By Bruno Jomba   October 17, 2026 (ENA) For more than a century, Cairo’s policy toward the Horn of Africa and the strategic waters of Bab-el-Mandeb has been defined by a single, zero-sum security doctrine: total control over the Nile Basin and absolute dominance over the maritime choke-points of the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb. Cairo’s national security framework explicitly securitizes both the Nile River and the Suez–Bab-el-Mandeb maritime corridor, treating any autonomous development along these lifelines as a direct challenge to its hegemony. Under this strategic view, a strong, unified, and economically thriving Ethiopia—the natural geographic anchor of East Africa, is perceived not as a partner for shared growth, but as an existential threat. To prevent Ethiopia from realizing its true potential and securing its natural position along the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb corridor, Egypt has consistently sought to project instability onto Ethiopian soil. Whether supporting armed secessionist movements, exploiting internal fractures, or backing anti-state elements across different eras, Cairo's strategy in the Horn of Africa has remained unchanged: keep Ethiopia turned inward, consumed by domestic crises, and stripped of its sovereign maritime reach. The Asmara Axis: A Proxy Regime Designed to Encircle The enduring nature of the Shabia regime in Eritrea must be understood within a wider geopolitical framework. During the colonial era, Eritrean patriots fought valiantly against fascist Italian occupation, rallying behind the rallying cry "Ethiopia or Death"—a testament to their desire for unity and independence. So what happens after Eritrean secession from Ethiopia? Well, the rise of Shabia in Cairo was not merely a domestic development but a calculated geopolitical move aimed at weakening Ethiopia. In the mid-twentieth century, as Ethiopia asserted its sovereignty and regional influence—particularly over the vital Nile headwaters—Egypt sought to extend control over the Red Sea corridor and counter Ethiopia’s growing regional role. By providing safe haven, financial support, and diplomatic infrastructure to exiled political groups and students in Cairo, Egypt effectively fostered a political base that transformed internal grievances into external armed rebellion. State-backed media outlets, such as Cairo-based radio broadcasts, amplified secessionist narratives deep into northern Ethiopia, fueling divisions and eroding national unity. This strategy created a protracted conflict—lasting decades—that drained Ethiopia’s human and material resources, deliberately fragmenting its national fabric and distracting the country from long-term development and regional leadership. Even after secession from Ethiopia, Shabia instead of channeling its resources into infrastructure, economic development, or the welfare of its citizens, the regime in Asmara turned the state into a tool for regional destabilization. The Cairo-backed axis engineered a geopolitical strategy aimed at permanently severing Ethiopia from its historic coastlines at Assab and Massawa. Since its inception, the Eritrean regime has served as a strategic hub for foreign interests intent on keeping Ethiopia landlocked, vulnerable, and economically constrained. Its record across the Horn of Africa speaks volumes: provoking armed clashes with Yemen, engaging in border disputes with Djibouti, waging devastating wars against Ethiopia, and repeatedly intervening in the internal affairs of Sudan and Somalia. External Aggression in Sudan and Regional Impunity The real-world consequences of this aggressive intervention are starkly evident across the region today. In Sudan, as the nation suffers through a devastating internal conflict, foreign meddling has reached alarming levels. Recent Egyptian military strikes targeting civilian artisanal gold miners in Sudan—conducted without mercy for human life—demonstrate a severe disregard for international norms and regional sovereignty. The Sudanese authorities, entangled in an existential conflict, feel compelled to exercise restraint rather than forcefully confront these violations underscores how deeply Egypt exploits regional vulnerabilities to project power without accountability. From the Nile Valley to the Red Sea coast, external interference continues to delay peace and tear apart the social fabric of the Horn. The Heavy Economic Toll of Forced Landlockedness The most severe consequence of this geopolitical containment has been the artificial stripping of Ethiopia’s sea access, turning a proud nation of over 135 million people into the most populous landlocked country on Earth. The loss of Ethiopia’s Red Sea access after 1991 remains an unpardonable betrayal of Ethiopia’s sovereignty. An un-elected transitional administration, lacking any mandate or constitutional authority, unilaterally acquiesced to the separation of Eritrea and the surrender of vital ports like Assab without consulting the Ethiopian people. By endorsing that referendum while denying the nation a voice, this rushed and illegal process stripped a historic power of its coastline without due legal process, leaving over 135 million Ethiopians landlocked and dependent on foreign ports. Every year, Ethiopia is forced to siphon billions of USD out of its national treasury into foreign port and transit fees. This massive financial drain strips the nation of capital that should be building modern hospitals, expanding universities, constructing industrial parks, and modernizing agriculture. High logistics costs burden domestic producers, make Ethiopian exports less competitive on the global market, and leave the economy vulnerable to external supply chain shocks. Had Ethiopia not been systematically cut off from its maritime outlets, those billions of USD would have been reinvested directly into domestic development, elevating Ethiopia into a vastly larger economic superpower and uplifting the entire Horn region. Ethiopia's Two-Water Doctrine To secure its future and guarantee regional stability across the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Bab-el-Mandeb corridor, Ethiopia stands firmly on its fundamental Two-Water Doctrine: First, Ethiopia asserts its absolute right to equitably utilize the waters of the Blue Nile. Projects like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) represent a triumph of self-reliance, designed to generate clean hydro-energy, power regional industrialization, and lift millions out of poverty without harming downstream nations. Second, Ethiopia maintains its imperative for direct, reliable, and sovereign access to the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb. Sovereign sea access is not a luxury; it is a core requirement for national defense, economic growth, and regional integration. No sovereign nation of over 135 million people can be expected to accept permanent maritime imprisonment or surrender its natural geographic rights. A Peaceful Horn Anchored by Ethiopia Despite decades of foreign intervention, proxy aggression, and deliberate encirclement, Ethiopia remains the resilient anchor state of East Africa. The future of the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb must not be dictated by foreign subversion or zero-sum military doctrines. The peoples of Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti share intertwined histories, cultures, and destinies. When Ethiopia thrives, the entire region gains through shared clean energy grids, cross-border trade corridors, and collective security. The Horn of Africa deserves lasting peace, uncompromised sovereignty, and sustainable development—and an empowered, secure Ethiopia with guaranteed access to the sea is the key to unlocking that prosperous future.

By Professor Al Mariam (Emeritus & Attorney at Law) October 16, 2026 (ENA) (𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭’𝐬 𝐬𝐚𝐮𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐠𝐨𝐨𝐬𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐚𝐮𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐠𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫.) On October 14, 2026, President Abdel Fatah El-Sisi responded to warnings made by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich that Egypt would lose its Sinai Peninsula should it attack Israel. El-Sisi asserted that his country had struggled for its land, that it had no plans to annex any territory and that it wanted only security and stability. 𝐄𝐥-𝐒𝐢𝐬𝐢’𝐬 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐛𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐝 𝐝𝐢𝐩𝐥𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐜 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐩𝐥𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐝𝐨 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐡𝐚𝐯𝐞 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐧𝐭𝐲 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐠𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐧𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐢𝐧 𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐨 𝐝𝐞𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐢𝐫 𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐬, 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐠𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲. Ethiopia has never made threats of any kind to occupy or attack Egyptian territory. The building and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in the Blue Nile is a development project in Ethiopia completed in September 2025 with the blood sweat and tears of Ethiopians. The controversy over the GERD is simply about filling and operating the dam, water security downstream, and lack of a shared agreement for cooperation—not Ethiopia’s claim over any Egyptian territory. Ethiopia has never denied Egypt's right to the waters of the Nile River under international law. Ethiopia also has an unquestioned sovereign right to develop its water resources and produce hydroelectric power for its economy consistent with the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, which mandates riparian countries to make equitable and reasonable use of shared water resources and cause no significant harm in doing so. In much the same way as El Sisi communicated to Israel, he should send a similar message of peaceful coexistence to Ethiopia: “Egypt does not want war with Ethiopia. Egypt has no territorial designs on Ethiopia. Egypt respects the sovereignty of Ethiopia, and it expects the same from Ethiopia. Egypt does not and will not support any terror groups or countries that sponsor terror groups to commit terrorism in Ethiopia, covertly provide them with arms and other military equipment under cover of night or otherwise. Differences between the two countries must be settled through negotiations, international law, technological cooperation, and security assurances to each other.” Indeed, this is the standard by which Egypt must deal with Israel, Ethiopia, and all other countries in the Horn of Africa. Three principles in President El-Sisi’s statement should be highlighted. First, he believes that Sinai belongs to Egypt and that its territorial integrity should be preserved. Second, he affirms Egypt wants to defend its territory, not to annex someone else's land. Third, Egypt's national security does not need to compromise the sovereignty of some other state. These three principles apply equally to Ethiopia. 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐜𝐚𝐧𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐲 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐈𝐬𝐫𝐚𝐞𝐥 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐰𝐡𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐭𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚'𝐬 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐨𝐩𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐚 𝐝𝐚𝐦 𝐨𝐧 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐚𝐬 𝐚 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐣𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐩𝐮𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐥𝐲 𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐥𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐚𝐠𝐚𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐨 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐨𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐥𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐬 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐝𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐦 𝐰𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡 𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐟𝐮𝐥 𝐧𝐞𝐠𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐩𝐢𝐫𝐢𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐛𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐡𝐨𝐨𝐝, 𝐦𝐮𝐭𝐮𝐚𝐥 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐛𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐥𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐥 𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐥𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚, 𝐒𝐮𝐝𝐚𝐧, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭. Ethiopia does not deny Nile waters are essential to Egyptian agriculture, drinking-water supply, industry, and national economy. The fact remains Egypt is heavily dependent on the Nile River, while Ethiopia is the principal source of the Blue Nile's headwaters; 86 percent of Nile waters originate in Ethiopia. Egypt's security concerns do not confer a veto over Ethiopia's development. These geographical facts establish a shared need for economic cooperation, not an exclusive right for Egypt to determine how Ethiopia develops its water resources. GERD is Ethiopia’s source of energy to produce electricity and propel its economic development. The major concern that the GERD can impact the scheduling of the water discharge from its reservoir during drought periods can be addressed in a transparent process of information exchange, coordinated operation of the dam, rigorous dam safety regime, and joint drought management system. In January 2020, in a joint statement by Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, the United States, and the World Bank, certain areas of agreement were defined, including the staged filling of the reservoir, drought management, the long-term operation of the dam, coordination, information exchange, and dispute resolution. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐛𝐥𝐞𝐦 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐢𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚 𝐦𝐚𝐣𝐨𝐫 𝐢𝐦𝐩𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬. 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐨𝐛𝐬𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐟𝐢𝐱𝐞𝐝 𝐨𝐧 𝐚 𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐦𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐛𝐥𝐚𝐦𝐞 𝐠𝐚𝐦𝐞 𝐚𝐠𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐭𝐮𝐜𝐤 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐪𝐮𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐜𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐧𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐞𝐫𝐚 𝐚𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬. 𝐇𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐥𝐲 𝐚 𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐤 𝐩𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐬 𝐛𝐲 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐥𝐚𝐮𝐧𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐚 𝐦𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐝𝐞𝐦𝐨𝐧𝐢𝐳𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐚𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐢𝐠𝐧 𝐚𝐠𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚. 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐮𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐚 𝐨𝐟 “𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐦” 𝐚𝐠𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐧𝐞𝐠𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐝𝐨𝐰𝐧-𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐦 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐥𝐚𝐰 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐧𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐬. Ethiopia continues to stand firm in its commitment to assert its right to development and ensure that its rightful use of shared water resources is recognized. The Declaration of Principles 2015 between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan and principles of international watercourse law provide a solution framework. The principles set forth by the Declaration and the Watercourses are that the waters of the Nile may be used in a just and reasonable manner through cooperation and due diligence not to cause any damage to other states. The important point is that the right to water security of the downstream state is not equivalent to an unlimited right to control upstream water resources. Neither can upstream sovereignty mean that the downstream consequences can just be disregarded. The way out of this deadlock is negotiation of rules that are practical, evidence-based, and reciprocal. Egyptian threats and rumors of war against Ethiopia over the Nile 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐚𝐝𝐨𝐩𝐭 𝐚 𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐟𝐮𝐥 𝐝𝐨𝐜𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐞 𝐭𝐨𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐝 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐛𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐨𝐧 𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐫 𝐠𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐰𝐨𝐫𝐤. 𝐓𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐚 𝐥𝐨𝐧𝐠 𝐝𝐨𝐜𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐡𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐨𝐟 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐫𝐡𝐞𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐜, 𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐬 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐨𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐫𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐩𝐮𝐭𝐞. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭, 𝐚 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐚𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐚𝐥 𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐨 𝐮𝐬𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐜𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐬. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐝 𝐝𝐞𝐦𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐰𝐡𝐲 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐚𝐤𝐞 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭’𝐬 𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐥𝐲 𝐡𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐫𝐡𝐞𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐜 𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐮𝐬𝐥𝐲. In 1979, President Anwar Sadat warned that Egypt would not passively accept a threat to its water supply. He dramatically declared, "If Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile water, there will be no alternative but for us to use force." In 2013, President Mohamed Morsi at a televised meeting proclaimed Egypt would support militant forces in Ethiopia and even attack the dam. Over the past seven years, President El-Sisi has warned that tampering with Egypt's Nile water security is its red line, and that the consequences would affect all of the region. Not to appear overly aggressive, El-Sisi has also been speaking with forked tongue that he would prefer diplomacy than not military force, and that Egypt acknowledges the right of Ethiopia to produce power, provided Egypt's water security remains intact. Using Egyptian military power against Ethiopia is not an option. The defeats that Egypt suffered when its forces invaded Ethiopia in the nineteenth century should serve as a lesson not to use military force. In the past, the Egyptian military has launched campaigns to increase Egyptian influence in the Horn of Africa, which includes the Red Sea and the Ethiopian Highlands. History teaches that using military action against Ethiopia will not make Egypt the dominant country or guarantee its exclusive use of Nile waters or solve disputes between the two countries for a lasting peace. The Khedive of Egypt, Ismail Pasha, undertook an invasion of the Ethiopian Empire through military means in the years 1874 and 1876 with the aim of taking control of the whole Nile River Basin to build an empire in Africa. In the Battle of Gundet (1875), Ethiopian forces crushed Egyptian forces. A well-known scholar observed, “Egyptian armies, often with European and American officers, were defeated and practically annihilated by Ethiopian forces led by the Emperor Yohannes on several occasions.” In the Battle of Gura (1876), Ethiopian forces routed invading Egyptian forces. One scholar noted, “Gura, fought six months later [Gundet], confirms the superior capabilities of the Ethiopian military.” Another noted, “Yohannes met the Egyptians in Hamasien and defeated them decisively at Gura in a three days’ battle, 7–9 March 1876.” In the Battle of Adwa against colonial Italy which took place on March 1, 1896, Ethiopian wiped out a highly armed modern European army within just a few hours. A highly regarded contemporary historian wrote, "Unlike Napoleon’s Russian campaign, the Adwa campaign ended in victory. This is greatness." 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐡𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐥𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐧 𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐜𝐚𝐧𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐛𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐬 𝐚 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐰𝐡𝐢𝐜𝐡 𝐰𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐛𝐨𝐰 𝐝𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐭𝐨 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐦𝐢𝐞𝐬 𝐝𝐮𝐞 𝐭𝐨 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐬𝐮𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲. 𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐫 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐩𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐝𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐜 𝐨𝐛𝐣𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐬. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐯𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐥𝐚𝐮𝐧𝐜𝐡𝐞𝐝 𝐛𝐲 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐚𝐠𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐡 𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐲 𝐝𝐢𝐝 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐬𝐮𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐞𝐝, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐧𝐞𝐰 𝐰𝐚𝐫 𝐰𝐚𝐠𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐠𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚, 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐛𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐚𝐦𝐞. It is not a stretch of the imagination to compare Israel’s wars with Egypt’s nineteenth-century campaigns against Ethiopia. During the June 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt was defeated by Israel and its Arab allies. The collapse of the Egyptian army took place in Sinai, and Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula. During the October War of 1973, Egypt won early victories in crossing the Suez Canal and penetrating the defenses of Israel in Sinai. Israel retaliated, crossed the Suez Canal and surrounded Egypt’s Third Army. Sinai was finally reclaimed diplomatically by Egypt, after the signing of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, when Israel withdrew from Sinai in 1982. The strategic significance and political implications of this war is that it allowed Egypt to reclaim Sinai through diplomacy and the 1979 peace agreement. 𝐈𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐩𝐮𝐭𝐞 𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐢𝐥𝐞, 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐥𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐡𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐮𝐬𝐞𝐟𝐮𝐥𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐟𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐨 𝐝𝐢𝐩𝐥𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐜 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐰𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐚𝐜𝐤 𝐒𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐢 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡 𝐝𝐢𝐩𝐥𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐜𝐲 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐚 𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐞 𝐚𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐟𝐭𝐞𝐫 𝐬𝐨𝐦𝐞 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬. 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐝𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐧𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐨 𝐛𝐞 𝐢𝐧 𝐚 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐮𝐨𝐮𝐬 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐰𝐚𝐫 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐈𝐬𝐫𝐚𝐞𝐥. Military action against Ethiopia will neither lead to Egyptian domination over the Nile, ensure the safety of Egypt’s water supply nor force Ethiopia to become a colonial/client state. 𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐰𝐚𝐫 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚, 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐄𝐥-𝐒𝐢𝐬𝐢 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐠𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐚 𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐭𝐨 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐬 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐟𝐮𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐞𝐱𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐟𝐚𝐢𝐫 𝐮𝐬𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐍𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐰𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫. 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐞𝐝, 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐡𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐅𝐫𝐚𝐦𝐞𝐰𝐨𝐫𝐤 𝐀𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐡𝐢𝐜𝐡 𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐡𝐞𝐬 𝐚𝐧 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐟𝐫𝐚𝐦𝐞𝐰𝐨𝐫𝐤 𝐭𝐨 𝐜𝐨𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐛𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐧-𝐰𝐢𝐝𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐠𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐨𝐩𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐢𝐥𝐞. The Nile River does not have to be an obstacle between Ethiopia and Egypt; rather, it should become the link between the two nations. Being united by many factors in common such as the history of the river and economics, the two nations should join hands to turn the Nile water into an engine of peace and prosperity. Ethiopia will never be threatened or intimidated militarily by Egypt in its lawful use of the Nile. Certainly, Ethiopia has no intention or desire to threaten or destabilize Egypt or use military means to dictate the way Egypt develops itself. The events involving Gundet and Gura show that Ethiopia will not be intimidated to give up its sovereignty. The events surrounding the Arab-Israeli war show that victory and defeat on the battlefield will not necessarily resolve the political problems involved. The return of Sinai shows the benefit of diplomacy and agreements. A true victory is one that preserves peace and the sovereignty of a nation. The history of Ethiopians indicates that they have always been strong and united in the defense of their homeland. Whether it was the Battle of Gundet and Gura or the Battle of Adwa, the Ethiopian people showed their capability of organizing their troops and using difficult terrains in order to repel their enemies. The defense of Ethiopia against the invasion of Somalia in 1977-1978 gives one more example of the ability of Ethiopian to resist and repel invaders. One lesson that can be learned from these battles is that when the sovereignty of Ethiopia has ever been challenged, then its people have always shown great determination, resilience and ability to defend their land. This glorious tradition is part of every Ethiopian, but the most important lesson that this tradition teaches us is that the greatest victory is that which is won without any battle. But if the battle becomes inevitable, then every Ethiopian is willing to fight for his motherland, making the Ethiopian National Defense Force invincible. What to do? Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan should commit to non-aggression — pledging not to threaten or use force against one another in violation of the UN Charter, not to support terrorism against each other and to refrain from doing anything that destabilizes the region. The three countries should establish practical arrangements for sharing information, ensuring dam safety, mitigating drought risks, and coordinating reservoir operations. It is important to ensure Ethiopia’s rights to manage its water resources fairly and reasonably, while taking into account the concerns of the downstream nations. Technical differences can be sorted out by negotiations and consultations. Moreover, regular military communications and dialogue under the guidance of the African Union should be held and issues addressed in good faith and good will. 𝐈𝐟 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭'𝐬 𝐜𝐥𝐚𝐢𝐦 𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐬𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐧𝐭𝐲 𝐫𝐞𝐦𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐨𝐟 𝐰𝐚𝐫, 𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐧 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐬𝐢𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐫 𝐜𝐢𝐫𝐜𝐮𝐦𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬. 𝐈𝐟 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐤𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐢𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐛𝐲 𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐟𝐮𝐥 𝐧𝐞𝐠𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐢𝐭𝐬𝐞𝐥𝐟 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐈𝐬𝐫𝐚𝐞𝐥, 𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐧 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐦𝐮𝐬𝐭 𝐛𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐬𝐢𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬. 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐛𝐞 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐥𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐫 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠; 𝐢𝐭 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐛𝐞 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐚 𝐬𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐰𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐞 𝐧𝐞𝐢𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐢𝐬 𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐨 𝐜𝐡𝐨𝐨𝐬𝐞 𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐨𝐩𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐧𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐡𝐛𝐨𝐫. 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐬𝐞𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐨𝐱 — 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐲— 𝐢𝐧 𝐦𝐚𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐚 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐬𝐚𝐲𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐭 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐧𝐨 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐫𝐞𝐭 𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐧 𝐚𝐠𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭 𝐈𝐬𝐫𝐚𝐞𝐥 𝐰𝐡𝐞𝐧 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐬 𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐮𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐜 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐬𝐞 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐮𝐬𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐍𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐰𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐬. 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐄𝐥-𝐒𝐢𝐬𝐢 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐚 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐰𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐡 𝐚𝐝𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐨: 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐝𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐧𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐥𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲. 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 𝐝𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐧𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐥 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐢𝐧 𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐨 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐨𝐩. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐛𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐠𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡 𝐜𝐨𝐨𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧, 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐜𝐨𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐢𝐨𝐧; 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡 𝐚𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭, 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐬; 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭, 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡 𝐡𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐦𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐞𝐬. 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐄𝐠𝐲𝐩𝐭 𝐧𝐞𝐞𝐝𝐬 𝐭𝐨 𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐄𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐚 – 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐰𝐡𝐢𝐜𝐡 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐫𝐡𝐞𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐜 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐛𝐞 𝐡𝐞𝐥𝐝. 𝐋𝐞𝐭’𝐬 𝐣𝐨𝐢𝐧 𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐰𝐞 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐬 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐦𝐚𝐤𝐞 𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐡 𝐨𝐧𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐮𝐬 𝐍𝐈𝐋𝐄 𝐆𝐑𝐄𝐀𝐓!