By staff writer Sept. 22, 2026 (ENA) As the world grapples with the challenges of water scarcity and sustainable development, Egypt's stance on these issues has raised eyebrows. Despite having vast underground water reserves that could last for centuries, even if rainfall in Ethiopia were to cease, Egypt continues to cry foul over the use of the Abay (Nile) River's waters. But is this concern genuinely about water scarcity, or is it a thinly veiled attempt to stifle the development of its neighboring countries? A History of Water Mismanagement Egypt's water management practices are, in fact, among the worst in the world. The country's agricultural sector, which consumes the lion's share of its water resources, is dominated by water-intensive crops like sugarcane and rice. These crops are not only unsustainable but also contribute to the country's water woes. It is ironic that while Egypt is willing to squander its water resources on these crops, it expects other countries, like Ethiopia, to forgo their own development and limit their water usage to a mere trickle.   A Double Standard Egypt's approach to water management is a classic case of "do as I say, not as I do." On one hand, the country is willing to waste its water resources on lavish projects, such as sprawling cities in the desert, while on the other hand, it expects Ethiopians to live in darkness, without even the basic amenities of electricity and clean water. This double standard is not only hypocritical but also a stark reminder of Egypt's proclivity for splashing water into the desert, while denying its neighbors the right to develop their own water resources. A Lack of Gratitude Despite Ethiopia's efforts to plant over 56 billion seedlings, a move that will not only help to reduce water evaporation from the Nile River but also contribute to the global fight against climate change, Egypt has chosen to respond with ingratitude. Instead of thanking Ethiopia for its environmental stewardship, Egypt has opted to destabilize the country, using every trick in the book to undermine its development. This twisted logic is a testament to Egypt's shortsightedness and its inability to see the bigger picture. A Neocolonial Mindset Egypt's behavior towards its neighbors, particularly Sudan, is a stark reminder of its neocolonial mindset. By treating Sudan as an appendage, Egypt is attempting to dismantle the country's sovereignty and reduce it to a mere vassal state. This approach is not only counterproductive but also a threat to regional stability and security. A Brinksmanship Strategy Egypt's ultimate goal is to ensure that no country on either side of the Red Sea thrives. This brinksmanship strategy is a recipe for disaster, as it will only serve to exacerbate tensions and create an environment of mistrust and hostility. By adopting this approach, Egypt is not only harming its neighbors but also undermining its own long-term interests.   In conclusion, Egypt's water woes are a self-inflicted wound, caused by its own mismanagement and hypocrisy. Instead of blaming its neighbors for its water scarcity, Egypt should take a long, hard look at its own practices and policies. By adopting a more sustainable and equitable approach to water management, Egypt can not only ensure its own water security but also contribute to the development and prosperity of its neighboring countries. Until then, Egypt's cries of water scarcity will remain nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to stifle the development of others, while it continues to waste its own water resources with impunity.

Addis Ababa, September 22, 2026 (ENA) —Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation recent statement suggesting that Ethiopians lack education is a manifestation of a crude colonial mentality that defines Cairo’s policy in its relations with African states, Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy underscored. Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Hani Sewilam, recent remarks are deeply regrettable, the ministry said today in a statement issued in response to Sewilam’s remarks. “The statement is a manifestation of a crude colonial mentality that defines Cairo’s policy in its relations with African states,” the said in its statement. For Cairo, its approval is a prerequisite for riparian countries of the Abay/Nile to develop their water resources. This is despite the fact that Egypt proceeded with the construction of the Aswan High Dam with no consultation with any upstream riparian state. The statement issued by Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy noted that inflammatory remarks by Egyptian officials and the double standards they espouse have no place in the context of basin wide cooperation. Ethiopia reaffirms its sovereign right to utilize its natural resources including Abbay River to meet the needs of its present and future generations, it added. It pointed out that Ethiopia has consistently maintained that transboundary rivers should drive cooperation, shared prosperity, and regional integration rather than monopolistic contention, and exclusion, rejecting any notion of hydro-imperialism that seeks to deny source countries their inherent rights as sovereign nations. While some continue to frame the Abay River primarily through the lens of security and zero-sum competition, Ethiopia has invested heavily in watershed rehabilitation, afforestation, and environmental conservation to strengthen the long-term sustainability of the basin. Ethiopia's approach stands in sharp contrast to the hostile narrative that has too often dominated official discourse in Cairo. It is time for Cairo to move from its obsolete policy and approach the matter with a 21st century outlook grounded in mutual respect and the enlightened long-term interests of all, the Ministry underscored, stressing to retire outdated hegemonic dreams and embrace the dawn of a new reality.

September 22, 2026 (ENA) Egypt stands out for its chronic mismanagement of water resources, despite contributing virtually nothing to the flow of the Abay (Nile)—a striking paradox at the heart of the Nile debate. For many hydropower analysts and transboundary water experts, water stored in Egypt’s downstream reservoirs suffers from high rates of evaporation due to the country’s hot desert climate. For Fekahmed Negash, Chairperson of the Advisory Team on Transboundary Water and GERD at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Water and Energy, this downstream nation’s vast reservoir lies in Egypt’s hot desert environment and is exposed to substantial evaporation losses. He estimated that the Aswan High Dam loses about 15 to 16 billion cubic meters of water annually through evaporation. Contrary to popular belief, this hard fact and the UN’s designation of Egypt as a water-scarce country, the nation possesses immense water potential that remains hugely misunderstood. Egypt has underground water enough for hundreds of years even if rain stops in Ethiopia for years. Egypt wastes water and has some of the worst practices in doing so. Egypt acts as if it has a swath of marshland and produces sugarcane and rice. What is appealing is that it wishes others not even to drink fresh water and produce cabbages for it to continue wasting water. Egypt wants Ethiopia to forgo its development and wallow in poverty for Egyptians to enjoy affluence. Egypt has proclivities of splashing water into a desert and creating sprawled cities, while it does not wish Ethiopians to have even light and stoves in their houses. Egypt doesn’t know how to be grateful. They pretend they are scared of water scarcity, but they don’t wish to thank Ethiopia for planning more than 50 billion seedlings. Rather, it leaves no stone unturned to destabilize Ethiopia—what a twist. Egypt believes it is a neighbor to Ethiopia because it considers Sudan just as an appendage. That’s why it is bent on dismantling Sudan using sellouts. Egypt doesn’t wish any country on both sides of the Red Sea to thrive—what a brinkmanship!

The signing of the Pretoria Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in November 2022 was widely hailed as a watershed moment for Ethiopia. After two years of devastating conflict in the northern part of the country, the agreement established a clear, lawful framework to restore constitutional order, demobilize combatants, deliver humanitarian relief, and rebuild shattered communities. Since the signing of the CoHA, the Ethiopian Federal Government has consistently demonstrated its dedication to the spirit and letter of the Pretoria Agreement. Federal institutions moved swiftly to reconnect Tigray to the national grid, restore banking and telecommunications, and reopen commercial air links to Mekelle. The government also facilitated unhindered humanitarian aid access across the region while allocating significant state resources toward rebuilding damaged infrastructure, schools, and healthcare facilities. Fulfilling a core diplomatic requirement, the Federal Parliament officially removed the TPLF from the national list of terrorist organizations to enable inclusive political engagement. Furthermore, in strict adherence to Article 10 of the agreement, the federal government facilitated the setup of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (IRA) to ensure local governance, service delivery, and transitional stability. Beyond initial diplomatic concessions, the Federal Government of Ethiopia backed its commitment to the Pretoria Accord with massive fiscal capital, allocating billions of Birr from the national treasury to finance the immediate reconstruction and socio-economic recovery of the Tigray region. Recognizing that peace cannot take root amid economic ruin, Addis Ababa prioritized funding to rebuild shattered health systems, reconstruct damaged schools, and repair critical transport, power, and telecommunications corridors—treating Tigray’s revitalization as a top national priority. These federal budget transfers, disbursed directly to fund public services, pay civil servants, and subsidize essential commodities, served as tangible proof of the state's determination to integrate Tigray back into the national fabric. Yet, this massive financial goodwill and capital investment have been met with profound bad faith from TPLF hardliners, who have diverted local resources, obstructed federal development projects, and funneled regional administrative funds toward covert re-militarization rather than the civilian welfare the money was meant to secure Rather than channeling its efforts into peaceful political competition and regional recovery, the TPLF leadership has actively undermined the governance framework envisioned at Pretoria. Behind this resistance lies a calculated objective: the hardline Debretsion Gebremichael-led faction seeks to reclaim the unbridled single-party hegemony it once wielded over Ethiopia. Reeling from its loss of federal dominance and resisting the constitutional order, the TPLF's core ambition is to manufacture regional instability, paralyze state institutions, and force a total renegotiation of the Pretoria Accord on terms that insulate its elite leadership from accountability. A central pillar of the peace deal was the establishment of an inclusive Interim Regional Administration, yet hardline factional leaders within the TPLF have systematically moved to dismantle it. By attempting to unilaterally oust IRA leadership, seize regional administrative bodies by force, and reject federal mandates extended to preserve regional stability, the group has shown an alarming disregard for lawful transitional governance. This systematic takeover replaces an inclusive, transitional public administration with single-party rule, directly violating the core principles of the Pretoria Agreement and stripping Tigrayan citizens of civilian-led, accountable governance. To achieve these disruptive ambitions, the TPLF hardliners have entered into unholy, opportunistic alignments with external spoilers and regional adversaries. Taking advantage of broader Horn of Africa geopolitical friction, the faction has cultivated tacit backing from foreign actors seeking to exploit Ethiopia’s internal vulnerabilities. Chief among these actors are the regimes in Cairo and Asmara, whose historic and strategic interests align with maintaining a fractured, vulnerable Ethiopian state. For the regime in Egypt, the motive is rooted in an existential paranoia over the Nile waters and the operational reality of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Cairo has long viewed any strong, unified, and economically sovereign Ethiopia as a direct threat to its centuries-old hydro-hegemony over the Abay River. Unable to halt the completion of the GERD through international diplomacy or legal coercion, Egypt’s intelligence and diplomatic apparatus has pivoted toward zero-sum encirclement. By funneling indirect backing, diplomatic cover, and operational logistical channels to dissident Ethiopian factions, Cairo seeks to keep Addis Ababa consumed by internal fires. For Egypt, an Ethiopia locked in civil strife is an Ethiopia incapable of projecting power, advancing downstream development, or asserting its sovereign rights over regional trade and maritime infrastructure. Eritrea’s totalitarian regime, led by Isaias Afwerki, operates under a parallel strategy driven by deeply rooted hostility toward Ethiopian regional dominance and a toxic political history with TPLF elites. Though Asmara and the TPLF fought a brutal war from 1998 to 2000, current tactical interests have forced an opportunistic convergence. As Ethiopia asserts its sovereign ambition to secure reliable access to the Red Sea, President Isaias views a consolidated, economically dynamic Ethiopia as a threat to his regime’s regional influence and maritime monopoly. Capitalizing on internal Ethio-Tigrayan political friction, Asmara has quietly opened channels with TPLF hardliners and other insurgent actors, stoking localized militarization to wrap Ethiopia in a web of perpetual border security crises. Together, Cairo and Asmara have turned the Horn of Africa into a theater of proxy warfare, leveraging the TPLF hardline faction as an instrumental lever to destabilize the nation from within. These external allies provide diplomatic cover, logistics, and material support to keep northern Ethiopia in a state of perpetual crisis. By acting as a proxy for regional forces hostile to Ethiopia’s economic self-determination and territorial integrity, the TPLF leadership is actively outsourcing the destabilization of its own homeland. The Pretoria Agreement explicitly mandated the complete Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Tigrayan armed forces, establishing that Ethiopia has only one unified national defense force. While the federal government created the national DDR framework, the TPLF has resisted full disarmament. Large contingents of combatants remain armed, active, and organized under regional command structures. Reports of re-armament, forced recruitment, and offensive troop movements near regional borders—coordinated with external elements—signal that the group is actively preparing for another round of war rather than choosing peace. Holding civilian populations hostage to the threat of renewed hostility severely jeopardizes regional security, stalls economic recovery, and prolongs human suffering across northern Ethiopia. The international community, including the African Union, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union, played a constructive role in bringing the parties to the negotiating table in 2022, and international partners must now step up enforcement to protect that investment in peace. International actors must clearly name and condemn actions that violate the CoHA, particularly the dismantling of the Interim Administration and refusals to complete disarmament. Support for transitional programs should be tied directly to measurable, verified progress in the DDR process, alongside unequivocal support for legitimate federal authority and legally recognized interim governance. Additionally, international aid agencies must ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches the civilian population directly without being diverted or hijacked by armed factions. A growing awareness among key international stakeholders reveals that the primary bottleneck to lasting peace in northern Ethiopia is no longer a lack of federal goodwill, but the deliberate subversion orchestrated by hardline TPLF factions and their external regional enablers. Recent diplomatic measures by the U.S. government—specifically targeted visa restrictions imposed under Section 212(a)(3)(C) against hardline TPLF figures and associated actors complicit in eroding the Pretoria Accord—mark a vital shift toward accountability. By directly penalizing those responsible for dismantling the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, delaying disarmament, and orchestrating illegal re-militarization, Washington has effectively validated the Ethiopian state's long-standing position: that recalcitrant internal elites and external spoilers, particularly those aligning with foreign interests in Asmara and Cairo, are the true perpetrators of volatility in the Horn of Africa. To protect the immense investment in peace, international partners must build upon these initial accountability steps and construct a systematic enforcement architecture. Diplomatic declarations must evolve into rigorous, conditional enforcement where developmental aid, transitional support, and international legitimacy are strictly contingent upon verifiable compliance with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) protocols. Furthermore, aid agencies and international monitors must audit humanitarian delivery mechanisms to prevent armed factions from hijacking relief supplies to fuel illicit mobilization. By unequivocally backing legitimate, constitutionally recognized interim governance and escalating targeted sanctions against both internal hardliners and external spoilers, the African Union, United Nations, United States, and European Union can ensure that the Pretoria Agreement remains a durable bridge to peace rather than a temporary pause in conflict. To secure a lasting peace in the Horn of Africa, the international community can no longer afford the dangerous posture of false equivalence. The Pretoria Agreement provided a clear, legal path toward national restoration, yet its fulfillment remains hostage to the revisionist ambitions of TPLF hardliners and the zero-sum geopolitical games of foreign spoilers in Cairo and Asmara. Allowing internal actors to dismantle lawful interim governance and re-militarize under the cover of foreign backing risks not only unraveling Ethiopia’s hard-won stability, but also igniting a wider regional conflagration. The global community—led by the AU, UN, US, and EU—must move decisively beyond passive rhetoric. By enforcing strict accountability, conditioning support on verified disarmament, and confronting foreign intervention, international stakeholders can neutralize these disruptive forces, protect the integrity of the Pretoria Accord, and ensure that Ethiopia’s sovereign trajectory remains defined by peace, unity, and economic progress.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopia’s President Taye Atske Selassie called for a fundamental shift in the global renewable-energy agenda—from simply expanding power generation to building the grids, storage, financing and productive systems needed to turn clean electricity into economic transformation. Addressing the “Delivering Electrify Now” High-Level Leaders Dialogue of the Global Renewables Summit in New York, President Taye said countries endowed with abundant renewable resources need stronger international support to convert their energy potential into reliable electricity access, industrial growth and inclusive prosperity. “Generation without grids, storage and robust utility capacity cannot drive economic transformation,” the President said, stressing that international financing must support the entire electricity value chain—from generation and transmission to distribution, storage and last-mile connections. The Global Renewables Summit, held during Climate Week NYC alongside the UN General Assembly, is bringing together political leaders, businesses, investors and international institutions to accelerate renewable-powered electrification and address the infrastructure and investment barriers slowing the energy transition.   President Taye said Ethiopia brings substantial renewable-energy potential to the global discussion, with more than 95 percent of its installed generation capacity coming from renewable sources. He highlighted the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and other renewable-energy investments as key foundations for expanding electricity access and powering the country’s industrialization. He outlined three interconnected priorities for Ethiopia: expanding and diversifying renewable generation, with installed capacity targeted to reach up to 14,000 MW by 2030 and non-hydro renewables accounting for at least 15 percent; using clean and affordable electricity to strengthen industrial competitiveness, including through industrial parks; and pursuing macroeconomic and energy-sector reforms to attract greater private investment, including increased private-sector participation in transmission and distribution. But the President emphasized that finance remains the critical link between renewable-energy potential and actual development. He called for more bankable projects supported by public resources and international partners, including the World Bank, African Development Bank and the European Union through Global Gateway. Particular attention, he said, should go to transmission infrastructure, substations, grid reinforcement, reconductoring and last-mile connections.   President Taye cited Ethiopia’s experience financing the GERD through domestic resources and broad public mobilization as an example of the importance of national ownership and commitment. At the same time, he stressed that international financial cooperation remains essential for developing countries seeking to build modern, reliable and interconnected electricity systems. He expressed appreciation for international support to Ethiopia’s power sector, including the European Union’s RISED programme, as well as assistance from the World Bank and African Development Bank in modernizing, rehabilitating and digitalizing electricity infrastructure. The President also warned that the global energy transition cannot deliver its full promise if renewable investment remains concentrated in a limited number of wealthy regions. For developing countries, he said, the ambition must go beyond generating renewable power: from energy potential to electricity access, from access to productive use, and from productive use to industrialization and job creation.   As Ethiopia prepares to host COP32 in Addis Ababa in 2027, President Taye said the country will work to help ensure that global climate and renewable-energy commitments translate into concrete implementation across Africa. His message comes as the international renewable-energy agenda increasingly focuses not only on expanding generation but also on scaling grids, storage and electrification to make clean power usable across economies.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) — Ethiopia’s pursuit of equitable access to the sea is an imperative agenda for the country’s economic growth, national security, regional stability and integration, House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR) member Ambassador Dina Mufti said. In an exclusive interview with ENA, Ambassador Dina said Ethiopia’s growing population and economy, coupled with evolving regional security dynamics, have made access to the sea an increasingly important national interest. He emphasized that Ethiopia is pursuing its quest for sea access through diplomatic means and seeks arrangements based on mutual benefit and respect for the interests and sovereignty of neighboring countries. According to Dina, Ethiopia’s interest in securing sea access is underpinned by historical, geographic, economic and security considerations. He noted that Ethiopia historically had access to the sea and used maritime routes for trade for many years, adding that the country’s loss of direct access to the sea has had significant economic and strategic implications. The ambassador also pointed to Ethiopia’s geographic proximity to the Red Sea as another factor underpinning its interest in securing access. He noted that some parts of Ethiopia are located relatively close to the Red Sea coastline and argued that the country has historical and legal grounds to pursue equitable access. Dina further explained that Ethiopia’s rapidly growing population and expanding economy are increasing the volume of international trade, thereby strengthening the need for diversified and reliable access to maritime routes. He said Ethiopia currently depends heavily on the Port of Djibouti for its maritime trade, noting that reliance on a single port can increase transportation costs, create logistical delays and expose the country’s trade to congestion and other disruptions. As Ethiopia’s imports and exports continue to expand, the diversification of port access has consequently become increasingly important, he added. Beyond economic considerations, Dina linked Ethiopia’s sea access agenda to regional peace and security, particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. He noted that the region continues to face security challenges, while piracy, human trafficking, arms and drug trafficking and other illicit activities pose risks to maritime security and international trade. According to the lawmaker, Ethiopia could make a meaningful contribution to addressing such challenges by strengthening its engagement in maritime affairs and maintaining the capacity to monitor developments that could affect its national interests and regional security. Ethiopia needs to be present in maritime areas in order to monitor developments at sea and better address issues that could affect the country, he added. Dina stressed that Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access is being advanced through diplomacy and is not intended to undermine the sovereignty or territorial integrity of neighboring countries. “Ethiopia is not interested in hurting or invading anyone,” Dina said, stressing that the country seeks sea access through a “win-win” approach. He further said Ethiopia’s economic prosperity and development could generate benefits for neighboring countries as well, given the close economic, social and security interdependence among countries of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s prosperity, growth and advancement would also be in the interest of neighboring countries, Dina said, underscoring the importance of cooperation and mutually beneficial regional integration.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) —Sudan’s warring parties should acknowledge that neither can secure an outright military victory and give negotiations a chance to end the conflict, Getachew Reda, adviser to the Ethiopian Prime Minister on East African affairs, said. Speaking to Pulse of Africa, Getachew said “Sudan deserves to be at peace,” warning that continued fighting is worsening displacement and humanitarian suffering. The war, which erupted in April 2023 between Sudan’s army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has devastated the country, driving millions from their homes, disrupting basic services and deepening a humanitarian crisis. The advisor said the best path forward would be for army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, to recognize that neither side was likely to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. As a result, Getachew said, millions of people have been forced to flee their homes and leave Sudan, as the conflict continues to deepen the country’s fragmentation. “Sudan has faced disintegration,” he said, pointing to the emergence of competing authorities and the division of control between the RSF and the Sudanese national army. “The best scenario is going to be for the two sides to realize that they cannot win an outright victory and to give negotiation a chance,” he said. Getachew said the conflict had also undermined what he described as a longstanding tradition of political accommodation in Sudan, where rival political figures had historically been able to coexist after changes of government. “You remove him from power. He removes you from power. But still, killing has hardly been the characteristic of the political class in Sudan,” he said. That tradition of political accommodation had been severely damaged by the current conflict, he said, describing the situation as “absolutely chaotic” and accusing both sides of contributing to the destruction of civilian areas and infrastructure. The war has also produced one of the world’s largest displacement crises. A UN report shows that since the conflict began, around 8.6 million people have been internally displaced, while about 19.5 million people are facing crisis levels of food insecurity. For Ethiopia, which shares a long border with Sudan, the conflict has wider implications, Getachew said, citing the influx of Sudanese refugees and the potential for instability in Sudan to affect Ethiopia. He warned that prolonged lawlessness could create opportunities for armed groups and other actors seeking to destabilize Ethiopia. “The elements that are given assignments to destabilize Ethiopia consider the lawlessness in Sudan a very classic environment for them to operate,” he said. Getachew also said Ethiopia should remain alert to the presence of what he described as anti-Ethiopian extremist elements within the broader Sudanese conflict. Despite those security concerns, he said Ethiopia’s interest was in seeing Sudan move toward a negotiated political settlement rather than a military victory by either side. He said any transition should ultimately be driven by civilians and smaller political forces, which he argued should come together to chart a future for Sudan. “Unfortunately, reason seems to be missing in action when it comes to the bigger players in the Sudanese conflict,” Getachew said. Since the war began in April 2023, IGAD, the African Union, the United Nations and other partners have pursued mediation efforts to end the conflict, but without a lasting breakthrough The mediators continue to stress that a sustainable solution must be Sudanese-led and owned by the Sudanese people. Despite these efforts, the war has continued and the humanitarian crisis has worsened. Last week, UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued a “mea culpa” (admission of fault) over the international community’s inadequate response, calling for greater attention to the suffering caused by the war.

Addis Ababa, September 21, 2026 (ENA) —The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, and United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres have co-chaired a high-level AU–UN meeting on the margins of the 81st United Nations General Assembly to deepen strategic cooperation, strengthen peace and security frameworks, and advance global financial reforms in support of Africa. According to a social media post by the AU, the meeting reaffirmed the two institutions’ shared commitment to supporting Africa’s efforts to address structural challenges and promote a fairer international order. Key issues discussed included reform of the international financial architecture, debt sustainability, and ensuring that African countries derive greater value from their critical mineral resources. The two sides underscored the strategic importance of AU–UN cooperation, including the three existing cooperation frameworks, and the need to finalise the joint roadmap beyond 2026. The United Nations was reaffirmed as a key partner of the AU in addressing peace and security challenges on the continent. On peace and security, the meeting highlighted the need to strengthen Africa’s peace and security architecture, reinforce preventive diplomacy and mediation, and ensure adequate resources to support African-led solutions to African challenges. The discussions also reviewed developments in the Sahel, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including continued support for the mediation led by Togo in the DRC. The meeting further expressed concern over external shocks, including conflicts, disruptions to global supply chains, and maritime chokepoints, which are placing additional pressure on African economies and food security. The potential impact of climate-related events was also highlighted. The two sides agreed on the need for concrete follow-up action, including finalising the AU–UN roadmap, planned engagements on Libya and Sudan, identifying countries most vulnerable to food insecurity, and developing contingency measures through strengthened coordination and financing.