Why Does Red Sea Security Need Ethiopia?

With analysis from Pulse of Africa (POA)

    By Mahder Nesibu

                                                         Sept. 15, 2026

The Red Sea, a narrow waterway connecting the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, has in recent years come under heavy insecurity. The prevalence of armed groups around the waterway, compounded by threats such as piracy, has undermined its reliability, despite it handling around 13 percent of global shipping. This threat has now come under the spotlight. When war broke out between Iran on one side and Israel and the United States on the other, a similar waterway, the Persian Gulf, and the chokepoint connecting it to the Indian Ocean, came to be weaponised, with Tehran effectively choking a passage that handles 25 percent of the world's oil and gas output. The same weaponisation became visible at Bab-el-Mandeb, the chokepoint of the Red Sea, when Yemen's Houthis, who control the country's north bordering the chokepoint, declared a blockade against Israel in March 2025, partly motivated by their alignment with Iran. The rebels have since extended that blockade to Saudi Arabia, with whom they have been at war for over a decade, a conflict paused by a truce in 2022.

Just last week, A blitzkrieg offensive by Houthi forces over the past week has shattered the regional status quo, placing the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait firmly under their control. Sweeping down Yemen’s western coast with relentless momentum, the forces have completely overrun Saudi-backed government positions, meeting virtually zero resistance along the way. Saudi is said to have launched counter offensives with sorties targeting Houthis’ positions. The situation remains fluid.

Saudi ships, like Israeli ones, have become targets for the Houthis, compounding the insecurity the waterway has been witnessing. On top of that, piracy, primarily emanating from the Somali coast, continues to pose a threat. Although thought to have decreased in frequency, piracy on Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea appears to be resurging. The New York Times reported in late August that the pattern points to a possible resurgence, with 2026 alone seeing 17 piracy-related incidents documented.

Although Israeli and Saudi shipping, alongside international cargo, are coming under direct attack, the effects of this insecurity are more structural. According to Reuters, shipping across the Red Sea has declined by as much as 60 percent since 2023, when the Houthi weaponisation of the chokepoint began, and has not effectively recovered since. These figures translate into greater costs for shipping and slower traffic, as ships are diverted through the Cape of Good Hope route along southern Africa, adding extra days at sea and additional fuel costs. For countries served through the Red Sea itself, this has meant greater volatility in their trade. Beyond the added costs of moving ships through the sea, it means living with the risk of disruption, particularly for essentials such as oil and gas.

This has been the case for countries in the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, whose supply lines have been subject to disruption. Moves to secure the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb have largely been futile, falling short of a comprehensive and cohesive plan to meet the challenge, as geopolitical competition within the Middle East and the Horn of Africa has undermined such efforts.

One country that has been making efforts to secure the Red Sea is Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa state, the largest in the region by both population and economy, has been trying to establish a security presence on the waterway to help address the prevailing insecurity. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti, the country on the African side of Bab-el-Mandeb, for more than 85 percent of its maritime affairs, and its imposed landlocked status has limited its ability to contribute to addressing a security dilemma that carries consequences for its own economy and stability, as well as those of its neighbours.

This, alongside historical realities and demographic concerns, has formed the foundation of the country's case for a return to the Red Sea. Access to the sea has been treated as a primary issue of national interest by the majority Ethiopians for long —an issue that received greater prominence particularly since 2018, when the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power. Alongside launching a diplomatic push, Ethiopia also revived its navy that same year, effectively declaring its strong interest in reestablishing a security presence on the Red Sea.

The Ethiopian Navy was a major actor in Red Sea affairs for decades. Established in 1955, it is older than most naval security institutions in the region, including Saudi Arabia's, which was launched in 1960. It had been a pillar of Red Sea security for decades and was only disbanded in 1996, following Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia in 1991. Now revived, it offers to contribute to maritime security and help address the growing dilemma facing the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

Speaking at the 4th Annual Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Dialogue this April, Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian Navy Kindu Gezu stated that Ethiopia's bid was also "for the common benefit of the region", adding that "inclusivity strengthens legitimacy and fosters shared interests in security and connectivity". For the region, and for those affected by insecurity in the Red Sea, it is worth considering what an increased Ethiopian role could contribute. For Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and also to superpowers with footholds on the region, the case for backing Ethiopia's return to the sea is a reasonable one on maritime security grounds.

Writing for the Middle Eastern outlet MEMRI, Morocco expert Anna Mahjar-Barducci made the case for Ethiopia's access to the sea on similar security grounds, arguing that the United States, a global power that considers Red Sea security a strategic priority, should back Ethiopia, as the country could play a critical role in securing the waterway.

The Middle East and the Horn of Africa face the same strategic considerations. Strategic competition aside, states in the region now have to treat maritime security as a matter of permanent concern. Ultimately, the solution rests on inclusive mechanisms that pool together available resources, including those Ethiopia can offer.

Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea could strengthen regional security.