By Michias Serlemo October 2, 2026 (ENA) Recent recycled statements beaming out of Cairo and Asmara contain claims that Ethiopia’s pushback against their forces both on the propaganda and on-the-ground military fronts was an attempt to deflect local tensions. But the realities show glaring continuity of that familiar historical pattern of regional destabilization by the two. The relationship between Egypt and Eritrean political movements has long been shaped by the strategic anxieties of the Horn of Africa. Cairo’s interest in Eritrea was not simply an expression of solidarity with anticolonial nationalism. Ethiopia’s size, location, and control of the Blue Nile made its political direction consequential to Egyptian perceived “security”. Egypt and Asmara have pursued a continuous, coordinated conspiracy to dismantle Ethiopia and there is ample evidence that establish this assertion. Cairo and the early Eritrean movement Egyptian engagement with Eritrean separatism dates to the movement’s formative years. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was established in Cairo in 1960 by exiled Eritrean leaders and students. Egypt offered a political environment in which Eritrean activists could organize, and Cairo’s media gave nationalist and anticolonial messages a regional audience. Egyptian authorities also provided refuge and diplomatic access to Eritrean figures. These connections helped the movement gain visibility and international reach. They also served Egyptian interests. In the decades after the Second World War, Cairo sought influence across Africa and the Arab world, while viewing the Nile basin and Red Sea as central to its security. Ethiopia, a large and increasingly assertive state upstream on the Blue Nile, was therefore more than a neighbor. Supporting Eritrean nationalists offered Cairo a way to cultivate influence near Ethiopia’s northern frontier and to maintain leverage in a strategically important region. Egypt not only saw Eritrean politics as a useful arena for influence, but pursues a policy of providing direct financial, military and training support to adversarial and armed elements to really harm the stability of Ethiopia, a source of 85 percent of the waters of the Nile. Continued support to such elements, in Egypt’s calculations, would mean that pressure on successive Ethiopian governments. That relationship now morphed into a situation where Cairo control much of the policies pursued by the Eritrean movement against Ethiopia. The ELF and later the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) never had local constituencies, and leadership, and political aims are often imports. Nile politics and proxy Egypt’s hegemonic take-all related to the Nile is central to understanding Egyptian policy. For generations, Egyptian governments have treated total ownership and secure access to the river as a vital national interest. Ethiopia’s development of the Blue Nile—including the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—has intensified a longstanding dispute over water, development, and regional authority. From Cairo’s perspective, a stronger Ethiopia could alter the balance of power in the basin. From Addis Ababa’s perspective, development of the river is essential to electricity generation, economic growth, and poverty reduction. It is plausible that Egyptian policymakers have viewed political pressure on Ethiopia as advantageous, a pressure that they perfected now to thinly veiled interference. A country occupied by internal conflict has less capacity to pursue ambitious regional projects. To establish that Egypt deliberately supported Eritrean factions in order to prevent Ethiopian development of the Nile is not contested. Egypt’s support for Eritrean independence was designed to deprive Ethiopia of coastline. Eritrea’s independence in 1993 did leave Ethiopia landlocked, transforming its access to trade and maritime routes. That change had major strategic consequences, and Egypt recognized Eritrea quickly. Eritrean independence followed a long-armed struggle and a political settlement shaped by imposed foreign policies. Independence, war, and mutual suspicion The end of the armed struggle did not bring durable harmony between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea became an independent state in 1993, though through rushed process and shady international deal. The 1998–2000 border war then produced immense human and economic costs. The conflict demonstrated how quickly unresolved disputes could become militarized and how regional alignments could complicate efforts at peace. Egypt had vested interests in the Red Sea and the Nile basin. Egypt waged several 19th century wars against Ethiopia, all of which repelled by the latter. In modern times Cairo reverted to directing Asmara’s military decisions, while providing backing to local militants that embolden them to carry out specific acts of aggression. Egypt waged several wars against the Ethiopian Empire in the 19th century, consisting of two primary invasion campaigns/major military offensives (1874–1876) under Khedive Isma'il Pasha. Asmara served as a hub for every anti-Ethiopian movement as can be verifiably substantiated historically. Contemporary conflict and information warfare Recent regional tensions have exposed a Cairo–Asmara alignment against Ethiopia. There are reasons for concern. Egypt and Ethiopia remain at odds over the GERD, and Ethiopia’s internal conflicts have been incentivized through backing flowing from known foreign sources. In fact, with the international community largely silent, Egypt is shifting to overt military support to those bent on making the Horn of Africa region one large battlefield. The Horn’s history gives Ethiopia legitimate grounds to scrutinize foreign involvement, including any material support to armed groups, and expose them before the world. Foreign actors have always exploited, sometimes even created, internal divisions. Information warfare compounds the problem. Egypt through its partisan outlets, and social media foment messages detrimental to regional stability. Sovereignty, development, and regional stability Ethiopia has a legitimate interest in defending its sovereignty and preventing outside support for armed violence. It also has a strong interest in avoiding a permanent security posture in which every neighboring state is treated as an enemy. The costs of prolonged conflict are borne chiefly by ordinary people: public resources are diverted from health, education, infrastructure, and employment, while trade and regional integration suffer. Eritreans and Egyptians, too, have little to gain from a Horn of Africa trapped in cycles of confrontation. Cairo and Asmara, however, choose this destructive path. Ethiopia can strengthen its position by presenting clear evidence of foreign interference, using regional and international institutions where appropriate, and maintaining channels for diplomacy even during periods of tension. Negotiations over the Nile should address the legitimate development needs of upstream countries. Practical cooperation on trade, transport, energy, and border security could reduce the incentives for proxy competition. Egypt and its proxy Eritrea do no chose this sane path to security. History does reveal a recurring pattern: states pursue influence through alliances, media, diplomacy, and sometimes support for armed movements. Egypt’s early engagement with Eritrean nationalism belongs within that history. Cairo’s overblown concerns about the Nile and Red Sea help explain why it would seek a presence in Eritrean affairs. Eritrea’s relations with Ethiopia, meanwhile, have at times been shaped by rivalry and strategic calculation. Looking at its historical and contemporary totality, the facts on the ground and trends clearly establish a seamless, decades-long Cairo–Asmara plot to weaken Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s Unwavering Legitimacy Amidst relentless external conspiracies, proxy warfare, and hostile encirclement, Ethiopia’s policy posture has stood as a beacon of legality, restraint, and constructive statesmanship. Throughout disputes concerning regional security, border administration, and transboundary water utilization (such as the equitable and reasonable use of the Nile under the Declaration of Principles), Ethiopia has consistently adhered to international legal frameworks, multilateral diplomacy, and peaceful dialogue. Despite possessing clear justification to respond aggressively to decades of proxy provocation, successive Ethiopian administrations have prioritized regional stability, economic partnership, and peaceful coexistence. Ethiopia has repeatedly extended olive branches, pursued regional peace initiatives, and championed African solutions to African problems. Ethiopia’s actions are fully legitimate under international law, grounded in the inherent right of self-defense, sovereign equality, and the promotion of mutual development. While external actors invest in division, destruction, and proxy proxies, Ethiopia continues to anchor its national mission on regional integration, infrastructural connectivity, and the shared prosperity of its peoples. The historical record is unequivocal: the enduring alliance between Cairo and Asmara has served as a principal engine of instability in the Horn of Africa. From the earliest days of armed insurgency to modern-day proxy sponsorship, Shaebia has acted as the operational arm of an external strategy designed to keep Ethiopia weak, divided, and preoccupied with internal survival. Yet, history also demonstrates the resilience of the Ethiopian state. Standing on firm moral, legal, and diplomatic ground, Ethiopia continues to navigate these complex geopolitical traps through patience, adherence to international law, and an unwavering commitment to peace. True regional stability will only dawn when external actors abandon their anachronistic proxy games, respect Ethiopian sovereignty, and embrace genuine, mutually beneficial regional cooperation.

Staff Writer October 1, 2026 (ENA) From the ballot box to a new government, Ethiopia enters a defining chapter of its democratic journey Ethiopia is moving into a decisive new chapter of its political journey, with the country’s federal government set to be formed following the conclusion of the 7th General Election and the establishment of newly elected regional and city councils. The transition marks a critical moment for Africa’s second-most populous nation, not simply because a new administration is taking shape, but because the country is seeking to translate an enormous electoral exercise into functioning institutions, political representation and a renewed national mandate. On October 5, 2026, Ethiopia is scheduled to inaugurate the newly elected House of People’s Representatives and formally establish the new federal government, completing the constitutional process that followed the June 1 general election. The date represents more than the opening of a new parliamentary term. It is the point at which the ballot box gives way to governance, as elected representatives assume responsibility for translating electoral mandates into policies, laws and public institutions. The 7th General Election was conducted on a scale rarely seen in Ethiopia’s history. More than 54 million citizens registered to vote, while 51.7 million cast ballots, according to the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). Forty-two political parties fielded 10,438 candidates, alongside 80 independent candidates, in an electoral process that extended across the country. For Ethiopia, the significance of the moment lies not only in the numbers. It lies in what comes next. From Ballots to Institutions The election has now moved beyond campaigning and voting. Its results are being translated into institutional authority. The Prosperity Party secured 438 of the 501 House of Peoples’ Representatives seats for which results were announced, giving it the parliamentary majority required under Ethiopia’s constitutional system to form the federal executive. The result gives the incoming government a clear parliamentary mandate. But the next chapter will ultimately be measured not by the size of the electoral victory, but by how that mandate is converted into effective governance. That responsibility comes at a consequential time. Ethiopia is simultaneously navigating economic reform, national dialogue, peacebuilding, institutional reform, regional diplomacy and an ambitious development agenda. The new administration will therefore inherit not merely the authority to govern, but a broad set of expectations from citizens, businesses, political actors and international partners. The transition from electioneering to governing will be the real test of the country's institutions. Regional Governments Already Taking Shape The federal transition is being preceded by developments at the regional and city levels.Regional councils have begun constituting their governments and electing their chief administrators, providing the institutional foundation for the next phase of governance. In Addis Ababa, the city council unanimously reappointed Adanech Abiebie as mayor on September 30, giving her another term to lead the capital’s administration. The council cited infrastructure development, administrative reforms and citizen-focused services among the areas of her previous tenure. The developments across the regions and the capital demonstrate that Ethiopia's post-election transition is unfolding through multiple layers of its federal structure rather than through a single event in Addis Ababa. This gradual process—from regional councils to the federal parliament—also underscores the constitutional architecture through which political authority is organized in the country. A Constitutional Transfer of Political Authority Ethiopia's Constitution places the House of People’s Representatives at the center of federal legislative authority and provides the constitutional basis for forming the executive following parliamentary elections. Article 56 provides that the political party or coalition holding a majority in the House forms and leads the federal executive. The election result has therefore established the parliamentary basis for the formation of the next government. The significance of October 5 consequently extends beyond ceremony. It represents the institutional point at which the outcome of the June election becomes a new governing arrangement. For a country with Ethiopia's political complexity, maintaining constitutional continuity during this transition carries particular importance. The election attracted significant continental attention, with the African Union deploying an election observation mission led by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. The AU subsequently commended the June 1 election, describing it as an important step in Ethiopia’s democratic evolution and recognizing the role of the National Election Board in administering the process. But the AU’s engagement went beyond election monitoring. As the host of the African Union headquarters and a country with a central diplomatic role on the continent, Ethiopia’s political developments carry significance well beyond its borders. As former President Kenyatta noted ahead of the vote, Ethiopia’s election held importance for the wider African continent. That continental attention now turns to what comes next: the peaceful translation of an electoral mandate into constitutional government. With the new House of Peoples’ Representatives set to open and the federal government to be formed on October 5, Ethiopia is approaching a defining moment. One is that will demonstrate whether electoral competition can be followed by orderly constitutional governance, institutional continuity and a peaceful political transition. Representation Beyond the Winning Party The parliamentary majority gives the Prosperity Party the constitutional basis to form the federal government. At the same time, the presence of opposition representatives in federal and regional legislatures means that Ethiopia's political institutions will continue to contain competing political voices. That matters because democracy does not end when the ballots are counted. The post-election parliament becomes the arena in which competing priorities, interests and political perspectives are translated into legislative debate, scrutiny and public policy. For opposition parties, elected representatives and independent voices, the new parliamentary term provides an institutional platform through which they can represent their constituencies and engage in the country's political process. For the governing party, the parliamentary majority brings the corresponding responsibility of translating its mandate into effective administration and public accountability. The Bigger Test: Turning Political Transition into Peace Perhaps the most important question for Ethiopia now is the new political cycle can help deepen peace and institutional stability. Ethiopia's political history has repeatedly demonstrated the cost of unresolved political disputes. The country's current national dialogue and reconciliation efforts are therefore taking place alongside the formation of the new government. The government has repeatedly presented dialogue, reconciliation and constitutional institutions as important instruments for addressing national challenges. The National Dialogue process has also sought to gather views on longstanding political and social issues across the country. The new government will therefore enter office with expectations extending well beyond economic management. Citizens will look to institutions to deliver security, justice, economic opportunity, public services and accountable governance. Political parties will be expected to compete through institutions rather than confrontation. And the international community will watch how Ethiopia's democratic institutions evolve during the new five-year political cycle. A New Chapter, Not an Ending The formation of a new government is often treated as the conclusion of an election. For Ethiopia, it is better understood as the beginning of the more demanding phase.The ballot has expressed a political choice. The councils are being organized. The federal parliament is preparing to open. The constitutional machinery is moving toward the installation of a new executive. Now comes governance. The coming political term will test whether electoral participation can be converted into stronger institutions; whether political competition can coexist with national dialogue; whether constitutional mechanisms can provide space for disagreement without returning the country to confrontation; and whether the enormous expectations generated by Ethiopia's development ambitions can be matched by institutional capacity. Ethiopia is entering this new chapter with the political authority produced by its seventh general election and with institutions that must now carry that mandate into everyday governance. The country’s democratic journey, therefore, does not end with the announcement of results or the swearing-in of a new government. It moves from the ballot box to the institution, from political competition to public responsibility, and from electoral mandate to the harder work of building peace, prosperity and accountable governance. That is the next chapter Ethiopia is preparing to write.