Op-ed by Brian Lammo

                                                       August 16, 2026 (ENA) 

Geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa are driven by a complex combination of water politics, competition for regional influence, access to the Red Sea, military alliances and domestic political conflicts. At the center of these tensions is Egypt’s persistent sabotage against Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable access to the Red Sea and its overall development projects along the Abay River, including the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

However, these two strategic priorities are central to Ethiopia’s economic development, energy security and long-term regional stability as well as economic integration.

 Yet Egypt has continued to pursue policies that Ethiopia views as jeopardizing its development interests and contributing to regional instability. Regional observers have also portrayed Egypt’s approach as part of a broader strategy aimed not only at challenging Ethiopia’s development projects but also at containing its growing regional influence and limiting its development options.

 Diplomatic pressure is one among different tactics that Egypt has been doing for years in obstructing developments in Ethiopia.    It has internationalized the dispute, mobilize diplomatic support, influence the positions of regional and international partners, and press for binding arrangements to jeopardize the construction and operation of any dam along the Abay River.

 Against this backdrop, Egypt has strengthened strategic partnerships with countries including Eritrea, seeking to capitalize on Eritrea’s longstanding tensions with Ethiopia, which added another layer to the region’s security dynamics, particularly through military cooperation, strategic alliances and political engagement.

This relationship has contributed to potential use of proxy dynamics to influence developments in Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa.

As a result, the region has become an increasingly contested environment in which diplomatic competition, military posturing, strategic partnerships, proxy relationships and economic interests overlap. These dynamics have complicated efforts to establish a stable and cooperative regional security framework.

Egypt, together with countries with which it has strengthened strategic relations, has employed a range of diplomatic, political and security measures that Ethiopia regards as constraints on its development. Egypt’s dispute over developments remains one of the most visible sources of tension in the region. Although Ethiopia constructed the dam on the Abay River with the stated objectives of expanding electricity generation, promoting industrial development and improving access to reliable power, Egypt has persistently sabotaged Ethiopia’s plans for major projects on the Abay (Nile) River and has sought diplomatic mechanisms to influence the construction and operation of the GERD.

 It has also internationalized the dispute through diplomatic engagement with organizations and international partners, including the United Nations, the Arab League and the European Union, in an effort to strengthen international attention to its concerns over the Abay and the GERD.

The central disagreement is not simply about the operation of one dam. It concerns fundamentally different interpretations of development, sovereignty and the use of shared water resources. Ethiopia argues that an upstream country should have the right to develop its water resources for electricity generation and economic transformation while avoiding significant harm to downstream states.

 Another sabotage by Egypt against Ethiopia is protecting financers not to support Ethiopia. Ethiopia has long argued that political pressure surrounding the Nile dispute can make it more difficult for the country to attract international financing for major water, energy and infrastructure projects.

 These efforts are viewed in Ethiopia as part of a broader attempt to restrict its development options and prevent the country from fully exploiting its water and energy resources.

Egypt has also attempted to further complicate the situation through military rhetoric. Egyptian officials have periodically referred to the possibility of military options in relation to Abay dispute. Although Egypt has no direct border with Ethiopia, it has conducted military exercises and strengthened security cooperation with countries in Ethiopia’s neighborhood.

Diplomacy, military exercises and strategic partnerships can reinforce one another, creating a wider environment in which Ethiopia faces pressure from several directions simultaneously.

Egypt’s efforts to strengthen its position in the Horn of Africa have increasingly involved partnerships with countries surrounding Ethiopia. These relationships have acquired particular significance as Ethiopia seeks reliable access to the Red Sea and expands its diplomatic and economic engagement across the region.

Egypt has strengthened its military and political relations with Somalia, including military assistance and security cooperation.

The emergence of a closer Egyptian Somali security relationship is particularly sensitive for Ethiopia because Somalia shares a long border with the country. The presence of an increasingly active Egyptian security partnership in Somalia has raised concerns in Ethiopia over the possibility of additional strategic pressure on its eastern flank.

Egypt has also maintained strong relations with Sudanese state institutions and the Sudanese Armed Forces, while the war in Sudan has increased the strategic importance of the country because of its geographic position between Egypt and Ethiopia and its proximity to the Red Sea.

These relationships should not automatically be characterized as a coordinated military encirclement of Ethiopia, as each country has its own national interests and security calculations. However, they demonstrate the growing competition for strategic influence around Ethiopia.

The broader pattern is nevertheless significant. Egypt’s expanding diplomatic and security network provides Cairo with additional avenues for building coalitions and increasing its leverage in regional discussions involving the Nile, security and Red Sea affairs.

 As Egypt strengthens its relationships with countries around Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa is consequently becoming a space where local conflicts and wider geopolitical competition increasingly reinforce one another.

Eritrea also exerted a sabotage against Ethiopian development. Since its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, relations between the two countries have been characterized by conflict, military confrontation and deep political mistrust.

The most significant confrontation was the 1998 to 2000 Eritrea Ethiopia War, which erupted over the disputed border around Badme and other areas. The conflict caused tens of thousands of deaths and displaced large numbers of people. Although the Algiers Agreement brought the war to an end, relations between the two countries remained frozen for nearly two decades in what became known as a "no war, no peace" situation.

During this period, Eritrea developed relationships with Ethiopian opposition and armed movements. Asmara was accused of providing sanctuary, training, logistical support and other forms of assistance to groups opposed to the government in Addis Ababa. Among the organizations historically associated with Eritrea were TPLF,  the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).

Eritrea has also played a wider negative regional role. Its relations with Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia have repeatedly generated international concern. Eritrea fought Yemen over the Hanish Islands in 1995 and clashed with Djibouti in 2008.

 In Somalia, Eritrea was accused by international monitoring mechanisms of supporting armed groups during the country's prolonged conflict between 2006 and 2018.

The United Nations Security Council subsequently imposed sanctions on Eritrea in 2009, although the sanctions were lifted in 2018.

Eritrea’s regional policy has therefore extended well beyond its bilateral dispute with Ethiopia. Its use of military force, strategic alliances and relationships with armed movements has contributed to the destabilization of the wider Horn of Africa.

 The strategic competition involving Egypt and Eritrea has increasingly intersected with Ethiopia’s internal political and security challenges. Ethiopian has repeatedly accused neighboring states, particularly Eritrea of cultivating relationships with armed groups and political movements inside the country. Such allegations demonstrate how domestic conflicts can become intertwined with wider regional rivalries and geopolitical competition.

Egypt, despite having no direct border with Ethiopia, has been also blamed for supporting or maintaining contacts with armed groups inside the country. Particular attention has been directed toward areas surrounding the GERD, including the Benishangul Gumuz region, as well as armed groups operating in other parts of Ethiopia.

These activities have contributed to political divisions, ethnic tensions and armed insurgencies that create opportunities for external actors seeking to weaken the country. External support for domestic actors can also prolong conflicts, complicate political dialogue and make national reconciliation more difficult.

Ethiopia has simultaneously sought to diversify its trade and transport connections. The Addis Ababa Djibouti railway remains a major commercial corridor, while the country has explored alternative transport routes through Kenya and other regional partners. Ethiopian Airlines has also developed an extensive international network, strengthening Ethiopia’s connectivity with global markets and contributing significantly to foreign exchange earnings.

Agriculture represents another important pillar of Ethiopia’s economic resilience. The expansion of irrigated wheat production has helped reduce dependence on imports and created opportunities for Ethiopia to supply grain to neighboring markets.

At the same time, the Green Legacy Initiative has developed into a major environmental and agricultural program, with large scale tree planting aimed at restoring degraded land, improving watershed management and strengthening long term climate resilience.

These initiatives demonstrate Ethiopia’s effort to respond to geopolitical pressure through economic transformation and national resilience. Rather than relying exclusively on military or diplomatic countermeasures, Addis Ababa has increasingly emphasized infrastructure, energy, agriculture, trade, environmental protection and regional connectivity as instruments of national strength.

Ethiopia’s experience illustrates how economic development can also serve as a strategic response to geopolitical pressure. By expanding its productive capacity, strengthening infrastructure and diversifying economic and diplomatic partnerships, the country seeks to reduce its vulnerability to external pressure while consolidating its position as a major political and economic actor in the Horn of Africa.

Instability in the Horn of Africa cannot be attributed solely to external actors. Domestic political grievances, unresolved territorial disputes, institutional weaknesses, economic pressures and competition among local political and armed groups remain important drivers of conflict. External intervention has deepened these vulnerabilities, but sustainable stability ultimately depends on addressing the domestic and regional causes of insecurity.

Ethiopia, has increasingly centered on economic resilience, energy development, infrastructure expansion, agricultural transformation, regional connectivity and the diversification of international partnerships.

 For Ethiopia, expanding electricity generation, strengthening infrastructure, diversifying trade routes and securing access to maritime markets are not merely economic objectives. They are also intended to reduce the country’s vulnerability to external pressure and strengthen its ability to make independent strategic decisions.