With analysis from Pulse of Africa (POA) By Mahder Nesibu Sept. 15, 2026 The Red Sea, a narrow waterway connecting the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, has in recent years come under heavy insecurity. The prevalence of armed groups around the waterway, compounded by threats such as piracy, has undermined its reliability, despite it handling around 13 percent of global shipping. This threat has now come under the spotlight. When war broke out between Iran on one side and Israel and the United States on the other, a similar waterway, the Persian Gulf, and the chokepoint connecting it to the Indian Ocean, came to be weaponised, with Tehran effectively choking a passage that handles 25 percent of the world's oil and gas output. The same weaponisation became visible at Bab-el-Mandeb, the chokepoint of the Red Sea, when Yemen's Houthis, who control the country's north bordering the chokepoint, declared a blockade against Israel in March 2025, partly motivated by their alignment with Iran. The rebels have since extended that blockade to Saudi Arabia, with whom they have been at war for over a decade, a conflict paused by a truce in 2022. Just last week, A blitzkrieg offensive by Houthi forces over the past week has shattered the regional status quo, placing the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait firmly under their control. Sweeping down Yemen’s western coast with relentless momentum, the forces have completely overrun Saudi-backed government positions, meeting virtually zero resistance along the way. Saudi is said to have launched counter offensives with sorties targeting Houthis’ positions. The situation remains fluid. Saudi ships, like Israeli ones, have become targets for the Houthis, compounding the insecurity the waterway has been witnessing. On top of that, piracy, primarily emanating from the Somali coast, continues to pose a threat. Although thought to have decreased in frequency, piracy on Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea appears to be resurging. The New York Times reported in late August that the pattern points to a possible resurgence, with 2026 alone seeing 17 piracy-related incidents documented. Although Israeli and Saudi shipping, alongside international cargo, are coming under direct attack, the effects of this insecurity are more structural. According to Reuters, shipping across the Red Sea has declined by as much as 60 percent since 2023, when the Houthi weaponisation of the chokepoint began, and has not effectively recovered since. These figures translate into greater costs for shipping and slower traffic, as ships are diverted through the Cape of Good Hope route along southern Africa, adding extra days at sea and additional fuel costs. For countries served through the Red Sea itself, this has meant greater volatility in their trade. Beyond the added costs of moving ships through the sea, it means living with the risk of disruption, particularly for essentials such as oil and gas. This has been the case for countries in the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, whose supply lines have been subject to disruption. Moves to secure the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb have largely been futile, falling short of a comprehensive and cohesive plan to meet the challenge, as geopolitical competition within the Middle East and the Horn of Africa has undermined such efforts. One country that has been making efforts to secure the Red Sea is Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa state, the largest in the region by both population and economy, has been trying to establish a security presence on the waterway to help address the prevailing insecurity. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti, the country on the African side of Bab-el-Mandeb, for more than 85 percent of its maritime affairs, and its imposed landlocked status has limited its ability to contribute to addressing a security dilemma that carries consequences for its own economy and stability, as well as those of its neighbours. This, alongside historical realities and demographic concerns, has formed the foundation of the country's case for a return to the Red Sea. Access to the sea has been treated as a primary issue of national interest by the majority Ethiopians for long —an issue that received greater prominence particularly since 2018, when the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power. Alongside launching a diplomatic push, Ethiopia also revived its navy that same year, effectively declaring its strong interest in reestablishing a security presence on the Red Sea. The Ethiopian Navy was a major actor in Red Sea affairs for decades. Established in 1955, it is older than most naval security institutions in the region, including Saudi Arabia's, which was launched in 1960. It had been a pillar of Red Sea security for decades and was only disbanded in 1996, following Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia in 1991. Now revived, it offers to contribute to maritime security and help address the growing dilemma facing the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Speaking at the 4th Annual Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Dialogue this April, Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian Navy Kindu Gezu stated that Ethiopia's bid was also "for the common benefit of the region", adding that "inclusivity strengthens legitimacy and fosters shared interests in security and connectivity". For the region, and for those affected by insecurity in the Red Sea, it is worth considering what an increased Ethiopian role could contribute. For Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and also to superpowers with footholds on the region, the case for backing Ethiopia's return to the sea is a reasonable one on maritime security grounds. Writing for the Middle Eastern outlet MEMRI, Morocco expert Anna Mahjar-Barducci made the case for Ethiopia's access to the sea on similar security grounds, arguing that the United States, a global power that considers Red Sea security a strategic priority, should back Ethiopia, as the country could play a critical role in securing the waterway. The Middle East and the Horn of Africa face the same strategic considerations. Strategic competition aside, states in the region now have to treat maritime security as a matter of permanent concern. Ultimately, the solution rests on inclusive mechanisms that pool together available resources, including those Ethiopia can offer. Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea could strengthen regional security.

Abay/Nile Waters at the Intersection of Ethiopia- Egypt Relations   Sept. 15, 2026 (ENA) By Ambassador Teshome Toga Chanaka (PHD) Background The Nile is one of the world’s great transboundary river systems, shared by eleven riparian countries. Egypt and Sudan are the principal downstream states with virtually no contribution to the flow of the Nile. The Nile’s waters originate in the upstream countries, Ethiopia being the source of the Blue Nile. The Blue Nile, originating in the Ethiopian highlands, contributes 86% share of the Nile’s annual flow. For centuries, the utilization of Nile waters has been a source of tension between upstream and downstream countries. Historical circumstances, colonial legacies and competing interpretations of rights over the river have contributed to a pattern of mistrust that has often prevented the emergence of a genuinely cooperative basin-wide framework. Egypt, in particular, has developed and maintained an entrenched position concerning the allocation and utilization of the Nile waters. Its continued emphasis on what it describes as “historical rights” and on agreements concluded during periods when most upstream countries were not parties to the negotiations has made it difficult to establish a framework based on contemporary principles of international water law, particularly equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation to cooperate. The 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan is a particularly important example. The agreement allocated the entire estimated Nile flow between the two downstream countries without the participation of the other riparian states, including Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile. It is difficult to envisage how such an arrangement could provide a sustainable basis for managing a shared trans boundary resource in the twenty-first century. The fundamental issue, therefore, is not whether Egypt has legitimate interests in the Nile. It unquestionably does. The question is whether those interests can legitimately be pursued at the expense of the equally legitimate interests of the other riparian states. Why Egypt Needs a New Nile Strategy for the 21st Century? Egypt’s heavy dependence on the Nile is a reality that Ethiopia fully understands. But dependence does not confer a monopoly over a shared international watercourse. The challenge is to reconcile Egypt’s legitimate water-security concerns with the development aspirations and rights of the upstream countries. The twenty-first century has transformed the political, economic and technological circumstances of the Nile Basin. Population growth, climate change, food insecurity, energy demands, economic development and changing patterns of regional cooperation have fundamentally altered the context in which Nile waters must be managed. It is therefore neither realistic nor sustainable to approach the Nile exclusively through the prism of historical allocations. The river must increasingly be viewed as a shared resource whose sustainable management requires cooperation, dialogue, scientific evidence and equitable utilization. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) represents perhaps the clearest manifestation of this changing reality. The GERD has demonstrated Ethiopia’s growing capacity to mobilize domestic resources and undertake major infrastructure projects in pursuit of its national development objectives. Whatever one’s position on the dam, it has fundamentally changed the political and strategic context of the Nile question.   Consequently, statements that Ethiopia should not be permitted to construct another dam on the Blue Nile cannot provide a serious basis for future policy. Ethiopia’s development needs cannot be indefinitely subordinated to another country’s perception of its own water security. Nor is it realistic to assume that Ethiopia’s development projects on the Nile can be prevented indefinitely through efforts to restrict international financing. The experience of the GERD demonstrated Ethiopia’s ability to mobilize domestic resources when external financing was unavailable. This is an important lesson for all concerned: the future of the Nile cannot be determined through vetoes, pressure or attempts to prevent development. It must be shaped through cooperation. The same applies to the broader political relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt. Attempts to address differences over the Nile through political pressure, geopolitical rivalry or support for destabilizing forces cannot provide a sustainable solution. Such approaches risk deepening mistrust and making an eventual settlement more difficult. Military confrontation is equally untenable. No military strategy can produce sustainable water security. The Nile will continue to flow across borders long after political crises have passed. The only durable answer is therefore a political and diplomatic framework that recognizes the legitimate interests of all riparian countries. Other major transboundary river systems demonstrate that shared rivers need not inevitably become sources of military confrontation. China, for example, shares numerous transboundary rivers with neighboring countries and has developed a variety of mechanisms for managing shared water interests. The experiences of other river basins demonstrate that differences can be managed through dialogue, cooperation and negotiated arrangements. The Comprehensive Framework Agreement and the Changing Regional Context The effort by the Nile Basin riparian states to establish a basin-wide legal framework has been underway for many years. The negotiation of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) was intended to provide a more inclusive and equitable basis for cooperation among the Nile Basin countries. The CFA’s evolution reflects an important reality: upstream countries increasingly expect their interests and development needs to be recognized within the governance of the Nile Basin. The issue is therefore larger than the GERD or the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia. It concerns the fundamental question of how an international river basin should be governed in an era of population growth, climate change, energy transition and rapid economic transformation.   A sustainable Nile framework cannot be built around arrangements negotiated without the participation of all concerned states. Nor can the interests of downstream countries simply be ignored. The answer lies in developing an inclusive framework that accommodates the legitimate concerns of downstream states while recognizing the development rights of upstream countries. Ethiopia’s Cooperative Approach Should Not Be Mistaken for Weakness Since the political transition of 1991, Ethiopia has repeatedly expressed its preference for dialogue and cooperation in addressing the Nile question. The 1993 memorandum of understanding reached during the visit of Ethiopia’s Transitional Government leadership to Cairo and the subsequent 2015 Declaration of Principles on the GERD involving Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan were important demonstrations of Ethiopia’s willingness to engage diplomatically and seek mutually beneficial solutions. The Declaration of Principles was particularly significant because it established a set of principles intended to guide the three countries in addressing issues related to the GERD, including cooperation, equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These initiatives demonstrate that Ethiopia does not seek confrontation with Egypt. Indeed, Ethiopia has repeatedly made clear that it has no intention in harming the Egyptian people. This was amply stated by PM Abiy Ahmed during his offical visit to Cairo. Ethiopians and Egyptians share deep historical, cultural and human bonds. If the two countries estblish cooperation and working together, the benefits will transcend the borders of the two countries. The outcome will have broader regional impact. The Nile should be a bridge connecting the peoples of the two countries rather than a permanent source of antagonism between them. But cooperation is necessarily reciprocal. Ethiopia’s willingness to negotiate should not be interpreted as an acceptance of arrangements that deny its legitimate development interests. Nor should restraint be mistaken for weakness. Ethiopia has legitimate interests in using its natural resources to reduce poverty, expand access to electricity, develop agriculture and transform its economy. At the same time, Ethiopia has an interest in ensuring that its utilization of the Nile is undertaken responsibly and without significant harm to downstream populations. This is precisely why a cooperative framework is possible. The Way Forward: From Confrontation to Cooperation The Nile question has reached a point where old assumptions need to be reconsidered. Egypt’s water-security concerns are legitimate. Ethiopia’s development aspirations are equally legitimate. Sudan also has legitimate interests that must be taken into account. The challenge is to create a framework in which these interests are not viewed as mutually exclusive. The choice before Egypt and Ethiopia should therefore not be framed as a choice between Egyptian water security and Ethiopian development. The real choice is between competition and cooperation; confrontation and dialogue; unilateralism and shared governance. There is considerable room for cooperation. The two countries could strengthen scientific and technical cooperation on hydrology, climate change, drought and flood management, sedimentation, agricultural productivity, electricity trade and water-use efficiency. Ethiopia’s potential for hydropower development and Egypt’s expertise in water management could, for example, become complementary rather than competing assets. A broader economic relationship could also transform the politics of the Nile. Energy trade, investment, infrastructure connectivity, agriculture and regional economic integration could create incentives for both countries to regard the river as an opportunity for mutual benefit rather than a zero-sum contest. The way forward is therefore not through threats, pressure or attempts to prevent Ethiopia from developing its water resources. Nor is it through unilateral actions that disregard the legitimate concerns of downstream countries. The answer is a return to the negotiating table with a different mindset. Egypt needs to recognize that the Nile Basin of the twenty-first century is fundamentally different from the Nile Basin of the nineteenth or twentieth century. Ethiopia, for its part, should continue to demonstrate that its development of the Nile can coexist with the legitimate water-security interests of downstream countries. The central principle should be simple: no country should seek to monopolize a shared river, and no country should be denied its legitimate right to development. The Nile can become either a permanent fault line between Egypt and Ethiopia or an unprecedented opportunity for cooperation between two ancient civilizations. The choice is ultimately political.   What is required now is not another round of confrontation, but a new political understanding—one founded on sovereign equality, equitable and reasonable utilization, mutual respect, scientific cooperation and shared prosperity. The Nile does not belong to one country. It is a shared resource, and its future must be built on shared responsibility. …………………… * The author is former Ethiopian Ambassador to Egypt. The views only represent that of the author alone. Ambassador Teshome Toga Chanaka is a senior Ethiopian politician and veteran diplomat. He served as Speaker of the House of Peoples' Representatives, Minister of Youth, Sports, and Culture, and Commissioner of the National Rehabilitation Commission. In his diplomatic career, he served as Ambassador to the European Union, China, Kenya, and Ghana.