By Staff Writer As geopolitical and politico-military dynamics reshape the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor, Ethiopia’s economic weight, strategic location and expanding regional engagement continue to make it a central actor in the region’s evolving balance. Ethiopia is undergoing a transformation that reaches far beyond economic growth. Across its economy, cities, digital infrastructure, environmental restoration, tourism, investment, energy and regional connectivity, the country is pursuing a broad development agenda aimed at reshaping its domestic foundations while expanding its role in the Horn of Africa and the wider continent. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the government has placed economic reform, infrastructure development, digitalization, environmental restoration and regional integration at the heart of its development strategy. The transformation is unfolding against a complicated geopolitical backdrop. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor have become increasingly important arenas for global trade, maritime security, strategic competition and shifting political alignments. Conflicts and political transitions in neighboring countries, competition over strategic ports and shipping routes, and the growing involvement of external powers have further elevated the region's geopolitical importance. In that changing environment, Ethiopia’s sheer demographic and economic weight, geographic position and expanding infrastructure make its trajectory consequential well beyond its borders. The question is therefore not simply how rapidly Ethiopia is growing. It is how the country's economic transformation, technological modernization, environmental agenda and search for deeper regional connectivity could reshape its position in a strategically vital part of Africa. Growth as the Foundation of Transformation Ethiopia’s economic reform program has become one of the central pillars of this transformation. The government has pursued a series of macroeconomic and structural reforms under the Homegrown Economic Reform agenda, seeking to move the economy toward greater private-sector participation, stronger exports, increased investment and a more market-oriented system. The government projects economic growth of around 10.2 percent for the current Ethiopian fiscal year, placing Ethiopia among the world's fastest-growing economies. Behind the headline figure is a broader structural effort. Infrastructure investment, agriculture, manufacturing, services, trade and construction are increasingly interconnected within a development strategy designed to expand productive capacity and create new economic opportunities. The reform process has also sought to address longstanding macroeconomic challenges, including foreign-exchange shortages, inflationary pressures and limited private-sector participation. The significance of the reforms lies not only in short-term growth, but in the attempt to change the underlying architecture of the economy. Ethiopia is seeking to move from a predominantly state-led economic model toward one in which private investment, competition and market mechanisms play a larger role. This represents one of the most consequential economic shifts in the country's recent history. Cities as Engines of a New Ethiopia The transformation is perhaps most visible in Ethiopia’s cities. What began as a major corridor-development program in Addis Ababa has evolved into a broader urban-development drive extending to cities across the country. The initiative combines road and transport infrastructure with pedestrian corridors, public spaces, greenery, recreational facilities and other urban improvements. Addis Ababa has become the most visible expression of this transformation. The capital is simultaneously Ethiopia’s political center, a diplomatic hub hosting the African Union and numerous international institutions, and an increasingly important commercial and investment center. The broader objective is to create cities capable of supporting a rapidly growing population and an expanding economy. Urban development is consequently being treated not simply as beautification, but as an economic and social infrastructure strategy. The Digital Leap Another defining feature of Ethiopia’s transformation is the rapid expansion of its digital economy. For decades, many public and financial services depended heavily on physical documents, face-to-face transactions and cash. That is changing. Digital public services, mobile money, electronic payments and national digital identification are increasingly becoming part of everyday economic and administrative life. The government's Mesob one-stop digital service initiative represents this shift toward integrated public services, bringing multiple services together through digital platforms and expanding access beyond the capital. At the foundation of this emerging ecosystem is Fayda, Ethiopia’s national digital identification system. A reliable digital identity can support access to financial services, social protection, government services and a growing range of digital applications. Meanwhile, mobile-money adoption has expanded rapidly. More than 58 million Ethiopians are reported to be using mobile-money services, while digital payments have recorded significant increases. The importance of this transformation goes beyond convenience. Digitalization can reduce transaction costs, widen financial inclusion, improve access to government services and create new opportunities for businesses and citizens. For a country of Ethiopia’s size, that represents a potentially significant change in the relationship between the state, the economy and its citizens. Investment and Tourism: Unlocking Untapped Potential Ethiopia’s economic transformation is also increasingly linked to investment and tourism. The country combines a large domestic market, a young population, substantial agricultural potential, a strategic geographic location, unique cultural heritage and diverse natural landscapes. Government initiatives have sought to turn those assets into economic opportunities. Projects associated with Dine for Sheger, Dine for Nation and Dine for Generation have contributed to a broader effort to develop urban tourism, hospitality, recreation and cultural destinations. Ethiopia is simultaneously seeking to expand its tourism offering beyond traditional historical routes by developing natural, cultural and urban destinations. The objective is increasingly clear: tourism is being positioned not merely as a source of foreign exchange, but as part of a wider urban-development, employment and investment strategy. The same logic applies to investment. Economic reforms are intended to create greater space for private capital and international investors while infrastructure expansion seeks to improve the conditions for doing business. The challenge is converting Ethiopia’s enormous potential into sustained investment, competitive exports and productive employment. Green Legacy: Development with an Environmental Dimension Perhaps no initiative better captures Ethiopia’s attempt to connect development with environmental restoration than the Green Legacy Initiative. Launched in 2019, the program has mobilized millions of Ethiopians around large-scale tree planting and environmental rehabilitation. More than 56 billion seedlings have been planted since the initiative began. But the significance of Green Legacy extends beyond the number of seedlings. The initiative increasingly encompasses watershed protection, land rehabilitation, climate resilience, biodiversity and efforts to restore degraded landscapes. It has also become an important component of Ethiopia’s international climate diplomacy. For a developing country facing the effects of climate change while seeking rapid economic growth, the underlying proposition is significant: environmental restoration and economic development do not necessarily have to be competing objectives. Ethiopia is attempting to demonstrate that ecological restoration can itself become part of a national development strategy. Energy and Regional Integration Energy is another area where Ethiopia’s domestic transformation intersects directly with regional ambitions. With more than 95 percent of its electricity generated from renewable sources, Ethiopia is seeking to position itself as an important clean-energy producer in East Africa. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is central to that strategy. Beyond meeting domestic electricity needs, Ethiopia has increasingly emphasized the potential of cross-border electricity trade to support economic integration. Power interconnections with neighboring countries can create new markets for electricity while providing energy-deficient economies with access to renewable power. The broader vision is therefore regional. Ethiopia is seeking to build infrastructure that connects markets rather than simply serving national consumption. Roads, electricity networks, aviation, telecommunications and trade corridors can collectively create a more integrated regional economy. This is where Ethiopia’s development agenda intersects with its regional diplomacy. The Red Sea Quest Few issues demonstrate this intersection more clearly than Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable maritime access. As one of Africa’s most populous countries and a major economy in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has repeatedly argued that dependable access to maritime trade routes is important for its long-term economic development and regional integration. The issue has acquired greater significance as the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have become increasingly important to global trade and maritime security. For Ethiopia, maritime access is fundamentally connected to logistics, trade competitiveness and integration into international markets. For the region, Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations intersect with questions of port infrastructure, shipping routes, security and regional economic cooperation. The challenge is therefore not merely geographic. Ethiopia’s approach has increasingly emphasized diplomatic engagement and negotiated arrangements, while presenting maritime connectivity as part of a broader regional integration agenda. A Strategic Actor in a Changing Region The Horn of Africa is experiencing a period of profound geopolitical change. The Red Sea shipping corridor has become increasingly important to global commerce. Competition over ports and maritime infrastructure has intensified. External powers are expanding their diplomatic, economic and security engagement. At the same time, conflicts and political instability continue to affect the region. Against this backdrop, Ethiopia remains one of the region’s central actors. Its large population, expanding economy, strategic location, military and institutional capacity, diplomatic role and infrastructure ambitions give it considerable regional weight. That does not mean Ethiopia is insulated from regional pressures. Far from it. The country continues to confront complex security, economic and diplomatic challenges, while its development ambitions are sometimes unfolding amid competing regional interests. But Ethiopia’s response has increasingly centered on strengthening its own economic foundations while expanding connectivity with its neighbors. Growing with the Region At the heart of Ethiopia’s development strategy is an increasingly visible proposition: national prosperity and regional prosperity are interconnected. Energy corridors can connect power markets. Transport infrastructure can connect economies. Digital networks can connect people and businesses. Tourism can connect cultures. Maritime connectivity can connect landlocked economies to global markets. And regional trade can create opportunities that individual countries may struggle to generate alone. This explains why Ethiopia’s development agenda increasingly extends beyond its national borders. The country is seeking to grow not in isolation, but through deeper economic and infrastructure connections with the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the wider continent. Taken together, these developments point to something larger than a collection of individual projects. They represent an attempt to redefine Ethiopia’s economic foundations and its regional role simultaneously.

By Guillermo Patria Sept. 24, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia is undertaking a broad transformation of its national defense system, seeking to build a military that is more professional, technologically advanced, operationally ready and increasingly capable of sustaining itself through domestic production. The transformation reaches across the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), Air Force, Special Operations Command, defense industries, drone production, military research and education, artificial intelligence and the rebuilding of the country's maritime capability. At its core is a strategic proposition: protecting Ethiopia's sovereignty and national interests requires not only soldiers and weapons, but also strong institutions, technology, industrial capacity and human capital capable of sustaining them. ENDF Chief of General Staff Field Marshal Birhanu Jula has described the reform as a historic transformation aimed at strengthening the force's organizational structure, unity, professionalism, readiness and technological capacity. The objective is therefore not simply to increase military hardware, but to change the character and capabilities of the force.   A force adapted to modern warfare The battlefield is changing rapidly. Traditional manpower and conventional weapons remain important, but military effectiveness increasingly depends on information, precision, communications, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare and the ability to make decisions rapidly. Ethiopia's reforms are increasingly responding to this reality. In February 2026, Field Marshal Birhanu described the modernized ENDF in terms of quantity, quality and technology, stressing the need to adapt military capabilities to changing technologies and security threats. The technological shift is also becoming institutional. In August 2026, the ENDF signed an agreement with the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute to explore AI applications in logistics, military training, cybersecurity, military healthcare, air operations and electronic warfare. Yet technology alone does not create military strength. It must be matched by trained personnel, effective institutions and operational readiness. Ethiopia's reform therefore also emphasizes professional military education, specialized training, engineering and technical expertise. Readiness at the center The ultimate purpose of a defense force is its ability to respond when national interests are threatened. Field Marshal Birhanu has repeatedly emphasized ENDF readiness amid what Ethiopia describes as a complex and changing security environment. In July 2026, he said reforms had strengthened the force's organizational structure and unity while maintaining a high level of readiness and introducing modern military technology. The Special Operations Command represents another dimension of this approach, with military leadership presenting it as a highly capable force designed for rapid response and proactive action against emerging threats. For Ethiopia, the broader objective is clear: national sovereignty must be protected by a force capable of detecting threats, mobilizing rapidly and responding effectively when national interests are at stake. From buying weapons to building them Perhaps the most important part of Ethiopia's defense transformation is taking place away from the battlefield—in factories, laboratories and engineering facilities. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has increasingly linked defense manufacturing with economic resilience and technological self-reliance. He has said Ethiopia is developing domestic capabilities to manufacture unmanned aerial vehicles, armored military vehicles, heavy weapons, artillery and ammunition. The significance goes beyond the products themselves. Defense manufacturing requires engineers, technicians, researchers, specialized machinery and reliable industrial systems, creating technological capabilities that can strengthen the wider economy.   The Homicho Ammunition Engineering Complex illustrates this trajectory. Its growing production capacity has enabled Ethiopia not only to supply domestic requirements but also to enter foreign markets, with the government reporting ammunition export contracts worth more than 30 million US dollars. The direction is therefore shifting from simply acquiring finished products toward developing the capacity to produce, maintain and improve critical systems domestically. The Air Force and the technology ecosystem The Ethiopian Air Force provides perhaps the clearest example of the transformation. The institution says it has moved from an analog operating environment toward the digital era while expanding aircraft maintenance, upgrading, spare-parts production and unmanned aviation. The significance is that a modern Air Force requires an entire technological ecosystem—pilots, engineers, technicians, maintenance facilities, spare parts, research, communications and digital systems. Ethiopia is increasingly seeking to develop these capabilities locally. The Air Force has reported increased production of components and spare parts while Ethiopian engineers and technicians take greater roles in aircraft maintenance, upgrading and unmanned systems. The objective is therefore not simply to acquire aircraft from abroad, but to develop the knowledge required to operate, maintain, upgrade and eventually develop increasingly sophisticated systems. This also explains the emphasis on human capital. Prime Minister Abiy has stressed that sophisticated aircraft alone cannot create an effective Air Force. Highly trained pilots, engineers, technicians, scientists and commanders are essential to converting technology into military capability.   Drones and artificial intelligence Few developments demonstrate the technological shift more clearly than Ethiopia's growing drone industry. The establishment of SkyWin Aeronautics Industries marked an important step in domestic UAV production. Drones bring together aviation, electronics, sensors, communications, software, data processing and increasingly artificial intelligence. In June 2026, the Information Network Security Administration and the Ethiopian Air Force agreed to establish a Drone Technology Center dedicated to research, innovation and development in unmanned aerial systems. The initiative connects defense requirements with research, laboratories, human-capital development and technology transfer—helping create a domestic technological chain from research and engineering to production and deployment. AI represents the next layer of this transformation. The ENDF's cooperation with the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute is intended to explore AI applications across logistics, training, cybersecurity, military healthcare, air operations and electronic warfare. The broader significance is that Ethiopia's defense modernization is moving beyond hardware toward technologies that can improve how information is collected, processed and used.   Fourth-generation capability, fifth-generation ambition Ethiopia's Air Force ambitions extend further. In January 2026, Prime Minister Abiy said the Ethiopian Air Force had developed fourth-generation combat capability and set an objective of moving toward fifth-generation capability by 2030, alongside plans to double the country's combat-aircraft capacity. These are stated government objectives rather than capabilities already fully achieved. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the direction of Ethiopia's military planning: keeping defense capabilities aligned with rapidly evolving technologies while continuing to invest in the human expertise required to operate them. The transformation therefore cannot be measured only by the number of aircraft acquired, but also by the country's ability to operate, maintain, upgrade and increasingly develop sophisticated systems. Land, air and sea Ethiopia's defense transformation also has a maritime dimension. The country lost direct access to the Red Sea following Eritrea's independence, and the Ethiopian Navy was subsequently disbanded. Its reconstruction now forms part of the country's evolving national security architecture. Vice Admiral Kindu Gezu, Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian Navy, has highlighted the changing security environment in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including piracy, arms trafficking, irregular migration, insurgent networks and geopolitical competition. For Ethiopia, maritime security has implications beyond naval operations. Trade routes, ports, energy supplies, commercial shipping and regional security are all connected to the wider maritime environment. The Navy consequently adds another dimension to the defense transformation, with land, air, cyber and maritime capabilities increasingly forming part of one national security architecture. Building strategic self-reliance Taken together, these developments reveal the broader direction of Ethiopia's defense reform. The ENDF is being reorganized and professionalized. Specialized forces are being developed around rapid response. The Air Force is expanding its digital, maintenance and engineering capabilities. Domestic drone production is emerging. Defense industries are producing ammunition, armored vehicles and other military equipment. AI is being explored for defense applications, while military universities and laboratories are becoming part of technological research and development. The Navy is rebuilding maritime capabilities. Individually, each represents a military reform. Together, they point toward an effort to build strategic self-reliance. A country cannot guarantee the sustainability of its defense capability if every critical component depends on external suppliers. Domestic production does not eliminate the need for international cooperation or foreign technology, but it can strengthen Ethiopia's ability to maintain essential capabilities, respond to emergencies and develop technologies suited to its own requirements. That is the broader bargain emerging from Ethiopia's defense transformation. The objective is not simply to possess modern weapons. It is to create a defense institution capable of using technology effectively, sustaining its equipment, developing its own technical expertise and responding rapidly when national interests are threatened. The deeper story is therefore being written not only on military grounds, but also in aircraft workshops, drone factories, ammunition plants, laboratories, military academies and technology institutes. The soldier remains at the center. But alongside the soldier stands an increasingly important network of pilots, engineers, scientists, technicians, programmers, researchers and manufacturers. Together, they represent a changing conception of military power. For Ethiopia, the emerging objective is a defense force that is professional in structure, ready in operation, technologically capable and increasingly self-reliant in production. In an era when national security is shaped by technology as much as manpower, the ability to build and sustain that capability may become as important as the weapons themselves. Ethiopia's defense transformation is therefore not simply about building a stronger army. It is about building the technological, industrial and human foundations that enable the country to defend its sovereignty and national interests with greater confidence and readiness.

Addis Ababa, September 24, 2026 (ENA) —Ethiopia has used the 81st United Nations General Assembly to put a broader strategic question before the international community: can a global system facing profound geopolitical, economic, technological and environmental change remain credible without giving greater weight to Africa and the Global South? For President Taye Atske Selassie, the answer is increasingly tied to how the international system distributes voice, opportunity and responsibility.   Addressing the General Debate in New York on September 23, President Taye linked Ethiopia’s national priorities to a wider case for stronger multilateralism, greater African representation in global institutions, peaceful regional integration, reliable maritime connectivity, climate justice, energy transformation, food security and technological inclusion. His message came as the 81st General Assembly meets under the theme “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations That Delivers for All.” The theme itself reflects an international system under pressure from armed conflicts, widening inequalities, climate emergencies, rapid technological change and declining confidence in multilateral institutions. Against that backdrop, Ethiopia’s intervention was more than a statement of national interests. It was an attempt to place those interests within a larger African and Global South agenda. Africa’s Voice and the Question of Global Legitimacy At the center of Ethiopia’s message is the longstanding question of African representation in global decision-making. President Taye renewed Ethiopia’s call for reform of the United Nations Security Council, arguing that Africa cannot remain structurally underrepresented in an institution whose decisions have profound consequences for international peace and security.   Ethiopia has consistently supported the African Common Position, including the call for two permanent African seats with full rights and responsibilities as well as veto power, alongside additional non-permanent representation. President Taye articulated that position explicitly in earlier engagements with UN leadership and has continued to frame Security Council reform as an issue of fairness, representation and institutional credibility. The argument has gained renewed relevance during this year’s General Assembly. The President of the 81st General Assembly, Khalilur Rahman, has himself identified inclusive global governance and UN reform as central pillars of his programme. In his opening remarks, he said reform must make the Organization more representative and responsive, while emphasizing that Africa’s underrepresentation in the Security Council is particularly significant. For Ethiopia, therefore, the issue is not simply about obtaining a larger African presence in New York. It is about whether institutions created in a very different geopolitical era can adequately represent the world as it exists today. Africa’s demographic weight, economic potential and growing strategic importance have expanded considerably, while its formal representation in the UN’s most powerful decision-making body remains limited. That tension lies at the heart of Ethiopia’s diplomatic argument.   From Multilateralism as Principle to Multilateralism as Security Ethiopia’s position also draws on its own diplomatic history. The country’s experience with the League of Nations and the failure of the international system to prevent fascist aggression in the 1930s has long shaped Addis Ababa’s view of collective security. That history gives Ethiopia a particular reason to treat multilateralism not simply as diplomatic architecture, but as a mechanism whose effectiveness can have direct consequences for national and regional security. The lesson Ethiopia draws is straightforward: international institutions lose credibility when their principles are applied selectively or when entire regions remain inadequately represented in decisions concerning war, peace and security. This perspective also fits Ethiopia’s longstanding diplomatic identity as an African state with deep multilateral engagement and as host of the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. The result is a foreign-policy narrative in which Ethiopia seeks to speak simultaneously as a national actor and as part of a broader African diplomatic constituency. Sea Access: From National Interest to Regional Connectivity Perhaps the most strategically consequential dimension of President Taye’s message is Ethiopia’s renewed emphasis on reliable sea outlet. For Africa’s second-most populous country and one of the continent’s largest economies, dependence on external maritime infrastructure is not simply a logistical matter. It affects trade costs, supply chains, industrial competitiveness and the country’s ability to integrate more deeply into global markets. President Taye has therefore linked Ethiopia’s economic ambitions with the need for dependable maritime connectivity, while emphasizing diplomatic engagement and arrangements that can serve wider regional interests. That framing matters. Ethiopia is increasingly presenting maritime access not merely as a national demand, but as part of a broader regional connectivity equation involving security, trade, infrastructure, ports, logistics and economic integration across the Horn of Africa. This places the issue within the strategic geography of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. The Ethiopian argument is that a large landlocked economy cannot fully realize its economic potential without predictable access to international maritime trade. At the same time, Addis Ababa has sought to frame connectivity as potentially mutually beneficial: coastal states can gain from investment, logistics, infrastructure and expanded trade generated by stronger links with Ethiopia. The question, therefore, is increasingly about how maritime connectivity can be incorporated into a regional economic architecture and a security lens.   Energy: Turning Africa’s Resources into African Growth President Taye’s message on energy follows a similar logic. Africa possesses enormous renewable-energy potential, yet millions of people remain without reliable electricity and many countries lack the transmission networks, financing and infrastructure required to convert generation capacity into productive economic activity. Ethiopia has sought to position itself at the center of this debate through its renewable-energy expansion and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). For Addis Ababa, the GERD is not presented simply as a national power project. It is part of a broader development model centered on domestic resource mobilization, renewable energy and regional electricity connectivity. The larger challenge, however, extends beyond generation. Africa needs transmission lines, interconnected grids, storage capacity, investment and industries capable of using electricity productively. This is where Ethiopia’s argument intersects with the wider global debate over energy access: building generation capacity is only one part of an energy transition. The more difficult question is how to finance and connect that capacity so that electricity becomes a foundation for industrialization, digital services, agriculture and employment. In that sense, Ethiopia is attempting to shift the conversation from Africa’s renewable-energy potential to Africa’s ability to convert that potential into economic transformation.   Climate Diplomacy and the Politics of Development Climate change provides another bridge between Ethiopia’s domestic priorities and its international diplomacy. President Taye has emphasized the disparity between countries’ historical contributions to global emissions and their exposure to climate-related consequences, placing questions of climate finance, equity and development at the center of Ethiopia’s position. Ethiopia’s selection to host COP32 in 2027 gives Addis Ababa an additional platform from which to pursue that agenda. The country’s Green Legacy Initiative, renewable-energy expansion and environmental restoration efforts form part of the domestic narrative Ethiopia is taking into international climate diplomacy. But the strategic question extends beyond tree planting or emissions. For many African countries, the climate debate is fundamentally connected to development finance. The continent requires resources not only to mitigate emissions but also to adapt infrastructure, strengthen food systems, expand energy access and protect vulnerable communities. Ethiopia’s message therefore seeks to connect climate responsibility with development opportunity. Food Security as Economic and Strategic Resilience Food security occupies a similar position. President Taye’s reference to Ethiopia’s expansion of wheat production reflects a broader effort to portray domestic agricultural production as a pillar of resilience. The lesson Ethiopia is advancing is that food security cannot be separated from economic stability, national resilience and geopolitical vulnerability. The disruptions of recent years—from conflicts and supply-chain shocks to climate-related disasters—have demonstrated how quickly dependence on international food markets can become a strategic concern. For Ethiopia and other African states, increasing domestic agricultural productivity is therefore increasingly framed not simply as an agricultural policy, but as part of a wider strategy to strengthen economic sovereignty and withstand external shocks. Technology and the Battle Over the Future Technology introduces another dimension to Ethiopia’s international message. Artificial intelligence is rapidly changing economies, labor markets, education, security and global competitiveness. Yet access to computing infrastructure, data, skills and investment remains highly unequal. The danger for Africa is not simply being left behind in the next technological revolution. It is becoming permanently dependent on technologies designed, owned and controlled elsewhere. President Taye’s emphasis on initiatives such as Ethiopia’s 5 Million Coders programme and the country’s efforts to expand digital and AI capabilities reflects an attempt to position technology as a development instrument rather than merely a consumer market. The question is increasingly whether African countries can participate in the creation of the next generation of technologies—and whether global AI governance will give developing countries a meaningful voice. That debate is particularly relevant at this year’s UNGA, where AI governance and the digital divide are prominent elements of the wider discussion on transforming multilateral cooperation. The General Assembly presidency has identified “Innovation with Inclusion” as one of its six pillars, emphasizing inclusive governance and investment to close the digital divide.   The Horn of Africa: Connectivity Cannot Be Separated from Stability Ethiopia’s global message ultimately returns to its immediate neighborhood. The Horn of Africa is simultaneously a zone of immense economic potential and persistent geopolitical vulnerability. Conflict, maritime insecurity, fragile political settlements and competition over strategic infrastructure continue to shape the region. President Taye’s engagement with UN Secretary-General António Guterres on the margins of UNGA 81 focused on peace and security in the Horn of Africa, regional connectivity and sustainable development. Guterres also reaffirmed UN support for Ethiopia’s preparations to host COP32. That combination is revealing. For Ethiopia, security and development are increasingly presented as interconnected rather than separate policy tracks. A stable Horn facilitates trade and infrastructure. Improved connectivity creates economic incentives for cooperation. Greater economic integration can, in turn, strengthen the foundations for regional stability. This is the broader logic behind Ethiopia’s emphasis on maritime access, regional integration and diplomatic engagement. Ethiopia’s UN Message Is About More Than Ethiopia Taken together, President Taye’s UN message forms a relatively coherent strategic picture. Ethiopia is seeking to connect Africa’s voice in global governance with Africa’s ability to drive its own development. Security Council reform addresses political representation. Maritime access addresses connectivity and trade. Renewable energy addresses industrialization and energy access. Food production addresses resilience. Technology addresses future competitiveness. Climate diplomacy addresses development finance and environmental vulnerability. Regional diplomacy addresses the stability required for these ambitions to advance. The common thread is agency. Ethiopia’s argument is that Africa should have greater influence not only over how global institutions make decisions, but also over how the continent’s resources, markets, technologies and development priorities are integrated into the global economy. That makes the message broader than a conventional foreign-policy statement. It is an argument about the architecture of the international system itself. From New York Rhetoric to Concrete Outcomes The harder question begins after the speeches. Calls for reform, representation, connectivity and equitable development are increasingly common in international diplomacy. Their significance ultimately depends on whether they generate institutional changes, financing, infrastructure, partnerships and durable political agreements. For Ethiopia, that means translating its growing diplomatic engagement into tangible outcomes: expanded trade and investment, stronger regional infrastructure, reliable maritime connectivity, renewable-energy partnerships, climate finance, technological capacity and a greater African role in global decision-making. The challenge is substantial. But so is the opportunity. At a moment when the UN itself is confronting questions about relevance, representation and trust, Ethiopia has chosen to place its national interests inside a much larger African and Global South conversation. The message from New York is therefore not simply that Ethiopia wants a stronger voice. It is that Africa wants a greater role in defining the rules of the international system—and Ethiopia intends to be part of that conversation. The measure of the strategy will now be what follows: whether diplomatic principles can be converted into practical partnerships, regional connectivity, development gains and institutional change. That is where Ethiopia’s UN message moves from rhetoric to strategy.

By Staff Writer Sept. 23, 2026 (ENA) No matter a government change or leadership in Egypt, one thing remains constant in the official Egyptian discourse regarding the Nile River, which is dealing with the resources of the basin countries from a perspective of guardianship and considering development in the upstream countries an issue that requires Cairo’s approval. However, this pathetic hydro-imperialist mentality is no longer capable of explaining the reality of the Nile today. Africa has changed and the regional system of the Nile Basin has changed, while the Egyptian discourse continues to use language belonging to a historical era that the continent moved beyond decades ago. As aptly put by the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy the recent statements by the Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation reflect a “crude colonial mentality” that characterizes Egypt’s policy toward African countries. This characterization was not prompted solely by the latest statements, as the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy had previously warned against the continuation of what it described as a mentality associated with the colonial era in dealing with the Nile issue, affirming that Ethiopia would not relinquish its right to use the river to meet the development needs of its people. The oft repeated official Egyptian discourse and the phrases used in reference to the Nile are “historical rights,” “all available measures,” and “water security”; as though repeating these terms could in itself grant a state additional rights in a transboundary river. But words, no matter how sharp and undiplomatic they may be, cannot change the fact that Ethiopia is a sovereign state and that its natural resources located within its territory are part of its right to development. Ethiopia's Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa had previously stated that Ethiopia does not need permission from any country to develop its water resources, explaining that the country built the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam without obtaining permission from anyone and that it would continue developing other dams in its river basins when the needs arise. This is not mere political statement, but reflects a reality that has already been established on the ground. The dam has been completed and is producing energy; and Ethiopia has transformed from a country that faced major electricity-generation deficit into a country expanding energy exports to its neighbors, while moving toward exploiting its enormous hydropower potential to provide electricity access for its people, support industrialization and development. The unbridled double standard One of the clearest paradoxes in the Egyptian discourse is Cairo's insistence on the need for consultation and approval by it before upstream countries establish projects, while Egypt itself proceeded with the construction of the Aswan High Dam without the upstream countries having a comparable role in deciding the project. The Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy pointed to this double standard in its statement issued, stressing that Cairo treats its approval as a prerequisite for the Nile Basin countries to develop their water resources, despite the fact that Egypt built the Aswan High Dam without consulting the upstream countries. Here emerges the question that political discourse cannot evade: If Egypt has the right to develop its water resources within its territory without seeking permission from the upstream countries, why does not the same principle apply to Ethiopia and the other countries? Unbridled double standards do not create a fair system for managing transboundary rivers. Unjust legacy cannot govern the future A fundamental part of the Egyptian position has remained based on historical arrangements and agreements dating back to political circumstances entirely different from today’s African reality. Ethiopia was not a party to the 1959 Agreement, nor did the other upstream countries participate in shaping a system that sought to determine the future of Nile waters without their participation. Therefore, attempting to present those arrangements as a definitive basis for the rights of all basin countries ignores a fundamental fact: A state that was not a party to an agreement cannot, with the passage of time, become bound by it merely because another state insists on it. Africa has changed politically, demographically, and economically. The needs for electricity, food, and water have multiplied, new regional integration projects have emerged, and the upstream countries have become more capable of developing their natural resources. Therefore, reproducing past arrangements as the only solution for the future is not cooperation. It is an attempt to preserve an unjust legacy despite the changing circumstances that produced it. Ethiopia maintains that transboundary rivers should be bridges for cooperation, development, and integration, not tools for excluding upstream countries or imposing restrictions on their right to development. In January 2026, Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa affirmed that Ethiopian transboundary rivers should be viewed as shared resources and opportunities for cooperation and green growth, stressing that the availability of water in Ethiopia could bring potential benefits to Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Egypt. This is the Ethiopian position: Water is not the exclusive property of Ethiopia, but neither is it the exclusive property of Egypt. Ethiopia is not demanding a monopoly over the Nile; rather, it rejects turning participation in the river into a pretext for depriving it of the use of its resources. The difference between the two positions is fundamental. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: A counter-hegemonic project The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is no longer a project that can be influenced by political statements or Egypt’s media-worn diplomatic warnings. It has become a developmental and strategic reality. Water and Energy Minister Habtamu Itefa said that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam contributed to doubling Ethiopia’s electricity-generation capacity to about 9.6 gigawatts, and has also become a catalyst for electricity interconnection and regional economic cooperation. He also explained that Ethiopia exports electricity to Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, and seeks to expand its electricity interconnection network with other countries. Thus, the project that Egyptian discourse attempted for years to portray as a source of threat has, in reality, become part of a broader transformation in Africa’s energy system. More importantly, Ethiopia does not view its water resources as a means of exercising influence over others, but as a foundation for overcoming energy poverty and achieving industrialization and economic growth. Egypt's problem is not however only about the GERD. For those who read between the lines, the underlying desire of the country has been repeatedly expressed by its official statements. Cairo is never prepared to accept Ethiopia as a strong developing country capable of investing in its natural resources without waiting for external approval. But Ethiopia has already demonstrated that it is capable and determined to develop its resources without any one's permission. Accepting this reality and mutually developing the region is the right answer. In August, the Ethiopian Water and Energy Minister affirmed that his country would continue developing its water resources and would build other dams when necessary. The minister also stressed that Ethiopia’s future is closely linked to the Abay River and the Red Sea, and that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam represents a transformative project that has changed the country’s position in the fields of energy, development, and regional integration. Thus, betting that strong political statements can return Ethiopia to a stage of hesitation or waiting is a bet on a reality that no longer exists. Ethiopia has repeatedly declared that transboundary rivers should be drivers of cooperation and shared prosperity, while at the same time rejecting any concept of water hegemony that deprives upstream countries of their sovereign rights. This is the position reaffirmed by the Ministry of Water and Energy. Consistent with this principle, Ethiopia continues to build its capabilities, continues to generate electricity and export energy, and continues to invest in its water resources. It also continues to work on watershed rehabilitation, afforestation, environmental conservation, and strengthening the sustainability of the Abay Basin, a point highlighted by the Ministry of Water and Energy in its latest statement. Ethiopia is not going back Repeated Egyptian statements will not change this course, nor will sharp rhetoric grant Cairo authority that neither law nor reality has given it. Past agreements will not turn back the clock, and they will not make Ethiopia relinquish its right to use its natural resources. Rather, the continuation of this discourse may produce the opposite result: Exposing the depth of a mentality that still views Ethiopian development as a threat instead of seeing it as an opportunity for African cooperation. Hence, the time has come for Egypt to deal with the Nile as a shared African basin, not a sphere of unilateral influence. The time has also come to recognize that Ethiopia is not a country waiting for permission to decide its future. The Nile will not be a tool of domination and Ethiopian development will not stop because of political rhetoric, no matter how loudly it is expressed. The reality of the 21st century imposes a different rule. Mutual respect instead of guardianship, cooperation instead of hegemony, and shared development instead of exclusion. This is not merely an Ethiopian vision. It is the only path capable of moving the Nile Basin from a legacy of conflict into a space of African integration.

By staff writer Sept. 23, 2026 (ENA) For years, the Federal Government of Ethiopia has demonstrated a clear and consistent commitment to peace, dialogue, and national stability. Even in moments of grave provocation, it has repeatedly chosen restraint over revenge, negotiation over escalation, and reconstruction over retaliation. This posture has not been accidental. It reflects a deep responsibility to the Ethiopian people, a recognition of the terrible cost of war, and an enduring belief that political differences should be settled through dialogue rather than destruction. Yet, despite this sustained effort, the TPLF has repeatedly shown an unwillingness to abandon antagonism, suspicion, and confrontation. Time and again, it has acted in ways that have deepened political division, threatened regional peace, and endangered the very people it claims to represent. The roots of the current crisis did not emerge overnight. They were fed over decades by a political culture that normalized distrust toward the central government and made confrontation appear to be a strategy rather than a failure. Even after Ethiopia entered a new political phase, the TPLF reacted not with sober reflection, but with resistance and resentment. The change in national leadership, and the public warmth shown to the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Tigray, appeared to unsettle a group that had long been accustomed to dominating political life. Rather than adapting to the country’s evolving political reality, it allegedly worked to obstruct reform, resist the formation of a broader political order, and undermine the very process that was intended to unify the country’s governing institutions. Emerging as a unifying national leader, Prime Minister Abiy traveled to the Tigray region initially, where he received an overwhelming welcome from the people. The enthusiasm and public reception were unprecedented, reflecting a strong sense of hope and acceptance in that part of the country. Unfortunately, the TPLF reacted with discomfort and quickly turned to hostile rhetoric, seeking to distance the people of Tigray from the national reconciliation narrative by fueling resentment. This belligerent group is now at the eleventh hour for another round of destruction. The banned TPLF has once again been portrayed as a Trojan horse for anti-Ethiopian forces. Let us count the record of the group since it entered Ethiopia’s political landscape. When efforts were made to merge the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its allied parties into a broader political framework, the TPLF reportedly opposed the initiative at every stage. Even after it became clear that the country was moving in a new direction, it refused to participate constructively in the Prosperity Party project and instead positioned itself outside the national consensus. The result was not principled disagreement, but a deliberate widening of political distance. In the process, it alienated itself from national institutions and severed its active role in federal political life, leaving Tigray politically isolated at a moment when unity was most needed. Worse still, while publicly speaking the language of rights and legitimacy, the group was allegedly preparing for confrontation. Reports of militarization, commandos training, and the strengthening of regional armed capability pointed to a dangerous direction. Rather than supporting peace, it appears to have chosen a path that placed military calculation above political responsibility. The tragedy that followed was not simply the result of battlefield developments; it was the outcome of a long chain of calculated decisions that pushed the country closer to conflict. The attack on the Northern Command remains one of the darkest and most painful chapters of this period. According to the federal position, the TPLF exploited the trust and affection that the people had toward the national army, used that trust to keep the Northern Command in place, and then turned against it in a shocking act of betrayal. This was followed by a campaign of misinformation designed to invert the truth and portray the aggressor as the victim. Such conduct did not merely fuel war; it wounded national trust and inflicted deep harm on Ethiopia’s social and political fabric. Even after the outbreak of war, the federal government continued to pursue peace. It called on elders, religious leaders, and all responsible voices to intervene. It gave opportunities for dialogue, restraint, and de-escalation. Yet the TPLF, according to the federal narrative, mocked these appeals and pressed ahead with war rhetoric, treating conflict as an instrument of power. It dragged young people into violence, placing them in the front lines of a struggle that could have been avoided. It also widened the war by attacking across borders, deepening the suffering of the region and pulling neighboring forces into an already devastating conflict. Despite all this, the federal government still did not abandon its responsibility to seek peace. The Pretoria peace agreement was a turning point that ended the war in Northern Ethiopia and offered a chance for recovery. Even then, the federal government chose magnanimity. It supported the restoration of services, allocated substantial resources for reconstruction, and worked to stabilize Tigray. It extended help through federal institutions, regional administrations, and development partners, showing once again that its priority was not punishment, but national healing. If the goal had been revenge, the outcome could have been very different. Instead, the government chose restraint, allowing the people of Tigray the space to recover and reflect. Yet the promise of peace was repeatedly weakened by conduct attributed to the TPLF itself. Instead of fully embracing disarmament and political normalization, it allegedly engaged in concealment, obstruction, and diversion. The implementation of the agreement was complicated by continued interference, including the manipulation of aid, the obstruction of movement, and the persistence of illicit practices that harmed ordinary civilians. Rather than using the peace process to rebuild trust, it appears to have treated it as a pause, a tactical opportunity to regroup rather than a genuine path toward reconciliation. The federal government, meanwhile, continued to act with unusual patience. It refrained from deploying forces in major locations in Tigray even when it had legal and practical grounds to do so. It respected the sensitivities of the moment, accepted political criticism, and chose to preserve peace even when it was not being fully reciprocated. This was not weakness; it was statesmanship. It reflected a deliberate effort to prevent renewed civilian suffering and to keep the country from sliding back into full-scale war. Today, the greatest burden falls not only on the federal state, but also on the people of Tigray themselves. Parents, youth, elders, and intellectuals cannot remain silent while history threatens to repeat itself. No political force should be allowed to sacrifice another generation in the name of power, grievance, or revenge. The youth of Tigray deserve education, work, dignity, and hope, not to be used as instruments in another cycle of destruction. Parents must raise their voices against those who turn the lives of their children into fuel for war. Community leaders and elites must choose responsibility over silence, truth over fear, and peace over factional loyalty. Ethiopia has paid too high a price for war. What the country needs now is not another round of bloodshed, but a shared commitment to stability, accountability, and reconstruction. The federal government has shown patience, made concessions, and opened doors to peace more than once. If peace is to hold, every actor must now choose it honestly. The people of Tigray, like all Ethiopians, deserve a future built on development and dignity. Those who continue to gamble with that future must be told clearly: enough is enough.

Why There Can Be No Lasting Red Sea Stability Without Ethiopia By Yordanos D.   Sept. 22, 2026 (ENA) The Red Sea is no longer merely a maritime corridor. It has become one of the world’s most exposed geopolitical fault lines—and the latest crisis around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is making one reality increasingly difficult to ignore: the security of the Red Sea cannot be separated from the security of the Horn of Africa, and the security of the Horn cannot be meaningfully addressed while Ethiopia remains on the margins of maritime decision-making. On September 15, 2026, UN Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari told the Security Council that the situation around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait had become increasingly volatile as fighting intensified along Yemen’s western coast and Houthi forces advanced toward the strategic waterway. He called for restraint, dialogue and the restoration and respect of navigational rights and freedoms under international law. The warning was not about Yemen alone. The Bab el-Mandeb is the narrow maritime gateway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Any sustained disruption there can ripple through shipping, insurance, energy markets, food supplies and global supply chains. The consequences do not stop at the shores of Yemen or the countries bordering the Red Sea. They can reach factories in Asia, markets in Europe and consumers thousands of kilometres away. And sitting directly across the African side of this strategic equation is Ethiopia. For more than three decades, Ethiopia has been landlocked following Eritrea’s independence in 1993. Yet geography has never made Ethiopia separate from the Red Sea. Quite the opposite: Ethiopia’s history, economy, security and diplomacy have remained deeply intertwined with the maritime corridor. Today, the dependence is brutally practical. Ethiopia’s international trade relies heavily on the Djibouti corridor, meaning that instability affecting Red Sea shipping, ports, insurance or maritime routes can quickly become an economic concern inside Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s own Institute of Foreign Affairs has described this exposure as a strategic vulnerability arising from the country’s dependence on a maritime corridor whose security is largely shaped beyond its direct institutional control. That reality should change the way the world understands Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations. Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable access to the sea is too often reduced to a territorial or political dispute. That is an incomplete reading of the issue. At its core, Ethiopia is confronting a structural problem: a major African economy and one of the continent’s most populous states is deeply dependent on a maritime system in which it has limited direct access and limited influence over the security architecture. That is not simply an Ethiopian problem. It is a regional problem. It is also becoming a global problem. The Red Sea Cannot Be Secured From Offshore The latest crisis around Bab el-Mandeb exposes the weakness of treating Red Sea security as a matter primarily for naval powers operating from outside the region. Warships can protect vessels. Military deployments can deter attacks. International missions can escort commercial shipping. But no naval fleet, however powerful, can by itself resolve the political, economic and institutional vulnerabilities that make the Red Sea susceptible to recurring instability. The UN itself has emphasized that protecting freedom of navigation must go together with preventing further escalation in Yemen and pursuing a political solution. That means maritime security cannot be divorced from regional diplomacy. And regional diplomacy cannot be divorced from the countries whose economies and security are directly exposed to the Red Sea. Ethiopia is one of those countries. Indeed, the regional stakes are now being recognized institutionally. On September 15, the IGAD Council of Ministers identified the safety and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as core regional peace, security and development priorities. It directed the IGAD Secretariat to strengthen regional maritime governance, cooperation and coordination in response to changing geopolitical and security dynamics. That decision carries an important message: Red Sea security is no longer a distant maritime issue. It is a Horn of Africa security issue. And if it is a Horn issue, Ethiopia cannot be treated as an afterthought. Ethiopia Is Not Asking to Be a Spectator Ethiopia’s argument for maritime access should therefore be understood against this wider strategic background. A country of Ethiopia’s economic and demographic weight cannot indefinitely remain almost entirely dependent on a single external maritime corridor while the security of that corridor is vulnerable to conflicts, geopolitical rivalries and disruptions beyond its control. That does not mean that Ethiopia is entitled to disregard the sovereignty of coastal states. Quite the contrary. The strongest case for Ethiopia’s maritime future is one based on negotiation, mutual benefit, international law and respect for the sovereignty of neighboring countries. Ethiopian has repeatedly framed maritime access in precisely these terms. Recent discussions have linked access to the sea with economic development, national security, regional integration and diplomatic cooperation, while emphasizing peaceful dialogue and mutually beneficial arrangements. This distinction matters. Ethiopia does not need confrontation to establish a maritime role. It needs a sustainable arrangement that aligns Ethiopian economic interests with the interests of coastal states. Such an arrangement could transform maritime access from a source of regional anxiety into an engine of regional interdependence. From Landlocked Vulnerability to Regional Stakeholder There is another dimension that deserves far greater international attention. If Ethiopia secures reliable sea access through a negotiated arrangement, it would not simply gain another route for imports and exports. It would acquire a stronger economic and institutional stake in the security of the maritime corridor itself. That could change the strategic equation. A country whose trade, infrastructure and economic future are directly connected to a maritime corridor has powerful reasons to protect that corridor. Ethiopia could contribute to maritime information-sharing, port security, search and rescue, emergency preparedness, anti-trafficking efforts, customs cooperation and the prevention of organized maritime crime. The foundations for such engagement are already emerging. In August 2026, the International Maritime Organization supported a workshop in Addis Ababa aimed at developing a roadmap for a National Maritime Information Sharing Centre, designed to strengthen coordination among Ethiopia’s maritime institutions and contribute to regional maritime security under the Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah Amendment. This is important because maritime security is not synonymous with military power. It is also about information. It is about institutions. It is about ports, customs, coast guards, shipping authorities, intelligence services, emergency response and civilian maritime governance. In other words, Ethiopia can become part of the solution without turning the Red Sea into another theatre of military competition. Addis Ababa Has Something Others Cannot Easily Replicate Ethiopia also possesses a diplomatic asset that should not be underestimated: Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian capital hosts the African Union and remains one of the continent’s principal diplomatic centers. Ethiopia is a member of IGAD and has decades of experience in African peace and security initiatives. This gives Ethiopia potential diplomatic channels extending beyond the immediate Red Sea littoral. The country maintains relationships across Africa, the Gulf and the broader Middle East. Its diplomatic position can therefore provide opportunities for dialogue among actors whose interests frequently collide. This does not mean Ethiopia should become a party to every conflict surrounding the Red Sea. It means Ethiopia has an interest—and potentially a role—in defending principles that should concern every maritime state: freedom of navigation, protection of civilian shipping, respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Dangerous Illusion of a Red Sea Without Ethiopia There is a persistent strategic contradiction in the way the region is sometimes approached. External powers recognize the enormous importance of the Red Sea. Naval forces are deployed. Military bases expand. International missions patrol the waters. Governments warn about threats to shipping. Yet the countries whose economies and security are most directly tied to the Horn of Africa are not always placed at the center of the security conversation. That approach is unsustainable. The Red Sea cannot be permanently stabilized by looking only northward toward the Middle East or outward toward global powers. Its African dimension is equally fundamental. The security problems on one side of Bab el-Mandeb inevitably interact with those on the other. Conflict in Yemen, instability in Sudan, terrorism, trafficking, piracy, arms smuggling and organized crime can reinforce one another across maritime and land borders. Recent UN discussions have explicitly linked the instability around Bab el-Mandeb to wider threats affecting international shipping and the Horn of Africa. The lesson is straightforward: the Red Sea is one security space, even when political borders divide it. Connectivity Can Become a Peace Strategy Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions should therefore be connected to a broader regional economic vision. Ports should not merely be places where ships load and unload. They can become gateways connecting inland economies with coastal markets. Roads, railways, logistics centers, digital customs systems and trade corridors can turn maritime access into regional economic integration. For Ethiopia, diversification of maritime routes would not necessarily mean abandoning its existing economic relationship with Djibouti. It could complement it. More routes can mean greater resilience. More partnerships can mean greater economic interdependence. And greater interdependence can create additional incentives for governments to protect infrastructure, trade corridors and regional stability. Connectivity cannot guarantee peace. But economic isolation rarely creates durable regional interdependence. A more interconnected Horn of Africa would give countries more to lose from conflict—and more to gain from cooperation. The Red Sea Needs African Ownership The deeper question, therefore, is not whether Ethiopia should be allowed to have a role in the Red Sea. The more consequential question is whether the region can realistically build lasting maritime stability while excluding one of Africa’s largest economies and most influential diplomatic centers from the strategic architecture surrounding that sea. The answer is increasingly difficult to justify. Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations should not be framed as a demand for confrontation with coastal states. They should be framed as part of a broader African agenda for connectivity, economic resilience and collective security. That requires diplomacy, not brinkmanship what Ethiopia is practically pursuing. It requires negotiated arrangements, not unilateral action. It requires regional institutions, not another contest among external powers. And above all, it requires recognition that the security of the Red Sea is a shared responsibility. A Strategic Opportunity Hidden Inside a Crisis The present crisis around Bab el-Mandeb is a warning—but it is also an opportunity. It demonstrates how quickly instability in a narrow waterway can become a global economic problem. It also demonstrates the limits of security arrangements that rely too heavily on military responses while neglecting regional institutions and political solutions. For Ethiopia, the crisis underscores the cost of remaining economically exposed to a maritime system over which it has limited direct influence. But it also creates an opportunity to articulate a more ambitious vision. Ethiopia can pursue maritime access while simultaneously strengthening regional maritime governance. It can deepen cooperation with coastal states while maintaining respect for their sovereignty. It can work through IGAD, the African Union and the United Nations. It can invest in maritime information systems, logistics, emergency response and security institutions. And it can use its diplomatic position in Addis Ababa to promote dialogue rather than deepen confrontation. The objective should be to institutionalize Ethiopia’s legitimate economic and security stake in the Red Sea through peaceful, lawful and mutually beneficial arrangements. No Durable Red Sea Security Without Ethiopia The future of the Red Sea will ultimately be decided not by geography alone, but by whether the states surrounding and depending on it can build a system capable of managing their shared vulnerabilities. Ethiopia is too large to be economically detached from that system. Too geographically connected to be strategically ignored. Too diplomatically significant to be treated merely as an inland observer. And too deeply exposed to Red Sea disruptions to remain permanently outside meaningful maritime security arrangements. The current crisis has made one fact unmistakable: what happens around Bab el-Mandeb does not remain around Bab el-Mandeb. It reaches the Horn of Africa. It reaches Ethiopia and global trade. And if the region genuinely wants a durable Red Sea security architecture, Ethiopia cannot simply be a country affected by decisions made about the sea. It must have a seat at the table where those decisions are shaped. Because lasting stability will not come from securing the water while ignoring the land, nor from protecting shipping while overlooking the economies and societies that depend on it. Thus, the Red Sea’s future is inseparable from the Horn of Africa’s future—and the Horn’s future cannot be designed without Ethiopia.

By staff writer Sept. 22, 2026 (ENA) As the world grapples with the challenges of water scarcity and sustainable development, Egypt's stance on these issues has raised eyebrows. Despite having vast underground water reserves that could last for centuries, even if rainfall in Ethiopia were to cease, Egypt continues to cry foul over the use of the Abay (Nile) River's waters. But is this concern genuinely about water scarcity, or is it a thinly veiled attempt to stifle the development of its neighboring countries? A History of Water Mismanagement Egypt's water management practices are, in fact, among the worst in the world. The country's agricultural sector, which consumes the lion's share of its water resources, is dominated by water-intensive crops like sugarcane and rice. These crops are not only unsustainable but also contribute to the country's water woes. It is ironic that while Egypt is willing to squander its water resources on these crops, it expects other countries, like Ethiopia, to forgo their own development and limit their water usage to a mere trickle.   A Double Standard Egypt's approach to water management is a classic case of "do as I say, not as I do." On one hand, the country is willing to waste its water resources on lavish projects, such as sprawling cities in the desert, while on the other hand, it expects Ethiopians to live in darkness, without even the basic amenities of electricity and clean water. This double standard is not only hypocritical but also a stark reminder of Egypt's proclivity for splashing water into the desert, while denying its neighbors the right to develop their own water resources. A Lack of Gratitude Despite Ethiopia's efforts to plant over 56 billion seedlings, a move that will not only help to reduce water evaporation from the Nile River but also contribute to the global fight against climate change, Egypt has chosen to respond with ingratitude. Instead of thanking Ethiopia for its environmental stewardship, Egypt has opted to destabilize the country, using every trick in the book to undermine its development. This twisted logic is a testament to Egypt's shortsightedness and its inability to see the bigger picture. A Neocolonial Mindset Egypt's behavior towards its neighbors, particularly Sudan, is a stark reminder of its neocolonial mindset. By treating Sudan as an appendage, Egypt is attempting to dismantle the country's sovereignty and reduce it to a mere vassal state. This approach is not only counterproductive but also a threat to regional stability and security. A Brinksmanship Strategy Egypt's ultimate goal is to ensure that no country on either side of the Red Sea thrives. This brinksmanship strategy is a recipe for disaster, as it will only serve to exacerbate tensions and create an environment of mistrust and hostility. By adopting this approach, Egypt is not only harming its neighbors but also undermining its own long-term interests.   In conclusion, Egypt's water woes are a self-inflicted wound, caused by its own mismanagement and hypocrisy. Instead of blaming its neighbors for its water scarcity, Egypt should take a long, hard look at its own practices and policies. By adopting a more sustainable and equitable approach to water management, Egypt can not only ensure its own water security but also contribute to the development and prosperity of its neighboring countries. Until then, Egypt's cries of water scarcity will remain nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to stifle the development of others, while it continues to waste its own water resources with impunity.

September 22, 2026 (ENA) Egypt stands out for its chronic mismanagement of water resources, despite contributing virtually nothing to the flow of the Abay (Nile)—a striking paradox at the heart of the Nile debate. For many hydropower analysts and transboundary water experts, water stored in Egypt’s downstream reservoirs suffers from high rates of evaporation due to the country’s hot desert climate. For Fekahmed Negash, Chairperson of the Advisory Team on Transboundary Water and GERD at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Water and Energy, this downstream nation’s vast reservoir lies in Egypt’s hot desert environment and is exposed to substantial evaporation losses. He estimated that the Aswan High Dam loses about 15 to 16 billion cubic meters of water annually through evaporation. Contrary to popular belief, this hard fact and the UN’s designation of Egypt as a water-scarce country, the nation possesses immense water potential that remains hugely misunderstood. Egypt has underground water enough for hundreds of years even if rain stops in Ethiopia for years. Egypt wastes water and has some of the worst practices in doing so. Egypt acts as if it has a swath of marshland and produces sugarcane and rice. What is appealing is that it wishes others not even to drink fresh water and produce cabbages for it to continue wasting water. Egypt wants Ethiopia to forgo its development and wallow in poverty for Egyptians to enjoy affluence. Egypt has proclivities of splashing water into a desert and creating sprawled cities, while it does not wish Ethiopians to have even light and stoves in their houses. Egypt doesn’t know how to be grateful. They pretend they are scared of water scarcity, but they don’t wish to thank Ethiopia for planning more than 50 billion seedlings. Rather, it leaves no stone unturned to destabilize Ethiopia—what a twist. Egypt believes it is a neighbor to Ethiopia because it considers Sudan just as an appendage. That’s why it is bent on dismantling Sudan using sellouts. Egypt doesn’t wish any country on both sides of the Red Sea to thrive—what a brinkmanship!

The signing of the Pretoria Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in November 2022 was widely hailed as a watershed moment for Ethiopia. After two years of devastating conflict in the northern part of the country, the agreement established a clear, lawful framework to restore constitutional order, demobilize combatants, deliver humanitarian relief, and rebuild shattered communities. Since the signing of the CoHA, the Ethiopian Federal Government has consistently demonstrated its dedication to the spirit and letter of the Pretoria Agreement. Federal institutions moved swiftly to reconnect Tigray to the national grid, restore banking and telecommunications, and reopen commercial air links to Mekelle. The government also facilitated unhindered humanitarian aid access across the region while allocating significant state resources toward rebuilding damaged infrastructure, schools, and healthcare facilities. Fulfilling a core diplomatic requirement, the Federal Parliament officially removed the TPLF from the national list of terrorist organizations to enable inclusive political engagement. Furthermore, in strict adherence to Article 10 of the agreement, the federal government facilitated the setup of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (IRA) to ensure local governance, service delivery, and transitional stability. Beyond initial diplomatic concessions, the Federal Government of Ethiopia backed its commitment to the Pretoria Accord with massive fiscal capital, allocating billions of Birr from the national treasury to finance the immediate reconstruction and socio-economic recovery of the Tigray region. Recognizing that peace cannot take root amid economic ruin, Addis Ababa prioritized funding to rebuild shattered health systems, reconstruct damaged schools, and repair critical transport, power, and telecommunications corridors—treating Tigray’s revitalization as a top national priority. These federal budget transfers, disbursed directly to fund public services, pay civil servants, and subsidize essential commodities, served as tangible proof of the state's determination to integrate Tigray back into the national fabric. Yet, this massive financial goodwill and capital investment have been met with profound bad faith from TPLF hardliners, who have diverted local resources, obstructed federal development projects, and funneled regional administrative funds toward covert re-militarization rather than the civilian welfare the money was meant to secure Rather than channeling its efforts into peaceful political competition and regional recovery, the TPLF leadership has actively undermined the governance framework envisioned at Pretoria. Behind this resistance lies a calculated objective: the hardline Debretsion Gebremichael-led faction seeks to reclaim the unbridled single-party hegemony it once wielded over Ethiopia. Reeling from its loss of federal dominance and resisting the constitutional order, the TPLF's core ambition is to manufacture regional instability, paralyze state institutions, and force a total renegotiation of the Pretoria Accord on terms that insulate its elite leadership from accountability. A central pillar of the peace deal was the establishment of an inclusive Interim Regional Administration, yet hardline factional leaders within the TPLF have systematically moved to dismantle it. By attempting to unilaterally oust IRA leadership, seize regional administrative bodies by force, and reject federal mandates extended to preserve regional stability, the group has shown an alarming disregard for lawful transitional governance. This systematic takeover replaces an inclusive, transitional public administration with single-party rule, directly violating the core principles of the Pretoria Agreement and stripping Tigrayan citizens of civilian-led, accountable governance. To achieve these disruptive ambitions, the TPLF hardliners have entered into unholy, opportunistic alignments with external spoilers and regional adversaries. Taking advantage of broader Horn of Africa geopolitical friction, the faction has cultivated tacit backing from foreign actors seeking to exploit Ethiopia’s internal vulnerabilities. Chief among these actors are the regimes in Cairo and Asmara, whose historic and strategic interests align with maintaining a fractured, vulnerable Ethiopian state. For the regime in Egypt, the motive is rooted in an existential paranoia over the Nile waters and the operational reality of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Cairo has long viewed any strong, unified, and economically sovereign Ethiopia as a direct threat to its centuries-old hydro-hegemony over the Abay River. Unable to halt the completion of the GERD through international diplomacy or legal coercion, Egypt’s intelligence and diplomatic apparatus has pivoted toward zero-sum encirclement. By funneling indirect backing, diplomatic cover, and operational logistical channels to dissident Ethiopian factions, Cairo seeks to keep Addis Ababa consumed by internal fires. For Egypt, an Ethiopia locked in civil strife is an Ethiopia incapable of projecting power, advancing downstream development, or asserting its sovereign rights over regional trade and maritime infrastructure. Eritrea’s totalitarian regime, led by Isaias Afwerki, operates under a parallel strategy driven by deeply rooted hostility toward Ethiopian regional dominance and a toxic political history with TPLF elites. Though Asmara and the TPLF fought a brutal war from 1998 to 2000, current tactical interests have forced an opportunistic convergence. As Ethiopia asserts its sovereign ambition to secure reliable access to the Red Sea, President Isaias views a consolidated, economically dynamic Ethiopia as a threat to his regime’s regional influence and maritime monopoly. Capitalizing on internal Ethio-Tigrayan political friction, Asmara has quietly opened channels with TPLF hardliners and other insurgent actors, stoking localized militarization to wrap Ethiopia in a web of perpetual border security crises. Together, Cairo and Asmara have turned the Horn of Africa into a theater of proxy warfare, leveraging the TPLF hardline faction as an instrumental lever to destabilize the nation from within. These external allies provide diplomatic cover, logistics, and material support to keep northern Ethiopia in a state of perpetual crisis. By acting as a proxy for regional forces hostile to Ethiopia’s economic self-determination and territorial integrity, the TPLF leadership is actively outsourcing the destabilization of its own homeland. The Pretoria Agreement explicitly mandated the complete Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Tigrayan armed forces, establishing that Ethiopia has only one unified national defense force. While the federal government created the national DDR framework, the TPLF has resisted full disarmament. Large contingents of combatants remain armed, active, and organized under regional command structures. Reports of re-armament, forced recruitment, and offensive troop movements near regional borders—coordinated with external elements—signal that the group is actively preparing for another round of war rather than choosing peace. Holding civilian populations hostage to the threat of renewed hostility severely jeopardizes regional security, stalls economic recovery, and prolongs human suffering across northern Ethiopia. The international community, including the African Union, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union, played a constructive role in bringing the parties to the negotiating table in 2022, and international partners must now step up enforcement to protect that investment in peace. International actors must clearly name and condemn actions that violate the CoHA, particularly the dismantling of the Interim Administration and refusals to complete disarmament. Support for transitional programs should be tied directly to measurable, verified progress in the DDR process, alongside unequivocal support for legitimate federal authority and legally recognized interim governance. Additionally, international aid agencies must ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches the civilian population directly without being diverted or hijacked by armed factions. A growing awareness among key international stakeholders reveals that the primary bottleneck to lasting peace in northern Ethiopia is no longer a lack of federal goodwill, but the deliberate subversion orchestrated by hardline TPLF factions and their external regional enablers. Recent diplomatic measures by the U.S. government—specifically targeted visa restrictions imposed under Section 212(a)(3)(C) against hardline TPLF figures and associated actors complicit in eroding the Pretoria Accord—mark a vital shift toward accountability. By directly penalizing those responsible for dismantling the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, delaying disarmament, and orchestrating illegal re-militarization, Washington has effectively validated the Ethiopian state's long-standing position: that recalcitrant internal elites and external spoilers, particularly those aligning with foreign interests in Asmara and Cairo, are the true perpetrators of volatility in the Horn of Africa. To protect the immense investment in peace, international partners must build upon these initial accountability steps and construct a systematic enforcement architecture. Diplomatic declarations must evolve into rigorous, conditional enforcement where developmental aid, transitional support, and international legitimacy are strictly contingent upon verifiable compliance with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) protocols. Furthermore, aid agencies and international monitors must audit humanitarian delivery mechanisms to prevent armed factions from hijacking relief supplies to fuel illicit mobilization. By unequivocally backing legitimate, constitutionally recognized interim governance and escalating targeted sanctions against both internal hardliners and external spoilers, the African Union, United Nations, United States, and European Union can ensure that the Pretoria Agreement remains a durable bridge to peace rather than a temporary pause in conflict. To secure a lasting peace in the Horn of Africa, the international community can no longer afford the dangerous posture of false equivalence. The Pretoria Agreement provided a clear, legal path toward national restoration, yet its fulfillment remains hostage to the revisionist ambitions of TPLF hardliners and the zero-sum geopolitical games of foreign spoilers in Cairo and Asmara. Allowing internal actors to dismantle lawful interim governance and re-militarize under the cover of foreign backing risks not only unraveling Ethiopia’s hard-won stability, but also igniting a wider regional conflagration. The global community—led by the AU, UN, US, and EU—must move decisively beyond passive rhetoric. By enforcing strict accountability, conditioning support on verified disarmament, and confronting foreign intervention, international stakeholders can neutralize these disruptive forces, protect the integrity of the Pretoria Accord, and ensure that Ethiopia’s sovereign trajectory remains defined by peace, unity, and economic progress.

By Staff Writer Armed conflicts, maritime insecurity, economic pressures, climate risks and rapid advances in artificial intelligence dominated the international agenda during the week of September 12 to 19, 2026, as developments in the Red Sea, Ukraine and Sudan continued to generate consequences far beyond their immediate theatres. The week highlighted the growing connections between security, energy, trade, humanitarian affairs, climate change and technology. Renewed fighting along Yemen's Red Sea coast raised fresh concerns over the safety of the Bab el Mandeb shipping corridor, while the wars in Ukraine and Sudan continued to drive displacement, food insecurity and regional instability. At the same time, energy market volatility added to inflation concerns and complicated monetary policy decisions. New evidence on global water resources underscored the mounting effects of climate change, while artificial intelligence moved further into discussions on international security, economic competitiveness and global governance. These developments came as the international community prepared for the high-level week of the 81st United Nations General Assembly, scheduled in the last week of September 2026. With conflicts continuing in several regions and strategic competition among major powers becoming increasingly pronounced, the Assembly is expected to provide a major forum for discussions on peace and security, climate change, development, health, technology and international cooperation. Peace and Security Renewed fighting in Yemen emerged as one of the week's most significant security developments because of its direct connection to the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb, a critical maritime passage linking the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The humanitarian consequences were immediate. The UN migration agency reported on September 18 that at least 112,000 people had been displaced inside Yemen, while nearly 3,000 had crossed the sea to Djibouti. Meanwhile, the Russia Ukraine war remained another major security concern during the week. The conflict continued to influence European defense planning, including discussions on air defense, drones, military production and the protection of national borders. Poland also remained particularly alert to developments along its eastern frontier, reflecting continuing concerns about the wider security consequences of the war. Beyond the battlefield, the conflict continues to affect European energy and defense policies as well as global food and commodity markets. Disruptions affecting Black Sea trade remain particularly significant for countries dependent on grain, fertilizer and other commodities. In Africa, Sudan remained with serious humanitarian and security emergencies as fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces continued. The conflict has displaced millions of people, disrupted agricultural production and weakened an already fragile economy. The consequences have also spread across Sudan's borders. Large numbers of displaced people have sought refuge in Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia and other neighboring countries. At the same time, strategic competition remained prominent across the Indo Pacific, where Taiwan, the South China Sea, maritime security, advanced technology and military capabilities continued to shape relations among China, the United States, Japan, India, South Korea and other regional powers. Taken together, these developments demonstrate that international security is no longer defined solely by conventional warfare. Maritime disruption, drones, cyber operations, organized crime and competition over strategic technologies are increasingly part of the global security environment Economy, Trade and Energy The security developments of the week also carried significant economic consequences, particularly through their effects on energy markets and international trade. Geopolitical tensions continued to influence energy markets as attacks involving energy infrastructure and insecurity around major maritime routes raised concerns about oil supplies and contributed to market volatility. Higher energy prices have consequences well beyond oil producing countries because they can increase transportation, electricity, manufacturing and food costs, adding pressure on households, businesses and governments. For developing economies that depend heavily on imported fuel, prolonged price increases can also strain foreign exchange reserves, government budgets and household incomes. Consequently, energy security has become increasingly connected to wider questions of economic stability and development. Alongside energy concerns, trade and supply chain security remained central to the global economic debate, particularly in relations between the United States and China. Washington and Beijing continue to differ over trade, technology, Taiwan, artificial intelligence and strategic competition. Their economic interdependence, however, means that decisions taken by either government can affect manufacturing, semiconductors, critical minerals, electric vehicles and digital technologies worldwide. The resulting economic landscape is therefore being shaped not only by conventional market forces, but also by geopolitical considerations, energy security and the strategic importance of technology and critical resources. Climate, Water and Environmental Risks While security and economic concerns dominated much of the international agenda, climate and environmental risks continued to demonstrate their growing influence on societies and economies. Climate change remained closely linked to extreme heat, wildfires, air pollution and changing rainfall patterns. The interaction between climate change and air quality is particularly significant because wildfires and heatwaves can worsen air pollution, while changing weather patterns can influence the movement and concentration of pollutants. The effects vary across regions. Heatwaves and wildfires continue to affect Europe and North America, while drought, heat stress and changing rainfall patterns pose serious challenges to agricultural communities in Africa and Asia. Latin American countries face growing pressures on agriculture, ecosystems and water resources, while small island states remain highly vulnerable to sea level rise and extreme weather. Water security is also inherently transboundary. Drought prone areas of Africa, Asia and the Middle East face particular challenges, while low lying and island countries remain vulnerable to rising seas and extreme weather. Rivers, groundwater systems and glaciers frequently cross-national borders, making data sharing, early warning systems and cooperation increasingly important. In this context, water management is becoming not only an environmental issue but also a matter of food security, economic resilience and regional cooperation. These concerns are expected to receive high level attention during the forthcoming UN General Assembly week, with discussions likely to address climate action, energy transition, sea level rise and the protection of vulnerable populations. The discussions bring together countries with very different circumstances, ranging from major energy producers and industrial economies to developing countries and small island states. The challenge is to reconcile economic development and energy needs with the growing pressure to reduce emissions and strengthen resilience to climate impacts. Diplomacy and International Cooperation Against the backdrop of continuing conflicts, economic uncertainty and environmental pressures, diplomacy is expected to take center stage as world leaders gather in New York for the high-level week of the 81st UN General Assembly. The General Debate is scheduled for September 22 to 28 and comes at a time of simultaneous conflicts, economic uncertainty, climate risks and intensifying competition among major powers. The session provides a platform for countries to present national priorities while addressing challenges that increasingly require collective action. For African countries, peace and security, development financing, climate finance, food security and energy access remain central concerns. European governments are focused heavily on Ukraine, defence and energy security, while Asian countries are addressing trade, technology, economic growth and maritime security. Middle Eastern states are expected to emphasize regional security, energy markets and conflict resolution. Small island states continue to place particular emphasis on sea level rise and climate finance. The General Assembly therefore offers a common diplomatic platform at a time when developments in one region increasingly affect countries and communities elsewhere. More broadly, the forthcoming General Assembly will provide an opportunity for governments to address interconnected crises through multilateral diplomacy. Its agenda reflects the reality that peace, development, climate action, health and technology increasingly require cooperation across national and regional boundaries. Technology and Artificial Intelligence Artificial intelligence increasingly emerged during the week as an issue of international policy rather than one confined to the technology sector. Governments, international organizations and technology companies are debating how to capture the economic and social benefits of AI while addressing concerns over safety, cybersecurity, employment, misinformation, military applications and the misuse of advanced systems. The discussion is also becoming closely connected to energy. Large data centers require substantial electricity, creating additional pressure on power systems as countries compete to expand AI infrastructure. Consequently, the development of AI is becoming linked to questions of electricity generation, energy security and infrastructure investment. The United States remains a major center of advanced AI development, while China continues to invest heavily in domestic AI capabilities and semiconductor technologies. European governments are pursuing regulatory approaches while seeking to strengthen technological capacity. The growing role of AI therefore adds another layer to existing global competition. Technological capacity is increasingly connected to economic productivity, national security, public services and international influence, making questions of access, regulation and responsible use increasingly important for both developed and developing countries. Humanitarian and Health Challenges The security and economic developments of the week also had significant humanitarian consequences, particularly in conflict affected regions. Conflict, displacement, extreme weather and economic pressures are placing additional strain on food systems. Sudan remains among the most severe cases, with humanitarian agencies facing both enormous needs and funding constraints. Food security is closely connected to energy and trade. Higher fuel prices increase transportation and agricultural production costs, while disruptions to major shipping routes can affect the movement of grain, fertilizer and other essential inputs. The humanitarian consequences of conflict also extend into public health. Damage to hospitals, water systems and sanitation infrastructure increases health risks, while displacement can make disease prevention and treatment more difficult. The situation in Yemen illustrates this connection particularly clearly. Displacement caused by insecurity has not only created immediate shelter and food needs but has also increased pressure on health, education and other essential services in receiving areas. Health security is also expected to receive attention during the UN General Assembly's high-level week, including discussions on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. The experience of recent health emergencies has reinforced the importance of international coordination because infectious diseases can cross borders regardless of political or economic differences. At the same time, climate change, conflict and migration are creating additional pressures on health systems. Extreme weather can increase health risks, while conflict can destroy public health infrastructure and displacement can place additional pressure on already limited services. Consequently, humanitarian and health concerns remain closely connected to the wider questions of peace, climate resilience, food security and international cooperation. Conclusion The week of September 12 to 19 demonstrated the degree to which global challenges have become interconnected. Conflict affected energy markets and shipping routes, economic pressures influenced monetary policy, climate change intensified water and environmental risks, while advances in artificial intelligence created new questions about security, governance and economic development. The renewed fighting in Yemen placed the security of the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb back at the center of international attention. Climate developments provided another reminder that global risks do not respect national borders. The WMO's latest assessment of global water resources showed continuing changes in river flows, freshwater storage and glaciers, underscoring the growing importance of water security alongside climate action. Meanwhile, economic policymakers continued to navigate inflation and geopolitical uncertainty, while the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence added a new dimension to international competition and governance. These developments show how decisions in one policy area increasingly influence outcomes in another. All these issues will converge during the forthcoming UN General Assembly high level week. Governments will face the task of addressing immediate crises while also strengthening cooperation on longer term challenges involving climate, health, food, energy, technology and sustainable development. Ultimately, the events of the past week showed that instability rarely remains confined to the place where it begins. A conflict can disrupt shipping and energy markets; higher energy costs can affect food prices and household incomes; climate shocks can intensify humanitarian needs; and technological advances can reshape both economies and security. The international agenda is therefore increasingly defined not by isolated crises, but by the connections between them. Understanding those connections will remain essential as governments and international institutions seek responses to the increasingly complex challenges shaping the global order. Sources: The roundup draws on reporting and analysis from major international and regional media and institutional sources including Reuters, AP, BBC, Al Jazeera, The Guardian, CNN, France 24, DW, Africanews, Euronews, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Bloomberg and Financial Times.

By Staff Writer   Sept. 20, 2026 The second week of September 2026 placed Ethiopia’s strategic interests in water, maritime access, diplomacy and economic transformation firmly at the center of national and international attention. Across Ethiopian media, the Abay/Nile and Red Sea emerged as two defining themes. Discussions on the Nile focused on equitable and sustainable utilization of shared water resources and Ethiopia’s role as the source of the Abay, while the country’s long-standing quest for reliable access to the Red Sea gained fresh momentum from government officials, researchers and geopolitical commentators. At the same time, Ethiopia’s diplomatic engagement remained active, with ambassadors and senior representatives from several countries reaffirming their interest in deepening bilateral partnerships in areas ranging from agriculture and technology to green development and people-to-people relations. The week also highlighted Ethiopia’s growing engagement on global and regional platforms, from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s General Conference in Vienna to the IGAD forum on El Niño preparedness in the Horn of Africa. Together, these developments point to a broader strategic narrative: Ethiopia is increasingly linking water resources, maritime access, regional security, diplomatic partnerships and economic transformation as interconnected elements of its long-term national interests. Abay/Nile: A Debate Over Rights, Development and a Changing Basin   The Nile once again occupied a prominent place in Ethiopia’s public discourse. Getachew Reda, Minister and Advisor to the Ethiopian Prime Minister on East African Affairs, sharply criticized what he described as Egypt’s continued attempt to assert exclusive control over the Nile, arguing that such an approach is increasingly disconnected from the realities of the region. In an exclusive interview with The Pulse of Africa, Getachew said Egypt had developed what he characterized as an “artificial reality” around the Nile and argued that the river should be viewed through the realities of geography, science and the development needs of all riparian states.   Former Ethiopian House of People’s Representatives Speaker Teshome Toga similarly argued that Egypt needs to adjust its Nile strategy to the realities of the 21st century. In his an analytical article published on, Teshome pointed to population growth, climate change, rising energy demand, food insecurity and economic development as factors that have fundamentally changed the Nile Basin. He called for a framework based on cooperation, equity and mutual respect rather than what he described as outdated colonial-era assumptions. The Abay’s contribution to the Nile was also central to the discussion. According to Teshome, the Blue Nile, which originates in the Ethiopian highlands, contributes about 86 percent of the Nile’s annual flow, underscoring Ethiopia’s central geographical position in the basin.   Senior researcher Abdushakur Abdussamad, meanwhile, told ENA that what he described as the political instrumentalization of the Nile and the stereotyping of upstream countries have shaped negative perceptions in Egypt toward Nile Basin countries, particularly Ethiopia. He argued that repeated media narratives portraying the Nile as exclusively belonging to Egypt have contributed to the perception that development projects in other basin countries necessarily threaten Egypt’s water interests. The competing narratives underscore a broader challenge for the Nile Basin: how to reconcile downstream water dependence with the development aspirations and utilization rights of upstream countries through a cooperative and sustainable framework. Red Sea Access Moves to the Center of Ethiopia’s Strategic Affairs If the Nile dominated the water debate, the Red Sea increasingly dominated the maritime one. Senior Ethiopian officials, researchers and academics this week linked access to the sea with economic development, national security, regional integration and Ethiopia’s wider diplomatic role. At a panel discussion organized by the Addis Ababa Leadership Academy, participants stressed that Ethiopia’s maritime interests should be pursued through peaceful dialogue, diplomatic engagement, cooperation and mutually beneficial arrangements.   Gizachew Asrat, Chief of Staff and Senior Researcher for the Horn of Africa at IFA, said consensus around Ethiopia’s role and presence in the Red Sea is growing. He argued that Ethiopia’s expanding population, economy and trade, together with regional security considerations, make maritime access an increasingly important strategic issue. For Addis Ababa University researcher Tesfaye Jima, the issue goes beyond commercial considerations. “The Red Sea is an existential issue for Ethiopia,” he said, linking maritime access to the country’s security, sovereignty, economy and diplomatic influence. He also pointed to Ethiopia’s future import and export requirements, agricultural and fishing interests, and its broader regional engagement. The debate also received international diplomatic resonance during the week. Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia Avraham Neguise reaffirmed Israel’s support for Ethiopia’s quest for sea access, describing stability in the Red Sea and a stronger Ethiopia as matters of broader international interest. The growing discussion therefore increasingly connects the Abay/Nile and Red Sea as two strategic questions with implications extending well beyond Ethiopia’s borders. Ethiopia on Global Platforms and Regional Preparedness Ethiopia’s international engagement was not limited to the Nile and Red Sea. In Vienna, the country participated in the 70th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, where member states are discussing nuclear safety and security, nuclear technology applications and the peaceful uses of nuclear science.   Ethiopia’s participation reflects the country’s continued engagement with global institutions on issues ranging from energy and technology to food security, environmental management and sustainable development. Closer to home, Addis Ababa hosted the IGAD Regional High-Level Forum on El Niño Preparedness for the Horn of Africa. Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Deputy Commissioner Aydrus Hassan stressed that the potential effects of El Niño require political leadership, national ownership, regional solidarity, timely financing and early action—not simply technical preparedness.   He said Ethiopia is strengthening its disaster-risk management system around monitoring, forecasting, impact assessment, early warning, preparedness, anticipatory action and response. The country is also seeking greater national self-reliance through its Disaster Risk Response Fund. The IGAD forum similarly called for stronger contingency planning, pre-positioning of essential supplies, health surveillance, protection of food systems and expanded anticipatory action across the region. Diplomacy: Partnerships Broadening Beyond Traditional Politics Ethiopia’s diplomatic landscape also remained active, with a series of interviews with foreign diplomats highlighting the breadth of the country’s international partnerships. Ethiopia-Israel relations, according to Ambassador Avraham Neguise, extend across agriculture, health, technology, water, energy, investment and capacity building. He described the relationship as one that has evolved from deep historical ties into a broad modern partnership.   Germany and Denmark, meanwhile, highlighted cultural diplomacy, people-to-people relations, academic cooperation and green transformation as important components of their longstanding partnerships with Ethiopia. Germany’s Deputy Head of Mission Ferdinand von Weyhe emphasized that high-level political engagement needs to be complemented by direct connections between the peoples of the two countries. Denmark’s Deputy Head of Mission Mirja Crone pointed to cooperation on green transformation, bringing Danish expertise together with Ethiopian companies and professionals to promote more sustainable economic growth. The diplomatic messages came alongside New Year greetings from German, Finnish and Danish diplomatic missions, which expressed hopes for peace, prosperity and stronger relations with Ethiopia. Taken together, the engagements show diplomacy extending beyond traditional political relations into technology, agriculture, climate action, culture, education, investment and sustainable development. Economic Front: Confidence, Capacity and Reform Economic transformation formed another important layer of the week’s narrative. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy praised Ethiopian Airlines for what he described as its strategic discipline, technical capability and operational professionalism, highlighting the carrier’s investment in training and technical capacity as key elements of its international reputation.   Ethiopian-American businessman Zemedeneh Negatu, CEO of CBE Capital Investment Bank, meanwhile argued that Ethiopia has the potential to sustain annual economic growth of between 9 and 11 percent over the coming decades, citing agriculture, manufacturing, natural resources, tourism and the country’s large young population as potential engines of growth. He particularly highlighted the transition from subsistence agriculture to mechanized and commercial production, the expansion of manufacturing and the potential for a more technology-driven economy. The economic conversation also increasingly centered on reform and investment.   International Finance Corporation Managing Director Makhtar Diop said Ethiopia had made progress in addressing constraints that previously affected private-sector investment, particularly foreign-exchange pressures, inflation and reserve levels. He also identified opportunities in digital technology, tourism, aviation, infrastructure and renewable energy. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s focus on technology and artificial intelligence emerged as another component of its economic transformation, with Zemedeneh emphasizing digital skills, automation and the country’s young population as potential drivers of future competitiveness. A Week Defined by Strategic Convergence The week’s developments reveal a striking convergence of issues that are often discussed separately. The Abay/Nile issue is increasingly framed around development, equitable utilization and regional cooperation. The Red Sea debate connects maritime access with trade, security, sovereignty and regional integration. Diplomacy is expanding into technology, agriculture, climate action, culture and investment, while economic reform is being linked to Ethiopia’s ambition to strengthen its position in regional and global affairs. From the Nile Basin to the Red Sea, from Vienna to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s strategic conversation is therefore extending beyond individual disputes or diplomatic engagements toward a broader question: how can the country translate its geographic position, natural resources, economic potential and international partnerships into long-term national and regional development? That question and the competing interests surrounding it—is likely to remain central to Ethiopia’s domestic and international agenda in the weeks ahead.

By Gezmu Edicha Sept. 20, 2026 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s participation in the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi was more than a routine diplomatic engagement. It was a clear moment of strategic significance for Ethiopia. In a world where influence is increasingly shaped by alliances, trade access, financial cooperation, and political positioning, Ethiopia played an active role with vision, ambition, and growing global relevance. For Ethiopia, the summit carried both symbolic and practical value. Symbolically, it reinforced the country’s place among emerging powers and reform-minded states seeking a fairer international order. Practically, it opened doors to concrete gains in trade, investment, aviation, climate diplomacy, technology transfer, and financial cooperation. These outcomes align closely with Ethiopia’s Home-Grown Economic Reform and its long-term development priorities. What made this summit important for Ethiopia was the way Prime Minister Abiy translated high-level diplomacy into tangible national benefit. Rather than treating the BRICS platform as a photo opportunity, he used it to advance specific national interests with precision and persistence. Diplomatic win on the global trade front One of the most important outcomes of the summit was the strong support Ethiopia received for its World Trade Organization accession process. According to the BRICS New Delhi Declaration, all member states expressed backing for Ethiopia’s entry into the WTO. This matters because WTO membership is a gateway to greater market access, stronger investor confidence, and deeper integration into the global economy. For Ethiopia, this endorsement carries real weight. It strengthens the country’s hand in ongoing negotiations and sends a message to the international community that Ethiopia’s reform is being recognized by influential global actors. In practical terms, this kind of support can help accelerate Ethiopia’s integration into global supply chains and improve its ability to compete under fair, rules-based trade arrangements. Just as important was the recognition of Ethiopia’s candidacy for an expanded seat on the International Civil Aviation Organization Council, which is backed by the African Union, and formally supported in the New Delhi Declaration. Ethiopia is home to Ethiopian Airlines, one of Africa’s most successful and globally respected carriers. Backing Ethiopia for this role reflects not only the country’s aviation expertise, but also its broader contribution to Africa’s air connectivity and transport leadership. Climate leadership and the road to COP32 The other major achievement is the endorsement of Ethiopia to host the 32nd United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP32) in 2027. This is a big diplomatic and reputational win. Hosting such a major global summit places Ethiopia at the center of international climate discussions and gives the country an opportunity to shape the agenda around issues that matter deeply to Africa and the developing world. Prime Minister Abiy’s vision for COP32 is rooted in practical climate action, equitable climate finance, and green development. This message therefore fits well with Ethiopia’s broader environmental agenda, especially the Green Legacy Initiative, which has become one of the country’s most visible national programs. It also builds on Ethiopia’s growing investment in renewable energy and sustainable development. If successfully delivered, COP32 in Addis Ababa could do more than showcase Ethiopia to the world. It could strengthen the country’s leadership in climate diplomacy, attract international partnerships, and highlight Ethiopia as a nation capable of hosting and shaping major global events. Financial cooperation for more resilient economic future In the financial sphere, the summit offered Ethiopia important long-term opportunities. A key focus of the BRICS financial architecture was the promotion of local-currency settlement systems and cross-border payment platforms. For Ethiopia, this is especially relevant. Like many developing economies, Ethiopia continues to face pressure from foreign exchange shortages and external currency shocks. A system that allows trade settlement in local currencies could reduce dependence on hard currency, lower transaction costs, and create more stability for importers and exporters. Trade with countries such as China, India, and Russia could become smoother and less expensive when these systems are effectively implemented. Ethiopia also advocated for faster and more predictable debt resolution mechanisms, as well as stronger liquidity support through the expansion of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. These are not abstract financial ideas. They are practical tools that can help protect developing countries from sudden shocks and provide breathing room during periods of fiscal stress. In simple terms, Ethiopia used the summit to push for a more balanced global financial system—one that does not leave developing nations vulnerable to the decisions and pressures of richer economies. Bilateral diplomacy that opened new doors Beyond the formal plenary sessions, the summit’s sidelines proved equally valuable. Intensive bilateral meetings produced promising openings in several strategic sectors. Talks between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reportedly focused on critical minerals, renewable energy, and pharmaceutical manufacturing. These are all high-value sectors with the potential to support Ethiopia’s industrialization and improve national resilience. They also discussed about enhancing defence cooperation, technology transfer, capacity building, and partnership towards COP32. Engagements with Russian President Vladimir Putin were also fruitful as the leaders held constructive discussion about strengthening the strategic partnership between Ethiopia and Russia. They also explored opportunities to expand educational exchanges and deepen collaboration in cultural and people-to-people ties. These matter because Ethiopia’s development challenge is not only about capital. It is also about capability. The ability to learn, adapt, and transfer technology is essential for long-term transformation. By building these kinds of partnerships, Ethiopia is positioning itself to access expertise and innovation that can strengthen its domestic economy. Ethiopia as bridge between Africa and Global South Perhaps the most important strategic takeaway from the summit is the increasing recognition of Ethiopia as more than a national state pursuing narrow interests. It is emerging as a bridge between Africa and the Global South, between regional integration and global partnerships, and between diplomatic ambition and economic transformation. As host of the African Union headquarters and a diplomatic hub on the continent, Ethiopia occupies a unique position. It can connect African priorities with broader international conversations in ways that few countries can. This gives Ethiopia a powerful platform to advocate not only for its own development, but also for the interests of Africa as a whole. With its population of more than 135 million, vast agricultural potential, strategic location, and growing industrial ambitions, Ethiopia has real assets to bring to the table. The BRICS summit showed that it is using those assets with increasing confidence.

With analysis from Pulse of Africa (POA) By Mahder Nesibu Sept. 15, 2026 The Red Sea, a narrow waterway connecting the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, has in recent years come under heavy insecurity. The prevalence of armed groups around the waterway, compounded by threats such as piracy, has undermined its reliability, despite it handling around 13 percent of global shipping. This threat has now come under the spotlight. When war broke out between Iran on one side and Israel and the United States on the other, a similar waterway, the Persian Gulf, and the chokepoint connecting it to the Indian Ocean, came to be weaponised, with Tehran effectively choking a passage that handles 25 percent of the world's oil and gas output. The same weaponisation became visible at Bab-el-Mandeb, the chokepoint of the Red Sea, when Yemen's Houthis, who control the country's north bordering the chokepoint, declared a blockade against Israel in March 2025, partly motivated by their alignment with Iran. The rebels have since extended that blockade to Saudi Arabia, with whom they have been at war for over a decade, a conflict paused by a truce in 2022. Just last week, A blitzkrieg offensive by Houthi forces over the past week has shattered the regional status quo, placing the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait firmly under their control. Sweeping down Yemen’s western coast with relentless momentum, the forces have completely overrun Saudi-backed government positions, meeting virtually zero resistance along the way. Saudi is said to have launched counter offensives with sorties targeting Houthis’ positions. The situation remains fluid. Saudi ships, like Israeli ones, have become targets for the Houthis, compounding the insecurity the waterway has been witnessing. On top of that, piracy, primarily emanating from the Somali coast, continues to pose a threat. Although thought to have decreased in frequency, piracy on Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea appears to be resurging. The New York Times reported in late August that the pattern points to a possible resurgence, with 2026 alone seeing 17 piracy-related incidents documented. Although Israeli and Saudi shipping, alongside international cargo, are coming under direct attack, the effects of this insecurity are more structural. According to Reuters, shipping across the Red Sea has declined by as much as 60 percent since 2023, when the Houthi weaponisation of the chokepoint began, and has not effectively recovered since. These figures translate into greater costs for shipping and slower traffic, as ships are diverted through the Cape of Good Hope route along southern Africa, adding extra days at sea and additional fuel costs. For countries served through the Red Sea itself, this has meant greater volatility in their trade. Beyond the added costs of moving ships through the sea, it means living with the risk of disruption, particularly for essentials such as oil and gas. This has been the case for countries in the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, whose supply lines have been subject to disruption. Moves to secure the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb have largely been futile, falling short of a comprehensive and cohesive plan to meet the challenge, as geopolitical competition within the Middle East and the Horn of Africa has undermined such efforts. One country that has been making efforts to secure the Red Sea is Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa state, the largest in the region by both population and economy, has been trying to establish a security presence on the waterway to help address the prevailing insecurity. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti, the country on the African side of Bab-el-Mandeb, for more than 85 percent of its maritime affairs, and its imposed landlocked status has limited its ability to contribute to addressing a security dilemma that carries consequences for its own economy and stability, as well as those of its neighbours. This, alongside historical realities and demographic concerns, has formed the foundation of the country's case for a return to the Red Sea. Access to the sea has been treated as a primary issue of national interest by the majority Ethiopians for long —an issue that received greater prominence particularly since 2018, when the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power. Alongside launching a diplomatic push, Ethiopia also revived its navy that same year, effectively declaring its strong interest in reestablishing a security presence on the Red Sea. The Ethiopian Navy was a major actor in Red Sea affairs for decades. Established in 1955, it is older than most naval security institutions in the region, including Saudi Arabia's, which was launched in 1960. It had been a pillar of Red Sea security for decades and was only disbanded in 1996, following Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia in 1991. Now revived, it offers to contribute to maritime security and help address the growing dilemma facing the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Speaking at the 4th Annual Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Dialogue this April, Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian Navy Kindu Gezu stated that Ethiopia's bid was also "for the common benefit of the region", adding that "inclusivity strengthens legitimacy and fosters shared interests in security and connectivity". For the region, and for those affected by insecurity in the Red Sea, it is worth considering what an increased Ethiopian role could contribute. For Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and also to superpowers with footholds on the region, the case for backing Ethiopia's return to the sea is a reasonable one on maritime security grounds. Writing for the Middle Eastern outlet MEMRI, Morocco expert Anna Mahjar-Barducci made the case for Ethiopia's access to the sea on similar security grounds, arguing that the United States, a global power that considers Red Sea security a strategic priority, should back Ethiopia, as the country could play a critical role in securing the waterway. The Middle East and the Horn of Africa face the same strategic considerations. Strategic competition aside, states in the region now have to treat maritime security as a matter of permanent concern. Ultimately, the solution rests on inclusive mechanisms that pool together available resources, including those Ethiopia can offer. Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea could strengthen regional security.

Abay/Nile Waters at the Intersection of Ethiopia- Egypt Relations   Sept. 15, 2026 (ENA) By Ambassador Teshome Toga Chanaka (PHD) Background The Nile is one of the world’s great transboundary river systems, shared by eleven riparian countries. Egypt and Sudan are the principal downstream states with virtually no contribution to the flow of the Nile. The Nile’s waters originate in the upstream countries, Ethiopia being the source of the Blue Nile. The Blue Nile, originating in the Ethiopian highlands, contributes 86% share of the Nile’s annual flow. For centuries, the utilization of Nile waters has been a source of tension between upstream and downstream countries. Historical circumstances, colonial legacies and competing interpretations of rights over the river have contributed to a pattern of mistrust that has often prevented the emergence of a genuinely cooperative basin-wide framework. Egypt, in particular, has developed and maintained an entrenched position concerning the allocation and utilization of the Nile waters. Its continued emphasis on what it describes as “historical rights” and on agreements concluded during periods when most upstream countries were not parties to the negotiations has made it difficult to establish a framework based on contemporary principles of international water law, particularly equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation to cooperate. The 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan is a particularly important example. The agreement allocated the entire estimated Nile flow between the two downstream countries without the participation of the other riparian states, including Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile. It is difficult to envisage how such an arrangement could provide a sustainable basis for managing a shared trans boundary resource in the twenty-first century. The fundamental issue, therefore, is not whether Egypt has legitimate interests in the Nile. It unquestionably does. The question is whether those interests can legitimately be pursued at the expense of the equally legitimate interests of the other riparian states. Why Egypt Needs a New Nile Strategy for the 21st Century? Egypt’s heavy dependence on the Nile is a reality that Ethiopia fully understands. But dependence does not confer a monopoly over a shared international watercourse. The challenge is to reconcile Egypt’s legitimate water-security concerns with the development aspirations and rights of the upstream countries. The twenty-first century has transformed the political, economic and technological circumstances of the Nile Basin. Population growth, climate change, food insecurity, energy demands, economic development and changing patterns of regional cooperation have fundamentally altered the context in which Nile waters must be managed. It is therefore neither realistic nor sustainable to approach the Nile exclusively through the prism of historical allocations. The river must increasingly be viewed as a shared resource whose sustainable management requires cooperation, dialogue, scientific evidence and equitable utilization. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) represents perhaps the clearest manifestation of this changing reality. The GERD has demonstrated Ethiopia’s growing capacity to mobilize domestic resources and undertake major infrastructure projects in pursuit of its national development objectives. Whatever one’s position on the dam, it has fundamentally changed the political and strategic context of the Nile question.   Consequently, statements that Ethiopia should not be permitted to construct another dam on the Blue Nile cannot provide a serious basis for future policy. Ethiopia’s development needs cannot be indefinitely subordinated to another country’s perception of its own water security. Nor is it realistic to assume that Ethiopia’s development projects on the Nile can be prevented indefinitely through efforts to restrict international financing. The experience of the GERD demonstrated Ethiopia’s ability to mobilize domestic resources when external financing was unavailable. This is an important lesson for all concerned: the future of the Nile cannot be determined through vetoes, pressure or attempts to prevent development. It must be shaped through cooperation. The same applies to the broader political relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt. Attempts to address differences over the Nile through political pressure, geopolitical rivalry or support for destabilizing forces cannot provide a sustainable solution. Such approaches risk deepening mistrust and making an eventual settlement more difficult. Military confrontation is equally untenable. No military strategy can produce sustainable water security. The Nile will continue to flow across borders long after political crises have passed. The only durable answer is therefore a political and diplomatic framework that recognizes the legitimate interests of all riparian countries. Other major transboundary river systems demonstrate that shared rivers need not inevitably become sources of military confrontation. China, for example, shares numerous transboundary rivers with neighboring countries and has developed a variety of mechanisms for managing shared water interests. The experiences of other river basins demonstrate that differences can be managed through dialogue, cooperation and negotiated arrangements. The Comprehensive Framework Agreement and the Changing Regional Context The effort by the Nile Basin riparian states to establish a basin-wide legal framework has been underway for many years. The negotiation of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) was intended to provide a more inclusive and equitable basis for cooperation among the Nile Basin countries. The CFA’s evolution reflects an important reality: upstream countries increasingly expect their interests and development needs to be recognized within the governance of the Nile Basin. The issue is therefore larger than the GERD or the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia. It concerns the fundamental question of how an international river basin should be governed in an era of population growth, climate change, energy transition and rapid economic transformation.   A sustainable Nile framework cannot be built around arrangements negotiated without the participation of all concerned states. Nor can the interests of downstream countries simply be ignored. The answer lies in developing an inclusive framework that accommodates the legitimate concerns of downstream states while recognizing the development rights of upstream countries. Ethiopia’s Cooperative Approach Should Not Be Mistaken for Weakness Since the political transition of 1991, Ethiopia has repeatedly expressed its preference for dialogue and cooperation in addressing the Nile question. The 1993 memorandum of understanding reached during the visit of Ethiopia’s Transitional Government leadership to Cairo and the subsequent 2015 Declaration of Principles on the GERD involving Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan were important demonstrations of Ethiopia’s willingness to engage diplomatically and seek mutually beneficial solutions. The Declaration of Principles was particularly significant because it established a set of principles intended to guide the three countries in addressing issues related to the GERD, including cooperation, equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These initiatives demonstrate that Ethiopia does not seek confrontation with Egypt. Indeed, Ethiopia has repeatedly made clear that it has no intention in harming the Egyptian people. This was amply stated by PM Abiy Ahmed during his offical visit to Cairo. Ethiopians and Egyptians share deep historical, cultural and human bonds. If the two countries estblish cooperation and working together, the benefits will transcend the borders of the two countries. The outcome will have broader regional impact. The Nile should be a bridge connecting the peoples of the two countries rather than a permanent source of antagonism between them. But cooperation is necessarily reciprocal. Ethiopia’s willingness to negotiate should not be interpreted as an acceptance of arrangements that deny its legitimate development interests. Nor should restraint be mistaken for weakness. Ethiopia has legitimate interests in using its natural resources to reduce poverty, expand access to electricity, develop agriculture and transform its economy. At the same time, Ethiopia has an interest in ensuring that its utilization of the Nile is undertaken responsibly and without significant harm to downstream populations. This is precisely why a cooperative framework is possible. The Way Forward: From Confrontation to Cooperation The Nile question has reached a point where old assumptions need to be reconsidered. Egypt’s water-security concerns are legitimate. Ethiopia’s development aspirations are equally legitimate. Sudan also has legitimate interests that must be taken into account. The challenge is to create a framework in which these interests are not viewed as mutually exclusive. The choice before Egypt and Ethiopia should therefore not be framed as a choice between Egyptian water security and Ethiopian development. The real choice is between competition and cooperation; confrontation and dialogue; unilateralism and shared governance. There is considerable room for cooperation. The two countries could strengthen scientific and technical cooperation on hydrology, climate change, drought and flood management, sedimentation, agricultural productivity, electricity trade and water-use efficiency. Ethiopia’s potential for hydropower development and Egypt’s expertise in water management could, for example, become complementary rather than competing assets. A broader economic relationship could also transform the politics of the Nile. Energy trade, investment, infrastructure connectivity, agriculture and regional economic integration could create incentives for both countries to regard the river as an opportunity for mutual benefit rather than a zero-sum contest. The way forward is therefore not through threats, pressure or attempts to prevent Ethiopia from developing its water resources. Nor is it through unilateral actions that disregard the legitimate concerns of downstream countries. The answer is a return to the negotiating table with a different mindset. Egypt needs to recognize that the Nile Basin of the twenty-first century is fundamentally different from the Nile Basin of the nineteenth or twentieth century. Ethiopia, for its part, should continue to demonstrate that its development of the Nile can coexist with the legitimate water-security interests of downstream countries. The central principle should be simple: no country should seek to monopolize a shared river, and no country should be denied its legitimate right to development. The Nile can become either a permanent fault line between Egypt and Ethiopia or an unprecedented opportunity for cooperation between two ancient civilizations. The choice is ultimately political.   What is required now is not another round of confrontation, but a new political understanding—one founded on sovereign equality, equitable and reasonable utilization, mutual respect, scientific cooperation and shared prosperity. The Nile does not belong to one country. It is a shared resource, and its future must be built on shared responsibility. …………………… * The author is former Ethiopian Ambassador to Egypt. The views only represent that of the author alone. Ambassador Teshome Toga Chanaka is a senior Ethiopian politician and veteran diplomat. He served as Speaker of the House of Peoples' Representatives, Minister of Youth, Sports, and Culture, and Commissioner of the National Rehabilitation Commission. In his diplomatic career, he served as Ambassador to the European Union, China, Kenya, and Ghana.

By Staff Writer Sept. 14, 2026 (ENA) The week of September 6 to 12, 2026, was marked by continuing conflicts, rising energy risks, diplomatic realignments and mounting climate and humanitarian pressures. The Middle East remained the most immediate source of concern for global security and energy markets, as tensions around strategic waterways threatened to disrupt oil supplies and international trade. The war in Ukraine also continued despite renewed diplomatic contacts, while the BRICS summit in New Delhi highlighted the growing influence of the Global South and provided a platform for a cautious rapprochement between India and China. Climate and health concerns added to the pressure. The World Meteorological Organization reported that August 2026 was the hottest August on record and warned that a strong El Niño could intensify extreme weather into 2027. Humanitarian crises remained acute in Gaza and Sudan, while a new Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo raised concerns about regional disease transmission. At the same time, artificial intelligence continued to move beyond the technology sector and into discussions about national security, economic development, military applications and global governance. Taken together, the week's developments underscored how closely security, energy, trade, climate, technology and humanitarian affairs have become intertwined. Peace and Security Middle East: The strategic waterways become a growing security risk as the Middle East remained the world's most immediate security and energy risk during the week, with the conflict involving Iran, the United States and regional actors continuing to threaten strategic transport routes. In Yemen, Iran aligned Houthi forces advanced toward the Bab el Mandeb Strait and reached Perim Island, a strategically important position at the entrance to the Red Sea. Any prolonged disruption of the waterway could compound the impact of restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz, another critical route for global energy shipments. Reuters reported that a closure of Bab el Mandeb could affect up to 7 percent of global oil supplies and about 12 percent of global trade. Saudi Arabia has sought greater US assistance against the Houthis, while Washington has so far favored intelligence and other forms of support rather than direct military involvement. The risks increased after Saudi Arabia temporarily shut its East West oil pipeline following a drone attack believed to have originated from Iraq. The pipeline can carry between 4 million and 5 million barrels of oil a day and provides an alternative route for Saudi exports when the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted. The simultaneous vulnerability of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and alternative oil infrastructure has intensified fears of a wider energy and shipping shock. Prolonged disruption could raise oil and transport costs, increase inflationary pressure and weigh on global economic growth. Gaza: Gaza remained caught between diplomatic efforts and continuing violence. Despite the ceasefire framework established in 2025, the humanitarian situation remained severe, with damaged infrastructure, restricted humanitarian access and deteriorating water systems leaving civilians increasingly vulnerable to hunger and disease. UN agencies continued to warn that food insecurity remained widespread. Damage to water and health infrastructure has also increased the risk of communicable diseases. The crisis illustrates the close relationship between Gaza's humanitarian emergency and the unresolved political and security questions surrounding the territory. Without sustained security arrangements, reconstruction and reliable humanitarian access, the humanitarian situation is likely to remain fragile. Ukraine: The Russia Ukraine war remained active despite renewed diplomatic efforts. US envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff travelled to Kyiv following discussions in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The meetings sought to revive negotiations and explore prospects for further diplomacy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the discussions as substantive. Diplomatic activity, however, did not translate into an immediate reduction in hostilities. Russian missile and drone attacks continued to strike Ukrainian cities, while Ukraine maintained attacks against targets inside Russia. The principal obstacles remain unresolved, including territorial control, security guarantees for Ukraine and the future structure of European security. The continuing gap between diplomatic contacts and developments on the battlefield demonstrates the difficulty of converting negotiations into a durable settlement. Europe: European governments are increasingly focused on hybrid threats linked to the Ukraine war, including drones, cyberattacks and possible sabotage of critical infrastructure. Germany is preparing stronger measures following a drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport that German authorities attributed to Russian actors. The episode has reinforced wider European concerns about the vulnerability of airports, energy facilities, telecommunications networks and other critical infrastructure. The shift reflects a broader understanding of modern conflict, in which pressure can be exerted through cyber operations, disruption of infrastructure and covert activities without crossing the threshold of conventional warfare. Economy, Trade and Energy Oil: Energy Markets Face Multiple Supply Risks Energy markets were among the week's most closely watched economic developments, with oil prices moving above $100 a barrel amid concerns over disruptions to supplies and shipping. The simultaneous risks surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and Saudi Arabia's alternative oil infrastructure have raised fears of a broader supply shock. A prolonged disruption could increase transportation and production costs worldwide and complicate central banks' efforts to contain inflation. The episode also demonstrates the strategic importance of alternative energy routes. Infrastructure designed to bypass vulnerable maritime chokepoints can become critical during periods of geopolitical tension, but its effectiveness depends on its own security and operational continuity. Global Growth Remains Fragile The global economy continues to face a difficult combination of geopolitical uncertainty, elevated public debt, trade disputes and changing monetary conditions. The World Bank projects global economic growth of about 2.5 percent in 2026. While growth remains positive, the outlook is constrained by persistent geopolitical tensions and uncertainty over trade and monetary policy. The United States is also facing significant fiscal pressure. Its federal budget deficit reached about $1.97 trillion on a fiscal year to date basis, exceeding the deficit recorded during the whole of fiscal year 2025. Because the United States remains central to global financial markets, developments in its fiscal and monetary policies influence borrowing costs, exchange rates and capital flows far beyond its borders. Trade: Geopolitics Reshapes Global Supply Chains Trade is increasingly being shaped by strategic considerations rather than market forces alone. Governments and companies are restructuring supply chains to improve resilience, protect strategic industries and secure access to critical minerals. Trade tensions between the United States and Canada continued during the week, while businesses increasingly explored alternative suppliers and production locations. This restructuring could create opportunities for resource rich developing countries, particularly in Africa. Rising demand for lithium, cobalt, copper, graphite and rare earth elements could support domestic processing and industrialization if African countries succeed in moving beyond the export of unprocessed commodities. The opportunity, however, depends on investment in infrastructure, energy, skills, technology and effective industrial policies. Diplomacy and Global Governance BRICS Strengthens Its Global South Platform The 2026 BRICS summit in New Delhi emerged as one of the week's most important diplomatic events, reinforcing the group's growing role in debates over global security, trade and international governance. Leaders expressed concern over conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine and criticised unilateral sanctions imposed outside the UN Security Council framework. They also called for greater protection of civilian infrastructure and nuclear facilities during armed conflicts. Chinese President Xi Jinping urged BRICS to play a greater role in efforts to promote peace in the Middle East. With its expanded membership, BRICS represents a substantial share of the world's population and economic output. Its growing influence reflects a broader effort by emerging powers to gain greater weight in institutions and decisions traditionally dominated by Western powers. The summit nevertheless exposed the limits of the grouping. BRICS members have different political systems, economic interests and strategic priorities. Its expansion therefore strengthens its geopolitical weight while also making consensus more difficult. India and China Pursue a Cautious Rapprochement Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit, signalling an effort to stabilise relations after years of tension. Xi's visit was his first to India in seven years. The two leaders discussed border stability, trade, investment and regional connectivity. Bilateral trade reached a record $155.6 billion in 2025, although India's trade deficit with China remains substantial. The meeting does not eliminate the countries' strategic rivalry, particularly over their disputed 3,800 kilometer border. However, improved relations could create space for greater trade and regional economic cooperation. Their rapprochement is also significant beyond bilateral relations. Better India China ties could influence the wider balance within BRICS and shape cooperation among major powers of the Global South. Africa Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis Deepens Sudan continues to face one of the world's largest humanitarian and security emergencies. The UN Security Council extended the arms embargo covering Darfur for another month while discussions continued over a US proposal for a nationwide embargo. Washington argues that broader restrictions could increase pressure on Sudan's warring parties to enter negotiations, while Russia has opposed expanding the measure. The conflict has displaced approximately 13 million people and contributed to famine conditions in parts of the country. Humanitarian agencies are also struggling with severe funding shortages, leaving millions without adequate food, healthcare and other essential assistance. Sudan's crisis increasingly demonstrates how prolonged conflict can overwhelm humanitarian systems. Displacement, hunger, disease and the destruction of infrastructure are reinforcing one another, making a political settlement increasingly urgent. Ebola: Regional Health Concerns Rise The Democratic Republic of Congo is confronting another serious Ebola outbreak, prompting increased surveillance and preparedness measures in neighboring countries. The World Health Organization has warned that insecurity, displacement and cross border population movement could complicate containment efforts. Countries including Kenya have strengthened preparedness at major border points, highlighting the importance of coordinated regional disease surveillance. The outbreak reinforces the growing connection between public health, population mobility and regional security. Rapid detection, cross border information sharing and adequate health infrastructure remain essential to preventing localised outbreaks from becoming wider emergencies. Climate and Environment Record Heat Raises Concern Over Extreme Weather The World Meteorological Organization reported that August 2026 was the hottest August on record and warned that a strong El Niño could intensify extreme weather into 2027. The combination of rising global temperatures and El Niño increases the risk of heatwaves, droughts, floods and agricultural disruption. Extreme heat is also affecting labour productivity, infrastructure and electricity demand. Climate change is therefore no longer solely an environmental issue. Its effects are increasingly visible in food security, public health, economic productivity, migration and national security. Wildfires Add to Public Health Risks Rising temperatures and increasingly frequent wildfires are also undermining air quality in some regions. Wildfire smoke contains fine particulate matter that can travel long distances, increasing respiratory and cardiovascular risks far from the original fire zones. The trend demonstrates how climate change can amplify several environmental and public health challenges simultaneously. Heat can increase wildfire risk, while smoke can worsen health conditions and place additional pressure on already stretched healthcare systems. Technology and Artificial Intelligence AI Safety Debate Intensifies Artificial intelligence remained a major global technology issue, with growing attention to the security implications of increasingly capable systems. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei called for greater caution in the development of advanced AI models, arguing that safety evaluations need to keep pace with technological progress. He highlighted concerns about AI's potential use in weapons development, surveillance, cyber operations and fraud. The debate is therefore moving beyond productivity and innovation toward questions of accountability, autonomous systems, national security and technological control. The central policy challenge is becoming increasingly clear: governments and technology companies must determine how to capture the economic benefits of increasingly capable AI while limiting its potential to amplify existing security threats. AI Offers Development Opportunities At the same time, the World Bank has highlighted AI's potential to accelerate productivity in developing economies if countries invest in digital infrastructure, skills and effective institutions. For Africa, AI could contribute to education, healthcare, agriculture, public administration and industrial development. Yet the continent also faces the risk of becoming overly dependent on technologies and platforms developed elsewhere. Building local digital capacity, improving connectivity and developing technical skills will therefore be essential if African countries are to become users, developers and owners of AI technologies rather than simply consumers. AI Supports Lunar Exploration AI is also expanding the boundaries of scientific exploration. NASA and IBM launched an open source AI model designed to analyse lunar data and identify geological features, including ice deposits, craters and volcanic formations. The technology could support future lunar missions by helping scientists identify resources and potential landing sites. The development illustrates how AI is increasingly being applied not only to commercial and security challenges but also to scientific research and space exploration. Latin America Brazil Election Becomes Increasingly Competitive Brazil's presidential election is becoming increasingly competitive. A September poll showed President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and right-wing challenger Flavio Bolsonaro tied at 41 percent in a potential runoff. The election will carry significance beyond Brazil because of the country's economic weight, agricultural importance and role in BRICS and global climate diplomacy. The outcome could influence Brazil's domestic economic policies as well as its position on environmental protection, regional integration and relations with major global powers. Colombia Enters a New Political Phase Colombia has also entered a new political phase following the election of right wing President Abelardo De La Espriella. Former President Juan Manuel Santos has urged the new government to fully implement the FARC peace agreement, arguing that it remains important to addressing rural poverty, drug trafficking and violence. The transition comes as Colombia continues to balance security concerns with the long term challenge of consolidating peace and expanding economic opportunities in areas historically affected by conflict. The Week in Perspective The week's developments reveal several broader trends shaping the international system. Geopolitics is increasingly affecting the global economy. Conflicts are no longer confined to battlefields. They are directly influencing oil prices, shipping routes, inflation, production costs and global supply chains. The international system is becoming more multipolar. The BRICS summit, the India China rapprochement and renewed diplomatic contacts involving Washington, Moscow and Beijing point to a more complex distribution of global power. Yet greater multipolarity does not necessarily mean greater cooperation, as major powers continue to compete over security, trade, technology and strategic influence. Climate and security are increasingly interconnected. Extreme heat, wildfires, floods and other climate related disasters are affecting food production, infrastructure, migration and public health. Climate pressures can also intensify existing economic and political vulnerabilities. Humanitarian needs are outpacing international financing. Protracted conflicts are generating displacement, hunger and disease at a time when humanitarian agencies face serious funding constraints. Sudan and Gaza remain among the clearest examples of this widening gap. AI is becoming a strategic issue. Governments and technology companies are increasingly concerned not only with the economic benefits of artificial intelligence but also with its military, cyber, surveillance and governance implications. At the same time, developing countries are seeking ways to use AI to accelerate economic and social development. Conclusion The week of September 6 to 12 demonstrated that the major challenges facing the international community cannot be considered in isolation. A conflict in the Middle East can affect oil prices and shipping costs thousands of kilometres away. A disruption in global trade can alter industrial strategies in Africa. Climate extremes can worsen food insecurity and displacement, while new technologies can simultaneously create opportunities for development and new forms of security risk. The emerging global order is therefore defined not only by competition among major powers but also by the growing interdependence of security, energy, trade, climate, technology and humanitarian affairs. The central challenge for governments is to manage these interconnected risks while maintaining channels for cooperation. The week's developments showed that geopolitical trust remains weak, but the need for international cooperation has rarely been greater.

By Staff Writer Sept. 13, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia entered the 2019 Ethiopian calendar year with an unusually broad national agenda—intensified diplomacy, investment promotion, economic transformation, digital innovation, reconciliation and a renewed focus on strategic maritime interests. From September 6 to 12, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s participation in the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi dominated Ethiopia’s international agenda. His engagements with leaders of major emerging economies highlighted Addis Ababa’s determination to turn diplomacy into opportunities for investment, technology, trade and development cooperation. At home, the government entered the new year emphasizing economic transformation, logistics development, digitalization, climate resilience and reconciliation. The release of more than 600 federal prisoners added a strong political and reconciliation dimension to the New Year, while renewed discussion over Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable Red Sea access placed the country’s economic and security interests at the centre of a wider regional debate. Taken together, the week’s developments point to an emerging national strategy: strengthen domestic productive capacity, widen international partnerships, attract capital and technology, deepen regional influence and pursue strategic interests while maintaining a commitment to cooperation and peaceful engagement. A New Year of Renewal and Reflection   Ethiopia celebrated Enkutatash 2019 on September 11, following the five-day Pagume period that bridges the old and new years. The occasion carried both cultural and political significance. Government leaders used the New Year to emphasize peace, national unity, development and continued reform. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and First Lady Zinash Tayachew shared a New Year meal with members of the local community, underscoring the traditional values of solidarity and togetherness. Enkutatash is among Ethiopia’s most distinctive cultural celebrations. Observed on Meskerem 1, it marks the beginning of a new year in the Ethiopian calendar and coincides with the transition from the rainy season to clearer skies, green landscapes and the appearance of the yellow Adey Abeba flowers. But Enkutatash represents more than the turning of a calendar page. It is a season of renewal, hope, reconciliation and togetherness. Families gather, children visit relatives and friends, traditional foods are prepared and people exchange wishes for peace, health and prosperity. Young girls traditionally perform Hoya Hoye, moving from house to house and receiving gifts in return. Across Ethiopia’s diverse communities, the New Year is celebrated through different traditions, music, dance, clothing and cuisine, while retaining a shared spirit of renewal. Churches and religious communities also hold special services, prayers and celebrations. In Addis Ababa and other cities, the celebration is increasingly accompanied by public cultural programmes, concerts, exhibitions and community events. Diplomatic representatives, including Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia Avraham Neguise and Cameroon’s Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue Monono, also extended New Year greetings to Ethiopians. For many Ethiopians, Enkutatash is therefore both celebration and reflection—a moment to leave behind the difficulties of the previous year, strengthen relationships and enter the new one with renewed determination. BRICS Puts Ethiopia’s Global South Strategy in Focus   The most prominent diplomatic development of the week was Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s participation in the 18th BRICS Leaders’ Summit in New Delhi. For Ethiopia, the summit was more than a high-level diplomatic gathering. It offered a platform to deepen engagement with major emerging economies while advancing Addis Ababa’s broader effort to strengthen Africa’s role within an evolving global order. Prime Minister Abiy called for stronger BRICS cooperation with Africa, particularly in minerals, renewable energy and industrial development. He stressed the importance of enabling African countries to move beyond exporting raw materials and capture greater value from their resources. Artificial intelligence also featured prominently in Ethiopia’s message. PM Abiy urged BRICS countries to ensure that AI becomes a tool for Africa’s development rather than another source of technological inequality. Debt sustainability and climate finance were also highlighted, linking the priorities of emerging economies with the development challenges confronting Africa. Ethiopia further proposed a BRICS coordination track toward COP32, which Addis Ababa is scheduled to host in 2027. The proposal reflects Ethiopia’s effort to connect economic diplomacy, climate action and the development priorities of the Global South. The strategic significance for Ethiopia is considerable. BRICS engagement can potentially expand access to markets, investment, technology and alternative sources of development finance while strengthening relations with some of the world’s fastest-growing economies. In this sense, Ethiopia’s BRICS diplomacy is increasingly economic as well as political. Bilateral Diplomacy Moves Toward Trade, Technology and Investment The New Delhi summit also created space for a series of bilateral engagements. Prime Minister Abiy’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin focused on strengthening the Ethiopia-Russia strategic partnership across areas including defence and security, trade, investment, education, technology, culture, climate and development.   His talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi explored opportunities to further strengthen Ethiopia-India relations, particularly in investment, defence and emerging sectors. With Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, discussions focused on investment, tourism, renewable energy and industrial development. Abiy also held discussions with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on Red Sea security and regional stability, while meeting Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Vietnamese Prime Minister Lê Minh Hưng. The breadth of these engagements illustrates a broader shift in Ethiopia’s foreign economic policy: diplomatic relationships are increasingly being viewed as platforms for investment, trade, technology transfer, industrial cooperation and development partnerships. Investment Diplomacy Takes Centre Stage Investment promotion remained another defining feature of the week. President Taye Atske Selassie led a high-level Ethiopian delegation to Dubai for the 15th Annual Investment Meeting, presenting Ethiopia’s investment opportunities and highlighting ongoing economic reforms. Clean energy and other strategic sectors were presented as areas of substantial potential for foreign investment. The engagement formed part of the government’s effort to increase private-sector participation in Ethiopia’s economic transformation. Ethiopia is also seeking stronger economic ties with Gulf countries. President Taye called for increased Qatari investment, reflecting Addis Ababa’s wider effort to attract capital into infrastructure, energy, manufacturing and other productive sectors. The message is increasingly clear: Ethiopia wants foreign investment not simply as a source of capital, but as a vehicle for expanding production, creating jobs, transferring technology and integrating the country more deeply into regional and global markets. Mojo Logistics Hub Strengthens the Trade Infrastructure   The inauguration of the expanded Mojo logistics centre marked another significant development in Ethiopia’s economic transformation. Located about 70 kilometres southeast of Addis Ababa, the facility covers approximately 60 hectares and is designed to increase freight-handling capacity, improve cargo movement and strengthen regional connectivity. Prime Minister Abiy described the project as an important step toward regional economic integration and the practical implementation of Ethiopia’s ambitions under the African Continental Free Trade Area. The significance of logistics extends beyond a single facility. For a landlocked economy heavily dependent on international trade, efficient logistics can reduce transportation costs, improve export competitiveness and connect Ethiopian producers more effectively with regional and international markets. It also complements Ethiopia’s broader maritime strategy: access to ports is only as useful as the inland systems that can move goods efficiently between production centres and maritime corridors. Growth Continues, but Transformation Must Reach Households Ethiopia entered 2019 with economic transformation remaining at the centre of the government’s agenda. Macroeconomic reform, private-sector development, manufacturing, agricultural commercialization, export growth and infrastructure expansion remain key priorities. The World Bank reported 9.2 percent economic growth for Ethiopia in fiscal year 2024/25, placing the country among Africa’s faster-growing economies. Yet strong headline growth does not automatically translate into broad-based prosperity. Low per-capita income, limited employment opportunities and pressure on household purchasing power remain significant challenges. The central question for the new year, therefore, is not simply whether Ethiopia can sustain growth, but whether growth can generate productive employment, strengthen household incomes and improve living standards. Reconciliation at the Start of a New Year Peace and reconciliation also featured prominently as Ethiopia entered 2019. More than 600 federal prisoners, including prominent figures, were released around the New Year. The move was presented as part of broader efforts to promote reconciliation and create conditions for political dialogue. Prime Minister Abiy urged those released to use the opportunity to begin the New Year in a spirit of peace and contribute to the outcomes of the national consultation process. The releases gave the New Year a powerful reconciliation message. At the same time, Ethiopia’s continuing security challenges demonstrate that reconciliation is not a single event but a longer national process. Turning political openings into sustainable peace remains one of the country’s most important—and difficult—tasks. From Paper to Digital Digital transformation is becoming increasingly central to Ethiopia’s development ambitions. In a message marking Pagume 5, described as “The Day of the Future,” Prime Minister Abiy said Ethiopia was moving “from paper to digital, from passive consumption to active innovation.” The ambition goes beyond expanding internet access. Ethiopia is seeking to develop domestic technological capacity, modernize public services and build an economy capable of producing technology and innovation. Artificial intelligence is emerging as an important part of that strategy. Officials from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development visited the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute as part of regional consultations on an IGAD AI framework and strategy. At the BRICS summit, Abiy linked AI directly to Africa’s development, arguing that technological advancement should contribute to economic transformation and digital sovereignty. For Ethiopia, AI has potential applications across agriculture, healthcare, education, finance, manufacturing and public administration. The challenge now is implementation: building the infrastructure, skills, institutions and locally relevant solutions required to translate ambitious digital policies into measurable economic and social gains. Green Growth and Climate Resilience   Climate resilience was another important theme of the week. An assessment by AlphaGeo ranked Addis Ababa second globally and first in Africa among major cities for climate resilience, using geospatial artificial intelligence to assess climate exposure and adaptation capacity. The assessment comes as Ethiopia continues to position renewable energy, environmental restoration, green infrastructure and climate adaptation as integral components of its development strategy. A Green Growth Investment Forum held during the week called for stronger private-sector participation in green investment, reflecting an effort to connect environmental priorities with economic opportunity. Ethiopia’s preparations to host COP32 in 2027 provide an additional international platform. Addis Ababa is seeking to use the conference to amplify Africa’s voice on climate finance while promoting renewable energy, green investment and climate-resilient development. The broader challenge will be to ensure that climate action supports economic transformation rather than competing with it. Red Sea Access: A Strategic Question Ethiopia Cannot Ignore Perhaps no issue carries a greater strategic regional dimension than Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable and sovereign access to the Red Sea. For Ethiopia, the issue is increasingly connected to economic development, national security, trade and the country’s demographic trajectory. Education Minister and economist Professor Berhanu Nega argued that Ethiopia’s growing population and economic requirements make the question of sea access increasingly difficult to postpone. “You cannot have 130 million people sitting here without access to the sea at a time when sea access is very important for security as well as trade,” Berhanu said. At the same time, he stressed that Ethiopia should pursue its objective peacefully and in a way that benefits neighbouring countries. “It is better if we do this peacefully, and not only peacefully but for mutual benefit, so that all of us can benefit from this,” he said. Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia Avraham Neguise also expressed support for Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access, describing it as a matter with wider implications for Red Sea stability. “Empowering and strengthening Ethiopia and creating stability in the Red Sea is the interest of all, not only for Ethiopia,” he said, adding that Ethiopia’s return to the Red Sea would be positive.   He further warned that instability along the maritime corridor could have consequences far beyond the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, affecting international trade and the global economy. Other analysts have placed greater emphasis on negotiation and regional arrangements. Former US Ambassador to Ethiopia and George Washington University adjunct professor David Shinn has suggested that Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations could potentially form part of a broader diplomatic understanding involving Ethiopia, Egypt and Eritrea. These perspectives point to the central challenge facing Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. For Addis Ababa, dependable sea access is increasingly viewed as an economic and strategic necessity. For its neighbours, however, any new maritime arrangement must be carefully managed to avoid aggravating existing regional rivalries. The issue will therefore require diplomacy as much as strategy. Red Sea Insecurity Raises the Stakes The security situation around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb adds another layer of urgency. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and serves as a critical maritime gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal route. Continued insecurity can disrupt shipping, increase transportation and insurance costs and place additional pressure on already vulnerable global supply chains. For Ethiopia, which depends heavily on maritime trade, prolonged disruption can directly affect the cost and reliability of imports and exports. This makes the maritime question part of a much larger economic equation. Efficient inland logistics, diversified trade corridors and stable regional maritime arrangements are all essential to protecting Ethiopia’s economic interests. The Bigger Picture The first major week of Ethiopia’s 2019 Ethiopian calendar year brought together issues that may initially appear separate but are increasingly interconnected. BRICS diplomacy is about more than foreign policy—it is also about markets, investment, technology and development finance. Investment diplomacy is about more than attracting capital—it is about expanding productive capacity, creating jobs and strengthening Ethiopia’s position in global value chains. The Mojo logistics centre is about more than cargo—it is part of the infrastructure required to make Ethiopia more competitive in regional and international trade. Digital transformation and artificial intelligence are about more than technology—they are increasingly tied to productivity, public services, innovation and economic sovereignty. Green development is about more than environmental protection—it is becoming an important source of investment, energy security and international influence. And the Red Sea question is about more than geography—it sits at the intersection of trade, security, demography, regional diplomacy and Ethiopia’s long-term economic ambitions. The release of more than 600 prisoners, meanwhile, gave the beginning of the new year a powerful message of reconciliation, even as continuing security challenges underline the difficult road ahead. A New Year, A Larger Strategic Test As Ethiopia begins 2019, the country faces the challenge of connecting these different priorities into one coherent national strategy. Economic growth must translate into jobs and better living standards. Investment must strengthen productive sectors rather than simply increase capital inflows. Digitalization must deliver practical gains. Climate action must support development. Reconciliation must contribute to lasting peace. And diplomacy must protect Ethiopia’s economic and strategic interests while avoiding unnecessary regional confrontation. The coming year will therefore be measured not only by the scale of Ethiopia’s ambitions, but by its ability to convert those ambitions into results. Ethiopia is seeking a larger role in the global economy, deeper partnerships with emerging powers, greater technological capacity, stronger regional connectivity and a more secure place within the maritime geography of the Horn of Africa. The strategic test will be to pursue these objectives while balancing national interests with regional cooperation and stability. That balance may ultimately define Ethiopia’s journey through 2019—and shape how the country positions itself in an increasingly competitive and interconnected world.

Addis Ababa, September 11, 2026 (ENA) —In a major media milestone for the continent, the prominent international publication TIME Africa has published a comprehensive cover story hailing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as a profound monument to continental unity, economic independence, and shared prosperity. The extensive report, titled "The Power to Unite Africa," underscores that the mega-dam is far more than a conventional engineering venture. Instead, it stands as a testament to what African ambition, homegrown capital, and regional synergy can accomplish when charting a self-determined path toward industrialization. A core focal point of the TIME Africa analysis is the uniquely autonomous financial trajectory of the project. At a time when cross-border African infrastructure is heavily dependent on foreign governments, development banks, and international lenders, Ethiopia successfully pioneered a paradigm shift. The publication commends the mobilization of domestic capital, noting that ordinary Ethiopian citizens and the global diaspora entirely financed the multi-billion-dollar project through government resources, domestic borrowing, and structured Renaissance Dam Bonds. TIME Africa positions this as a masterclass for a continent burdened by massive infrastructure funding gaps, proving that African savings, pension funds, and diaspora wealth can effectively substitute for restrictive international project finance. With an installed generating capacity exceeding 5,000 megawatts, the dam is described as a catalyst to completely transform Ethiopia’s domestic energy architecture, eliminate power shortages, and stimulate manufacturing. Crucially, the report argues that the dam's true genius lies in its outward-facing regional capacity. By channeling surplus electricity across borders via expanding transmission grids into neighboring countries like Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, and wider members of the Eastern African Power Pool, the GERD serves as the vital physical anchor needed to realize the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Addressing the long-standing geopolitical friction surrounding the Nile, TIME Africa critiques outside actors and international commentaries that have historically reduced the technically complex river management into a zero-sum security conflict. The publication highlights that when infrastructure is viewed through a lens of military threats, the backward and illogical vocabulary of conflict replaces diplomatic and engineering solutions. Citing groundbreaking scientific research published in Nature Water, the report presents empirical evidence showing that deep economic interdependence actually protects downstream water security. Because hydroelectric production requires water to continuously flow to generate power, Ethiopia holds an inherent commercial incentive to keep the Nile moving through the dam's turbines. Enhanced power trade scenarios demonstrate that Sudan can resolve electricity shortages, while Egypt can significantly lower its maximum annual irrigation deficit. The report insists that permanent technical data sharing and direct institutional communication will easily resolve prolonged drought management without the need for geopolitical gridlock. "The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will likely be viewed as one of the great African stories of our time." The report highlights the significance of homegrown funding for major infrastructure, demonstrating that projects costing billions can be built with minimal reliance on international finance. It advocates for shifting from zero-sum water disputes to cooperative benefit-sharing and regional market integration. ⬇️ Read the full piece below. THE POWER TO UNITE AFRICA The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is more than a hydroelectric project. It is a demonstration of what African ambition, African capital and regional cooperation can achieve – and an opportunity to turn a potentially contested resource into a source of shared prosperity. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will likely be viewed as one of the great African stories of our time. Built across the Blue Nile, it is the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa and one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects the continent has undertaken. It has the capacity to transform Ethiopia’s energy landscape, support industrialisation and feed electricity into an increasingly interconnected regional market. But its importance goes beyond the power it can generate. GERD offers something larger: an opportunity to rethink how African countries build together, finance their own development and manage resources that do not stop at national borders. There is another reason the project matters. Ethiopian citizens and diaspora helped pay for it. At a time when the discussion around African infrastructure often begins with the question of which foreign government, development bank or international investor will finance it, GERD followed a significantly different path. The project was overwhelmingly financed domestically, including through government resources, domestic borrowing and bonds purchased by Ethiopians at home and abroad. The Renaissance Dam Bond was deliberately structured to allow relatively small investments, giving ordinary Ethiopians and members of the diaspora a means to participate in financing a project that was presented as part of the country’s national development. That story deserves far more attention than it receives. Africa faces an enormous infrastructure financing gap, while African savings, pension capital, diaspora wealth and domestic financial markets remain underused as sources of development capital. GERD is not a financing model that can simply be copied from one country to another, but the principle behind it is powerful. A population was asked to participate directly in building national infrastructure, and a project costing billions of dollars was brought into existence with extraordinarily limited dependence on conventional international project finance. For a continent searching for ways to finance its own transformation, that experience is key. On top of that, there is the electricity. The dam’s installed generating capacity is more than 5,000 megawatts. For Ethiopia, where access to reliable electricity remains a major developmental challenge, that power can support homes, businesses, manufacturing and a more industrial economy. Beyond Ethiopia, it can be traded. Transmission lines do not need to end at national borders. Ethiopia already trades electricity with neighbouring countries, and a deeper regional power market could allow energy generated on the Blue Nile to support economies far beyond the dam itself. This is where GERD becomes much more interesting as an African project rather than simply an Ethiopian one. For years, however, the dam has been discussed internationally through a very different lens. Rather than beginning with what this infrastructure could make possible – greater electricity generation, regional power trade, industrialisation, lower-carbon growth and a more interconnected East Africa – international involvement and commentary around GERD have repeatedly amplified the dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt. A technically complex disagreement over the management of a shared river has too often been pulled into the language of geopolitical confrontation. The Nile has, in effect, become internationalised as a source of friction when it could be treated as an extraordinary platform for African cooperation. Framing, as always, is important. Africa cannot allow – or afford – for outside influence to spur division again. Language creates political possibilities, but it can also close them. Once infrastructure is discussed principally as a threat, security begins to displace economics, diplomacy and engineering. Questions about electricity markets, transmission infrastructure, reservoir management and regional development become questions about winners and losers. Eventually, the backwards and illogical vocabulary of military action begins to enter a conversation that should fundamentally be about how neighbouring African countries share the benefits of a river upon which they all depend. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has described the Nile as an existential issue for Egypt and stated that his country retains the right to defend itself under international law should harm occur that interrupts its water supply. Egypt’s concerns cannot just be dismissed. The Nile is fundamental to Egyptian life, agriculture and economic security, and no serious vision of African cooperation should require one African country to disregard the legitimate interests of another. But accepting the legitimacy of Egyptian water security concerns is very different from accepting the inevitability of confrontation. There is another way to look at the problem, and the research points towards it. From Water Sharing to Benefit Sharing Research published in Nature Water offers one of the most compelling arguments for changing the terms of the debate. Rather than modelling GERD purely as a question of how much water one country retains or another receives, researchers examined the relationship between water management and electricity trade across the region. Their conclusion deserves considerably more attention in African policymaking. Greater electricity trade between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt is evidenced to create benefits for all three. The researchers found that increased power trade could reduce irrigation water deficits in Egypt and Sudan, increase hydropower generation in Ethiopia, increase generation from existing hydropower facilities downstream, reduce Sudanese electricity shortages, lower regional carbon emissions and increase Ethiopia’s financial returns from electricity exports. Under the highest power-trade scenario examined, the model reduced Egypt’s maximum annual irrigation deficit by as much as four billion cubic metres compared with the baseline proposal used by the researchers. The reason is remarkably straightforward. Hydroelectricity requires water to move. If Ethiopia has long-term agreements to sell electricity downstream, it has an economic incentive to release water through GERD’s turbines to generate that electricity. The commercial relationship itself can therefore reinforce the movement of water downstream. This changes the nature of the conversation. Instead of negotiating only over water allocations, the countries can negotiate over benefits. Egypt and Sudan gain access to competitively priced renewable electricity and potentially more predictable river management. Ethiopia earns export revenues and creates demand for the enormous generating capacity it has built. Regional grids become more interconnected. Economic interdependence grows. The river ceases to be something that must simply be divided and becomes something from which value can be created together. That does not eliminate every difficulty. The operation of GERD during prolonged drought remains an important and legitimate issue, and different operating policies can produce different outcomes downstream. This is precisely why Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan need permanent technical cooperation: shared hydrological data, transparent reservoir information, agreed drought-management mechanisms and direct communication between the institutions responsible for water and electricity. But those are engineering and diplomatic problems capable of engineering and diplomatic solutions. They are not arguments for conflict. A Monument to African Ambition GERD represents something Africa desperately needs more of: infrastructure at scale. Across the continent, unreliable and insufficient electricity continues to constrain economic growth. Businesses rely on generators, factories struggle with inconsistent grids, and communities remain disconnected from the power systems that modern economies take for granted. Africa cannot industrialise without electricity. It cannot process more of its own minerals, build globally competitive manufacturing industries, expand its digital economy or provide modern infrastructure for a rapidly growing population without vastly more generation and transmission capacity. GERD should therefore not be understood solely as an Ethiopian asset. Its greatest potential may ultimately lie in the network around it. Sudan can benefit. Kenya can benefit. Djibouti can benefit. Egypt can benefit. Other members of the Eastern African Power Pool can benefit as regional transmission infrastructure develops. The objective should not be for every African country to become an energy island, attempting to produce every megawatt it consumes within its own borders. Europe does not function that way. Neither should Africa. A genuinely interconnected African electricity market would allow countries with abundant hydroelectric, solar, wind, gas or geothermal resources to sell power across borders, improving resilience and allowing capital to flow towards the places where energy can be produced most efficiently. GERD could become one of the anchors of such a system in Eastern Africa. Africa Cannot Bomb Its Way to Development There is something deeply troubling about the ease with which military language enters discussions about African infrastructure. The continent already faces a sizable infrastructure deficit. We need power stations and transmission lines, railways and ports, roads and fibre networks, water infrastructure, industrial corridors and logistics systems. Many of the projects capable of transforming African economies will inevitably cross borders or affect neighbouring countries. If every major cross-border project becomes a geopolitical zero-sum contest, Africa’s development will remain hostage to its artificially created borders rather than accelerated by them. The answer cannot be destroying infrastructure. It must be building more of it – and connecting it. This matters even more as Africa attempts to create the world’s largest integrated trading area through the African Continental Free Trade Area. Trade integration without infrastructure integration is an illusion. Goods cannot move freely without transport corridors. Digital services cannot scale without fibre and data infrastructure. Industry cannot grow without reliable energy. A common African market ultimately requires physical systems that make national borders less economically consequential. GERD offers an opportunity to think in exactly those terms. An African Solution There is also a question of agency. The future of the Nile should ultimately be determined by Africans. International partners can provide expertise and finance. Scientists from around the world can contribute research. Multilateral institutions can facilitate negotiations. All of that has value. But Africa should be wary when disagreements between African states become theatres for wider geopolitical competition or when outside involvement hardens positions rather than helping neighbouring countries find common ground. The continent knows that history too well. The Nile Basin should instead become a demonstration of African diplomatic maturity: Ethiopia’s development aspirations recognised, Egypt’s water security protected, Sudan’s interests respected and a regional economic framework built around the things these countries can achieve together. The African Union exists precisely because sovereignty and continental solidarity do not have to be opposing ideas. GERD presents an opportunity to prove that principle in practice. The Renaissance Can Be Bigger Than Ethiopia The name itself deserves consideration: the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Its renaissance need not belong only to Ethiopia. Imagine a future in which GERD powers Ethiopian industry while exporting electricity throughout the region; where Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia coordinate water and energy management rather than levying threats; where interconnected grids allow renewable electricity to move to wherever it is needed; and where the Nile supports African manufacturing, data centres, mineral processing, transport systems and rapidly growing cities. There is a lesson in how it was built, too. Ethiopians did not wait for the rest of the world to decide that their infrastructure was worth financing. Citizens bought bonds. The diaspora contributed. Domestic institutions provided capital. Whatever the full scope of that model was, the underlying idea is worth carrying across the continent: Africans themselves can have a direct financial stake in the infrastructure that will determine Africa’s future. That could mean infrastructure bonds. Diaspora instruments. Pension capital. Sovereign investment. Regional development finance. It could mean new vehicles that allow African citizens to invest directly in commercially viable energy, transport and digital projects. GERD should provoke a much broader discussion not only about what Africa needs to build, but about who should own and finance what it builds. The dam is already there. The question facing Africa now is what the continent chooses to make of it. A dam can become a wall, or it can become a bridge. At a moment when Africa needs energy, infrastructure, industrialisation and greater continental integration, we should always choose the bridge. The waters of the Nile have connected African civilisation for thousands of years. Now they can help power its future.  

By Yordanos D. Sept. 11, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia is welcoming the 2019 New Year with renewed confidence, a stronger sense of national purpose and an increasingly ambitious development agenda, as the country seeks to transform the gains of recent years into lasting economic prosperity and improved livelihoods. Enkutatash, celebrated on Meskerem 1, falls on September 11 in the Gregorian calendar and marks the beginning of a new year in Ethiopia's distinctive calendar. The Ethiopian calendar consists of twelve months of 30 days each, followed by the five day or six day intercalary month of Pagume. Beyond its uniqueness as a system of timekeeping, the calendar remains an important expression of Ethiopia's historical identity and cultural continuity. The New Year also arrives as the rainy season gives way to the bright season traditionally associated with renewal. Green landscapes, blooming Adey Abeba flowers, family gatherings and traditional songs give the holiday a distinctive atmosphere. For Ethiopians, therefore, the New Year represents more than the turning of a calendar page. It is a moment for reflection on what has been achieved, recognition of the challenges that remain and renewed commitment to what lies ahead. For Ethiopia, the arrival of 2019 carries an additional significance. It comes at a time when the government is seeking to move the country's development trajectory from reform and construction toward greater productivity, economic self reliance and broad based prosperity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly framed the current period as a transition from announcing ambitions to delivering tangible results. In a series of messages issued during the final days of 2018, he described Ethiopia's resurgence as increasingly visible in major national projects, economic reforms and initiatives intended to improve everyday life. "Yesterday we declared our rise; today, we live it," the Prime Minister said in his September 7 message. He pointed to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, corridor development, the Bishoftu International Airport mega project and macroeconomic reforms as manifestations of the country's development momentum. He said the transformation was already bringing "seamless urban mobility, vast employment opportunities" and a stronger outlook for future generations. The country had built an unshakable foundation for multinational unity through its indigenous values and the philosophy of Medemer, or synergy. The Prime Minister cited the National Dialogue, human centered corridor development, volunteer programs and the Green Legacy Initiative (GLI) as examples of efforts intended to translate collective national aspirations into practical results, stressing Ethiopia's objective is not merely physical construction but the creation of an inclusive and economically self-reliant country in which citizens can participate in and benefit from national development. That message provides an important framework for 2019. The new Ethiopian year is expected to be more about consolidating reforms, completing major projects, expanding production and ensuring that economic growth produces wider opportunities. From Reform to Productive Growth The economic agenda for 2019 is anchored in the country's Ten-Year Development Plan and the second phase of the Homegrown Economic Reform Program. The government has increasingly emphasized macroeconomic stability, structural transformation, private sector participation, domestic resource mobilization and export competitiveness. The federal budget approved for the 2019 Ethiopian fiscal year amounts to about 2.339 trillion Birr, making it the largest federal budget in the country's history. The allocation framework gives significant attention to education, roads, health, agriculture, energy expansion and urban development, while also providing budgetary support to regional states. The budget is designed to consolidate the gains of economic reform while addressing the pressure on household purchasing power and supporting low-income communities. Finance Minister Ahmed Shide has said the spending plan gives particular attention to vulnerable households while maintaining the reform agenda and pursuing inclusive growth. The scale of the budget reflects the breadth of the government's ambitions for the new year. But the central test will be implementation: whether investment can translate into greater production, more employment, stronger exports and improved public services. Agriculture and Food Sovereignty Agriculture remains at the heart of Ethiopia's transformation because of its role in food security, employment, industrial inputs and export earnings. The country has increasingly moved beyond a narrow food security approach toward the broader objective of food sovereignty. Wheat production, irrigation development, mechanization, agricultural clusters, improved seeds and livestock development have become important elements of this strategy. The Yelemat Trufat initiative is also intended to strengthen livestock productivity and improve household nutrition while creating opportunities for farmers and pastoralists. The broader objective is to make agriculture more productive, commercially oriented and capable of supplying both domestic industries and export markets. In 2019, greater attention is expected to be placed on irrigation and dry season production, mechanization, value addition and market linkages. Such measures are critical if agricultural growth is to translate into lower food imports, stronger rural incomes and a reliable supply of raw materials for manufacturing. The government's wider development plan identifies agriculture as one of the sectors capable of driving structural transformation alongside manufacturing, mining, tourism and technology. Ethiopia reiterated this approach at an African Union technical meeting in July, highlighting agriculture, manufacturing, mining, tourism and technology as key sectors under the Ten-Year Development Plan. Manufacturing and "Made in Ethiopia" Industrialization will be another major priority in 2019. The Made in Ethiopia initiative has been designed to increase domestic production, strengthen industrial capacity, substitute imports and improve export performance. The Ministry of Industry reported that policy measures under the initiative, together with improved access to finance, have contributed to increased manufacturing production, exports and import substitution. The next challenge is to turn these gains into a sustained industrial transformation. Ethiopia needs industries capable of producing more inputs locally, creating decent employment for a growing young population and connecting agriculture with manufacturing through stronger value chains. Greater productivity, improved quality, reliable energy supplies, logistics, access to finance and export market development will therefore remain central to the industrial agenda. The emphasis on domestic production also forms part of a broader national objective of reducing dependency and increasing economic self reliance. Mining Mining is emerging as another important pillar of the transformation agenda. The government is seeking to expand responsible mining investment, improve the formalization of the sector and increase the contribution of minerals to export earnings and foreign exchange generation. Gold has become particularly important, while broader mineral exploration is expected to support industrial development and diversification. The sector, however, will need to balance investment and production with environmental protection, community benefits and responsible resource management. If managed effectively, mining can provide foreign exchange while supplying raw materials for domestic industries and creating new investment opportunities. Tourism and Aviation Tourism is another area where Ethiopia's natural, historical and cultural assets offer significant economic potential. Initiatives such as Dine for Ethiopia and broader destination development efforts have sought to turn Ethiopia's historical sites, landscapes, cuisine and cultural heritage into stronger sources of employment and foreign exchange. Aviation is an important part of this strategy. The planned Bishoftu International Airport represents one of the country's most ambitious infrastructure projects and is intended to strengthen Ethiopia's position as a major aviation and logistics hub. Prime Minister Abiy has identified the airport among the projects symbolizing the country's current development momentum. The airport, together with Ethiopian Airlines' expanding network, improved road connectivity and tourism infrastructure, could strengthen Ethiopia's position as a gateway connecting Africa with the Middle East, Asia and other global markets. Technological Transformation The digital economy is becoming increasingly central to the country's development strategy. Under Digital Ethiopia 2030, Ethiopia is seeking to expand digital public services, digital identification, mobile financial services, telecommunications, artificial intelligence and technology based entrepreneurship. The objective extends beyond providing internet access. Digital transformation is expected to reduce transaction costs, improve government services, expand financial inclusion, create new businesses and connect Ethiopian enterprises to regional and global markets. Prime Minister Abiy has also increasingly linked Ethiopia's development ambitions with technological sovereignty. In his message marking African Union Day, he called on African countries and young people to take greater ownership of the continent's digital future. For Ethiopia, this means that 2019 could become an important year for turning digital infrastructure into productive economic capacity. Infrastructure That Connects the Economy Infrastructure development remains one of the most visible components of Ethiopia's transformation. Corridor development projects in Addis Ababa and other cities are changing urban mobility and public spaces while creating new commercial and social infrastructure. The approach is increasingly focused on integrating roads, pedestrian facilities, public spaces, greenery and urban services rather than treating road construction as an isolated activity. Prime Minister Abiy has specifically cited human centered corridor development as one of the practical initiatives demonstrating how collective national action can generate tangible results. Beyond cities, roads, energy infrastructure, logistics corridors and aviation projects are intended to reduce the cost of moving people and goods and connect producers to markets. The challenge in 2019 will therefore be to ensure that infrastructure does not remain an end in itself but becomes a platform for production, investment and employment. Energy Independence Energy remains fundamental to Ethiopia's industrial and economic ambitions. The completion and inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has become one of the country's most important milestones in its effort to expand electricity generation and strengthen energy security. The dam is also increasingly presented by the government as a symbol of national capacity, collective financing and self reliance. Prime Minister Abiy has included the GERD among the major projects that demonstrate Ethiopia's shift from aspiration toward concrete development. The priority for the new year is therefore not only generating electricity but ensuring that expanded power supply translates into industrial production, agricultural processing, digital services, exports and improved living standards. Green Development Economic transformation is also being pursued alongside environmental restoration. The Green Legacy Initiative has become one of Ethiopia's most prominent national environmental programs, combining tree planting with watershed restoration, climate resilience and broader public mobilization. The initiative has evolved from a tree planting campaign into a wider development approach linking environmental protection with agriculture, water management, urban greenery and climate resilience. Prime Minister Abiy again cited the Green Legacy Initiative in his latest New Year message as one of the practical programs through which collective national values have been converted into tangible action. The coming year will therefore require Ethiopia to pursue economic growth while protecting its natural resources and strengthening resilience against climate related shocks. Human Capital No development strategy can succeed without investment in people. Education, health, employment and skills development remain essential to Ethiopia's long term transformation, particularly given the country's large and youthful population. The 2019 federal budget places education and health among the major priority areas, while the government's economic strategy continues to emphasize employment creation and private sector development. The challenge is to ensure that young Ethiopians are not simply beneficiaries of economic growth but active participants in it. This requires stronger technical and vocational education, digital skills, entrepreneurship opportunities, access to finance and a business environment capable of absorbing millions of young people entering the labor market. Unity as a Development Imperative Economic transformation cannot be separated from peace and national cohesion. In his latest New Year message, Abiy placed unity at the center of the country's development trajectory, arguing that shared values and Medemer provide the foundation for collective progress. His message comes after a year in which the National Dialogue process, development initiatives, volunteer programs and large scale infrastructure projects have all been presented as mechanisms for strengthening national cohesion. The idea is straightforward: development requires stability, stability requires cooperation and cooperation becomes stronger when citizens share a sense of national purpose. As Ethiopia enters 2019, this connection between peace, unity and development is likely to remain one of the central themes of the government's agenda. From Construction to Results The defining question of 2019 will ultimately be whether Ethiopia can move successfully from building foundations to generating results from those foundations. The country has invested heavily in roads, energy, urban infrastructure, agriculture, digital systems, environmental restoration and major national projects. Economic reforms have also begun to change the policy environment. The next stage requires productivity. Factories must produce more competitively. Farmers must earn more from higher productivity. Infrastructure must reduce transport costs. Digital systems must make services faster and more accessible. Energy expansion must support industrialization. Tourism must create jobs and foreign exchange. Mining must generate greater economic value while protecting communities and the environment. This is consistent with the broader philosophy expressed by Prime Minister Abiy at the Ethiopia Delivers National Summit earlier this year, where he described nation building as a continuous collective responsibility and emphasized that reforms should become foundations for lasting change. A New Year of Execution Ethiopia therefore enters 2019 at a significant point in its development journey. The country is not beginning from zero. It enters the new year with major projects completed, others under construction, an extensive economic reform program, a new fiscal framework and a development strategy that places agriculture, manufacturing, mining, tourism and technology at the center of structural transformation. The approved 2.339 trillion birr federal budget provides the financial framework for implementing the priorities of the new fiscal year, while the Ten Year Development Plan provides the longer term direction. But ambition alone will not determine the success of the new Ethiopian year. Implementation, productivity, accountability and the ability to translate national investments into improvements in household incomes and public services will be decisive. That is why the message of the New Year is increasingly one of execution. Ethiopia's 2019 begins with the country seeking to transform the foundations laid during the previous years into a more productive, resilient and self reliant economy. The challenge is substantial, but so is the opportunity. As the Adey Abeba blooms across the Ethiopian landscape and families gather to celebrate Enkutatash, the New Year offers a natural moment to look forward. It is a moment to preserve what has been achieved, correct what has not worked, accelerate what is delivering results and ensure that the country's major development ambitions are translated into tangible benefits for its people. In the words of Prime Minister Abiy's latest New Year message, Ethiopia's aspiration is to build an inclusive, economically self-reliant nation while unlocking the collective potential of its people. For 2019, that aspiration now faces its most important test which is turning momentum into lasting prosperity.

By Yordanos D. Sept. 7, 2026 (ENA) In the week ranging from August 28 to September 5, 2026, the world experienced overlapping security, economic, environmental, and humanitarian challenges, with developments across Africa, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas demonstrating the increasingly interconnected nature of global affairs. Conflicts continued to affect energy markets and diplomatic relations, while economic pressures, climate risks, humanitarian emergencies, and technological competition crossed regional boundaries. At the same time, countries in the Pacific and other vulnerable regions continued to call for stronger international cooperation as global challenges increasingly transcend national borders. Peace and Security The world witnessed a complex array of overlapping security challenges across multiple continents, illustrating how local instability rapidly reverberates through global trade, energy supply chains, and international relations. Major power rivalries, ongoing armed conflicts, and non-traditional threats continued to destabilize key strategic regions, highlighting the delicate balance between diplomatic efforts and escalating volatility on the ground. One among these is the Russia Ukraine conflict which remained one of the central security concerns in Europe during the week, as diplomatic contacts involving the United States and Russia raised cautious hopes for renewed negotiations. However, disagreements over territory, security guarantees and Ukraine's future continued to complicate efforts to achieve a durable settlement, while continued military attacks underscored the gap between diplomatic engagement and an effective ceasefire. The conflict also continued to have implications beyond Europe, particularly through its effects on energy supplies, food markets and international security calculations. Meanwhile, tensions involving the United States and Iran remained a major threat to stability in the Middle East, with developments surrounding the Strait of Hormuz drawing particular international attention because of the waterway's importance to global energy transportation. Any prolonged confrontation in the region could therefore have consequences far beyond the Middle East, particularly for energy dependent economies in Asia and Europe. In Africa, Sudan remained one of the continent's most serious security and humanitarian emergencies, while instability in parts of the Sahel continued to challenge governments and regional organizations. In the Horn of Africa, security concerns, political stability and access to strategic maritime routes likewise remained closely interconnected. Elsewhere, Asia continued to face security pressures linked to territorial disputes, military competition and strategic rivalry among major powers. The region's position along some of the world's most important trade and maritime routes means that instability in the Middle East can quickly influence Asian security and economic calculations. In the Americas, Haiti's prolonged security crisis remained a major concern, with gang violence, weak state institutions and humanitarian pressures creating a complex emergency that requires both security measures and political solutions. At the same time, Pacific island countries increasingly view climate change itself as a security challenge, as rising sea levels, extreme weather, food insecurity and potential displacement threaten the long-term stability of vulnerable communities. Global Economy, Trade and Energy Economic developments during the week continued to demonstrate how closely national economies are linked to geopolitical events. Europe remained under pressure from the economic consequences of the Russia Ukraine war and elevated energy costs, prompting governments to strengthen energy security, diversify supplies and expand renewable energy. These efforts have also gained strategic importance as European countries seek to reduce vulnerabilities created by dependence on external energy sources. The situation in the Middle East remained particularly important for Asia, where many economies depend heavily on imported energy. Any prolonged disruption around the Strait of Hormuz could raise transportation and production costs and contribute to broader inflationary pressures. At the same time, Asian economies continued to occupy a central position in global manufacturing and the production of electric vehicles, batteries and renewable energy technologies. Across Africa, governments continued to confront the difficult task of financing infrastructure, energy and industrial development while managing debt pressures, food insecurity and climate related economic losses. Consequently, many African countries are seeking investment partnerships that can promote manufacturing, value addition and renewable energy rather than relying primarily on exports of raw materials. In North America, policies adopted by the United States on tariffs, technology, energy and strategic supply chains continued to influence global trade patterns and relations with major economic powers. In Latin America, meanwhile, governments continued to balance economic growth with the need to expand clean energy investment and reduce excessive dependence on commodity exports. The region's reserves of lithium, copper and other strategic minerals, together with its agricultural production, have increased its importance to the global energy transition. Climate Change and the Environment Climate change continued to emerge as both an environmental and development challenge across continents. In Africa, changing weather patterns are affecting agriculture, water availability, food security and livelihoods, encouraging governments to link climate adaptation with agricultural modernization, renewable energy and environmental restoration. Similar pressures are being felt across Asia, where extreme heat, flooding, storms and other climate hazards are placing growing demands on infrastructure, agriculture and public services. The region's rapid economic growth makes it both highly exposed to environmental risks and central to global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Europe continued to advance policies aimed at reducing emissions and expanding renewable energy, while increasingly linking climate policy with energy independence, industrial competitiveness and national security. In North America, the United States and Canada continued to confront wildfires, extreme weather and other climate related risks while debating the pace of the transition from fossil fuels to cleaner energy sources. In Latin America, the Amazon remained at the center of international environmental discussions, with deforestation, biodiversity protection, agricultural expansion and the rights of indigenous communities continuing to influence policy debates. For Pacific Island states, however, climate change represents a particularly immediate threat. Rising sea levels, coastal erosion, extreme weather and changing patterns of food and water availability are placing pressure on communities whose economies and territorial security are closely tied to the ocean. Consequently, Pacific leaders continue to call on major emitters to strengthen climate action and uphold efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Global Health and Humanitarian Affairs Health and humanitarian challenges continued to intersect with conflict, displacement, climate change and economic insecurity. Across Africa, health systems in several countries remained under pressure from armed conflict, population displacement and disease outbreaks. The Democratic Republic of the Congo's experience with Ebola has underscored the continuing importance of rapid disease surveillance, vaccination and international cooperation, while access to affordable treatment for conditions such as sickle cell disease remains an important public health priority. In conflict affected areas, the destruction of health infrastructure and displacement of communities further complicate efforts to provide basic medical services. In Asia, governments continued to strengthen disease surveillance and preparedness based on lessons from previous global outbreaks. Dense populations, rapid urbanization and extensive international travel make regional cooperation especially important in limiting the spread of infectious diseases. Europe, for its part, continued to strengthen public health preparedness while confronting the combined pressures of aging populations, migration and growing demands on health systems. Across the Americas, unequal access to healthcare, infectious diseases, chronic illnesses and humanitarian emergencies remained important concerns, with Haiti providing a particularly clear example of how insecurity can severely disrupt healthcare delivery. The humanitarian consequences of conflict remained especially severe in the Middle East, where displacement and damage to health services continued to place civilian populations at risk. Humanitarian organizations have therefore continued to call for civilian protection and expanded access to medical assistance. Meanwhile, Pacific countries face distinctive health risks associated with climate change, including heat stress, food insecurity, water shortages and the spread of climate sensitive diseases, demonstrating how environmental pressures can increasingly become public health emergencies. Diplomacy and International Relations Diplomatic activity during the week reflected the growing need for countries to address security, economic and environmental challenges collectively. In Africa, governments continued to strengthen partnerships focused on trade, investment, peace and development, while regional organizations faced continued pressure to improve mechanisms for resolving conflicts and responding to unconstitutional changes of government. In Europe, the Ukraine conflict remained a dominant issue in diplomatic discussions as governments sought to maintain support for Ukraine while preserving transatlantic cooperation and addressing the continent's energy and security concerns. Across Asia, strategic competition involving China, the United States, India, Japan and other major powers continued to shape diplomatic relations. Economic partnerships, maritime security, technology and supply chains have increasingly become integral components of foreign policy, illustrating how diplomacy is no longer confined to traditional political and security matters. In the Middle East, diplomatic efforts remained focused on containing regional conflicts and preventing further escalation, particularly as tensions involving Iran and the United States demonstrated how instability in the region can affect international security and the global economy. At the same time, Pacific island states continued to use international diplomacy to elevate climate change, ocean governance and sustainable development as central foreign policy and security priorities. Their efforts reflect a broader shift in international diplomacy toward recognizing environmental and developmental challenges as matters of global security. Technology, Innovation and Strategic Competition Technology remained another major arena of international competition, with the United States continuing to occupy a central position in global efforts involving artificial intelligence, semiconductors, advanced computing and other strategic technologies. Asian economies, particularly China, Japan, South Korea and India, continued to expand investment in artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, electric vehicles and renewable technologies. As a result, technological competition is becoming increasingly intertwined with national security, economic independence and control over strategic supply chains. Europe likewise continued efforts to strengthen technological sovereignty and reduce dependence on external suppliers for critical technologies, energy systems and digital infrastructure. In Africa, governments are increasingly turning to digital transformation, artificial intelligence, fintech and digital public infrastructure to expand economic opportunities and improve public services. Latin American countries are similarly seeking to develop digital economies and technology-based industries while attracting investment in critical minerals and clean energy technologies. For Pacific Island countries, the technological challenge is somewhat different but equally important. Reliable digital connectivity remains essential for improving access to education, healthcare, disaster response and international markets. Thus, while major powers compete over advanced technologies, smaller and developing economies continue to focus on ensuring that digital transformation contributes to inclusion, resilience and sustainable development. Food, Water and Human Security Food and water security remained closely linked to conflict, climate change and economic conditions. In Africa, food insecurity continued to be driven by conflict, drought, displacement and economic pressures, making investment in irrigation, agricultural productivity and climate resilient farming increasingly important for long term stability. In Asia, water shortages, food prices and agricultural resilience remained significant concerns, particularly as climate change places additional pressure on freshwater resources and food production. The Middle East continued to face particularly acute water security challenges, where limited freshwater resources, population growth, climate change and political tensions are increasing competition over water. In Europe, the continuing consequences of the Ukraine war remained relevant to agricultural markets, grain supplies and fertilizer prices, with effects extending well beyond the continent. The Americas continued to serve as major suppliers of agricultural commodities to global markets, meaning that droughts, floods and other climate shocks in North and South America can influence food prices and supply chains worldwide. Pacific island states, meanwhile, remain especially vulnerable to food and water insecurity because of limited arable land, dependence on imported food and the growing effects of rising sea levels and extreme weather. These pressures illustrate how food, water and environmental security are increasingly inseparable and why solutions require cooperation across regions rather than isolated national responses. Global Outlook The week's developments demonstrate that peace, economic security, climate change, health, food security, technology and diplomacy can no longer be treated as separate global issues. A conflict in one region can disrupt energy supplies and food markets thousands of kilometers away. Climate shocks can increase food insecurity, displacement and migration, while health emergencies can quickly become economic and humanitarian crises. Similarly, diplomatic tensions can influence trade, investment, technology and access to strategic resources. Looking ahead, global developments are likely to be shaped not only by individual conflicts or national policies but also by the ability of countries to cooperate across regions. The challenge for the international community is increasingly interconnected: maintaining peace while building resilient economies, responding to climate change, protecting public health, securing food and water supplies, and ensuring that technological and economic transformation creates opportunities across all continents. Sources: The roundup draws on reporting and analysis from major international and regional media and institutional sources including Reuters, AP, BBC, Al Jazeera, The Guardian, CNN, France 24, DW, Africanews, Euronews, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Bloomberg and Financial Times.

By Staff Writer Sept. 4, 2026 (ENA) Ethiopia closed the 2018 Ethiopian calendar year with a week marked by accelerating economic transformation, expanding digital ambitions and a more assertive focus on strategic national interests. From agriculture and exports to digitalization, housing finance, water resources and maritime access, developments during the final days of the year pointed to an emerging national agenda centered on productive capacity, economic resilience, strategic autonomy and deeper integration into regional and global markets. The five-day Pagume programme provided a platform for the government to take stock of progress in economic reform, agriculture, infrastructure, renewable energy, technology and national resilience while outlining priorities for the year ahead. The figures presented during the week offered concrete indicators of the scale of this transformation. More than 33.5 million hectares were cultivated during the 2025/26 fiscal year, producing more than 1.85 billion quintals of agricultural output, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. Livestock exports generated 128.3 million USD, up from about $95 million previously, an increase of more than 35 percent. Ethiopia also earned more than 11.2 billion USD in export revenues during the 2018 Ethiopian fiscal year and has set a target of 13.4 billion USD for 2026/27, reflecting an intensified drive to expand exports, generate foreign exchange and move toward higher-value production. Taken together, these developments signal an economy seeking not only faster growth but also a stronger productive base capable of reducing import dependence, easing foreign-exchange pressures and strengthening resilience to external shocks. Economic Transformation: From Reform to Productive Capacity Economic transformation emerged as the defining theme of the week. As Ethiopia prepared to enter a new calendar year, the Government Communication Service used Pagume to highlight what it described as progress in macroeconomic stability, revenue mobilization, exports, agricultural and industrial production, renewable energy and major infrastructure development. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed placed these achievements within a broader national sovereignty and self-reliance agenda, pointing to rising wheat production, expanding domestic manufacturing and initiatives such as Yelemat Trufat (Bounty of the Basket) and Made in Ethiopia. The direction reflects Ethiopia’s ongoing Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda, which seeks to address macroeconomic imbalances, strengthen the foreign-exchange market, improve debt sustainability and create greater space for private-sector investment. The emerging model is therefore about more than growth. It is increasingly about producing more, processing more, exporting more and competing more effectively in global markets. Agriculture: A Pillar of Economic Sovereignty Agriculture remains central to Ethiopia’s transformation because it links food security, employment, rural incomes, exports and industrial development. The reported cultivation of more than 33.5 million hectares and agricultural output exceeding 1.85 billion quintals underscore the scale of the sector. The government is seeking to raise productivity through irrigation, mechanization, improved seeds, fertilizer production, livestock development and agro-processing, with the longer-term goal of moving from predominantly subsistence-oriented agriculture toward a more productive and commercially integrated sector. Wheat production has acquired particular strategic importance. Expanding domestic wheat output can reduce import requirements while conserving scarce foreign exchange, making agricultural productivity increasingly relevant to the country’s broader economic sovereignty agenda. Livestock exports offer another avenue for value creation. Ethiopia’s 128.3 million USD in livestock export earnings during the 2018 Ethiopian fiscal year highlights the potential to expand foreign-exchange earnings through greater processing capacity and higher-value meat and livestock products. However, sustaining these gains will require continued investment in irrigation, rural infrastructure, market access, productivity, food-system resilience and household purchasing power. Digital Transformation Opens a New Economic Frontier Digitalization is rapidly becoming another pillar of Ethiopia’s economic transformation. Ethio Telecom’s 2026/27 business plan targets 295 billion birr in revenue, a 36.7 percent increase from the previous year. It also aims to expand its customer base to 96.2 million and mobile data and internet users to more than 60 million. The ambition goes beyond telecommunications. Under its three-year “Next Horizon: Digital & Beyond” strategy, Ethio Telecom is seeking to expand into digital financial services, cloud computing, enterprise solutions, digital platforms and artificial intelligence. The shift reflects a broader national effort to use digital infrastructure to expand financial inclusion, support entrepreneurship, modernize public services and connect a growing population to the digital economy. Housing Finance Signals Deeper Financial-Sector Reform Another significant development was the agreement between the National Bank of Ethiopia and the International Finance Corporation to establish a dedicated Mortgage Refinance Company. The institution will have 100 billion Birr in capital, with the IFC committing at least 200 million USD. The initiative is intended to ease liquidity constraints in the banking system and expand mortgage financing. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who witnessed the signing of the Framework for Cooperation, said the partnership would support the government’s ambition to provide 1.5 million affordable and dignified homes while increasing private-sector participation. Beyond housing, expanded mortgage finance could stimulate construction, employment, financial intermediation and household asset formation, while contributing to the development of Ethiopia’s financial sector. Strategic Water Resources and Abay/Nile Perhaps the week’s most consequential strategic debate centered on Ethiopia’s water resources and the equitable utilization of the Abay/Nile. Fekahmed Negash, Chairperson of the Advisory Team on Transboundary Water and GERD at the Ministry of Water and Energy, highlighted the substantial evaporation losses experienced by downstream reservoirs. In an interview with ENA, Fekahmed said downstream reservoirs could lose up to 20 billion cubic meters of water annually through evaporation, with the Aswan High Dam alone accounting for an estimated 15–16 billion cubic meters in annual losses. He argued that Ethiopia’s highland geography provides favorable conditions for water storage, particularly in deep and relatively cool gorges where evaporation can be minimized. According to Fekahmed, highland storage can also provide wider benefits, including sediment retention, longer downstream dam lifespans, flood regulation and opportunities for cascade hydropower generation. He called for a unified basin-wide framework through which Nile countries could maximize the river’s shared benefits. The discussion comes as Ethiopia continues to emphasize the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of transboundary water resources, while presenting water development as essential to agriculture, energy generation and economic growth. Historical Equity Enters Abay Debate The strategic water debate also took on a historical and economic dimension. Former State Minister for Irrigation Development Birhanu Lenjiso argued that Ethiopia has legitimate grounds to seek redress for historical economic losses, foregone development opportunities and longstanding inequities in Abay/Nile utilization. His argument adds a development perspective to Ethiopia’s longstanding position that the Nile should be utilized equitably and in a manner that supports the development aspirations of all basin countries. The debate increasingly extends beyond water itself to questions of energy security, food production, economic development and regional cooperation. Red Sea Access: Economic Imperative Meets Strategic Interest Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable access to the Red Sea also remained prominent during the week. Education Minister Professor Berhanu Nega described access to the sea as a logical, historical and economic imperative, linking the issue to Ethiopia’s demographic realities, economic interests and national security. For a large landlocked economy, maritime connectivity has direct implications for the cost and competitiveness of imports and exports, foreign-exchange flows, supply-chain resilience and access to international markets. Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions are therefore increasingly intertwined with its broader economic strategy. Water resources, energy, trade corridors and maritime connectivity are emerging as interconnected components of the country’s long-term economic and strategic outlook. Regional Connectivity and Digital Logistics Advance The same emphasis on economic integration was evident in Ethiopia’s engagement with the Horn of Africa Initiative Trade Ministers Meeting, which highlighted the importance of trade corridors, connectivity and trade-facilitating infrastructure. Meanwhile, Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics launched a digital customer self-service platform aimed at modernizing port and cargo operations. The platform provides services including cargo tracking, booking, demurrage management, digital payments and complaints handling, helping reduce reliance on paper-based procedures and streamline import-export operations. The move illustrates how Ethiopia’s economic transformation is increasingly extending beyond production to the digital modernization of trade and logistics. Pagume and the Narrative of National Revival The government’s decision to organize Pagume under the theme “Ethiopia’s Revival” was significant both economically and politically. Rather than treating the final five days of the Ethiopian calendar simply as a period of celebration, the programme served as a national stocktaking exercise and a platform for presenting a forward-looking development narrative. The five days focused respectively on breakthrough, revival, resilience, diversity, and the future and digital transformation. The framework sought to connect individual achievements and projects to a broader national story centered on renewal, resilience and economic self-reliance. Looking Ahead: From Growth to Strategic Autonomy The final week of the 2018 Ethiopian calendar year offered a snapshot of a country seeking to redefine the foundations of its economic future. Agricultural expansion is being linked to food security and industrialization. Domestic manufacturing is being promoted to reduce import dependence. Digitalization is opening new economic frontiers. Housing finance is being connected to financial-sector development. Export expansion is becoming increasingly important for foreign-exchange generation. And water resources and maritime connectivity are being framed as strategic pillars of long-term economic security. The challenge now is implementation. Production gains and ambitious targets will have their greatest impact if they translate into higher household incomes, more jobs, stronger private investment, improved food security and greater international competitiveness. Ethiopia’s economic transformation is consequently becoming broader than a conventional growth agenda. It is increasingly a project to build the productive capacity, infrastructure, technology, financial systems and regional connectivity needed to sustain growth and strengthen strategic autonomy. As Ethiopia enters a new year, the emerging direction is clear: produce more, add more value, export more, digitize faster and deepen regional economic integration. If sustained and effectively implemented, this trajectory could reshape not only Ethiopia’s domestic economy but also its strategic position in the Horn of Africa and its role in the wider African and global economy.