Ethiopia and the Red Sea: Historical Sovereignty and the Legal Imperative of Restored Access

Op-ed By Nebiyu Tedla (Ambassador)

Ethiopia has historically been a Red Sea–oriented and maritime civilization, with ancient and well-established legal and historical claims to sovereign access to the sea. Despite these deep roots, Ethiopia has faced repeated efforts particularly during the colonial and post-colonial periods to sever its Red Sea access through legal and political injustices. These attempts to render Ethiopia landlocked have had implications not only for the country itself but also for regional and international peace and security. Therefore, Ethiopia’s pursuit to restore its rightful sovereign access to the Red Sea remains imperative from historical, legal, economic, and geopolitical perspectives.

Historical sovereignty during the Axumite and Medieval times

Northern Ethiopia, historically known by local communities as “Medri Bahri” (land of the sea), encompassed territories adjacent to the Red Sea, which were long under Ethiopian control. Central to this was Adulis, a major strategic port firmly within Ethiopia’s sphere of influence during the Axumite era. Adulis served as a vital commercial hub, linking Ethiopia and Africa more broadly to global trade networks, making the Red Sea coast essential to Axum’s economic strength and security. Adulis was best known as the main port of the Kingdom of Aksum, one of the great ancient powers of the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopian rulers consistently asserted historical authority over the coastal regions and their hinterlands, including much of present-day Eritrea. During various periods, Muslim sultanates along the coast functioned as vassal states. Adulis paid tribute to Axum, mainly through customs duties and trade goods (ivory, gold, slaves, spices). Axum controlled foreign trade and diplomacy through Adulis. Axum held ultimate authority over taxation, trade policy, and external relations. Even in later eras, such as the Zemene Mesafint (Era of the Princes), Ethiopian control persisted; in the 18th century, Ras Mikael Sehul of Tigray exercised effective authority over Red Sea coastal areas, including Massawa, through the vassal principalities.

Modern times sovereignty and claims

In the 19th century, attempts by the rulers of Egypt to invade Ethiopia were decisively repelled by Ethiopian forces in the Battles of Gundet and Gura, affirming Ethiopia’s sovereignty over both the Red Sea coastal areas and their hinterlands. These landmark victories underscored Ethiopia’s effective control of territories that today lie within Eritrea, historically known as Mereb Melash, a region of the Ethiopian Empire.

The Battle of Gundet was fought in a narrow mountain pass near the village of Gundet in the Seraye district, along the strategic route linking the port of Massawa to Adwa in Tigray. The second and more decisive engagement, the Battle of Gura, took place on the Plain of Gura, roughly 80 miles inland from Massawa. Gura, located in the Akele Guzay region (present day Debub Region of Eritrea), lies about 9 kilometers southeast of Dekemhare and approximately 32 kilometers south-southeast of Asmara. Together, these victories demonstrated that the hinterlands of present day Eritrea were firmly under Ethiopian authority at the time.

Another clear affirmation of Ethiopia’s sovereign control over the Red Sea region is found in the Hewett Treaty (also known as the Adwa or Adulis Treaty) of 1884 a foundational legal document that strengthened Ethiopia’s historical claim to Red Sea access. Negotiated in 1884 at Adwa, the treaty involved the Ethiopian Empire under Emperor Yohannes IV and Great Britain represented by Rear Admiral Sir William Hewett. The Hewett Treaty was signed between Ethiopia (under Emperor Yohannes IV) and Great Britain, with Britain acting in part on behalf of Egypt. Egypt’s position in the region had weakened following military defeats and internal unrest, which led Britain to manage many of Egypt’s foreign affairs during this period. Its purpose was to end prolonged Egyptian hostilities towards Ethiopia and to secure Ethiopian assistance in facilitating the withdrawal of Egyptian forces trapped in Sudan during the Mahdist uprising.

Among its key provisions of the treaty was the restoration of the Bogos district (in present-day Eritrea) to Ethiopian sovereignty. Territories including Mereb, Bellesa, and Hamasien, which had been occupied by Egypt, were formally returned to Ethiopia. Crucially, the treaty also guaranteed Ethiopia’s authority to the ports of Massawa and Amphilla, including the southern hinterlands of Massawa. In return, Ethiopia agreed to ensure the safe evacuation of Egyptian garrisons from the Sudanese frontier.

Through these provisions, the Hewett Treaty legally affirmed Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Red Sea coastline and the hinterlands of what is now Eritrea, fully endorsing Ethiopia’s historic entitlement to Red Sea access prior to Italian colonial intervention. The treaty affirmed Ethiopia’s de jure recognition of its territorial claims and its preexisting sovereign rights over both land and coastline. It serves as documentary evidence that regional and international actors of the period acknowledged Ethiopia’s legitimate access to the coast prior to Italy’s arrival.

However, despite Emperor Yohannes IV’s fulfillment of his obligations under the treaty most notably the rescue of thousands of Egyptian soldiers the agreement is often remembered in Ethiopian history as a betrayal. Less than a year later, in 1885, the then Britain rulers permitted Italy to occupy the port of Massawa rather than safeguarding Ethiopia’s coastal access. This decision effectively severed Ethiopia from the Red Sea and laid the groundwork for prolonged conflict with Italian colonial forces, culminating in the Battle of Dogali and, ultimately, the Battle of Adwa.

Italy’s Invasion and Eritrea’s Creation

Prior to Italy’s full-scale invasion of Ethiopia’s coastal regions and later its hinterland, the Battle of Dogali marked a critical early confrontation. Fought on January 26, 1887, near the town of Dogali inside what is now Eritrea, the battle represented a significant military clash between the Ethiopian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy. In the aftermath of the Hewett Treaty, Italy occupied the port of Massawa and began advancing inland into territory claimed by Ethiopia. Ras Alula Engida, governor of the Mereb Melash region under Emperor Yohannes IV, demanded that Italian forces withdraw. When they refused, Ras Alula led an ambush against an Italian column commanded by Colonel Tommaso De Cristoforis. After an intense engagement with the Italian troops exhausted the column was almost entirely destroyed. The Ethiopian victory at Dogali became a powerful symbolic affirmation of Ethiopian sovereignty over the region.

In Italy, the defeat at Dogali widely referred to as the “Dogali Massacre” triggered a profound political crisis, culminating in the resignation of Prime Minister Agostino Depretis. The event left a lasting imprint on Italian national memory, commemorated by the monument honoring the “Five Hundred Heroes” at Rome’s Piazza dei Cinquecento.

Italian territorial expansion in the region began earlier in Assab, a move that set in motion a gradual process of colonial encroachment and ultimately led to the formal establishment of an Italian colony in 1890. Through this expansion, Italy invaded Ethiopia’s internationally recognized coastal territories and consolidated its control by creating the colony of Eritrea. The designation “Eritrea” was officially assigned on January 1, 1890, by the Italian colonial administration. As such, Eritrea was carved out of territory that had historically formed part of the Ethiopian state. Prior to Italian occupation, Eritrea did not exist as a distinct political or territorial entity; rather, it constituted an integral extension of Ethiopia’s historical domain.

The breached 1900, 1902 and 1908 boundary treaties

The second Italian invasion of Ethiopia constituted a clear repudiation of Italy’s own treaty obligations as set out in the boundary agreements of 1900, 1902, and 1908. By launching the invasion, Italy violated the fundamental international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, which requires states to honor their treaty commitments. The aggression further breached the Covenant of the League of Nations and the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact, both of which explicitly renounced war as an instrument of national policy. In addition, Italy violated the Ethio-Italian Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration signed on August 2, 1928.

Following the Second World War, Ethiopia was restored on the basis of its pre-invasion territorial status, and the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy formally extinguished all Italian claims to sovereignty. As a consequence, the colonial boundary treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908 delineating the Ethiopia–Eritrea border lost their legal force. This followed the doctrine of ipso facto termination, whereby the outbreak of war automatically abrogates preexisting treaties between belligerent states. Against this legal backdrop, Emperor Haile Selassie’s decision to reincorporate Eritrea into Ethiopia was both rational and consistent with the international legal norms prevailing at the time. That decision should therefore be evaluated within its historical and legal context, rather than through the lens of standards that emerged decades later.

The United Nations-brokered federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia thus represented a politically expedient but fundamentally flawed compromise. It failed to fully remedy the colonial dismemberment of Ethiopian territory and instead laid the groundwork for future conflict. By declining to recognize Eritrea as an integral part of Ethiopia prior to 1890, the arrangement left unresolved the core legal and historical injustice at the heart of the dispute.

In light of these factors, Ethiopia, as the parent state, retains a compelling claim to reasonable access to the Red Sea. With the exception of a relatively brief period of Italian occupation, Ethiopia historically maintained access to the Red Sea, and principles of historical justice demand the correction of the profound injustices inflicted during the colonial, post-colonial, and more recent periods. Beyond historical considerations, Ethiopia’s access is also dictated by vital economic and security imperatives. Naval militarization, the establishment of foreign military bases, and the threat of piracy along this critical international waterway directly affect Ethiopia’s national interests.

Regrettably, there has been little indication of a genuine willingness on the part of President Isaias Afwerki’s government to pursue constructive cooperation with Ethiopia. Instead, policies of destabilization have prevailed, driven by the perception that a strong and economically viable Ethiopia poses a strategic threat. Yet Eritrea bears moral and legal responsibilities under the international principle of good neighborliness to take into account the vital interests of Ethiopia. This obligation is heightened by the historical reality that Eritrean territory was fashioned out of lands that had long formed part of the Ethiopian state. Accordingly, Eritrea has both a moral and legal duty to accommodate Ethiopia’s need for sovereign access to the Red Sea. Without addressing this fundamental issue, lasting peace and genuine cooperation between the two countries will remain elusive.

Ethiopia’s landlocked condition is neither a natural destiny nor an undisputable fact. Geography will never remain a destiny but one that can be bended through time and factors. If not, it is a source of regional instability and a significant barrier to sustainable development. For Ethiopia, the restoration of sovereign access to the Red Sea is not a matter of preference but a national imperative essential to long-term peace and prosperity. The way forward therefore requires the principled and resolute correction of these longstanding injustices.

Ambassador Nebiyu Tedla is Director General of Public Diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia