Addis Ababa, July 31, 2026 (ENA) —The banned Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has once again launched an aggressive campaign of public mobilization and war propaganda that could push the Tigray region toward another devastating cycle of conflict. Leaders of the illegal faction have openly stated the purpose of these gatherings: to prepare the region for renewed confrontation with the Federal Government of Ethiopia. According to the criminal clique leaders’ public remarks, the campaign is aimed at laying the political and psychological groundwork for another destructive war. The faction leaders, including Debretsion Gebremichael and Fetlework Gebregziabher, have publicly declared that they are preparing for armed conflict against the Ethiopian federal government. They have also expressed their intention to align with anti-Ethiopian forces operating both within the country and abroad. The group has intensified a coordinated propaganda campaign, publicly declaring: “Now that our preparations are complete, we will begin our work from the gates of Addis Ababa alongside our allies.” Political commentators warn that such rhetoric signals a dangerous escalation that could destabilize not only northern Ethiopia but also the wider Horn of Africa unless the international community breaks its silence and exerts meaningful pressure on the TPLF leadership. The faction’s renewed mobilization is widely portrayed as a direct challenge to the peace established under the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in November 2022. At the time of the agreement, the TPLF leadership was reportedly in a state of severe military and political disarray. The Federal Government held the military advantage and possessed the capacity to eliminate the group. Instead, it chose a negotiated settlement, allowing the remnants of the faction to survive in order to give the people of Tigray an opportunity to heal, rebuild, and pursue a peaceful future. That decision reportedly created significant diplomatic friction with Asmara. The Eritrean government favored the total defeat of the TPLF, while Addis Ababa maintained that Tigray was an integral part of Ethiopia and that lasting peace was essential for national recovery. Ethiopia proceeded with the implementation of its obligations under the Pretoria Accord. However, that the TPLF leadership used the post-war period not for rehabilitation and reconstruction, but to secretly rearm and reorganize, thereby violating the core principles of the Pretoria Agreement. The Eritrean government, meanwhile, is accused of continuing a long-standing strategy of keeping Ethiopia weak and divided. Analysts claim that Asmara views a strong and economically prosperous Ethiopia as a strategic threat and has allegedly continued supporting anti-Ethiopian elements even during periods of improved bilateral relations. One of the most striking developments is the emerging alliance between TPLF remnants and Asmara. The TPLF’s own internal assessments documented severe atrocities allegedly committed by Eritrean forces in Tigray during the war. Yet the same TPLF leadership is now reportedly aligning itself with Asmara and other regional proxy forces. For the Eritrean government, this alliance is portrayed as a tactical arrangement designed to turn Tigray into a buffer zone that shields Eritrea from future conflict. For the TPLF leadership, it is presented as a desperate effort to regain political relevance at the expense of Tigrayan lives. The rhetoric of war is growing louder, and the machinery of mobilization appears to be accelerating. Observers warn that renewed conflict in Tigray would not remain a localized crisis; it could trigger wider instability across the Horn of Africa, disrupt regional economic corridors, intensify humanitarian pressures, and threaten broader security dynamics. The international community, they argue, must not remain passive while a rogue faction threatens the stability of an entire region. Global actors—including the United Nations, the African Union, and key Western partners—should move beyond expressions of concern and apply direct diplomatic pressure on those accused of orchestrating military mobilization and undermining the Pretoria peace process. Many of this view contend that sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and other targeted measures should be directed at individuals responsible for fueling renewed conflict. They warn that the cost of inaction could be measured not only in renewed bloodshed in northern Ethiopia, but also in a prolonged regional crisis capable of destabilizing the Horn of Africa for years to come.

With analysis from Pulse of Africa (POA) July 29, 2026 (ENA) For decades, Egypt’s discourse on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has been dominated by alarmist rhetoric rooted in fears of water deprivation and existential threats. This narrative was largely shaped by Egypt’s reliance on colonial-era treaties, such as the 1929 and 1959 agreements, which prioritized Egyptian water rights and excluded upstream nations like Ethiopia. Egyptian politicians, media outlets, and commentators consistently portrayed the GERD as a strategic weapon designed to starve Egypt of its vital water resources. Former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, in a 2013 cabinet meeting, famously declared, “If Egypt's share of Nile water decreases by one drop, our blood will be the alternative... All options are open to protect Egypt’s water security.” Similarly, Mohamed Nasr El-Din Allam, Egypt’s former Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, argued that the construction of the GERD was a “direct violation of Egypt's historical water rights,” threatening to “destroy millions of acres of Egyptian farmland,” displace populations, and trigger severe water scarcity nationwide. Egypt’s media and political discourse often painted the dam as a threat to regional stability, with sensational claims suggesting Ethiopia aimed to alter the hydrology of the Nile deliberately. Media outlets regularly depicted the GERD as an existential threat, designed to “starve the Egyptian people,” “hold Cairo hostage,” and “disrupt the natural flow of the Nile.” This alarmist tone fostered a zero-sum view of Nile water management, where any upstream development was seen as an act of hostility and a threat to Egypt’s survival. For many years, this narrative shaped Egyptian policy and public opinion, emphasizing the need to defend “water security” at all costs, often at the expense of regional cooperation or scientific understanding. However, recent developments highlight a subtle but important shift in the Egyptian discourse, driven by expert analyses and a growing recognition of hydrological realities. A notable turning point was an extensive interview with Dr. Abbas Sharaky, a Professor of Water Resources and Geology at Cairo University, hosted on the Masrawy platform. While the interview contained some subjective grievances and lingering concerns about safety protocols, it also included fundamental acknowledgments that challenge the long-standing alarmist narrative. Dr. Sharaky stated, “From a geographical and geological perspective, the mountainous and rocky nature of the terrain surrounding the Renaissance Dam makes it virtually impossible to use the water for massive agricultural expansion in the adjacent region.” This insight directly counters the myth that Ethiopia intends to divert Nile water for large-scale irrigation projects around the reservoir. Instead, the physical landscape of the dam’s environment acts as a natural barrier, making such diversion infeasible. Furthermore, Dr. Sharaky emphasized the inevitability of water flowing downstream, regardless of upstream storage. He explained, “The water stored in the Renaissance Dam has no geographical path forward other than rushing toward Sudan and Egypt. Therefore, I always say to Ethiopians: ‘Preserve this water, because it is ultimately Egyptian water coming to us.’ Ethiopia has no choice but to open the gates to generate electricity or discharge the surplus.” This statement aligns with the hydrological principle that water, governed by gravity and river hydraulics, cannot be permanently diverted or consumed upstream without downstream repercussions. The recognition that the GERD essentially functions as a storage and flow regulation asset, rather than a water-consuming project, marks a significant departure from previous fears of water theft. In a striking admission, Dr. Sharaky described the GERD as a “de facto Egyptian reserve dam on Ethiopian land,” asserting, “In a geological and hydrological sense, the water is forced to flow toward Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia can close the gates for a limited period, but it will be forced to open them.” This understanding underscores the fact that Ethiopia’s ability to withhold water indefinitely is limited by physical and hydrological constraints, and that the dam’s primary function is to regulate water flow rather than to control or divert it. Egypt’s ongoing water security remains intact, according to the expert. Dr. Sharaky affirmed that the country is “in a state of water safety thanks to the presence of the High Aswan Dam, Lake Nasser, and recognized national efforts.” While concerns about safety and operational protocols persist, the expert emphasized that Egyptian infrastructure and strategic reserves provide a buffer against immediate crises, countering claims that the GERD will cause an imminent drought. This emerging recognition of hydrological facts does not signify a paradigm shift in Egyptian policy or rhetoric but highlights an urgent need for a broader understanding rooted in science rather than political rhetoric. For decades, Egyptian public discourse relied on zero-sum assumptions—believing that any upstream water retention was equivalent to theft or destruction of Egyptian rights. The detailed insights from hydrologists like Dr. Sharaky demonstrate that the physical realities of the Nile basin—such as terrain, gravity, and the non-consumptive nature of hydroelectric turbines—must form the basis for future negotiations and regional cooperation. Grounding Egyptian policy in scientific principles opens the door for more pragmatic regional agreements, such as cross-border power purchase deals, joint climate resilience initiatives, and shared development projects. It also encourages a shift away from fear-driven narratives towards mutual understanding and cooperation, vital for sustainable Nile basin management. The change in tone observed in Dr. Sharaky’s interview—moving from emotional rejection to recognition of the dam’s limited impact—represents an essential step in this process. While political rhetoric may lag behind, science and geography remain unalterable. Emphasizing hydrological facts over sensationalism is crucial for fostering trust among Nile riparian states and developing cooperative frameworks that benefit all parties. As regional dynamics evolve, Egypt’s commitment to science-based discourse and regional integration will be key to ensuring stability, shared prosperity, and sustainable management of the Nile’s vital water resources.