored, stressing to retire outdated hegemonic dreams and embrace the dawn of a new reality.

September 22, 2026 (ENA) Egypt stands out for its chronic mismanagement of water resources, despite contributing virtually nothing to the flow of the Abay (Nile)—a striking paradox at the heart of the Nile debate. For many hydropower analysts and transboundary water experts, water stored in Egypt’s downstream reservoirs suffers from high rates of evaporation due to the country’s hot desert climate. For Fekahmed Negash, Chairperson of the Advisory Team on Transboundary Water and GERD at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Water and Energy, this downstream nation’s vast reservoir lies in Egypt’s hot desert environment and is exposed to substantial evaporation losses. He estimated that the Aswan High Dam loses about 15 to 16 billion cubic meters of water annually through evaporation. Contrary to popular belief, this hard fact and the UN’s designation of Egypt as a water-scarce country, the nation possesses immense water potential that remains hugely misunderstood. Egypt has underground water enough for hundreds of years even if rain stops in Ethiopia for years. Egypt wastes water and has some of the worst practices in doing so. Egypt acts as if it has a swath of marshland and produces sugarcane and rice. What is appealing is that it wishes others not even to drink fresh water and produce cabbages for it to continue wasting water. Egypt wants Ethiopia to forgo its development and wallow in poverty for Egyptians to enjoy affluence. Egypt has proclivities of splashing water into a desert and creating sprawled cities, while it does not wish Ethiopians to have even light and stoves in their houses. Egypt doesn’t know how to be grateful. They pretend they are scared of water scarcity, but they don’t wish to thank Ethiopia for planning more than 50 billion seedlings. Rather, it leaves no stone unturned to destabilize Ethiopia—what a twist. Egypt believes it is a neighbor to Ethiopia because it considers Sudan just as an appendage. That’s why it is bent on dismantling Sudan using sellouts. Egypt doesn’t wish any country on both sides of the Red Sea to thrive—what a brinkmanship!

The signing of the Pretoria Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in November 2022 was widely hailed as a watershed moment for Ethiopia. After two years of devastating conflict in the northern part of the country, the agreement established a clear, lawful framework to restore constitutional order, demobilize combatants, deliver humanitarian relief, and rebuild shattered communities. Since the signing of the CoHA, the Ethiopian Federal Government has consistently demonstrated its dedication to the spirit and letter of the Pretoria Agreement. Federal institutions moved swiftly to reconnect Tigray to the national grid, restore banking and telecommunications, and reopen commercial air links to Mekelle. The government also facilitated unhindered humanitarian aid access across the region while allocating significant state resources toward rebuilding damaged infrastructure, schools, and healthcare facilities. Fulfilling a core diplomatic requirement, the Federal Parliament officially removed the TPLF from the national list of terrorist organizations to enable inclusive political engagement. Furthermore, in strict adherence to Article 10 of the agreement, the federal government facilitated the setup of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (IRA) to ensure local governance, service delivery, and transitional stability. Beyond initial diplomatic concessions, the Federal Government of Ethiopia backed its commitment to the Pretoria Accord with massive fiscal capital, allocating billions of Birr from the national treasury to finance the immediate reconstruction and socio-economic recovery of the Tigray region. Recognizing that peace cannot take root amid economic ruin, Addis Ababa prioritized funding to rebuild shattered health systems, reconstruct damaged schools, and repair critical transport, power, and telecommunications corridors—treating Tigray’s revitalization as a top national priority. These federal budget transfers, disbursed directly to fund public services, pay civil servants, and subsidize essential commodities, served as tangible proof of the state's determination to integrate Tigray back into the national fabric. Yet, this massive financial goodwill and capital investment have been met with profound bad faith from TPLF hardliners, who have diverted local resources, obstructed federal development projects, and funneled regional administrative funds toward covert re-militarization rather than the civilian welfare the money was meant to secure Rather than channeling its efforts into peaceful political competition and regional recovery, the TPLF leadership has actively undermined the governance framework envisioned at Pretoria. Behind this resistance lies a calculated objective: the hardline Debretsion Gebremichael-led faction seeks to reclaim the unbridled single-party hegemony it once wielded over Ethiopia. Reeling from its loss of federal dominance and resisting the constitutional order, the TPLF's core ambition is to manufacture regional instability, paralyze state institutions, and force a total renegotiation of the Pretoria Accord on terms that insulate its elite leadership from accountability. A central pillar of the peace deal was the establishment of an inclusive Interim Regional Administration, yet hardline factional leaders within the TPLF have systematically moved to dismantle it. By attempting to unilaterally oust IRA leadership, seize regional administrative bodies by force, and reject federal mandates extended to preserve regional stability, the group has shown an alarming disregard for lawful transitional governance. This systematic takeover replaces an inclusive, transitional public administration with single-party rule, directly violating the core principles of the Pretoria Agreement and stripping Tigrayan citizens of civilian-led, accountable governance. To achieve these disruptive ambitions, the TPLF hardliners have entered into unholy, opportunistic alignments with external spoilers and regional adversaries. Taking advantage of broader Horn of Africa geopolitical friction, the faction has cultivated tacit backing from foreign actors seeking to exploit Ethiopia’s internal vulnerabilities. Chief among these actors are the regimes in Cairo and Asmara, whose historic and strategic interests align with maintaining a fractured, vulnerable Ethiopian state. For the regime in Egypt, the motive is rooted in an existential paranoia over the Nile waters and the operational reality of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Cairo has long viewed any strong, unified, and economically sovereign Ethiopia as a direct threat to its centuries-old hydro-hegemony over the Abay River. Unable to halt the completion of the GERD through international diplomacy or legal coercion, Egypt’s intelligence and diplomatic apparatus has pivoted toward zero-sum encirclement. By funneling indirect backing, diplomatic cover, and operational logistical channels to dissident Ethiopian factions, Cairo seeks to keep Addis Ababa consumed by internal fires. For Egypt, an Ethiopia locked in civil strife is an Ethiopia incapable of projecting power, advancing downstream development, or asserting its sovereign rights over regional trade and maritime infrastructure. Eritrea’s totalitarian regime, led by Isaias Afwerki, operates under a parallel strategy driven by deeply rooted hostility toward Ethiopian regional dominance and a toxic political history with TPLF elites. Though Asmara and the TPLF fought a brutal war from 1998 to 2000, current tactical interests have forced an opportunistic convergence. As Ethiopia asserts its sovereign ambition to secure reliable access to the Red Sea, President Isaias views a consolidated, economically dynamic Ethiopia as a threat to his regime’s regional influence and maritime monopoly. Capitalizing on internal Ethio-Tigrayan political friction, Asmara has quietly opened channels with TPLF hardliners and other insurgent actors, stoking localized militarization to wrap Ethiopia in a web of perpetual border security crises. Together, Cairo and Asmara have turned the Horn of Africa into a theater of proxy warfare, leveraging the TPLF hardline faction as an instrumental lever to destabilize the nation from within. These external allies provide diplomatic cover, logistics, and material support to keep northern Ethiopia in a state of perpetual crisis. By acting as a proxy for regional forces hostile to Ethiopia’s economic self-determination and territorial integrity, the TPLF leadership is actively outsourcing the destabilization of its own homeland. The Pretoria Agreement explicitly mandated the complete Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Tigrayan armed forces, establishing that Ethiopia has only one unified national defense force. While the federal government created the national DDR framework, the TPLF has resisted full disarmament. Large contingents of combatants remain armed, active, and organized under regional command structures. Reports of re-armament, forced recruitment, and offensive troop movements near regional borders—coordinated with external elements—signal that the group is actively preparing for another round of war rather than choosing peace. Holding civilian populations hostage to the threat of renewed hostility severely jeopardizes regional security, stalls economic recovery, and prolongs human suffering across northern Ethiopia. The international community, including the African Union, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union, played a constructive role in bringing the parties to the negotiating table in 2022, and international partners must now step up enforcement to protect that investment in peace. International actors must clearly name and condemn actions that violate the CoHA, particularly the dismantling of the Interim Administration and refusals to complete disarmament. Support for transitional programs should be tied directly to measurable, verified progress in the DDR process, alongside unequivocal support for legitimate federal authority and legally recognized interim governance. Additionally, international aid agencies must ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches the civilian population directly without being diverted or hijacked by armed factions. A growing awareness among key international stakeholders reveals that the primary bottleneck to lasting peace in northern Ethiopia is no longer a lack of federal goodwill, but the deliberate subversion orchestrated by hardline TPLF factions and their external regional enablers. Recent diplomatic measures by the U.S. government—specifically targeted visa restrictions imposed under Section 212(a)(3)(C) against hardline TPLF figures and associated actors complicit in eroding the Pretoria Accord—mark a vital shift toward accountability. By directly penalizing those responsible for dismantling the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, delaying disarmament, and orchestrating illegal re-militarization, Washington has effectively validated the Ethiopian state's long-standing position: that recalcitrant internal elites and external spoilers, particularly those aligning with foreign interests in Asmara and Cairo, are the true perpetrators of volatility in the Horn of Africa. To protect the immense investment in peace, international partners must build upon these initial accountability steps and construct a systematic enforcement architecture. Diplomatic declarations must evolve into rigorous, conditional enforcement where developmental aid, transitional support, and international legitimacy are strictly contingent upon verifiable compliance with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) protocols. Furthermore, aid agencies and international monitors must audit humanitarian delivery mechanisms to prevent armed factions from hijacking relief supplies to fuel illicit mobilization. By unequivocally backing legitimate, constitutionally recognized interim governance and escalating targeted sanctions against both internal hardliners and external spoilers, the African Union, United Nations, United States, and European Union can ensure that the Pretoria Agreement remains a durable bridge to peace rather than a temporary pause in conflict. To secure a lasting peace in the Horn of Africa, the international community can no longer afford the dangerous posture of false equivalence. The Pretoria Agreement provided a clear, legal path toward national restoration, yet its fulfillment remains hostage to the revisionist ambitions of TPLF hardliners and the zero-sum geopolitical games of foreign spoilers in Cairo and Asmara. Allowing internal actors to dismantle lawful interim governance and re-militarize under the cover of foreign backing risks not only unraveling Ethiopia’s hard-won stability, but also igniting a wider regional conflagration. The global community—led by the AU, UN, US, and EU—must move decisively beyond passive rhetoric. By enforcing strict accountability, conditioning support on verified disarmament, and confronting foreign intervention, international stakeholders can neutralize these disruptive forces, protect the integrity of the Pretoria Accord, and ensure that Ethiopia’s sovereign trajectory remains defined by peace, unity, and economic progress.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopia’s President Taye Atske Selassie called for a fundamental shift in the global renewable-energy agenda—from simply expanding power generation to building the grids, storage, financing and productive systems needed to turn clean electricity into economic transformation. Addressing the “Delivering Electrify Now” High-Level Leaders Dialogue of the Global Renewables Summit in New York, President Taye said countries endowed with abundant renewable resources need stronger international support to convert their energy potential into reliable electricity access, industrial growth and inclusive prosperity. “Generation without grids, storage and robust utility capacity cannot drive economic transformation,” the President said, stressing that international financing must support the entire electricity value chain—from generation and transmission to distribution, storage and last-mile connections. The Global Renewables Summit, held during Climate Week NYC alongside the UN General Assembly, is bringing together political leaders, businesses, investors and international institutions to accelerate renewable-powered electrification and address the infrastructure and investment barriers slowing the energy transition.   President Taye said Ethiopia brings substantial renewable-energy potential to the global discussion, with more than 95 percent of its installed generation capacity coming from renewable sources. He highlighted the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and other renewable-energy investments as key foundations for expanding electricity access and powering the country’s industrialization. He outlined three interconnected priorities for Ethiopia: expanding and diversifying renewable generation, with installed capacity targeted to reach up to 14,000 MW by 2030 and non-hydro renewables accounting for at least 15 percent; using clean and affordable electricity to strengthen industrial competitiveness, including through industrial parks; and pursuing macroeconomic and energy-sector reforms to attract greater private investment, including increased private-sector participation in transmission and distribution. But the President emphasized that finance remains the critical link between renewable-energy potential and actual development. He called for more bankable projects supported by public resources and international partners, including the World Bank, African Development Bank and the European Union through Global Gateway. Particular attention, he said, should go to transmission infrastructure, substations, grid reinforcement, reconductoring and last-mile connections.   President Taye cited Ethiopia’s experience financing the GERD through domestic resources and broad public mobilization as an example of the importance of national ownership and commitment. At the same time, he stressed that international financial cooperation remains essential for developing countries seeking to build modern, reliable and interconnected electricity systems. He expressed appreciation for international support to Ethiopia’s power sector, including the European Union’s RISED programme, as well as assistance from the World Bank and African Development Bank in modernizing, rehabilitating and digitalizing electricity infrastructure. The President also warned that the global energy transition cannot deliver its full promise if renewable investment remains concentrated in a limited number of wealthy regions. For developing countries, he said, the ambition must go beyond generating renewable power: from energy potential to electricity access, from access to productive use, and from productive use to industrialization and job creation.   As Ethiopia prepares to host COP32 in Addis Ababa in 2027, President Taye said the country will work to help ensure that global climate and renewable-energy commitments translate into concrete implementation across Africa. His message comes as the international renewable-energy agenda increasingly focuses not only on expanding generation but also on scaling grids, storage and electrification to make clean power usable across economies.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) — Ethiopia’s pursuit of equitable access to the sea is an imperative agenda for the country’s economic growth, national security, regional stability and integration, House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR) member Ambassador Dina Mufti said. In an exclusive interview with ENA, Ambassador Dina said Ethiopia’s growing population and economy, coupled with evolving regional security dynamics, have made access to the sea an increasingly important national interest. He emphasized that Ethiopia is pursuing its quest for sea access through diplomatic means and seeks arrangements based on mutual benefit and respect for the interests and sovereignty of neighboring countries. According to Dina, Ethiopia’s interest in securing sea access is underpinned by historical, geographic, economic and security considerations. He noted that Ethiopia historically had access to the sea and used maritime routes for trade for many years, adding that the country’s loss of direct access to the sea has had significant economic and strategic implications. The ambassador also pointed to Ethiopia’s geographic proximity to the Red Sea as another factor underpinning its interest in securing access. He noted that some parts of Ethiopia are located relatively close to the Red Sea coastline and argued that the country has historical and legal grounds to pursue equitable access. Dina further explained that Ethiopia’s rapidly growing population and expanding economy are increasing the volume of international trade, thereby strengthening the need for diversified and reliable access to maritime routes. He said Ethiopia currently depends heavily on the Port of Djibouti for its maritime trade, noting that reliance on a single port can increase transportation costs, create logistical delays and expose the country’s trade to congestion and other disruptions. As Ethiopia’s imports and exports continue to expand, the diversification of port access has consequently become increasingly important, he added. Beyond economic considerations, Dina linked Ethiopia’s sea access agenda to regional peace and security, particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. He noted that the region continues to face security challenges, while piracy, human trafficking, arms and drug trafficking and other illicit activities pose risks to maritime security and international trade. According to the lawmaker, Ethiopia could make a meaningful contribution to addressing such challenges by strengthening its engagement in maritime affairs and maintaining the capacity to monitor developments that could affect its national interests and regional security. Ethiopia needs to be present in maritime areas in order to monitor developments at sea and better address issues that could affect the country, he added. Dina stressed that Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access is being advanced through diplomacy and is not intended to undermine the sovereignty or territorial integrity of neighboring countries. “Ethiopia is not interested in hurting or invading anyone,” Dina said, stressing that the country seeks sea access through a “win-win” approach. He further said Ethiopia’s economic prosperity and development could generate benefits for neighboring countries as well, given the close economic, social and security interdependence among countries of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s prosperity, growth and advancement would also be in the interest of neighboring countries, Dina said, underscoring the importance of cooperation and mutually beneficial regional integration.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) —Sudan’s warring parties should acknowledge that neither can secure an outright military victory and give negotiations a chance to end the conflict, Getachew Reda, adviser to the Ethiopian Prime Minister on East African affairs, said. Speaking to Pulse of Africa, Getachew said “Sudan deserves to be at peace,” warning that continued fighting is worsening displacement and humanitarian suffering. The war, which erupted in April 2023 between Sudan’s army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has devastated the country, driving millions from their homes, disrupting basic services and deepening a humanitarian crisis. The advisor said the best path forward would be for army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, to recognize that neither side was likely to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. As a result, Getachew said, millions of people have been forced to flee their homes and leave Sudan, as the conflict continues to deepen the country’s fragmentation. “Sudan has faced disintegration,” he said, pointing to the emergence of competing authorities and the division of control between the RSF and the Sudanese national army. “The best scenario is going to be for the two sides to realize that they cannot win an outright victory and to give negotiation a chance,” he said. Getachew said the conflict had also undermined what he described as a longstanding tradition of political accommodation in Sudan, where rival political figures had historically been able to coexist after changes of government. “You remove him from power. He removes you from power. But still, killing has hardly been the characteristic of the political class in Sudan,” he said. That tradition of political accommodation had been severely damaged by the current conflict, he said, describing the situation as “absolutely chaotic” and accusing both sides of contributing to the destruction of civilian areas and infrastructure. The war has also produced one of the world’s largest displacement crises. A UN report shows that since the conflict began, around 8.6 million people have been internally displaced, while about 19.5 million people are facing crisis levels of food insecurity. For Ethiopia, which shares a long border with Sudan, the conflict has wider implications, Getachew said, citing the influx of Sudanese refugees and the potential for instability in Sudan to affect Ethiopia. He warned that prolonged lawlessness could create opportunities for armed groups and other actors seeking to destabilize Ethiopia. “The elements that are given assignments to destabilize Ethiopia consider the lawlessness in Sudan a very classic environment for them to operate,” he said. Getachew also said Ethiopia should remain alert to the presence of what he described as anti-Ethiopian extremist elements within the broader Sudanese conflict. Despite those security concerns, he said Ethiopia’s interest was in seeing Sudan move toward a negotiated political settlement rather than a military victory by either side. He said any transition should ultimately be driven by civilians and smaller political forces, which he argued should come together to chart a future for Sudan. “Unfortunately, reason seems to be missing in action when it comes to the bigger players in the Sudanese conflict,” Getachew said. Since the war began in April 2023, IGAD, the African Union, the United Nations and other partners have pursued mediation efforts to end the conflict, but without a lasting breakthrough The mediators continue to stress that a sustainable solution must be Sudanese-led and owned by the Sudanese people. Despite these efforts, the war has continued and the humanitarian crisis has worsened. Last week, UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued a “mea culpa” (admission of fault) over the international community’s inadequate response, calling for greater attention to the suffering caused by the war.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) —The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, and United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres have co-chaired a high-level AU–UN meeting on the margins of the 81st United Nations General Assembly to deepen strategic cooperation, strengthen peace and security frameworks, and advance global financial reforms in support of Africa. According to a social media post by the AU, the meeting reaffirmed the two institutions’ shared commitment to supporting Africa’s efforts to address structural challenges and promote a fairer international order. Key issues discussed included reform of the international financial architecture, debt sustainability, and ensuring that African countries derive greater value from their critical mineral resources. The two sides underscored the strategic importance of AU–UN cooperation, including the three existing cooperation frameworks, and the need to finalise the joint roadmap beyond 2026. The United Nations was reaffirmed as a key partner of the AU in addressing peace and security challenges on the continent. On peace and security, the meeting highlighted the need to strengthen Africa’s peace and security architecture, reinforce preventive diplomacy and mediation, and ensure adequate resources to support African-led solutions to African challenges. The discussions also reviewed developments in the Sahel, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including continued support for the mediation led by Togo in the DRC. The meeting further expressed concern over external shocks, including conflicts, disruptions to global supply chains, and maritime chokepoints, which are placing additional pressure on African economies and food security. The potential impact of climate-related events was also highlighted. The two sides agreed on the need for concrete follow-up action, including finalising the AU–UN roadmap, planned engagements on Libya and Sudan, identifying countries most vulnerable to food insecurity, and developing contingency measures through strengthened coordination and financing.

By Staff Writer   Sept. 20, 2026 The second week of September 2026 placed Ethiopia’s strategic interests in water, maritime access, diplomacy and economic transformation firmly at the center of national and international attention. Across Ethiopian media, the Abay/Nile and Red Sea emerged as two defining themes. Discussions on the Nile focused on equitable and sustainable utilization of shared water resources and Ethiopia’s role as the source of the Abay, while the country’s long-standing quest for reliable access to the Red Sea gained fresh momentum from government officials, researchers and geopolitical commentators. At the same time, Ethiopia’s diplomatic engagement remained active, with ambassadors and senior representatives from several countries reaffirming their interest in deepening bilateral partnerships in areas ranging from agriculture and technology to green development and people-to-people relations. The week also highlighted Ethiopia’s growing engagement on global and regional platforms, from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s General Conference in Vienna to the IGAD forum on El Niño preparedness in the Horn of Africa. Together, these developments point to a broader strategic narrative: Ethiopia is increasingly linking water resources, maritime access, regional security, diplomatic partnerships and economic transformation as interconnected elements of its long-term national interests. Abay/Nile: A Debate Over Rights, Development and a Changing Basin   The Nile once again occupied a prominent place in Ethiopia’s public discourse. Getachew Reda, Minister and Advisor to the Ethiopian Prime Minister on East African Affairs, sharply criticized what he described as Egypt’s continued attempt to assert exclusive control over the Nile, arguing that such an approach is increasingly disconnected from the realities of the region. In an exclusive interview with The Pulse of Africa, Getachew said Egypt had developed what he characterized as an “artificial reality” around the Nile and argued that the river should be viewed through the realities of geography, science and the development needs of all riparian states.   Former Ethiopian House of People’s Representatives Speaker Teshome Toga similarly argued that Egypt needs to adjust its Nile strategy to the realities of the 21st century. In his an analytical article published on, Teshome pointed to population growth, climate change, rising energy demand, food insecurity and economic development as factors that have fundamentally changed the Nile Basin. He called for a framework based on cooperation, equity and mutual respect rather than what he described as outdated colonial-era assumptions. The Abay’s contribution to the Nile was also central to the discussion. According to Teshome, the Blue Nile, which originates in the Ethiopian highlands, contributes about 86 percent of the Nile’s annual flow, underscoring Ethiopia’s central geographical position in the basin.   Senior researcher Abdushakur Abdussamad, meanwhile, told ENA that what he described as the political instrumentalization of the Nile and the stereotyping of upstream countries have shaped negative perceptions in Egypt toward Nile Basin countries, particularly Ethiopia. He argued that repeated media narratives portraying the Nile as exclusively belonging to Egypt have contributed to the perception that development projects in other basin countries necessarily threaten Egypt’s water interests. The competing narratives underscore a broader challenge for the Nile Basin: how to reconcile downstream water dependence with the development aspirations and utilization rights of upstream countries through a cooperative and sustainable framework. Red Sea Access Moves to the Center of Ethiopia’s Strategic Affairs If the Nile dominated the water debate, the Red Sea increasingly dominated the maritime one. Senior Ethiopian officials, researchers and academics this week linked access to the sea with economic development, national security, regional integration and Ethiopia’s wider diplomatic role. At a panel discussion organized by the Addis Ababa Leadership Academy, participants stressed that Ethiopia’s maritime interests should be pursued through peaceful dialogue, diplomatic engagement, cooperation and mutually beneficial arrangements.   Gizachew Asrat, Chief of Staff and Senior Researcher for the Horn of Africa at IFA, said consensus around Ethiopia’s role and presence in the Red Sea is growing. He argued that Ethiopia’s expanding population, economy and trade, together with regional security considerations, make maritime access an increasingly important strategic issue. For Addis Ababa University researcher Tesfaye Jima, the issue goes beyond commercial considerations. “The Red Sea is an existential issue for Ethiopia,” he said, linking maritime access to the country’s security, sovereignty, economy and diplomatic influence. He also pointed to Ethiopia’s future import and export requirements, agricultural and fishing interests, and its broader regional engagement. The debate also received international diplomatic resonance during the week. Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia Avraham Neguise reaffirmed Israel’s support for Ethiopia’s quest for sea access, describing stability in the Red Sea and a stronger Ethiopia as matters of broader international interest. The growing discussion therefore increasingly connects the Abay/Nile and Red Sea as two strategic questions with implications extending well beyond Ethiopia’s borders. Ethiopia on Global Platforms and Regional Preparedness Ethiopia’s international engagement was not limited to the Nile and Red Sea. In Vienna, the country participated in the 70th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, where member states are discussing nuclear safety and security, nuclear technology applications and the peaceful uses of nuclear science.   Ethiopia’s participation reflects the country’s continued engagement with global institutions on issues ranging from energy and technology to food security, environmental management and sustainable development. Closer to home, Addis Ababa hosted the IGAD Regional High-Level Forum on El Niño Preparedness for the Horn of Africa. Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Deputy Commissioner Aydrus Hassan stressed that the potential effects of El Niño require political leadership, national ownership, regional solidarity, timely financing and early action—not simply technical preparedness.   He said Ethiopia is strengthening its disaster-risk management system around monitoring, forecasting, impact assessment, early warning, preparedness, anticipatory action and response. The country is also seeking greater national self-reliance through its Disaster Risk Response Fund. The IGAD forum similarly called for stronger contingency planning, pre-positioning of essential supplies, health surveillance, protection of food systems and expanded anticipatory action across the region. Diplomacy: Partnerships Broadening Beyond Traditional Politics Ethiopia’s diplomatic landscape also remained active, with a series of interviews with foreign diplomats highlighting the breadth of the country’s international partnerships. Ethiopia-Israel relations, according to Ambassador Avraham Neguise, extend across agriculture, health, technology, water, energy, investment and capacity building. He described the relationship as one that has evolved from deep historical ties into a broad modern partnership.   Germany and Denmark, meanwhile, highlighted cultural diplomacy, people-to-people relations, academic cooperation and green transformation as important components of their longstanding partnerships with Ethiopia. Germany’s Deputy Head of Mission Ferdinand von Weyhe emphasized that high-level political engagement needs to be complemented by direct connections between the peoples of the two countries. Denmark’s Deputy Head of Mission Mirja Crone pointed to cooperation on green transformation, bringing Danish expertise together with Ethiopian companies and professionals to promote more sustainable economic growth. The diplomatic messages came alongside New Year greetings from German, Finnish and Danish diplomatic missions, which expressed hopes for peace, prosperity and stronger relations with Ethiopia. Taken together, the engagements show diplomacy extending beyond traditional political relations into technology, agriculture, climate action, culture, education, investment and sustainable development. Economic Front: Confidence, Capacity and Reform Economic transformation formed another important layer of the week’s narrative. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy praised Ethiopian Airlines for what he described as its strategic discipline, technical capability and operational professionalism, highlighting the carrier’s investment in training and technical capacity as key elements of its international reputation.   Ethiopian-American businessman Zemedeneh Negatu, CEO of CBE Capital Investment Bank, meanwhile argued that Ethiopia has the potential to sustain annual economic growth of between 9 and 11 percent over the coming decades, citing agriculture, manufacturing, natural resources, tourism and the country’s large young population as potential engines of growth. He particularly highlighted the transition from subsistence agriculture to mechanized and commercial production, the expansion of manufacturing and the potential for a more technology-driven economy. The economic conversation also increasingly centered on reform and investment.   International Finance Corporation Managing Director Makhtar Diop said Ethiopia had made progress in addressing constraints that previously affected private-sector investment, particularly foreign-exchange pressures, inflation and reserve levels. He also identified opportunities in digital technology, tourism, aviation, infrastructure and renewable energy. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s focus on technology and artificial intelligence emerged as another component of its economic transformation, with Zemedeneh emphasizing digital skills, automation and the country’s young population as potential drivers of future competitiveness. A Week Defined by Strategic Convergence The week’s developments reveal a striking convergence of issues that are often discussed separately. The Abay/Nile issue is increasingly framed around development, equitable utilization and regional cooperation. The Red Sea debate connects maritime access with trade, security, sovereignty and regional integration. Diplomacy is expanding into technology, agriculture, climate action, culture and investment, while economic reform is being linked to Ethiopia’s ambition to strengthen its position in regional and global affairs. From the Nile Basin to the Red Sea, from Vienna to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s strategic conversation is therefore extending beyond individual disputes or diplomatic engagements toward a broader question: how can the country translate its geographic position, natural resources, economic potential and international partnerships into long-term national and regional development? That question and the competing interests surrounding it—is likely to remain central to Ethiopia’s domestic and international agenda in the weeks ahead.

Addis Ababa, September 20, 2026 (ENA) —Alula Pankhurst has commended the Ethiopian government’s diplomatic efforts to recover heritage artifacts taken from the country through looting, force, and other illicit means. Pankhurst, researcher and member of the Ethiopian National Heritage Restitution Committee, emphasized that Ethiopia has achieved encouraging results in recent years by strengthening diplomatic engagement, improving coordination among stakeholders and applying the principle of “Medemer,” or synergy, in facilitating the return of cultural heritage items. In an exclusive interview with ENA, he said numerous Ethiopian artifacts had been repatriated over the past seven years through diplomatic initiatives and coordinated efforts involving government institutions, researchers, heritage organizations and international museums.   Pankhurst emphasized that heritage objects removed through force, looting or other illicit means should be returned to their rightful historical owners. Against this backdrop, a British scholar and social development consultant said Ethiopia has intensified efforts to identify and recover heritage items that were illegally taken out of the country, including artifacts that subsequently appeared on international art and antiquities markets. According to Pankhurst, Ethiopian authorities have, in several cases, submitted formal diplomatic objections to prevent the sale of Ethiopian artifacts on foreign markets. Following the cancellation of such sales, the government and other stakeholders have engaged with the relevant parties to negotiate the return of the artifacts, in some cases through agreements involving reasonable and affordable compensation, he said.   Pankhurst also highlighted ongoing efforts to recover Emperor Tewodros II’s Gospel, which was looted from Maqdala and later put up for sale in Abu Dhabi by an Austrian firm. He said direct engagement with international museums has also become an important avenue for securing the return of Ethiopian heritage. In this regard, an agreement has been reached with the Toledo Museum of Art in the United States for the gradual repatriation of about 380 Ethiopian artifacts acquired by the museum from an individual, Pankhurst noted. Under the agreement, the museum is expected to return two 15th century manuscripts and three crosses in the near future, while the remaining artifacts will be repatriated in phases over the next five to ten years.   Pankhurst said such agreements demonstrate the importance of sustained diplomatic engagement and cooperation among government institutions, researchers, heritage organizations and international museums in restoring Ethiopia’s cultural heritage. The ongoing repatriation efforts, he added, are helping recover historical objects that constitute an important part of Ethiopia’s cultural and historical identity.

Addis Ababa, September 20, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopia’s quest for reliable access to the Red Sea is an unavoidable national imperative,a co-founder and former Deputy Director of the East African Policy Research Institute (EAPRI), Birhanu Lenjiso said. Birhanu, author of Water: ‘Ethiopia’s Gateway to Prosperity,’ told ENA that Ethiopia’s growing population, expanding economy, and strategic position in the Horn of Africa make securing sea access an inevitable national objective. Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access should also be viewed in the broader context of Abay/Nile, he argued that the political and strategic dynamics surrounding the two issues are closely interconnected. Speaking about Ethiopia’s historical relationship with the sea, he pointed to the Aksumite civilization, which was closely associated with maritime trade and commercial links across the Red Sea.   For Birhanu, Ethiopia’s interest in maritime access therefore extends beyond its immediate economic and logistical needs. “We are not really asking for maritime access because we need a port, or because we have a large population, or because our economy is growing,” he said. He argued that Ethiopia’s historical experience and longstanding links with maritime commerce should form part of the country’s case when engaging with the international community on access to the sea. Birhanu, who is also a former State Minister for Irrigation Development, said Ethiopia should strengthen this narrative by bringing together historical evidence with contemporary economic and strategic considerations. He described maritime access as “part and parcel of Ethiopian identity,” saying the historical dimension should not be overlooked in discussions about Ethiopia’s relationship with the Red Sea and the wider maritime environment. Against this background, Birhanu said Ethiopia’s objective is to diversify its maritime access and establish arrangements that can provide greater reliability. “All Ethiopia is asking is to have diversified access to the sea,” he said. He said Ethiopia’s large and growing market gives maritime access a broader economic dimension, while developments in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa have made the issue increasingly significant from a regional perspective. According to Birhanu, Ethiopia’s access to the sea could generate benefits beyond the country by connecting its large economy more directly with regional maritime trade and stimulating economic activity across the Horn of Africa.   He said Ethiopia does not necessarily need to pursue a single model for maritime access, pointing instead to a range of possible arrangements with coastal states. These could include long-term lease agreements, infrastructure corridors, and jointly developed transport and logistics projects, he said. He cited Ethiopia’s longstanding use of the Djibouti corridor as an example of how cross-border infrastructure and economic interests can create mutually beneficial arrangements. At the same time, Birhanu said dependence on a single major maritime route creates vulnerabilities, making diversification important for Ethiopia’s long-term economic interests. Asked whether Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access is inevitable, Birhanu said the country’s demographic and economic trajectory would continue to increase the importance of securing dependable access to international maritime routes. He also linked Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations to the broader security and economic dynamics of the Horn of Africa.   The region has extensive coastlines and occupies a strategically important position along major international maritime routes, while also facing persistent security challenges, he noted. In his view, greater economic integration between Ethiopia and coastal states could contribute to trade, infrastructure development, and regional stability. He argued that Ethiopia’s large consumer market and economic potential could become an asset for coastal countries if appropriate access and infrastructure arrangements are developed. Birhanu said Ethiopia’s maritime access and its position on the Nile share what he described as a common underlying principle: equitable use of regional resources. He argued that Ethiopia’s discussions over Abay/Nile and its pursuit of access to the Red Sea should therefore not be treated as entirely separate strategic questions. “I don't really see maritime access or maritime access challenge as a separate topic. I believe it is very much connected to the Nile issue. The two waters are separate, but their politics is very much interconnected,” he said. He said Ethiopia’s approach is centered on development and equitable access rather than control over the resources of other countries.   “We are asking for equity everywhere. We are asking for development. We are not asking for domination,” Birhanu said. He maintained that Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations should ultimately be viewed within the broader objective of strengthening regional economic integration and enabling the country to participate more directly in maritime trade. “We are not looking for confrontation on Nile. We are not looking for confrontation on the Red Sea. We are looking for cooperation,” he said. Birhanu said such an approach could allow Ethiopia to advance its economic interests while creating opportunities for coastal countries and contributing to the development and security of the wider Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

By Gezmu Edicha Sept. 20, 2026 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s participation in the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi was more than a routine diplomatic engagement. It was a clear moment of strategic significance for Ethiopia. In a world where influence is increasingly shaped by alliances, trade access, financial cooperation, and political positioning, Ethiopia played an active role with vision, ambition, and growing global relevance. For Ethiopia, the summit carried both symbolic and practical value. Symbolically, it reinforced the country’s place among emerging powers and reform-minded states seeking a fairer international order. Practically, it opened doors to concrete gains in trade, investment, aviation, climate diplomacy, technology transfer, and financial cooperation. These outcomes align closely with Ethiopia’s Home-Grown Economic Reform and its long-term development priorities. What made this summit important for Ethiopia was the way Prime Minister Abiy translated high-level diplomacy into tangible national benefit. Rather than treating the BRICS platform as a photo opportunity, he used it to advance specific national interests with precision and persistence. Diplomatic win on the global trade front One of the most important outcomes of the summit was the strong support Ethiopia received for its World Trade Organization accession process. According to the BRICS New Delhi Declaration, all member states expressed backing for Ethiopia’s entry into the WTO. This matters because WTO membership is a gateway to greater market access, stronger investor confidence, and deeper integration into the global economy. For Ethiopia, this endorsement carries real weight. It strengthens the country’s hand in ongoing negotiations and sends a message to the international community that Ethiopia’s reform is being recognized by influential global actors. In practical terms, this kind of support can help accelerate Ethiopia’s integration into global supply chains and improve its ability to compete under fair, rules-based trade arrangements. Just as important was the recognition of Ethiopia’s candidacy for an expanded seat on the International Civil Aviation Organization Council, which is backed by the African Union, and formally supported in the New Delhi Declaration. Ethiopia is home to Ethiopian Airlines, one of Africa’s most successful and globally respected carriers. Backing Ethiopia for this role reflects not only the country’s aviation expertise, but also its broader contribution to Africa’s air connectivity and transport leadership. Climate leadership and the road to COP32 The other major achievement is the endorsement of Ethiopia to host the 32nd United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP32) in 2027. This is a big diplomatic and reputational win. Hosting such a major global summit places Ethiopia at the center of international climate discussions and gives the country an opportunity to shape the agenda around issues that matter deeply to Africa and the developing world. Prime Minister Abiy’s vision for COP32 is rooted in practical climate action, equitable climate finance, and green development. This message therefore fits well with Ethiopia’s broader environmental agenda, especially the Green Legacy Initiative, which has become one of the country’s most visible national programs. It also builds on Ethiopia’s growing investment in renewable energy and sustainable development. If successfully delivered, COP32 in Addis Ababa could do more than showcase Ethiopia to the world. It could strengthen the country’s leadership in climate diplomacy, attract international partnerships, and highlight Ethiopia as a nation capable of hosting and shaping major global events. Financial cooperation for more resilient economic future In the financial sphere, the summit offered Ethiopia important long-term opportunities. A key focus of the BRICS financial architecture was the promotion of local-currency settlement systems and cross-border payment platforms. For Ethiopia, this is especially relevant. Like many developing economies, Ethiopia continues to face pressure from foreign exchange shortages and external currency shocks. A system that allows trade settlement in local currencies could reduce dependence on hard currency, lower transaction costs, and create more stability for importers and exporters. Trade with countries such as China, India, and Russia could become smoother and less expensive when these systems are effectively implemented. Ethiopia also advocated for faster and more predictable debt resolution mechanisms, as well as stronger liquidity support through the expansion of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. These are not abstract financial ideas. They are practical tools that can help protect developing countries from sudden shocks and provide breathing room during periods of fiscal stress. In simple terms, Ethiopia used the summit to push for a more balanced global financial system—one that does not leave developing nations vulnerable to the decisions and pressures of richer economies. Bilateral diplomacy that opened new doors Beyond the formal plenary sessions, the summit’s sidelines proved equally valuable. Intensive bilateral meetings produced promising openings in several strategic sectors. Talks between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reportedly focused on critical minerals, renewable energy, and pharmaceutical manufacturing. These are all high-value sectors with the potential to support Ethiopia’s industrialization and improve national resilience. They also discussed about enhancing defence cooperation, technology transfer, capacity building, and partnership towards COP32. Engagements with Russian President Vladimir Putin were also fruitful as the leaders held constructive discussion about strengthening the strategic partnership between Ethiopia and Russia. They also explored opportunities to expand educational exchanges and deepen collaboration in cultural and people-to-people ties. These matter because Ethiopia’s development challenge is not only about capital. It is also about capability. The ability to learn, adapt, and transfer technology is essential for long-term transformation. By building these kinds of partnerships, Ethiopia is positioning itself to access expertise and innovation that can strengthen its domestic economy. Ethiopia as bridge between Africa and Global South Perhaps the most important strategic takeaway from the summit is the increasing recognition of Ethiopia as more than a national state pursuing narrow interests. It is emerging as a bridge between Africa and the Global South, between regional integration and global partnerships, and between diplomatic ambition and economic transformation. As host of the African Union headquarters and a diplomatic hub on the continent, Ethiopia occupies a unique position. It can connect African priorities with broader international conversations in ways that few countries can. This gives Ethiopia a powerful platform to advocate not only for its own development, but also for the interests of Africa as a whole. With its population of more than 135 million, vast agricultural potential, strategic location, and growing industrial ambitions, Ethiopia has real assets to bring to the table. The BRICS summit showed that it is using those assets with increasing confidence.

Addis Ababa, September 20, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates are stepping up efforts to deepen partnership in various spheres, Ethiopia’s Ambassador to the UAE, Jemal Beker told ENA. The Special Envoy and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary highlighted the expanding partnership as the two countries accelerate cooperation in investment, tourism, trade, and other economic sectors to turn growing diplomatic ties into tangible business opportunities. He said Ethiopia’s ongoing macroeconomic reforms are helping create a more favorable environment for foreign investment by improving the investment climate, attracting international capital, and strengthening the country’s integration into the global economy. The Ethiopian Embassy in the UAE, he added, is playing an active role in promoting Ethiopia’s investment opportunities and connecting Ethiopian businesses and projects with potential international investors. Ethiopia’s abundant renewable energy resources, large and youthful workforce, strategic geographic position, and international connectivity—including through Ethiopian Airlines, are among the country’s major investment advantages, Ambassador Jemal pointed out. The embassy is leveraging international conferences, business forums, investment events, and direct engagement with the private sector to showcase these opportunities and facilitate stronger links between Ethiopian and UAE-based investors. Ambassador Jemal also highlighted the participation of an Ethiopian delegation led by President Taye Atske Selassie in the annual Global Investment Meeting in the UAE as an important platform for presenting Ethiopia’s investment potential and further strengthening economic cooperation between the two countries. Beyond investment, Ethiopia and the UAE are working to expand bilateral trade by consolidating existing markets while identifying new areas of commercial cooperation. The embassy is engaging relevant stakeholders and businesses to facilitate stronger connections and help increase trade flows between the two countries. Tourism is also emerging as another important area of bilateral cooperation. Ethiopia is seeking to attract more visitors from the UAE by promoting its rich historical and cultural heritage, diverse natural landscapes, and growing tourism destinations. Initiatives such as “Dine for Nation” are being increasingly promoted to international audiences as part of efforts to position Ethiopia as an attractive tourism destination. The two countries are also exploring greater cooperation in technology transfer, professional expertise, and technical support. Such partnerships could strengthen knowledge sharing, capacity building, and access to technologies that support Ethiopia’s broader economic transformation. Ambassador Jemal said Ethiopia will continue working with the UAE to expand trade and investment, attract more tourists, and strengthen cooperation in technology and professional expertise. The efforts, he noted, reflect the two countries’ broader push to turn their growing bilateral relationship into tangible economic opportunities for businesses and people in both countries.

Addis Ababa, September 19, 2026 (ENA) — In a sharp assessment, Getachew Reda, Minister and Advisor to the Ethiopian Prime Minister on East African Affairs, described Egypt’s claim of exclusive control over the Nile as an outdated fantasy and condemned its regional interference as both counterproductive and dangerous. In an exclusive interview with The Pulse of Africa, Getachew stated: “Egyptians are very good at creating an artificial reality.” He described Egypt’s long-standing insistence that the Nile belongs to it alone — not as a shared resource among upstream and downstream countries, but as something it owns entirely. He highlighted the audacity of this position, noting that one should not be surprised if an Egyptian claimed that Egypt itself is the source of the Nile. Getachew argued that Egypt has shown a tremendous capacity to force science to fit its preferred narrative. In politics, he said, this has produced a deep sense of entitlement that they call “historic rights,” to such an extent that it would be almost impossible for an Egyptian to believe there are people who happen to be the source of the Nile and who might have some use for it — whether for hydroelectric power, irrigation, or other purposes. Invoking the ideas of Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, he argued that Egypt has developed cultural, social, and historical hegemony over how the Nile is perceived by Egyptians, which he attributed to what he described as a one-sided interpretation of the river’s significance. As a result, any attempt by other riparian countries to use these water resources is deemed unacceptable. The advisor explained that the Egyptian framing of “historic rights” is simply the idea that whoever used the water first must continue to use it indefinitely. “Historic rights became obsolete because they are unacceptable,” he asserted, adding that the later concept of “water security” promoted in international circles is simply another name for the same outdated claim. He rejected the notion that the Nile issue is an existential question for Egypt, arguing that Egyptian leaders securitize the matter precisely because they wish to preserve a monopoly. “Egyptian politicians have a very complicated relationship with reality,” Getachew remarked. The minister was blunt about Egypt’s water management. Egypt has among the worst water-management practices, he argued, pointing to water-intensive projects such as the Toshka scheme, including golf courses and other developments in the desert, as examples of what he described as poor water management. He further noted that annual evaporation from the Aswan High Dam far exceeds the amount of water stored in Ethiopia’s reservoirs. Getachew stated that the Egyptian regime has systematically worked to destabilize Ethiopia — the source of the largest share of the Nile’s water — and Sudan, which holds significant irrigation potential. Instability in Sudan, he argued, serves Egypt’s interests by preventing that country from fully utilizing the river. He cited what he called a clear double standard: while the Muslim Brotherhood is banned and suppressed in Egypt, Egyptian authorities have supported Brotherhood-linked elements in Sudan. He characterized Egypt’s political maneuvering as short-sighted. Getachew was unequivocal: the best option for Egypt is to abandon its failed strategy, come to terms with Ethiopia, and work toward regional stability. A stable Ethiopia and Sudan, he stressed, would never prejudice Egypt’s legitimate interests. He argued that Ethiopia, as an upstream riparian, has every right to use its water resources, while noting: “The problem with Egypt is that it cannot come to terms with reality.” “My advice is that the reality has changed and changed forever. Trying to impose their version of science, climate science, and hydrology on upstream countries is anachronistic and counterproductive. Their heavy involvement in destabilizing activities in the region is equally counterproductive — and potentially dangerous for themselves.” Any genuine negotiation or mediation, he insisted, must bring both sides to the table and be rooted in reality and science, not politics. “Geography is stable. You cannot change geography,” Getachew stated.

Addis Ababa, September 19, 2026 (ENA) —Access to the Red Sea is an existential issue for Ethiopia, with implications for the country’s security, sovereignty, economy, and diplomatic influence, a researcher at Addis Ababa University said. Tesfaye Jima, a researcher at Addis Ababa University, made the remarks in an exclusive interview with ENA, saying Ethiopia’s interest in the Red Sea goes far beyond trade. Ethiopia’s growing population and future economic needs make access to the sea an important national concern, he said, questioning how the country can meet its future demands and sustain its influence while remaining landlocked. “The Red Sea is an existential issue for Ethiopia,” he said, noting that sea access matters for imports and exports, as well as fishing and agricultural production. Sea access would give Ethiopia greater control over its economic activities and strengthen its security and sovereignty, he said. Access to the Red Sea would also strengthen Ethiopia’s diplomatic and political engagement in the region and beyond, he said. “We need the Red Sea to project influence regionally and globally,” he said. Ethiopia’s interest in the Red Sea also has a regional dimension, he said, arguing that stronger engagement could contribute to peace, security and economic cooperation in the region. Ethiopia’s demographic and economic potential could enable it to play a greater role in regional affairs, he said, highlighting the importance of developing maritime and naval capabilities. Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea and broader participation in regional mechanisms could benefit countries in the region by promoting cooperation in peace, security and development, he argued.   On the legal dimension, Ethiopia has signed international treaties, agreements and conventions relevant to its interests in the Red Sea and the Nile, he said. Historical agreements and records, including those dating back to the 1870s, should be studied and presented with evidence through diplomatic channels as part of Ethiopia’s efforts to explain its position and national interests, he said. Tesfaye also stressed the importance of research and public awareness, calling on scholars to conduct evidence-based studies and engage major international institutions, while the media should help the public better understand the issue. National unity and cooperation are essential in pursuing Ethiopia’s sea-access interests, he said, adding that national interests should serve the country, its people and future generations. Ethiopia should pursue its interests through peaceful diplomacy while addressing internal challenges and strengthening peace and stability at home, he said. He cited Ethiopia’s experience in advancing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam through diplomatic engagement as an example of advancing national interests through peaceful means. Ethiopia’s sea-access agenda should therefore be treated as a long-term national issue requiring research, diplomacy, public awareness and cooperation, he said.